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Abstract  
In the last two decades, we have seen a significant surge in the number of Islamic 
fundamentalist movements, and there has not been a concise reason as to why.  The main 
objective of this research is to determine the causes of Islamic fundamentalism, and, in so 
showing that an Islamic fundamentalist movement is inherently a social movement.  To 
determine the causes of Islamic fundamentalism it is best to employ a labyrinth analogy, and 
it consists of four social movement conditions.  The four conditions that make up my 
fundamentalist labyrinth can be found in the four social movement literatures, and they 
include: resources associated with resource mobilization theory; opening political institutions 
as associated with political process theory; socioeconomic inequality associated with 
Marxism; and the ideas, be they religious or freedom of thought, associated with new social 
movement theory.  Not one of the four social movement literatures acknowledges, or is able 
to explain Islamic fundamentalism.  Taken as a whole, each plays a vital role in my 
fundamentalist labyrinth.  Social movement theorists have excluded Islamic social 
movements, specifically Islamic fundamentalism, from each of their respective sub-fields 
because they do not fit into any one of their theories.  However, by merging the different 
theories to form a new theory in the social movement literature, I have been able to explain 
the causes of Islamic fundamentalism.  Furthermore, I have created the first dataset that 
contains every Islamic fundamentalist movement that is or has been in operation from 1970 
through 2006.  The fundamentalist dataset has a total N (total number of fundamentalist 
groups) of 16,072 and a total number of unique fundamentalist movements of 983.  With this 
dataset I was able to determine what state-level phenomena are positively associated with 
Islamic fundamentalism.  Finally, to solidify this I developed three in-depth case studies: 
Hamas, Hezbollah, and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. 
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Introduction 
In the last ten years we have seen a significant surge in acts of terrorism, specifically 
suicide terrorism committed by Islamic fundamentalists.  We have also seen a significant 
surge in the number of Islamic fundamentalists turning to electoral politics and experiencing 
relatively strong electoral success.  The goal of my dissertation is to determine the causes of 
Islamic fundamentalism and in doing so I will show that an Islamic fundamentalist movement 
is inherently a social movement.  This recent surge in the number of Islamic fundamentalists 
and fundamentalist movements makes my dissertation substantively important.  Our current 
knowledge of Islamic fundamentalism is significantly limited and there are major voids in the 
literature.  Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups and political movements exert a radical 
form of opposition to the state and existing state institutions.   
The origins of the anti-system literature reside in the writings of Sartori (1976) on 
party systems.  Anti-system movements share a common political goal: criticizing 
government and the political mainstream while mobilizing disaffected individuals against the 
existing political system.  An anti-system fundamentalist movement does this while basing its 
criticism in religion.  Nowhere has this been more apparent in the last two decades than in the 
Islamic world and Islamic political institutions.  There is no consensus as to what causes the 
rise of Islamic fundamentalism or an explanation as to why some states have more Islamic 
fundamentalist movements than other states.  My dissertation will provide a systematic 
answer to this question through the lens of a social movement.   
It is becoming extremely difficult to determine the point of demarcation between 
international relations and comparative politics and no phenomena blurs this point more than 
the rise and actions of Islamic fundamentalists.  Currently, Islamic fundamentalism is the 
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greatest threat to the international community and, arguably, the negative results of 
liberalism, globalization, and the Americanization of global politics have facilitated their 
growth and success.  Many of these Islamic fundamentalists have turned to global terrorism 
to intimidate the nation-state into complying with their rhetoric.  The study of social 
movements is a major subfield in comparative politics, and the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism is the most recent of the social movements.  The global effects of Islamic 
fundamentalism and their acts of terror have a major impact on the global economy and the 
state which inherently impacts international relations.  This latest threat to the harmony of the 
international system is created via domestic political systems and is a direct result of the 
foundations of comparative politics.  My dissertation will further blur the point of 
demarcation between international relations and comparative politics by unifying Islamic 
fundamentalism and social movements.    
To determine the causes of Islamic fundamentalism it is best to employ a labyrinth 
analogy.  A fundamentalist labyrinth is relatively simple; there is one path that explains 
where fundamentalism comes from and what facilitates it.  A labyrinth is often compared 
with maze, but a maze is a tour puzzle in the form of a complex branching passage with 
choices of path and direction, while a labyrinth has only a single Eulerian path to the center.  
A labyrinth is an unambiguous throughroute to the center and back and is not designed to be 
difficult to navigate.  To explain what causes Islamic fundamentalism requires a labyrinth 
that consists of four conditions.  This unambiguous throughout explains what causes and 
what facilitates Islamic fundamentalism; there is no ambiguity or puzzle involved in this 
process.  My dissertation will demonstrate that each of these four conditions found within the 
labyrinth plays an integral part in explaining the rise and success of Islamic fundamentalism.  
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The four conditions that make up my fundamentalist labyrinth can be found in the four social 
movement literatures: resource mobilization theory, political process theory, Marxism, and 
new social movement theory.  Not one of the four social movement literatures acknowledges, 
or is able to explain Islamic fundamentalism; however, taken as a whole they can.   
My dissertation makes two significant contributions to the field of political science 
and its respective subfields of international relations and comparative politics.  First, it 
explains in a rudimentary manner the causes of Islamic fundamentalism.  The significance of 
this is paramount because Islamic fundamentalism is currently one of the greatest threats to 
the modern nation-state, secularism, Middle East peace, the global economy, the U.S. 
economy, and global domestic political institutions.  Secondly, it shows how Islamic 
fundamentalist movements have the same characteristics as social movements.  I am making 
a significant contribution to both the Islamic fundamentalism literature and the social 
movement literature jointly; no place in either literature is there a correlation between social 
movements and Islamic fundamentalism.  I am the first scholar to argue that the combination 
of the different social movement literatures is the missing link that can accurately explain the 
causes of Islamic fundamentalism.   
My dissertation tests the existing theories and main arguments found in the social 
movement literature; it is also the first large N analyses of Islamic fundamentalist 
movements, and, in turn, social movements.  However, it does more than simply test the 
existing literature and existing arguments.  Individually the four different social movement 
literatures cannot explain where Islamic fundamentalism comes from.  If I were to simply test 
the existing literature and add a large N chapter, my results would be simple and limited.  The 
conclusion would indicate that not one existing argument about social movements explains 
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Islamic fundamentalism – this is already known.  Islamic fundamentalist movements are 
complex and multi-dimensional, and a single strand of the social movement literature cannot 
explain them.  However, I have developed a theory that takes parts of each of the four social 
movement theories and combines them in such a way that they can explain the causes of 
Islamic fundamentalism.  I argue that Islamic fundamentalist movements are inherently social 
movements.   
This is a significant addition to the existing literature because it justifies, and 
acknowledges, the importance of each strand of the social movement literature.  Also, it 
makes explicitly clear that together they can explain where Islamic fundamentalism comes 
from, and why Islamic fundamentalists do what they do.  The different social movement 
literatures incorrectly dismiss their counter literatures as irrelevant.  Nothing can be further 
from the truth; together each of the different literatures explains more than any one can 
individually, especially as it relates to Islamic fundamentalist social movements.  Social 
movement theorists have excluded Islamic social movements, specifically Islamic 
fundamentalism, from each of their respective sub-fields of the social movement literature 
because it does not fit into any one of their categorizations.  However, by merging those 
different categorizations to form a new theory in the social movement literature, I explain 
what causes the formation and the facilitation of Islamic fundamentalism.  
The first condition found within my fundamentalist labyrinth is Marxism.  Karl Marx 
had a legitimate argument that when the state oppresses, enslaves, and ignores the masses 
long enough they will revolt.  What we are currently seeing in the case of Islamic 
fundamentalism is a revolt manifested in the significant surge of terrorist acts and the 
electoral success of Islamic fundamentalists.  Marx was correct when he argued that 
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individuals get involved in collective action when their social class has reached its breaking 
point; they will then unite against their antagonists and forcibly change both the 
socioeconomic and sociopolitical intuitions (according to Marx there is no separation 
between those individuals who dominate economics with those who dominate politics).  The 
socioeconomic inequality argument of Marx as being the sole reason for collective action is 
flawed; however, socioeconomic inequality is positively associated with the number and 
strength of Islamic fundamentalist movements.    
It did not occur to Marx to ask what makes individuals engage in collective action; he 
simply assumed that collective action was a direct result of society’s structural development 
rather than individual choice.  This is a legitimate argument; however, it does not explain 
why Muslims join Islamic fundamentalist social movements.  In this aspect the resource 
mobilization theorists are correct in their critique of the Marxists; resources, on both the 
group and state levels, are imperative for a movement’s formation and success.  Resource 
mobilization theory is the second condition found within my fundamentalist labyrinth.   
Resources in the resource mobilization literature have been defined in numerous ways 
and they include such things as money, labor, land, capital, and technical expertise.  I define 
resources here as money and population; however, I deviate from the traditional resource 
mobilization theorists to also include education and leadership as resources.  Arguably, there 
is not a more valuable resource than that of a nation-state’s educational level, especially in 
the Islamic world.  Resource mobilization theorists assume that the actors in social 
movements are rational; arguably, participants in Islamic social movements are rational.  Like 
socioeconomic inequality, resources are positively associated with the number and strength of 
Islamic fundamentalist movements.    
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The third condition found within my fundamentalist labyrinth is the political process 
theory.  The key foundation of political process theory include the import role that political 
institutions play in facilitating social movements, and the idea that participation in protest 
activities can lead to increased representation.  Many political process theorists argue that 
collective action arises as a result of an individual’s grievances, discontent, and frustration 
toward their government and state institutions.  This is especially true in the Islamic world 
because westernization, modernization, Americanization, poverty, socioeconomic inequality, 
and lack of democracy all help facilitate Islamic collective behavior, specifically the rise and 
success of Islamic fundamentalists.  Furthermore, political process theory claims that social 
movements occur when expanding political opportunities are seized by individuals who are 
formally or informally excluded from the political environment.  The main objective of those 
individuals participating in a social movement is to provoke political change; at the core of 
most Islamic fundamentalist movements is the desire to facilitate political change.  The 
opening of political institutions is positively associated with the number and strength of 
Islamic fundamentalist movements.         
The final condition found within my fundamentalist labyrinth is the new social 
movement theory.  New social movement theorists argue that social movement participants 
are looking to enhance the quality of life for all sectors of society and that membership in 
these movement(s) falls into two categories: those who are paying the costs of modernization 
and those who have been marginalized by the development of the welfare state and the new 
middle class.  Also, the rise and success of the Religious Right plays an integral part in the 
New Social movement literature; arguably, it is a pillar of the literature itself.  The first 
category is the case for Islamic movements.  Modernization via westernization and 
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Americanization are helping to facilitate the rise of Islamic fundamentalist movements.  One 
major similarity between the European/American Religious Right and Islamic 
fundamentalism is that both share the idea of religion and believe in the lack of secularism in 
everyday life, specifically in the sociopolitical and socioeconomic institutions.  Furthermore, 
the new social movement scholars challenge the conventional division of politics into left and 
right and broaden the definition of politics to include issues that had been considered outside 
the domain of politics; this is apparent in Islamic social movements.  New social movement 
participants are interested in intangible goods that would enhance the quality of life for all 
sectors of society.  This is also the objective of Islamic fundamentalists.  New social 
movement scholars argue that current social movements are post-material movements whose 
foundations are ideas.  Ideas, as described by New Social movement scholars are positively 
associated with the number and strength of Islamic fundamentalist movements.   
My dissertation consists of seven chapters.  Chapter two consists of an extensive 
literature review that looks at all the existing literature on Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, 
and the predominant causes of Islamic fundamentalism.  My objective in chapter three is to 
give a broad overview of the social movement literature; this includes explaining what 
constitutes a social movement, how social movements have been defined in the literature, and 
what major arguments, and major findings social movement scholars have concluded with.  
The remainder of chapter three argues that each of the four conditions found in my 
fundamentalist labyrinth: Marxism, resource mobilization theory, political process theory, 
and new social movement theory.  In chapter four, I statistically test my fundamentalist 
labyrinth theory.  I have created a unique data set that contains every Islamic fundamentalist 
  8 
group that is or has been in operation from 1970 through 2006.  The fundamentalist data set I 
created has a total N (total number of fundamentalist groups) of 16,072.   
To solidify all of this, test my hypotheses, and show that Islamic fundamentalist 
movements are social movements, I have developed three in-depth case-study chapters: 
Palestine, specifically looking at Hamas; Lebanon, specifically looking at Hezbollah; and 
Egypt, specifically looking at the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.  Each case study serves 
multiple purposes.  First they help illustrate the results of my large-N chapter that indicates 
each of the social movement conditions are positively associated with the number of 
fundamentalist movements found within the majority-Islamic nation-state.  Second, they 
provide evidence as to what facilitates a movement’s success.  Third, I evaluate the evidence 
found within each of the three movements as to why they should be considered social 
movements; I illustrate the social-movementness of these groups.  Furthermore, I chose to 
specifically look at these three movements because each one is an important fundamentalist 
movement within the Islamic world; and each one offers something significantly different 
than the other two.  First, I chose the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood because it is the oldest 
and most resilient fundamentalist movement in the Islamic world.  Unlike Hamas and 
Hezbollah there is no Islamic outside ideological force facilitating, sponsoring, or endorsing 
the Muslim Brotherhood.  However, Egypt does receive significant U.S. financial aid.  I 
chose Hamas as my second case study because it has recently had significant electoral 
success and has been a major terrorist group for two solid decades.  Unlike Hezbollah, Hamas 
is a Sunni movement and receives significant foreign aid and ideological influence from 
Saudi Arabia, an outside Sunni ideological force.  I chose Hezbollah as my third case study 
because they have become the most successful Shiite fundamentalist political movement in 
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the Islamic world.  Also, they receive massive financial aid and ideological influence from 
Iran, an outside Shiite ideological force.  Finally, I chose these case-studies because they 
show the different ways Islamic fundaments movements can develop.  Hamas is the result of 
an evolutionary process where fundamentalist movements evolve and develop over time.  The 
formation of Hezbollah has nothing to do with movement evolution; instead it is the result of 
the evolution of the Shiite people and their eventual radicalization.  Finally, the formation of 
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has nothing to do with movement evolution, or evolution 
and radicalization of the Egyptian masses.  Instead, its formation is the result of significant 
changes in the sociopolitical and socioeconomic institutions of Egypt.  Each fundamentalist 
movement forms in a different way; the process does not matter in the eventual outcome.  
What matters is the presence of each of my social movement labyrinth conditions, which 
ultimately are facilitating Islamic fundamentalism. 
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Chapter One: Islamic Fundamentalism 
The following chapter is broken down into six sections; first, there is a brief overview 
of Islamic fundamentalism and an explanation of my use of both the term and what 
constitutes an Islamic fundamentalist movement.  Secondly, there is an inclusive review on 
all the existing Islamic fundamentalism literature.  Third, I examine all of the current 
definitions of fundamentalism and conduct an in-depth linguistics analysis of the term 
fundamentalism.   Fundamentalism, as a term, was created in the United States in the 1920s to 
describe the conservative movement of evangelical Christianity, and it translates into the 
uncompromising literal interpretation of scripture.  In the last thirty years, fundamentalism 
has also come to describe Islamic radicalism and militancy.  Fundamentalism is a term used 
mainly by Christians and the West.  Thus, when the term is applied to Islam, it causes 
difficulties and misunderstandings in the translation, and these misunderstandings will be 
evaluated.  Also, one of the key terms associated with Islamic fundamentalism is that of 
Jihad.  According to Islam, all Muslims are expected to perform jihad; the reasons and 
meanings behind this will be evaluated.  Fourth, I look at the terrorist literature.  Terrorism is 
an important part of the Islamic fundamentalism literature; arguably, it is the most mainstream 
and well known branch of the fundamentalism literature in Western scholarship.   
Following this, I look at the causes of Islamic fundamentalism.  The literature gives 
five possible reasons as to the causes of Islamic fundamentalism; first comes the 
socioeconomic argument where it is assumed that worsening economic conditions, 
unemployment, and poverty facilitate fundamentalism.  A second prevalent reason found in 
the literature is that the cultural tension between Islam and the West; the result of 
modernization, Westernization and Americanization, are facilitating fundamentalism.  Third, 
many scholars argue that fundamentalism is the result of the Soviet Empire imploding.  
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Another relatively minor one, which is interconnected with the above three, is that individuals 
turn to Islamic fundamentalists in personal times of crisis, and to be closer to God.  Fifth, 
fundamentalism is the result of outside phenomena such as the Palestinian refugee problem, 
the 1979 Iranian revolution, the radicalization of Egyptian society via the Muslim 
Brotherhood, or the assassination of President Sadat.   
Finally, at the end of this chapter I evaluate my contribution to the literature, and 
argue that the Islamic world and Islamic fundamentalism has been excluded from the social 
movement literature, and Islamic fundamentalist movements are inherently social 
movements.  In doing this, I lay out the foundation of my theory – my fundamentalist 
labyrinth and the conditions found within it.  The literatures on Islamic fundamentalism and 
social movements are both unable to explain the emergence and success of these movements 
because both fail to recognize that Islamic fundamentalism is a new kind of social movement.  
Not one of the social movement scholars considers Islamic fundamentalism a social 
movement.       
Currently, our greatest threat to the global community is Islamic fundamentalism.  
According to most Islamists, Islamic fundamentalism is a manifestation of the Islamic 
world’s contempt toward the West.  Islamic fundamentalism is reactive.  Fundamentalist 
movements form in reaction to, and in defense against, the results and consequences of forced 
assimilation, modernization, technology or industrialization, globalization, Americanization, 
and Westernization which have penetrated the larger Islamic community.  Western 
imperialism, Western cultural imperialism, Western economic and military domination, and 
the Western facilitation and domination of political regimes throughout the Islamic world that 
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place the needs of Western powers before the needs of their own citizens, have all culminated 
in the Islamist’s loathing of the West.   
  Islamic fundamentalism, like all religious extremist movements, was born from the 
spiritual relationship an individual has with his God.  A fundamentalist movement starts with 
a radical interpretation of scripture, the purification of all socioeconomic and sociopolitical 
contradictions to that interpretation, and the then the fundamental desire to defend their 
interpretation.  Most religions are losing their members either to outright secularism or to 
relativism, which leads fundamentalists to believe their faith is being eroded and displaced.1   
Fundamentalism is an extremist effort to counteract this trend.  According to Keddie (2003), 
most Muslims believe in the ideal of religious hegemony over everyday life and politics.  
Secularism is not admissible in Islam because the separation of religion and politics runs 
counter to Islam’s claim to regulate all aspects of human life.  
Numerous scholars argue that the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a reawakening of 
religious ideas and social movements throughout the Middle East and this led to the creation 
of Islamic fundamentalism.2   The fundamentalist literature assumes that Islamic 
fundamentalism originated from the Islamist’s literal interpretation of Islamic scripture, 
specifically the Quran (Jun 2002, 81).3  Said Amir Arjomand (2004) argues that 
fundamentalism is the endeavor to purify pristine Islam from alien influences by returning to 
its scriptural foundations.  Jun (2002, 75) argues that fundamentalists emphasize the priority 
of the community over that of the individual.  Bulent Diken and Carsten Bagge Lausten 
(2006) argue that fundamentalists stress the need to use whatever means necessary to defend 
                                                
1 Relativism is the assumption that any given religion is culture-bound and thus relatively true or false 
2 These scholars include: Tessler and Nachtwey (1998),  Wald (1993), Goldstein and Keohane (1993), White 
(2002), Jaber (1997) and Wickham (2002) 
3 This includes for the Sunnis (the tradition of the Profit and the sayings and deeds of Muhammad) and the 
Shiites (the Islamic Law). 
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the true faith. As a result, when looking at Islamic nation-states, it is critical that the 
relationships between religion and religious movements are evaluated when examining social 
and political phenomena and political institutions of those nation-states.  
In order to return to a literal interpretation of scripture, there needs to be a total 
rejection of Western materialism as well as of the political, intellectual, economic, and 
cultural domination of the West.4  As a result of the degradation the Islamic world faced as a 
result of Western materialism, there is an inner desire to revert back to Islam not only as a 
religion but as a system of life.5  Hava Lazarus-Yefeh (1988) said that Islamic fundamentalist 
groups constitute a counter-society which has its own internal rules and norms, while seeking 
to establish a theocratic state.6  R.M Burrell (1989) argues that a fundamentalist sees it as his 
duty to apply “Koranic truths” to the creation of a new society, and these truths become the 
foundation of that new society’s governmental institutions.7  In other words, it is the purpose 
of government is to implement the teachings of Islam.  This was confirmed by James 
Piscatori (1986) when he looked at whether Islam is compatible with the modern nation-state; 
                                                
4 As argued by: S.H. Haq Nadvi (1981), Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1988), and Raphael Israeli (1993) 
5 Raphael Israeli (1993) quoted and then paraphrased S.H. Haq Nadvi (1981) The Dawn of Spiritualism 
Mirrored in the Dawn of the XV Hijra Century Durban; page 7 and Saad Eddin Ibrahim (April 1988) Egypt’s 
Islamic Activism in the 1980.  Third World Quarterly. Pages 632-657 and on page 1 of his book: Muslim 
Fundamentalism in Israel published in 1993 by Brassey: London.    
6 Hava Lazarus-Yafeh. (1988). Contemporary Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Jerusalem 
Quarterly, Pages 27-39.  The following are also characteristics Lazarus-Yafeh included in his argument as to 
what constitutes a fundamentalist group: harsh criticism of established religions and their hierarchies and their 
leaders are negatively labeled as anti-Islam.  Fundamentalists have ambiguous attitudes towards science and 
technology (however they do not shun technology that furthers their causes such as arms and electronic devises).  
Fundamentalist groups lean heavily on Holy Scriptures and the Quran is the ultimate state Constitution.  
Fundamentalists desire a separation of their group of true believers from the rest of society in preparation for the 
“kingdom of God” on earth.  Finally, women are to remain in their traditional role in the family and the sexes 
MUST be separated in education, prayer, and all public forums.           
7 R. M. Burrell (1989), Introduction: Islamic Fundamentalism in the Middle East – A Survey of its Origins and 
Diversity. In: Islamic Fundamentalism: Papers read at a seminar held at the School of Oriental and African 
Studies, University of London on March 10, 1988. Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland: London. 
Page 4-6 and 9     
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he found that it can be and he used the Koran and the writings and interviews of religious 
scholars as his major sources.   
Fundamentalism, according to Jeffrey Hadden (2004), is a proclamation or reclaimed 
authority of a sacred tradition that is to be reinstated as an antidote for a society that has 
strayed.  George Marsden defines a fundamentalist as “an evangelical who is angry about 
something.”8  Roberto Marin-Guzman (2003) argues that Islamic fundamentalism contains 
three basic tensions inherent to Islam itself: 1) transcendence vs. immanence of God; 2) 
diversity vs. unity; and 3) authenticity vs. openness (keeping the old ways vs. admitting new 
ones).9  According to Youssef Choueiri (2002: 123), radical Islam is a political-cultural 
movement that “postulates a qualitative contradiction between Western civilization and the 
religion of Islam.”  Finally, Bassam Tibi (2002: 13) argues that Islam has become the West’s 
leading challenger for one simple reason, and that is, Islamic perspectives are not restricted to 
national or regional boundaries.  Islam resembles Western civilization in the sense that it is 
universal in both its claims and its outlook.  He suggests that Islamic fundamentalism should 
be viewed as an ideology contributing to what he calls the “War of Civilizations” (page 16).      
Islamic contention is part of what is called “Islamic activism” or the mobilization of 
contention to support Islamic social movements.  Islamic movements, that either perpetuate 
or facilitate Islamic social movements, can be divided into four categories:  fundamental, 
                                                
8 George Marsen. 1990. Defining American Fundamentalism, in Norman J. Cohen: The Fundamentalist 
Phenomenon: A View from Within, a Response from Without. Grand Rapids: University of Michigan Press. For 
related definitions see: Robert Brent Toplen. 2006. Radical Conservatism: The Right’s Political Religion. 
University of Kansas Press. Also, David Edwin Harrell. 1993. American Revivalism from Graham to Robertson, 
in Edith Blumhofer and Randall Balmer. Modern Christian Rivals Champaign-Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press. Joel Carpenter. 1996. Revive Us Again: The Reawakening of American Fundamentalism    
9 The belief that God is transcendent basically means there is a surmountable distance between God and man.  In 
Islam, Allah is perfection, power and mercy, while man is imperfect.  Man is the creation of God, and due to his 
imperfection, he is inclined towards evil, pride, and selfishness.  Given this enormous separation between God 
and man, all human beings must be submitted to God.  This is the precise meaning of Islam (Islam equals 
submission, that is man’s submission to Allah) Roberto Marin-Guzman (2003: 66). 
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moderate, liberal, or nationalist.  Fundamentalist Islamist movements aim to create an Islamic 
state through revolution.  Moderate and liberal Islamic movements want to pursue their 
political agendas within existing (and often quasi-democratic) state institutions.  Nationalist 
Islamist movements demand political equality, semi-open political institutions, and are semi-
democratic.  The following table breaks down the Islamic political trends and explains the 
ideological differences between the beliefs, political teachings, and different types of Islamic 
movements.  The movements of most interest are the fundamentalist movements; however, it 
is important to show how Islamic fundamentalist movements compare to Islamic moderate, 
liberal, or nationalist movements.    
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Table One: Muslim Social Movements 
 
 Fundamental Moderate Liberal Nationalist  
Beliefs Requires a strict and 
absolute following of 
Islamic beliefs and the 
teachings of the Koran 
in all aspects of life.  
Following strict 
adherence to Islamic 
law. Westernization 
and Western 
conditioned  
modernization is 
condemned  
There is an Islamic 
belief system and it is 
in moderate levels in 
the public realm. 
Moderate levels of 
Westernization and 
modernization 
Secular; Islamic law has 
no place in society and 
the Islamic belief system 
minimally exists in the 
public realms. Western 
beliefs as they relate to 
democratic ideas, 
freedoms of speech and 
press. Modernization is 
limitedly embraced and 
only is cases where 
socioeconomic equality is 
guaranteed  
Secular; Islamic 
law has no place 
in society; 
Islamic belief 
system is 
condemned and 
Westernization 
and 
modernization 
are embraced 
Government  Majoritarian democracy 
is a must for all states 
with a legal system 
based of Koranic 
teachings and Sharia 
law.  However, 
religious and ethnic 
minorities may be 
excluded. 
Not democratic or 
semi-democracy 
Demands a total and 
transparent democracy 
with total equality to all 
people, including 
religious and ethnic 
minorities 
Not democratic 
or semi-
democratic 
 
Teachings Only through the 
teachings of 
fundamental Islam. 
Shiites Follow strict 
adherence to the 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s  
interpretation of the 
Koran and Sunnis 
follow a strict 
interpretation of Islam 
via the Grand 
Ayatollahs  
Following Koranic 
teachings are 
fundamental; 
however, this must be 
done in a modern 
context and is 
interpreted 
subjectively   
Koranic teachings have 
no place in politics or 
society. Secular 
ideologies or values are 
the basis for all teachings.  
However, religious 
scholars are respected and 
protected   
Koranic 
teachings have no 
place in politics 
or society. 
Secular Western 
ideologies or 
values are the 
basis for all 
teachings.  
Religious 
scholars are 
subjected to 
harassment    
Identity Identifies with Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, Al-
Qaeda, or any radical 
Islamic movement that 
completely dissociates 
itself with anything 
non-Islamic.    
Moderate 
nationalism; 
Identifies with Arab 
nation and/or nation-
state; However, Islam 
plays an important 
role in both society 
and politics and 
cannot be evaluated 
separately  
Semi-nationalist; 
identifies with human 
rights and socioeconomic 
and sociopolitical 
equality foremost 
Pure nationalism; 
Identifies only 
with the Arab 
nation and/or 
nation-state 
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I define an Islamic fundamentalist movement as any group, political party, or issue-
oriented militant movement which is non-secular in its beliefs, ideas, or dogmas.  It also must 
encourage, sponsor, and/or condone the lack of separation of church and state within 
government, state institutions, education, or educational institutions.  Furthermore, for a 
movement to be considered fundamentalist it must have socio-political objectives, and not 
just religious ones.  The theoretical justification behind this definition of a fundamentalist 
movement must be broad enough to encompass multiple types of movements; this is why I 
used words such as group, political party and issue-oriented militant movement.  This 
terminology in broad enough to catch most organized movements of people without 
excluding any.  No fundamentalist movement is secular and a true fundamentalist movement 
believes in the lack of separation in government, state institutions, education or educational 
institutions.  It is also important to note that a fundamentalist movement does not have to 
believe in the lack of separation in all of these.  Finally, to separate religious movements from 
fundamentalist movements, I note that the movements must have socio-political objectives 
and not just religious ones.  I define a social movement’s success as its ability to survive, 
spread its beliefs, and/or influence the nation-state either positively or negatively.  Success 
here has nothing to do with the fundamentalist movement’s ability to change or influence the 
socioeconomic or sociopolitical structures and institutions of the state; success in its most 
broad interpretation simply means it has an impact. The Islamic movement is not confined to 
a single Muslim state; the idea that al-Islam huwa al-hall (Islam is the solution) resonates 
with particular force in Islamic politics.10   
                                                
10 Islam means “submission” or “surrender” to the Almighty and the one who surrenders is a Muslim.  FM 
Denny (1994: 67) An Introduction to Islam   
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In the fundamentalist data set I created there is a total N (total number of 
fundamentalist movement-years) of 16,072.  I obtained this number by taking each Islamic 
nation-state and counting every fundamentalist movement present for every year, and then 
summing the years.  The total number of unique Islamic fundamentalist movements is 983.   
The following two tables show the total number of fundamentalist movements each 
Islamic nation-state has had over the last 37 years.  By just looking at the first table, a 
significant amount of information is being lost, and it does not explain the causes of Islamic 
fundamentalism.  However, it is interesting to examine the average number of fundamentalist 
movements in each nation-state for each year (the average number of fundamentalist groups 
is next to the total number).  The only reliable information that can be taken from table two is 
the nation-states with the fewest fundamentalist movements.  The second table, then, gives a 
breakdown of the total number of unique fundamentalist movements.          
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Table Two: Total Number of Fundamentalist Movement-Years 
 
Iran 1329 (37) Oman 35 (1) 
Algeria  452 (12.7) Saudi Arabia 421 (11.3) 
Azerbaijan  8 Syria  872 (23) 
Bahrain 212 (5.7) Tajikistan  168 (11) 
Bangladesh 803 (22) Tunisia 159 (4.4) 
Brunei 0 Turkey 435 (11.7) 
Djibouti  0 Turkmenistan  7 
Egypt 616 (17) United Arab Emirates 32 
Indonesia  1125 (11) Uzbekistan 96 (6.4) 
Israel 510 (13.8) Yemen 208 (13.8) 
Jordan 434 (12) Kazakhstan 24 (1.7) 
Kuwait 22 (less than 1) Eritrea 30 (2.1) 
Lebanon  1748 (47) Ethiopia  437 (11.5) 
Libya  542 (15) Tanzania  7 
Iraq 1283 (34) Afghanistan 728 (19.7) 
Mauritania 49 (1.4) Somalia 349 (9.5) 
Morocco  224 (6) Sudan 667 (18) 
Qatar 2  Kyrgyzstan 81 (5.4) 
Pakistan  1203 (32.5) Palestine  1261 (34.6) 
 
Table Three: Total Number of Unique Fundamentalist Movements  
 
Iran 76 Oman 2 
Algeria  35 Saudi Arabia 37 
Azerbaijan  4 Syria  35 
Bahrain 12 Tajikistan  9 
Bangladesh 39 Tunisia 9 
Brunei 0 Turkey 25 
Djibouti  0 Turkmenistan  2 
Egypt 45 United Arab Emirates 2 
Indonesia  66 Uzbekistan 8 
Israel 36 Yemen 17 
Jordan 22 Kazakhstan 5 
Kuwait 6 Eritrea 5 
Lebanon  92 Ethiopia  7 
Libya  24 Tanzania  1 
Iraq 149 Afghanistan 27 
Mauritania 3 Somalia 10 
Morocco  10 Sudan 29 
Qatar 1 Kyrgyzstan 4 
Pakistan  67 Palestine  62 
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History of Fundamentalism 
An evaluation of the linguistics behind the term fundamentalism is important to my 
dissertation because it personifies much of the misconceptions between the West and the 
Islam; also, it helps explain the broader cultural issues associated with fundamentalism.  In 
the Encyclopedia of Religion (1987), there is no listing under the term fundamentalism; rather 
it is placed under the heading “Evangelical Christianity and Fundamentalism.”  The earlier 
Hastings Encyclopedia (1921) has no reference to fundamentalism either.  The term was 
invented in the United States in the 1920s to designate conservative offshoots of evangelical 
Christianity; it referred to individuals and groups that believed in an uncompromising literal 
interpretation of the Bible, and the idea that the world has fallen into a state of spiritual decay.  
The term fundamentalism originated in the 1920 edition of the Northern Baptist periodical, 
The Watchman-Examiner, whose editor described himself and a group of conservative 
Evangelical Protestants as militants willing to preserve the “fundamentals” of the Christian 
faith from the evolutionists and Biblical critics infecting mainline seminaries and colleges 
(Almond et al., 2003:1).  George Marsden (1990) and Ho Jin Jun (2002) argue that the term 
fundamentalist became familiar in the American vocabulary as a result of religious zealots 
who were interested in forcing a literal interpretation of the Bible that they started breaking 
away from mainstream churches and American society in the 1910s and 1920s.  Asntoch 
Soha and Thomas Carr (2001:1) argue that the term fundamentalism was first used to 
distinguish a religious movement within American Christianity; a movement which was 
grounded in what was thought to be divinely sanctioned beliefs that sought to identify and 
exclude those who did not share those same beliefs or identity.  Today, the term 
fundamentalism is frequently used to refer to Islamic extremism.  With the transformation of 
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the term fundamentalism to Islam, Christian evangelism ceased to be explicitly 
fundamentalist and is now also referred to as televangelism, evangelicalism, or the religious 
right.   
Most adherents to monotheistic religions consider extremist members to be a minority 
within their respective religions.   Fundamentalist leaders, be they Christian, Jewish, or 
Islamic, believe they have the divine right to pick and choose scripture for their own self-
interest or self-indulgence; they intentionally find passages that suit their immediate self-
serving purposes.  They often reject all previous interpretations of scripture (at times even 
their own) and seek to lead the flock to act on their fundamentalist, self-serving 
interpretation.  Fundamentalism is defined as essentially reactive, militant, and restrictive.  
Oftentimes, it is a fundamentalist’s objective to suppress alternative visions and movements 
within a given society, or world, and force their literal interpretation of scripture on 
nonbelievers.  According to Bassam Tibi (2002: 20) Islamic fundamentalists believe that 
God’s rules replace humanities rules.  He goes on to argue that fundamentalism is not simply 
a revival of pre-modern religious worldviews, but is rather a practical policy preference.  He 
says “Fundamentalists do not debate in intellectual clubs, or do they engage in theological 
controversies; religious fundamentalists are ideologues and political activists primarily 
concerned with political power” (page 20).       
Fundamentalism is a term used mainly by Christians and the West.  When the term is 
applied to Islam, it causes difficulties and misunderstandings in the translation.  Muslim 
scholars have used various terms to refer to those who are Islamic extremists; however, 
fundamentalism does not translate into Arabic or Farsi.  According to Roberto Marin-Guzman 
(2003) examples of this would include: islah which means reform, salafiyys which implies a 
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return to ancestors, tajdid is renewal, nohda is renaissance.  Other terms have been applied to 
radical Islam is, Islamtakfir which means excommunication, Hijra which means flight from 
unbelief, and islamiyyum which means Islamists.  This last term is the most precise 
linguistically and is applied to those Muslim movements which wish to revive Islam, and use 
violence to do so.  They call themselves islamiyyum; however, the terms fundamentalism or 
fundamentalist do not translate.  Youssef Choueiri (2002) argues that most Islamic writers 
and intellectuals view fundamentalism as a generic Western term, irrelevant to Islam.     
One of the most important terms associated with Islamic fundamentalism is that of 
Jihad.  According to Islam, all Muslims are expected to perform jihad.  Jihad is a noun; its 
literal meaning is striving or a determined effort.  The term jihad is derived from the Arabic 
root jhd, which literally translates to strive.  The active participle in Jihad is mujahid which 
means someone who strives or participates in jihad (Streusand, 1997). The term Jihad has 
often been translated as Holy War and is a concept coined in Europe in the 11th century to 
refer to the Crusades; there is no equivalent word in Islam.  In the Middle East the term harb 
and not Jihad is used to describe war.  Since Jihad derives from the Arabic root striving, a 
better translation would be striving in the cause of God.   
The use of the Jihad to justify violent attacks against the West is an incorrect use of 
the word’s original and religious meaning.  There are two aspects of the Jihad: the greater 
Jihad, which is fighting to overcome carnal desires and evil inclinations; and the lesser Jihad, 
which is the armed defense of Islam against aggressors.  The term Jihad has two meanings, 
one of which is violent.  The non-violent meaning of Jihad refers to the personal struggle for 
virtue and morality, the struggle to follow God’s will.  According to John Esposito (2003), 
Jihad can also refer to “fighting injustice and oppression, spreading and defending Islam, and 
  23 
creating a just society through preaching, teaching, and, if necessary, armed struggle or holy 
war.”  The two broad meanings of Jihad, non-violent and violent, are exemplified in a well-
known prophetic quote that signified the return from a military expedition, the Prophet 
Mohammad said, “We have returned from a lesser Jihad (Jihad al-asghar) to the greater Jihad 
(Jihad al-akbar).”  When asked, “O, Messenger of Allah, what is the greater Jihad?” 
Mohammad answered, “It is the Jihad against one’s soul.”   
In the context of the contemporary Islamic fundamentalists’ calls for suicide 
bombings and other terrorist attacks, use of the term Jihad clearly refers to the violent 
struggle against perceived enemies of Islam, specifically the crusading West, the Communist 
East, and Israel (Esposito, 2003).  Islamic fundamentalist leaders claim their followers have a 
religious obligation to engage in Jihad, either by physically fighting Islam’s enemies or by 
supporting those who do.  Proponents of this logic ground their position in a Koranic verse in 
Surah 9 (al-Tawbah) verse 41: “Fight with your possessions and your souls in the way of 
Allah.” 11  According to Vincent Cornell (2002) Muhammad said, “The first person against 
whom judgment will be pronounced on the Day of Resurrection will be a man who dies a 
martyr.  He will be brought forth and God will make known to him the blessings he has 
bestowed on him and he will recognize them.  God will say: ‘And what did you do about 
them?’ He will say “I fought for you until I died a martyr.  God will say: you lie! You only 
                                                
11Typically, possessions translate into money, and incorporate a large spectrum of outreach activity, from the 
metaphysical which benefits the soul to charitable giving and social welfare activities which benefit the body.  
To fulfill these social welfare duties, the Islamic endowments (waqf, or awqaf in the plural) are responsible for 
the upkeep of mosques and holy sites in contemporary Muslim societies also, they typically manage social 
service institutions.  For dawa definition, see R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the 
Arab World (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1985) page 44.  
According to Dikena and Lausten (2006) based on the sacred texts, one can distinguish between four forms of 
jihad: the jihad of the sword, that is the lesser jihad, and the three forms of greater jihad which are the jihad of 
the heart (moral reformation), jihad of the tongue (proclaiming God’s word abroad) and jihad of the hand (works 
in accordance with God’s will) (also see James Turner Johnson, “The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic 
Traditions” 1997.   
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fought that it might be said about you, he is courageous.  And it was as he said.  Then he will 
be ordered to be dragged along on his face until he is cast into hell fire.”  What makes this 
quote significant is how it shows the manipulation Islamists use while recruiting rank-and-file 
members, specifically for suicide attacks.  Muhammad said “The first person against whom 
judgment will be pronounced on the Day of Resurrection will be a man who dies a martyr.  
He will be brought forth and God will make known to him the blessings he has bestowed on 
him and he will recognize them.”  Islamic fundamentalist recruiters quote the first half of 
Muhammad’s statement and ignore the second half, which completely changes the message.  
In other words, fundamentalists manipulate the message for self-serving gain.  This is done in 
schools and Mosques controlled by fundamentalists.  Throughout the Middle East, there are 
more than six thousand private schools founded and sustained by Islamic groups (Akhtar and 
Sakr, 61; al-Faruqi, 123; Bassiouni, 136).  The Islamist movements whose dawa tradition has 
had the greatest success include Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood; 
each is noted for having a politically activist nature propagated through the educational 
system.12 
 
The Origins and Causes of Islamic Fundamentalism 
Scholars give five significant reasons as to the causes of Islamic fundamentalism.  
First, some argue that worsening economics, unemployment, and poverty facilitate 
fundamentalism (the socioeconomic arguments).  A second prevalent reason found in the 
                                                
12 An academic study based on interviews of jailed terrorist operatives found that the “pre-recruitment social 
environment for members of Islamist groups like Hamas “was dominated by the mosque, religious organizations 
and religious infrastructure”.  For the Islamist groups the study found that almost 50% of members cite the 
mosque, Muslim Brotherhood or other religious influence as central (Jerrold M. Post, Ehud Sprinzak, and 
Laurita M. Denny, “The Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern 
Terrorists,” Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence.  2003. 174-184). 
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literature is that cultural tension between Islam and the West, which is result of 
modernization, Westernization and Americanization, is facilitating fundamentalism.  Third, 
many scholars argue that fundamentalism is a result of the Soviet Empire imploding.  Fourth, 
some argue that individuals turn into Islamic fundamentalists in personal times of crisis in 
order to be closer to God.  Fifth, some of the literature explains fundamentalism as the result 
of the Palestinian refugee problem.  Still other scholars blame the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism on outside forces such as the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the radicalization of 
Egyptian society, or the assassination of President Sadat.  Finally, there are many scholars 
that argue Islamic fundamentalism is a direct result of a combination of the above said 
reasons.      
Although there are multiple arguments as to what causes Islamic fundamentalism, 
most scholars do not view Islamic fundamentalism as a social movement.  The one exception 
would be those that believe the socioeconomic arguments that worsening economies 
facilitates fundamentalism.  However, in the Islamic world, Marxism, with its atheist persona 
would never be legitimized; it would amount to heresy.  Yet in Loretta Napoleni (2003) 
comparison of the roots of the medieval Christian Crusades and of the modern Islamic Jihad 
movement, she found that economics are the determining factor for the modern Jihad, just as 
it was for the Christian crusaders.  Pradeep Chhibber (1996) attributes the electoral 
achievements of fundamentalist parties to national economic factors.  Throughout the Muslim 
world, it was the organized Muslim extremists that kept the state’s infrastructure working 
during periods of economic hardships or national disaster; such was the case in Lebanon, 
Turkey, Palestine, and Egypt.  Walz (1986), Keddie (1988, 2003), Jaber (1997), Saad-
Ghorayeb (2000), and Robert Mortimer (1991) all argue that political alienation incited by 
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economic deprivation has influenced fundamentalism.  Kenneth Grasso (1995) argues that 
Islamic fundamentalism is the result of the social structure; specifically, its level of 
development, degree of urbanization, the pattern of distribution of wealth and income, and 
differences in patterns of consumption.  Bradford Dillman (1992) argues that in many post-
colonial societies a single party came to power at independence, and it was the party that 
brought the independence movement.  However, as socioeconomic conditions worsen, 
fundamentalist political parties achieved significant electoral success.   This has been the case 
in Pakistan, India, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey.13  Almond et al. (2003) 
argues that the uneven distribution of economic development, natural resources, and growth 
rate facilitate the growth of fundamentalism. They went on to argue that recessions, 
depressions, inflation, strikes, unemployment, and famine may create attitudes and grievances 
among particular groups in the population and this leads to a rise in fundamentalism.  The 
level of economic productivity and prosperity is one among several factors I will consider in 
my explanation of the emergence and growth of fundamentalist movements.   
A second prevalent argument in the literature is that Islamic fundamentalism is the 
result of the loss of traditional Islamic culture from Westernization, Americanization, and 
modernization.  Many scholars have explained the rise of religion as a political force on the 
                                                
13 Norman Palmer (1977) and Girilal Jain (1977) argued that Pakistanis and Indians were tired of the mounting 
state corruption, the growing income disparities between the top five per cent and the rest of the population, the 
steady impoverishment of hundreds of millions of people, the increasing unemployment, and other social and 
economic ills and they both predicted that there would be significant electoral shifts in both political systems.  
Their predictions turned out to be true.  The electoral success of the fundamentalist Islami Jamoori Ittihad in 
Pakistan after 1990 and the election of the fundamentalist Bharatiya Janata Party, which emerged as the second-
largest party in India following the national elections in 1991, have been attributed to poor and middle-class 
support of these parties.  In both cases, the party in power lost because the fundamentalists promised to improve 
the socioeconomic conditionsAs argued by: Anwar Syed (1991) and Yogendra Malik and V.B. Singh (1994).   
Andrew Wilder (1988 and 1993) argues that women, who are considered a lower class, socio-economically and 
that they voted independently of their male family members for the Islamic fundamentalists (also see Iftikhar 
Malik 1996. and National Commission on Status of Women; 1984 Islamabad: Government of Pakistan statistics 
and Maleeha Lodhi (1992) who cited the failure of the PPP government between 1988 and 1990 to take any 
concrete steps to improve the status of women in Pakistan, as a result they turned to the extremist parties.   
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tensions associated either with modernization, or an ideological or general social crisis, and 
pressures emanating from changes in the international environment.14  Pipe (1983) and Tibi 
(2002) argue that Muslims suffer from a double crisis, and this double crisis facilitates 
Islamic fundamentalism.  First, Muslims suffer from socioeconomic and political crises 
deriving from the imposed integration of Islamic civilization into a world dominated by the 
West.  Secondly, Muslims suffer from an identity crises brought on by exposure to cultural 
modernity.  The general feeling among Islamic fundamentalists is that since the Crusades, the 
Western world was engaged in a campaign to destroy Islam and Islamic civilization; this has 
come to formation via the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and Muslims standing up to the 
Western world (Rudolf Zarzar, 2001:127).  Numerous scholars have cited the disappearance 
of traditional Islamic civil society over the last century via Western imperialism as the cause 
of Islamic fundamentalism.15  Almond et al. (2003), Appleby and Sivan (2003) and Wickham 
(2002) argue that it is imperative to not underestimate the importance of Western imperialism 
in the explanation the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.  Thus, Islamic fundamentalists 
denounce cultural modernity as a virus that has befallen Islam; they see it as contributing to 
the weakening of Islamic civilization (Tibi, 2002: 73). 
Other scholars attribute the rise of fundamentalism as a political force to the failures 
of modernization and Westernization, most notably the social crises that resulted.  For 
example, Emmanuel Sivan (1985) argues that Islamic fundamentalism in the Sunni Middle 
East is the direct result of the failures of modern Arab politics, especially the nationalists.  He 
                                                
14 Those scholars who argue this include: Mohammed Ayoob (1981); Ali Dessouki (1982); John Esposito 
(1980); Nikki Keddie (1988); Daniel Levine (1986); Bernard Lewis (1985); Marry Martin and Scott Appleby 
(1991 and 1993); Robert Mortimer (1991); James Piscatori (1986) ; Maxime Robinson (1974); Emmanuel Sivan 
(1984); P.J. Vitikiotis (1987)  
15 This is argued by: Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur (2004); Roger Eatwell (2004); Abdillah, Masyuri 
(1997); Rita Kipp (1990); Gwenn Okruhlik (2003); Ann Swidler (1995); Bulent Aras (1998); Michael Meeker 
(1991); and Carrie Wickham (2002). 
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argues that Sunni Muslim fundamentalists are justified to revolt because of alien western 
culture.  Santosh Soha and Thomas Carr (2001; 125) argue that Islamic fundamentalists 
oppose nationalism because they see it as responsible for breaking up the Muslim 
community.  Nationalism wants Muslims to forsake the worship of God for the worship of 
the state.  In other words, Muslims are expected to submit to the will of the state rather than 
the will of God. One of the first scholars of radical Islamic movements, Sayyid Qutb, argues 
that radical Islam is largely a response to Islamic reformism and Arab nationalism.16  On the 
other hand, David Johnson (2006) argues that fundamentalism seems closely aligned with 
nationalism, which he sees as a popular reaction against foreign cultural and religious 
traditions.17  Johnson’s argument, on the surface, seems to be contradicting Soha/Carr and 
Qutb, but he is not.  He is correct, but only insofar as on the surface both movements are 
similar in their ability to gain popular support against foreign cultural and religious traditions.   
Esposito (1980) studies the emergence of Islam in Pakistan in the 1970s.  He found 
that it emerged from the restrictive modernization process facilitated by the nationalists, 
specifically the administration of Prime Minister Ali Bhutto and the social crises which were 
associated with it.  A second example of this phenomenon is Iran.  Keddie (1988) looks at the 
emergence of fundamentalist Islam after the Iranian revolution.  She argues that it was the 
result of the Shah’s policy of rapid modernization and Westernization that facilitated the 
Iranian social crisis in the 1970s.  Both Esposito and Keddie finds that modernization and the 
                                                
16 Qutb’s most famous books include: The Characteristics f the Islamic Conception and its Foundations (1960), 
Islam and the Problems of Civilization (1960), Signposts Along the Road (1964); and Under the Auspices of the 
Quran (1966).   
17 Nikki Keddie (1998) in “The New Religious Politics: Where, When, and Why Do Fundamentalisms Appear?” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History. Pages 696-723 argues that most comparative volumes on 
fundamentalism are collections, with most authors discussing one area.  She Shows that the exceptions are: 
Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993) and Brude Lawrence, Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt 
Against the Modern Age (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1989).    
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multiple social crises associated with modernization cumulated into the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism.  However there is no consensus on the scope and depth of these conditions.  
Ayoob (1980) also argues that Islamic fundamentalism can emerge after just one social crisis.  
Ayoob (1981) looked at Islamic resurgence in Southeast Asia in the in late 1960s and 1970s; 
he found that Islam reasserted itself as a political force because Muslims became disheartened 
due to restrictive modernization.  The catalyst for their movement was in 1968 and resulted 
from a social crisis called the “Corregidoor Massacre” where young Muslim soldiers in the 
Philippine military were executed by the Philippine government for no apparent reason, other 
than their religion.  As a result they established the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM).  
The MIM manifesto demanded a separate Islamic state; which led to a significant number of 
violent clashes between the MIM and the Philippine government.  
   One aspect of modernization is the growth and availability of technology.  Some 
scholars cite the changes in government policy toward education and media development as 
the causes of Islamic fundamentalism.  The spread of print, the rise of mass-circulation 
newspapers and radio, the cultural dominance of cinema and television and, more recently, 
the Internet has changed the mode, speed, of quality of the exchange of information and ideas 
throughout the world.18   
Some have argued that the modern fundamentalist movement emerged as a response 
to the perceived failures of secularism and as a reaction to the local governments that 
postulate a separation of church and state, or impose laws that contradict the Quran (Marin-
Guzman 2003: 69).  Bernard Lewis (1990:60) argues that the roots of Muslim rage, and in 
turn Islamic fundamentalism, is the rivalry between Judaism-Christianity, their secular beliefs 
                                                
18 These scholars include: Chadwick F. Alger (1997); David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and 
Jonathan Perraton (1999); Farbia Adelkhah (2000); Jon Altman (1998); and Paul Dreshc (1993). 
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and the worldwide expansion of both.  A fundamentalist works to bring religion back to 
center of the state, its institutions, and makes sure it plays an active role in public policy 
decisions.  Furthermore, secular schools and universities spread knowledge and cultivate the 
analytical skills that challenge and erode religious beliefs.  Hence, fundamentalists are in 
conflict with the educational and scientific establishment.19  Finally, some scholars have 
argued that the developing world’s fundamentalist movements tend to have nationalist and 
anti-imperialist tendencies in addition to their religious ones.20   
The third explanation for the causes of Islamic fundamentalism is the implosion of the 
Soviet Empire.  With the end of the Cold War, Islamic fundamentalism emerged as a global 
security issue that posed serious challenges to state authority in the Middle East (Khashan, 
2000).  Specifically, Lal Khan (1994) hypothesized that Islamic fundamentalism resulted 
from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the spreading of capitalism throughout the Middle 
East.  With capitalism comes socioeconomic inequality; therefore, capitalism can be seen as 
responsible for causing poverty, facilitating fundamentalist psychology and breeding 
fundamentalist movements.  
International relations in the post-Cold War period are becoming increasingly less 
state-centered and more centered around relations among civilizations (Tibi, 2002: 10), as 
well as culture and religion.  Mark Juergensmeyer (1993) argues that secular states are now 
being confronted by religious factions.  He labels this phenomenon the “new Cold War” and 
                                                
19 As argued by: Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (1993); Majid Tehranian 313-40; Majid Tehranian; 
“Islamic Fundamentalism in Iran and the Discourse of Development,” pages 341-73; Michael Rosenak, “Jewish 
Fundamentalism in Israeli Education,” paged 374-414; Susan Rose and Quentin Sahultze, “The Evangelical 
Awakening in Guatemala: Fundamentalist Impact on Education and Media,” pages 415-51; Susan Rose, 
“Christian Fundamentalism and Education in the United States”, pages 452-89; Quentin Schultze “The Two 
Faces of Fundamentalist Higher Education,” pages 490-535; Krishna Kumar, “Hindu Revivalism and Education 
in North-Central India,” pages 536-57       
20 As argued by: Mark Juergensmeyer (1993); John Voll 2005; Zygmunt Bauman (1996); and Gregory Gleason 
(1997) 
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argues that Islamic fundamentalists are looking for religious politics that are free from the 
taint of Western culture.   
The demise of the bipolar international structure synonymous with the Cold War,     
facilitated the rise of Islamic fundamentalism (Tibi, 2002).  The bipolar Cold War world was 
synonymous with global stability; when the Cold War ended, that global stability evaporated.   
During the Cold War, regional and domestic conflicts within the Islamic world were 
subordinated; however, with the end of global bipolarity, there is no adequate international 
political security structure to manage international changes which resulted in the increase of 
Islamic fundamentalism (Horsman and Marsshall, 1994).  Tibi (2002) argues that the two 
superpowers effectively contained the escalation of existing conflicts and kept Islamic 
fundamentalism suppressed.   
Hilal Khashan (1997:9-10) argues that the collapse of the Soviet Union contributed to 
Islamic militancy in three ways.  First, the “radicals” saw in the fall of communist dogma 
clear proof of the unworkability of man-made laws and the limits of authoritarian oppression.  
Second, the breakup of Yugoslavia, a by-product of Soviet collapse, triggered the Bosnia-
Herzegovina War which led to the mass execution of tens-of-thousands of Muslims; this 
attracted thousands of Arabs to fight on the side of Bosnian Muslims.  Western governments 
did very little to stop Serbian ethnic cleansing; as a result, much of the Islamic world became 
alienated at Western apathy.  Third, the end of East-West ideological rivalry created a 
vacuum in international relations whose balance hinged in sustaining balanced conflict.  The 
United States found itself without a major enemy.  According to Khashan the atmosphere that 
resulted, in which conflict between good and evil had ceased to inspire American policy 
makers, played up the Islamic threat inspired a revival of the East-West confrontation.  
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Finally, Bernard Lewis (1990) argues that Islamic fundamentalism is the direct result of the 
Soviet Union’s invasion into Afghanistan in 1979 and the formation of the Mujahideen.    
The fourth explanation of Islamic fundamentalism is interconnected with the above 
three; it argues that individuals turn to Islamic fundamentalism in personal times of crisis and 
to be closer to God.  Phebe Marr (1994) argues that when facing serious socioeconomic 
problems, crises of cultural identity, government ineptitude, and rapid and disruptive change, 
the Middle East has turned increasingly to Islam for solace and solutions.  Marr looks at only 
the spiritual and religious aspects of Islam.  In this setting, Muslims are just like Christians or 
Jews, during hard times individuals turn to their sacred teachings and religious leaders for 
guidance and solace.  Furthermore, this has root in the Islamic tradition where all Muslims 
are obligated to submit themselves to God and spread true Islam.  Bernard Lewis (1990) 
argues that individuals are turning to Islam because it brings comfort and peace of mind to 
countless people, spiritually or financially.   
The remaining explanations argue that fundamentalism is the result of an outside 
event.  Some scholars have argued that Islamic fundamentalism is the direct result of the 
mobility and migrations of Jews and Palestinians, specifically the displacement of 
Palestinians after the establishment of Israel.21  According to Hilal Khashan (1997: 13) 
Islamic fundamentalism resulted from the decline of Arab nationalism (Arab nationalism 
reached its peak in the late-1950s) and took its most significant blow after the Arabs lost the 
1967 Six Day War.  In fact the Egyptian Brotherhood claims that the lack of spirituality 
caused Egypt’s defeat.  However, John O. Voll (2004) argues that the birth of that modern 
Islamic fundamentalism began as in Egypt in 1928, with the establishment of the Muslim 
                                                
21 As argued by: Anne Barnard (2006); Carrie Wickham (1997); David Rapoport (2001); Ami Pedahzur, 
William Eubank, and Leonard Weinberg (2002); and Bruce Hoffman (1999) 
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Brotherhood, which was the result of socioeconomic inequality.  Lia (1998); Sagiv (1995) 
Kepel (1985) argue that modern Islamic fundamentalism emerged from the 1981 
assassination of President Anwar Sadat.  The assassins were identified as Islamic 
fundamentalists, members of a group called al-Jihad, who hoped to spark an Islamic 
revolution in Egypt.  Al-Jihad was one of a number of small, militant groups that had 
emerged during the 1970s as Egyptian political institutions began to open.  While the 
members of Al-Jihad disagreed on specifics of program and method, they agreed on the need 
for the Islamization of Egyptian society.  Leaders of al-Jihad believed that an armed struggle 
against a Western contaminated anti-Islamic government was a requirement of their faith.  
For such militants, Sadat had become the modern Pharaoh, who in Islamic tradition is the 
prime example of the evil ruler.22  At the same time, throughout Egypt, Islamic 
fundamentalists were running medical clinics for the poor, schools, health care facilities, and 
a variety of other social welfare activities.  
Other scholars have argued that the Islamic fundamentalism is the result of the Iranian 
Islamic Revolution.  It has been argued that the Iranian Revolution was the first major 
success of Islamic extremism (which becomes fundamentalism), particularly those of 
Abrahamian (1982, 1989, 1993); Khomeini (1989); and Keddie (1988, 2003).  Each one 
systematically notes the Iranian revolution’s success is the direct result of the Shah’s 
restrictive political institutions that started opening (or cracking) religious ideology, socio-
economic inequality and poverty. 
                                                
22 As argued by:  Patrick D. Gaffney (1987) in Richard T. Antoun and Mary Elaine Hegland (1987); Robin 
Write (1987);  Saad Eddom Ibrahim (1988 and 1980);  John Voll (1982); Gabriel Baer in Gabriel R. Warburg 
and Uri M. (1983); Uri M. Kupferschmidt (1982); John Esposito (1982); Bruce Borthwick (1981); Paul Jabber 
(1986); Robert Bianchi (1989); Nancy E. Gallagher (1989); James Pittaway (1989); Chris Eccel  (1988).  For an 
analytical description of the backgrounds of the members of al-Jihad, see Gills Kepel, Muslim Extremism in 
Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) and R. Hrair Dekmejian, 
Islam in Revolution (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985).   
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Still others see the formation of Islamic fundamentalism as the result of multiple 
phenomena or a combination of the above stated reasons.  For example, Hilal Khashan (1997: 
5) argues that Islamic fundamentalism is the product of cultural and intellectual stagnation, 
Western colonialism, and the failure of the secular nationalist model of government.  
Jacqueline Ismael (1985: 139) argues that Islamic political activism (which by the late 1990s 
became Islamic fundamentalism) is the result of socioeconomic, sociopolitical, and 
sociocultural conditions of the Islamic world and the result of the failure of the Islamic state 
“to safeguard the community against foreign domination and exploitation.”  Nikki Kedie 
(1998: 699) argues that global trends have favored the recent rise in “religiopolitics” which 
are often cited when discussing particular movements.  These include eight trends:  
globalization, economic issues, increasing migration, greater choices for women, continued 
growth in secular state power; education and urban growth; global cultural homogenization; 
and global improvements in health.  Joel Beinin (112) argues that the changes in the global 
and regional political economy are linked to the changes in political community, culture, and 
identity expressed in the resurgence of Islam.    
Analyses of the Causes  
Each of the above theorists makes legitimate arguments; however, they are a bit short-
sided.  For example, Islamic fundamentalism is a relatively new phenomenon and if the 
Palestinian and Israeli refugee problems were what was facilitating their emergence then, 
Islamic fundamentalism would have existed for the last six decades.  Also, states like Jordan 
and Syria, which have the largest numbers of Palestinian refugees, would have significantly 
more Islamic fundamentalist movements.  Second, traditional Islamic society has been 
disappearing since colonization; if that were the sole reason for the emergence of Islamic 
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fundamentalism, then arguably these movements would have existed for over a century, 
which they have not.  Third, if Westernization and Americanization were the root causes of 
Islamic fundamentalism, then fundamentalism would be much older than it is.  If it were the 
media, then we would see significantly more fundamentalist movements in states with 
significant media openness and advanced media technology, this is also not the case.  If it 
were only socioeconomic inequality, then the most economically depressed states would 
experience the most fundamentalist groups, this is not the case.  Furthermore, if this was the 
case, states with the strongest economies world have the fewest fundamentalist movements, 
this is not that case.  Also, based on the above arguments, states with the most poverty and 
unemployment would have the most fundamentalist movements; however, there are many 
examples of states with extensive poverty and very few fundamentalist movements, Eritrea 
for example.  And while international relations were significantly transformed after the 
demise of the Soviet empire; I am reluctant to say this is the sole reason for Islamic 
fundamentalism.  Finally, it were just the Americanization of the Islamic world, then one 
would expect to find no fundamentalist movements in states with no American influence and 
significant fundamentalist movements in states with significant amounts of American 
influence, this too is not the case.  
Terrorism 
Terrorism is an important part of the Islamic fundamentalism literature; arguably, it is the 
most mainstream and well known aspect.23  Terrorism is as old as human inequality.  One of 
the first documented examples of terrorism occurred in the first century BC by Zeolots-
                                                
23 The word “terrorism” dates from the Jacobin government during the French Reign of Terror it was used to 
eliminate opposition to the French Revolution, but did not come into common usage until the late nineteenth 
century, when a group of Russian revolutionaries adopted the term to describe their violent struggle against the 
Tsar and his rule.   
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Sicarris, a Jewish terrorist organization dedicated to inciting a revolt against Roman rule in 
Judea; they murdered their victims (both Jews and Romans) with daggers in broad daylight in 
the center of Jerusalem, eventually creating such fervent anxiety among the population that 
they generated a mass insurrection.24  Arguably, this is one of the first documented social 
movements.  However, according to Hilal Khashan (1997: 12), the first modern organized act 
of political terror dates back to July 23, 1968, when members of the Popular Front of the 
Liberation of Palestine hijacked an Israeli airliner en route to Algiers airport.   
Terrorism signifies acts of violence against innocents that are committed by 
nongovernmental actors.25 According to Robison et al. (2006) the existing literature on 
terrorism largely focuses on the ideology and psychology of terrorists (Juergensmeyer 2003; 
Stern 2003), terrorist recruitment (Sageman 2004) and types of attacks (Pape 2005; Bloom 
2005), or grand debates over the impoverished vs. privileged backgrounds on individual 
terrorists (Krueger and Maleckova 2003).  Islamic terrorism is seen making broader multi-
class appeals, using more lethal tactics justified in religious terms.26 
The terrorism literature can be broken down into three different categories: the 
definitions of terrorism, the causes of terrorism, and how to combat or stop terrorism (the 
                                                
24 See: Laqueur 1977 and Rapoport 1984, Also On the role of the Zealots and Sicarii in precipitating the Jewish 
revelots against Rome, see Moshe Aberback and David Aberback. The Roman-Jewish Wars and Hebrew 
Cultural Nationalism (2000) 
25 I must distinguish between terrorism and guerrilla warfare: this issue is relevant because historically, guerrilla 
groups have conducted this type of violence to further their goals.  Crowley (1992) explains that guerrilla 
warfare is a very ancient form of warfare generally used by weaker parties that must confront superior forces.  It 
involved harassing the enemy by avoiding direct confrontation and concentrating on slowly milking the enemy’s 
strength and morale through ambushes minor skirmishes, raids, cutting of communications and supply lines an 
seek similar techniques (1992; 3).  Guerrillas normally set up small military units and seek to establish liberated 
zones that may be used to challenge the state military.  In these enclaves, guerrillas create a parallel state 
structure.  Guerrillas use the areas they control to mount attacks against opposing state.  My dissertation will 
consider guerrilla warfare and terrorism as one-in-the same 
25 As argued by Gary Prevost (1990); Julio Perez (1987); Hodges 1986; Bayo (1965) Blasier (1983); Tilly 
(1995) and Stohl & Lopez (1988) 
26 As argued by: Rapoport 2004; Hoffman 1998; Enders and Sandler 2000; Laqueur 2001; Stern 2002; and 
Juergensmeyer 2003 
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deterrence strategies).  The existing literature makes it very clear that terrorism is a 
significantly difficult phenomenon to define; the term is inherently subjective, and the actions 
of a terrorist are also highly subjective.  Furthermore, as we have seen in the last thirty years, 
terrorism and terrorists continuously evolve.  Generally speaking, the targets of a terrorist 
attacks are not the victims who are killed or maimed in the attack, but rather the governments 
or their agents with whom the terrorists hope to stir a reaction.  Terrorism is a matter of 
perception and it is seen differently by different observers; one person’s terrorist is another 
person’s freedom fighter.  Reflecting the diverse nature of the concept, there is not an agreed 
definition within the terrorism literature.27  Koufa (2001: 8) argues that arriving at a generally 
accepted definition of terrorism has been elusive because, it is a highly loaded term and its 
definitions are often mixed with value judgments.28   
Definitions of Terrorism  
Governments and their agents have developed practical definitions of terrorism 
(Feldmann and Perala 2004).  For example, Benjamin Netanyahu (1986) defined terrorism as 
the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear 
for political ends.  Furthermore, Feldmann and Perala (2004: 103) point out that under Title 
22 of the United States Code (section 2656f(d)), the US government defines terrorism as 
premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against concomitant targets by sub-
national groups or clandestine agents (US Department of State 1999).  In its Terrorism Act 
2000, the British government defines terrorism as the use of (or the threat to) designed to 
influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public and made for 
the purpose of advancing a political, religious, or ideological cause (United Kingdom 2000).   
                                                
27 As argued by: Laqueur 1999; 5-7, 1987, 1977; Gordon and Lopez 1999, 7; Stern 1999, 11-15; Brown and 
Merrill 1993; Kegley 19990; 3, Koufa 2001  
28 In the United Nations Special Report on Human Rights and Terrorism 
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The second major category for defining terrorism is by academics that have developed 
precise definitions of terrorism (Feldmann and Perala 2004).  For example, Walzer (2002: 5) 
defines terrorism as the deliberate and random killing of innocent people in order to spread 
fear through an entire population and force the hand of its political leaders.  Bruce Hoffman 
(1998: 43) defines terrorism as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through 
violence, or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.  Charles Tilly (2004: 5) 
defines terrorism as the asymmetrical deployment of threats and violence against enemies 
using means that fall outside the corms of political struggle routinely operating within some 
current regime.  Stern (1999: 11) and Stohl (1988: 3-5) both argue that terrorism is an act or 
threat of violence against noncombatants with the objective of exacting revenge and/or 
intimidating with the intent to influence a wider audience or to send a message.  For Laqueur 
(1997: 143) terrorism refers to the use or the threat of ruthless violence that induces a state of 
fear in the victim and does not conform to humanitarian rules.  Segaller (1987: 11) argues that 
terrorists kill one person to threaten a thousand, or to intimidate an industry, expand public 
insecurity, or blackmail governments into reconsidering specific policies (Feldmann and 
Perala 2004).29  Albert Bergensen (2004:50) defines terrorism as the use of violence by 
nonstate groups against noncombatants for symbolic purposes, that is, to influence or 
somehow affect another audience for some political, social, or religious purpose.  Gordon and 
Lopez (1999: 8) argue that one of the most interesting dimensions of terrorism is that the 
political goal of a terrorist act is not encapsulated in the act itself.  Micholus et al. (1989) 
defines terrorism as the use or the threat of anxiety; including violence for political purposes 
by any individual or group, whose intent is to oppose any established governmental authority, 
                                                
29 For a discussion of the bargaining relationship between terrorist groups and local states, see Paul Pillar, 
Terrorism and US Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C., Brookings, 2001. pages 145-148). 
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and whose actions are intended to influence the attitude and behavior of a target group wider 
than its victims.  Donald Black (2004:16) defines terrorism as self-help by organized civilians 
who covertly inflict mass violence on other civilians.  Jeff Goodwin (2006, 2031) argues that 
terrorism may be defined as the strategic use of violence and threats of violence, usually 
intended to influence several audiences, by oppositional political groups against civilians or 
nonincumbents who belong to a specific ethnicity, religious or national group, social class or 
some other collectivity, without regard to their individual identities or roles.         
These scholars argue that there are six major facilitators of terrorism and they include: 
political systems that restrict citizens political and civil liberties, specifically political 
repression (Hafez 2003), worsening economic systems (Robison et al. 2006), and the effects 
of modernization facilitate terrorism (Robison et al. 2006).  Specifically, globalization (Lake 
2002), the cultural clash between Western and Islamist values (Huntington 1996), and the 
pro-Israeli stance of the United States (Pape 2005) as the major causes of terrorism.   
Nongovernmental terrorism is more likely in systems that restrict citizen’s political 
and civil liberties.  Political systems that deprive the population of adequate institutional 
mechanisms to express and channel demands are facilitating terrorism.30  As Bueno do 
Mesquita (2005) pointed out, models that consider the effect of government counterterrorism 
policy have tended either to assume that crackdowns always increase mobilization or have 
ignored this effect and argued that crackdown play only a counterterrorism role that decreases 
violence.31  He further argues that there has been long tradition in political science that 
                                                
30 As argued by: Ceboratev and Nef 1989, 76-88; Kegley 1990, 99-100; Crenshaw 1990; 115-24; Waldmann 
1992, 289-90 
31 The increase mobilization scholars include: de Figueiredo and Weingast 2001; Rosendorff and Sandler 2004; 
Wilkinson 1986. The scholars that have ignored this effect and argued that crackdown play only a 
counterterrorism role that decreases violence includes: Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Sandler, Tschirhart, and 
Cauley 1983. 
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assumes both ideological and economic factors are important determinants of violent 
mobilization (for example Gurr 1970; Lichbach 1989; Muller and Seligson 1987).  Samuel 
Huntington (1968), Douglas Bwy (1968: 20-21, 56), and Bernard Lewis (1967) suggest that 
terrorism results from the economic disturbances and instability that characterize 
modernizing societies.  Their hypothesis may be forty years old; however, their conclusions 
are still viable and explain much of the terrorist formations.  Some studies argue that periods 
of low growth are more likely to produce political violence (Bwy 1968; Muller and Weede 
1990).  Russell and Miller (1977), Krueger and Maleckova (2002), and Berrebi (2003) 
conclude that socioeconomics matter.  Blomberg et al. (2004) found that economic downturns 
are correlated with increased terrorist acts. Nongovernmental terrorism results from a 
vigorous reaction on behalf of certain members of society who, frustrated by unendurable 
socioeconomic conditions, particularly social inequality and institutional degradation, decide 
to engage in this kind of violent activity.32 
 
Suicide Terrorism  
One of the emerging subfields of the terrorism literature is that of suicide terrorism.   
Robert Bryon and Bader Araj (2006: 1974) defined suicide terrorism as the use of explosives 
against one or more people by one or more attackers.  The attackers enjoy organizational 
support and know in advance and with certainty their actions will result in their deaths.  By 
definition, merely planning an attack does not qualify as suicide terrorism; the attacker must 
be en route to his or her target.  Pape (2005: 198) assumes that suicide terrorism is 
strategically rational in the sense that it often pays.  In his view, organizations engage in 
suicide terrorism because it helps them achieve their strategic goals relatively efficiently with 
                                                
32 As argued by: Halperin 1967 37; Laqueur 1987 159; Lopez 1988 501-5, Waldmann 1992 298 
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a comparatively high rate of success, little financial cost and minimal loss in life on the side 
of the insurgents.  
The literature argues that there are three possible causes of suicide terrorism: 
deprivation, culture, and strategic choice.  First, absolute deprivation refers to longstanding 
poverty and unemployment, relative deprivation to the growth of an intolerable gap between 
expectations and rewards (Gurr 1970; Moore 2003).  Deprivation of any sort frustrates some 
individuals driving them to commit self-immolating acts of aggression against the perceived 
source of their suffering.  However, not all scholars agree with this assumption and argue that 
the evidence does not support the deprivation theory.  Pape (2005: 213) found that suicide 
terrorists are much more educated than the populations from which they were recruited.  
Furthermore, Laqueur (2004: 16) found that suicide terrorists from Egypt and Saudi Arabia 
have come mainly from middle or upper class families. 
The second potential cause of suicide terrorism is culture and all the phenomena that 
are associated with culture.  The idea that culture, especially religion, influences behavior 
dates back to Max Weber’s classic essay (Weber 1958).  The clash of civilizations between 
Islam and the West is facilitating terrorism according to Huntington (1996) and Lewis (2002).  
Also, Zogby (2002) argues that suicide bombers hold strongly negative attitudes only toward 
U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East.  Furthermore, not only is suicide terrorism 
associated with Islamic attacks on Christianity and Judaism, but it is also associated with 
attacks between Sunnis and Shiites.  According to Reuter (2004: 37) and Brym and Araj 
(2006: 1972), the martyrdom of Hussein at the battle of Karbala  in 680 was a single event in 
Islamic history and it is often said to have reinforced the readiness of Muslims, especially 
Shiites, to sacrifice their lives for the collective good in the face of overwhelming odds.   
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A major advance in thinking about suicide terrorism took place when scholars began 
to analyze it as a strategic rational political action (Harrison 2003; Madsen 2004; Sprinzak 
2000).  Robert Pape’s study of 462 suicide bombers who attacked targets worldwide between 
1980 and 2003 gives a strong empirical support to this school of thought (Pape 2003, 2005).  
Pape’s study includes quoting the leaders of elective terrorist organizations, specifically 
Hezbollah, Hamas, and al-Qaeda.  The core of Pape’s argument is that every group 
committing suicide terrorism has one main objective and that is removing a foreign state from 
their homeland (Pape 2005; Laqueur 2004).   
 
Terrorism Deterrence  
One of the major themes running through the terrorism literature is the idea of 
deterrence.  One of the major questions is: can deterrence stop the modern terrorists?33  
Trager (2006) argues that many prominent international relations scholars and analysts have 
argued that deterrent strategies have no significant role to play in countering the new terrorist 
threat.  Richard Betts (2002), for example, writes that deterrence has “limited efficacy for 
modern counterterrorism.”  However, Trager (2006) argues that the claim that deterrence is 
ineffective against terrorists is wrong because terrorists are rational.   Some argue that 
deterrence approaches are only one of several examples of strategies for counter terrorism.  
Other strategies include persuasion (or winning hearts and minds), economic aid and 
democratization, appeasement, and military force.34  The case against the use of deterrence 
                                                
33 A deterrence strategy consists of the following two elements: (1) a threat or action designed to increase an 
adversary’s perceived costs of engaging in particular behavior, and (2) an implicit or explicit offer of an 
alternative state of affairs if the adversary refrains from that behavior.  This second element defines them 
magnitude of the political objectives sought by the coercing state.  Other works that also address this issue 
include Barry M. Blechman and Tamara S. Cofman (1999) and Alexander L. George (1991). 
34 On persuasion see Helena Finn, the case for cultural diplomacy: engaging foreign Audiences” Foreign Affairs. 
November/December 2003, pages 15-20; Peter Peterson, Diplomacy and war on terrorism.  Foreign Affairs, 
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strategies in counterterrorist campaigns rests on three pillars.  First, terrorists are thought to 
be irrational, and therefore unresponsive to the cost-benefit calculation required for 
deterrence.  Second, as Robert Pape (2005) argues, many terrorists are said to be so highly 
motivated that they are willing to die and are not deterred by fear, death, or punishment.  
Third, even if terrorists were afraid of punishment, they cannot be deterred because the 
terrorist movement cannot be turned back. 
Max Abrahms (2006) analyzed the political plights of twenty eight terrorist groups; 
his data yielded two unexpected findings.  First, the groups accomplished their forty-two 
objectives only 7% of the time.  Second, although the groups achieved certain types of 
objectives more than others, the key variable for terrorist success was a tactical one: target 
selection.  These findings suggest that (1) terrorist groups rarely achieve their policy 
objectives, and (2) the poor success rate is inherent to the tactic of terrorism itself.  Together, 
the data challenges the dominant scholarly opinion that terrorism is strategically rational 
behavior.35  However, this assumption of rationality contradicts some anti-deterrence scholars 
who insist that the terrorist is irrational, specifically Robert Pape.  In my analysis, I treat the 
                                                                                                                                                  
September/October 2000 pages 74-96; Michael Mousseau, Market civilization and its clash with terror. 
International security Winter 2002/03 pages 5-29.  On economic aid and democratization see: Carol Graham, 
“Can Foreign Aid Help Stop Terrorism? Not With magic Bullets” Brookings Review, Summer 2002 pages 28-
32; Ivo H Daalder and James M. Lindsay, “Nasty, Brutish, and Long: America’s War on Terrorism” Current 
History, December 2001, pages 403-408; and Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “The Economics and the 
Education of Suicide Bombers: Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?” New Republic. June 2002, pages 27-33 
35 As argued by Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva (2006) terrorists are thought to be irrational, and 
therefore unresponsive to the cost-benefit calculation required for deterrence.  The claim that terrorists are 
irrational is more commonly found in the popular press but it is also a key argument against deterrence strategies 
concerning terrorism generally and therefore must be addressed in any discussion of the use of terrorism 
deterrence and counterterrorism.  The assertion that terrorist are highly irrational is contradicted by a growing 
body of literature that shows that terrorist groups usually have a set of hierarchically ordered goals and choose 
strategies that best advance them.  Martha Crenshaw in Chalres W. Kegley (1990) page 117; Betts, “The soft 
Underbelly if American Primiacy”; Robert Pape (2003) pages 343-361; Jonathan Schachter, (2002) page 96; and 
Andrew Kydd and Barabra Wlater (2002) pages 279-289. 
In his book Islam in Revolution, R.H. Deckmejan devotes a few pages to a psychological profile of the Arab 
Muslim fanatic or religious extremist.  He lists a number of features: alienation, dogmatism, and inferiority 
complex that resolves itself in an assertion of superiority, activism/aggressiveness, authoritarianism, intolerance, 
paranoia, idealism, austerity, obedience, conformity, and conspiratorial tendencies (R. Hrair Dekmejian, 1985 
pages 32-36) 
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terrorist as highly rational.  Rationality is more than just a logical analysis.  It also has to 
include one’s analysis on probability via a cost-benefit analysis.  A terrorist does this; for the 
most part, he/she understands that the only way to achieve the objective is via a terrorist act.   
Writers are increasingly recognizing that terrorism is an effective coercive strategy.  
Alan Dershowitz (2002) argues that Palestinian gains since the early 1970s reveal that 
terrorism works; the use of terrorsim is an entirely rational choice to achieve a political 
objective.  In the past several years, numerous scholars have shown that when a state rewards 
a terrorist group then other groups are encouraged to use terrorism.36  David Lake (2002) 
adapted James Fearon’s (1995) rationalist bargaining model to argue that terrorism is a 
“rational and strategic” tactic because it enables terrorists to achieve a superior bargaining by 
increasing their capabilities relative to those of target countries.  Based on their game-
theoretic model and case study of Hamas, Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter (2006) 
concluded that terrorist groups are “surprisingly successful in their aims.”  According to Scott 
Atran (2006), terrorist groups “generally” achieve their policy objectives.  As evidence, he 
points to Hezbollah and explains how they successfully forced the United States and France 
to withdraw their forces from Lebanon in 1984.  Finally, Ehud Sprinzak (2000) looks at the 
plights of Hezbollah and the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka to testify to a terrorist’s effectiveness.   
At its root, terrorism is about justice or at least someone’s perception of it, whether 
man-made or divine. 37  States often use force; however, they are subjected to international 
norms; terrorists do not abide by international laws or norms.  Thus, at the minimum, I will 
                                                
36 As argued by: John Derbyshire (2000); Evelyn Gordon (2005); R.W. Johnson  (2001); and Kruglanski and 
Fishman, “the Psychology of Terrorism”, page 207; and Chomsky, “The New War Against Terror.” 
37 Arguably, if violent acts do not have a political aim, then they are by definition criminal acts. There are many 
examples of different types of violence and quite a few of them are inherently political; including conventional 
war among states, terrorism is distinguished by its non-state character.  States obviously employ force for 
political ends; however, when a state uses force internationally, it is considered an act of war; when it is used 
domestically it is called law enforcement, state terror, oppression, or civil war.  Although states can terrorize, in 
this dissertation it will be assumed that they cannot by definition be terrorists.     
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consider any act as a terrorist act if it has the following characteristics: a fundamentally 
political nature, the surprise use of violence against seemingly random targets, the targeting 
of the innocent by non-state actors, and the discontent of international laws and norms.   
The following tables break down all terrorist and suicide terrorist attacks included in 
my analysis.  Although these two tables do not explain what is causing terrorism, they do 
give an exact count of all terrorist and suicide terrorist attacks during the last thirty-six years, 
and the nation-states in which they occurred.   
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Table Four: Total Number of Terrorist Attacks 
 
Iran 134 Oman 1 
Algeria  225 Saudi Arabia 81 
Azerbaijan  6 Syria  28 
Bahrain 18 Tajikistan  56 
Bangladesh 149 Tunisia 15 
Brunei 0 Turkey 1236 
Djibouti  0 Turkmenistan  1 
Egypt 85 United Arab Emirates 9 
Indonesia  231 Uzbekistan 14 
Israel 1255 Yemen 122 
Jordan 84 Kazakhstan 4 
Kuwait 45 Eritrea 4 
Lebanon  662 Ethiopia  74 
Libya  16 Tanzania  9 
Iraq 7405 Afghanistan 1028 
Mauritania 7 Somalia 74 
Morocco  44 Sudan 42 
Qatar 2 Kyrgyzstan 19 
Pakistan  1026 Palestine  1929 
    
 
Table Five: Total Number of Suicide Terrorist Attacks  
 
Iran 0 Oman 0 
Algeria  1 Saudi Arabia 9 
Azerbaijan  0 Syria  0 
Bahrain 0 Tajikistan  1 
Bangladesh 6 Tunisia 0 
Brunei 0 Turkey 22 
Djibouti  0 Turkmenistan  0 
Egypt 3 United Arab Emirates 1 
Indonesia  5 Uzbekistan 6 
Israel 102 Yemen 4 
Jordan 3 Kazakhstan 0 
Kuwait 0 Eritrea 0 
Lebanon  22 Ethiopia  0 
Libya  0 Tanzania  0 
Iraq 568 Afghanistan 66 
Mauritania 0 Somalia 0 
Morocco  6 Sudan 0 
Qatar 1 Kyrgyzstan 0 
Pakistan  21 Palestine  49 
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My Contribution 
A significant obstacle to theory building in Islam, Islamic fundamentalism or Islamic 
social movements is that the research on Islam has been multidisciplinary.  Scattered among a 
variety of academic disciplines, publications and research on Islam tend to follow narrow sets 
of research questions, theoretical frameworks, and methodologies, each determined by a 
particular focus.  Political scientists, for example, are mostly concerned with how Islam 
impacts the state, political institutions, autocratic verses democratic systems, and voting.  
Sociologists are interested in exploring the psychological and demographic roots of Islamists, 
terrorists, or radicals.  The few sociological analyses of fundamentalists that exist are based 
on a very limited samples of particular groups, often only of those who have been arrested or 
killed.38  Religious scholars predominantly focus on the theology behind the Koran and 
religious leaders, or religious scholars and their interpretations of scripture.  Finally, 
historians tell the stories of particular Islamic groups, states, people, or national and/or ethnic 
differences. 
The Muslim world, specifically Islamic fundamentalism, has yet to be fully integrated 
into social movement theory (Wiktorowicz 2004: 4).  David Snow and Susan Marshall (1984) 
were the first to incorporate research on Islamic activism into the social movement literature.  
                                                
38 The most famous such study was conducted by Saad Eddin Ibrahim with members of two groups, Shabab 
Muhammad, which launched an abortive coup in 1974, and Jama’at al-Muslimin, better known as the Takfir 
wa’l Hijra group, which assassinated a former minister of religious affairs in 1977.  Ibrahim’s study was 
conducted with members who were still alive and in prison.  His results have been published in “Anatomy of 
Egypt’s Militant Groups,” International Journal of Middle East Studies (1980): 423-53, and in “Islamic 
Militancy as a Social Movement: The Case of Two Groups in Egypt” in Ali E. Millal Dessouki.  Islamic 
Resurgence in the Arab World (New York: Praeger, 1982), pages 117-37.  Elbaki Hermassi, “La Societe’ 
Tunisienne au miroir islamiste,” Majhreb-Machrek 103 (January – March 1984), in which he interviewed 
members of the Mouvement de Tendance Islamique (MTI) in Tunisia.  Ervand Abrahamian was able to 
interview members of the Iranian Mujahidin for his book, The Iranian Mojahedin (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1989).  In Iran between Two Revolutions, Abrahamian utilizes data concerning dead guerrillas for his 
analysis of the composition if guerrilla movements (Princeton University Press, 1982: pages 480-81). Much of 
the data about the much-discussed Jihad group responsible for the assassination of Sadat in Egypt was obtained 
from court records and newspaper articles rather than from direct interviews with members of the group.    
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Their analysis looked at the relationship between cultural imperialism and Islamic 
movements.  They depicted religion as the source of a mobilizing ideologies, and 
organizational resources that are used to combat perceived cultural imperialism.39  Others 
have argued for the more general elimination of the artificial divergence between the studies 
of religious and nonreligious movements (either directly or indirectly by way of example).40  
Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald (1996) argued that areas outside of the 
western world have “comparative riches available to social movement scholars” and went on 
to argue the non-western social movements should be studied more.  Sidney Tarrow’s (1998) 
decision to include a brief discussion of Islamic fundamentalism in the second edition of 
Power and Movement was one step; however, it was only a minor one.  I find the fact that 
Western social movement scholars have excluded much of the Islamic world highly 
disturbing.  However, my objection here is not to directly correct the bias of generations of 
social movement scholars.  Rather I seek to determine the causes of Islamic fundamentalism 
and in doing so show that they are social movements.    
                                                
39 Numerous studies have evaluated the role religion, specifically Islam, has on one’s political preferences 
(Palmer, Safty and Sullivan 1990; Tessler 1997; Harik 1996); Palmer (1996).  Palmer, Safty, and Sullivan 
(1996) measured public opinion data from Egypt and observed a negative relationship between religious 
activism (as measured by support for religious dress, censorship, religious instruction in schools, and Islamic 
revival) and support for economic liberalism in such areas as price controls and subsidies.  They found that 
religiosity (measured by piety, prayer, and ritual performance) bears no relationship to attitudes toward these 
issues of political and economic policy.  Other studies have explored the relationship between religious piety 
and partisan preferences using survey data from Egypt, Palestine, and Lebanon.  In each case there was a weak 
relationship not only between religiosity and political preferences in general, but also between religiosity and 
support for Islamic political movements in particular.  Tessler (1997) found that in Egypt, more than one third of 
those classified as more pious did not support Islamic parties, whereas approximately half of those who did 
support these parties were not personally devout.  Harik (1997, 57) found that in Lebanon, the relationship 
between religiosity and support for the Islamic political party, Hizbullah, was only moderately strong.  
Arguably, one of the most influential Islamic surveys was done by Palmer (1996); she was attempting to 
measure the Islamic movement in Lebanon.  Her study measured the religiosity, political alienation, and 
political preference of 1,434 Lebanese students attending six universities and colleges in Beirut.  She asked 
numerous open-ended questions relating to the student’s preferred political party, self-identity, religion, political 
preferences, and preferred governmental system.  What makes her study so significant is that she was able to 
determine that Hezbollah was able to unite popular support like no other political party.   
40 For Example: Foran 1994; Verges 1997; Tehami 1998; Wolff 1998; Munson 2001; Wiktorowicz 2001; Schatz 
2002; Wickham 2002; Clark 2003; Hafez 2003.   
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Social Movements  
Social movements do what politicians cannot, according to Meyer (1990: 263) that is, 
they imagine a different future.  Enrique Larana et al. (1995) argue that people join social 
movements because they are “sick and tired of being sick and tired.”  Verba et al.’s (1996) 
understanding of social movements seems to concentrate on the unconventional 
manifestations of the underrepresented.  Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) view social 
movements as a facilitator of democracy.  The purpose of social movements for Melucci and 
Avritzer (2000) is to provide representation for the unrepresented.  Dubet and Thaler (2004) 
stress that social movements consist of organized actors who work against the status quo.  
Munck (1995) defines social movements as strategic actors who operate concurrently in 
social and political institutional arenas against the established system.  Zald and Berger 
(1978) argue that a social movement is the expression of, and need for, change.  Powell 
(1986) avoids the term “social movement” altogether focusing instead on what he calls 
“extremist issue positions.”  Social movements are often viewed as a means to political 
representation, as a way to mobilize the public in some supportive fashion, and ultimately as 
a stepping stone to political legitimization.   
According to Meyer (1990), social movements imagine a different future.  Islamic 
fundamentalists also do this; they imagining a future where religion takes precedence and 
dominates both the individual and the socioeconomic and sociopolitical institutions within the 
nation-state.  Most individuals who join a fundamentalist movement are “tired of being sick 
and tired” just as Larana et al. (1995) finds social movement participants.  Also, Islamic 
fundamentalist movements are inherently “unconventional manifestations of the 
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underrepresented” just as Verba et al. (1996) found social movements.  Islamic 
fundamentalist movements facilitate democracy.  For example the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood, Hamas, and Hezbollah all call for democracy, specifically, democratic 
institutions, constitutions, and free elections.  Furthermore, most members of Islamic 
fundamentalist movements work against the status quo and the established political-
socioeconomic systems.  Powell’s (1986) avoidance of the term “social movement” and 
instead calling the phenomenon “extremist issue positions” could very well describe Islamic 
fundamentalism.  Arguably, there are more extreme positions than that of the Islamic 
fundamentalist.     
Neither the Islamic fundamentalism nor the social movement literature alone is able to 
explain the emergence and success of these movements; both fail to recognize that Islamic 
fundamentalism is a new kind of social movement.  Most social movement scholars do not 
consider Islamic fundamentalism a social movement.  The one exception in the Islamic 
fundamentalist literature is a relatively unknown book by Quintan Wiktorowicz (2004).  
Wiktorowicz’s book is a compilation of case studies that evaluate individual Islamic 
movements.  While he does not address the causes of Islamic fundamentalism, he does assert 
that Islamic fundamentalism could be viewed as a social movement.  My work differs 
significantly from his because he only connects Islamic fundamentalism with resource 
mobilization theory and does not acknowledge the other three theories.  Also, there is no 
connection or causal relationship between social movements and Islamic fundamentalism.  
Based on the literature of each of the above said social movement schools theories, I derived 
the following five hypotheses (with eleven sub-hypothesis) to examine how specific 
phenomenon associated with each school of thought and Islamic fundamentalism:  
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H1: Socioeconomic inequality as described by the Marxist social movement theory is 
positively associated with the number and success Islamic fundamentalist groups present 
within the nation-state.  
 
H1A: If there is significant unemployment in the nation-state there will be an increase 
in the number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state 
 
H1B: If there is significant poverty in the nation-state there will be an increase in the 
number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state 
 
H2: Resources as described by the resource mobilization social movement theory is positively 
associated with the number and success Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the 
nation-state.   
 
H2A: If a nation-state’s overall population’s educational level increases, there will be 
an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state. 
 
H2B: If the total amount of U.S. aid increases within a nation-state, there will be an 
increase in the number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state. 
 
H2C: If a nation-state’s GDP were to increase, there will be an increase in the 
number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state. 
 
H2D: If the total amount of ODA increases within a nation-state, there will be an 
increase in the number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state. 
 
H3: The degree of openness of political institutions as described by the political process 
social movement theorists has an inverted-U shaped relationship with the number and 
success of Islamic fundamentalist movements; the number of movements should be the 
strongest in system which are neither highly democratic nor highly autocratic.  
 . 
H3A: There is a linear negative relationship between strong autocracies and 
fundamentalist movements.  If the political system is a strong autocracy with grievous 
human rights violations, there will be fewer Islamic fundamentalist movements within 
that nation-state. 
 
H3B: There is a linear negative relationship between strong democracies and 
fundamentalist movements.   If the political system is a perfect democracy with few 
human rights violations, there will be fewer Islamic fundamentalist movements within 
that nation-state. 
 
H4: Ideas as described by the new social movement theorists are positively associated with 
the number and success Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state 
 
H4A: If there is a significant outside ideological force present, there will be an 
increase in the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements within that nation-state. 
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H4B:  If U.S troops are present within the Islamic nation-state, there will be an 
increase in the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements within that nation-state.  
 
H4C: If the total amount of U.S. aid increases within a nation-state, there will be an 
increase in the number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state. 
 
The following hypothesis was developed from the association between terrorism and 
the degree of Islamic fundamentalism within an Islamic nation-state, as measured by the total 
number of fundamentalist movement-years present.   
 
H5: The total degree fundamentalism in the Islamic nation-state is positively associated with 
the total degree of non-state induced violence within that nation-state.  In other words, if the 
nation-state has a large degree of fundamentalism, it will have a large number of terrorist 
attacks.  
 
To determine the causes of Islamic fundamentalism I will employ a labyrinth analogy.  
A labyrinth explanation of the causes of Islamic fundamentalism is relatively simple; there is 
one path that explains where fundamentalism comes from and what facilitates it.  As argued 
in the introduction, my labyrinth consists of four conditions, each of which can found in the 
social movement literatures: Marxism, political process, resource mobilization, and new 
social movements.  The following chapters will help prove that each of these four conditions 
found within the labyrinth are positively associated with Islamic fundamentalism.   
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Chapter Two: Social Movements and Theory 
The best way to understand this contribution to the social movement literature, as it 
relates to the causes of Islamic fundamentalism, is through this fundamentalist labyrinth.  My 
theory is that the social movement conditions facilitate Islamic fundamentalism; these social 
movement conditions are positively associated with increases in the number of Islamic 
fundamentalist movements present within majority-Islamic nation-states.  Furthermore, 
Islamic fundamentalist movements are caused by the same phenomena that facilitate social 
movements.  This being said, Islamic fundamentalist movements are social movements.  The 
conditions within my fundamentalist labyrinth include the resources found in resource 
mobilization theory, socio-economic inequality found in Marxism, political institutions and 
the socio-political structures found in political process theory, and the ideas found in the new 
social movement theory.        
The social movement literature exemplifies ambiguity.  It is difficult to grasp the 
nature, characteristics, causes, and even what constitutes a social movement.  Social 
movements cannot be reduced to a specific insurrection, revolt, revolution, political protest, 
strike, boycott, terrorist attack, or any act committed by a “freedom-fighter,” and they are 
scattered across time.  They cannot be identified with any specific organization, political 
ideology, dogma, political party, ethnicity, religion, nationality, or country; social movements 
are extremely fluid, which makes the existing literature broad and ambiguous.  Koopmans 
(1993) argues that social movements are characterized by a low degree of institutionalization, 
high heterogeneity, a lack of clearly defined boundaries and decision making structures, and a 
volatility matched by few other social phenomena.  In addition, it is limited because of its 
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unwillingness to include Middle Eastern or Islamic movements and its inability to explain 
Islamic fundamentalism.   
John Foran (1993) argues that when dealing with social movements, states matter, 
culture matters, social structure matters, accidents of history matter – everything matters.  
Foran’s description of social movements was not designed to describe Islamic 
fundamentalism; however, it does so perfectly.  When looking at Islamic fundamentalist 
movements, states, social structure, culture, as well as accidents in history all matter in the 
emergence and success of Islamic fundamentalist movements.  Furthermore, as it relates to 
the shifting of political opportunities or environments; Suzanne Staggenborg (1986) shows 
that political environments matter.  She found that when faced with either threats or 
opportunities, social movement members tended to band together to maximize the 
information and material resources at their disposal.   
Both social movements and Islamic fundamentalist movements are catalysts of 
change; both arise in response to societal strains, conflicts, social or political injustices, or the 
degradation and the subjugation of individuals or groups via those in power.  Significant 
phenomena such as economic transformations, population shifts, and social disruptions, wars, 
or natural disasters also can also be a catalyst for both social movements and Islamic 
fundamentalist movements.  Furthermore, various societal/political strains, such as 
industrialization, modernization, urbanization, Westernization, Americanization, or economic 
crises disrupt social life and facilitate both social movements and Islamic fundamentalist 
movements.       
As a result of the ambiguity of the social movement literature, it is very difficult to 
define social movements.  German sociologist, Lorenz von Stein was the first to use the term 
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social movement in his discussions of mass political movements.41  Von Stein’s definition 
was the first definition to convey the idea of a continuous, unitary process by which the 
whole working class gained self-consciousness and power.  When von Stein was developing 
his thesis, Marx and Engel’s Communist Manifesto (1848) proposed a very similar argument 
concerning the mass-consciousness of the proletariat (Tilly 2004).  They argue that all 
previous historical movements were movements of minorities in the interest of minorities; 
however, they saw new movement as the self-conscious, independent movement of the 
immense majority against the minority (Marx and Engels 1848: 44).  Von Stein, Marx, and 
Engle represent the first generation of social movement theorists.  Their definitions of social 
movements are rooted in functionalism and focus on the structural and psychological causes 
of mass mobilization or protest (McAdam 1982; Wiktorowicz 2004).   
Subsequent generations of social movement scholars have expanded the idea of 
functionalism.  For example, social movements have been defined as an organized mass-
effort with its main goal of bringing about change, whether in relationships, norms, beliefs, or 
all of these.  Specifically, their main objective is a fundamental change to the social order, 
especially its established sociopolitical institutions.42 There is a general agreement in the 
social movement literature that social movements are products of social change.43  Also, a 
fairly strong consensus has emerged among social movement scholars who consistently 
                                                
41 The book was titled: History of the French Movement from 1789 to the Present 1850.   Also, Werner J. 
Cahnman (1966). Book Review: Lorenzo Von Stein: The History of the Social Movement in France, 1789-
1850; Traslated by Kaethe Mengelberg. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 71, No. 6. (May, 1966), pp. 
746-747 
42As argued by: Rudolf Heberle 1951 (He develops general social movement theories; but, focuses on the 
relationship between social movements and political parties; Clarence King (1956) he developed the first 
general principles analysis of selected social movements; Hans Toch (1969)  study looked at theoretical 
approaches, placing a greater emphasis on individual motivational and perceptual processes.  Lyford Edwards 
(1927); Crane Brinton (1965); George Pettee (1938) each attempted to develop general theories of revolution as 
a type of social movement theory analysis of American and European revolutions; F.W. Voget 1956, 1959 
43 This is argued by: Kyriacos Markides 1974; Cemeron 1969; King 1956; Heberle 1951; Toch 1965; Smelser 
1963; Turner and Killian 1957; Rush and Denisoff 1971; Gusfield 1970 
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emphasize the importance of two broad factors in analyzing the origins of collective action: 
shifting political opportunities or environments and the formation of collective identity.   
As a result of the ambiguity inherent in the social movement literature, there are 
numerous definitions of social movements.  For example, Tarrow (1994) defines social 
movements as collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in 
sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities.  Della Porta and Diani (1999: 16) 
argue that social movements are informal networks, based on shared beliefs and solidarity, 
which mobilize, through the frequent use of various forms of protest.  Herbert Blumer (1951) 
argues that a social movement is essentially two or more people aligning their actions around 
a common goal as they seek to establish a new order of life.  He argues that in its beginning, a 
social movement is “amorphous, poorly organized, and without form; the collective behavior 
is on a primitive level, and the mechanisms of interaction are elementary; as a social 
movement develops, it takes on the character of a society.  It acquires organization and form, 
a body of customs and traditions, established leadership, an enduring division of labor, social 
rules and social values.”  
The purpose of social movements for Melucci and Avritzer (2000) is to provide 
representation for the unrepresented; Islamic fundamentalism does this.  Dubet and Thaler 
(2004) stress that social movements consist of organized actors who work against the status 
quo.  The status quo in much of the Islamic world has been westernization, lop-sided 
modernization, socioeconomic inequality, and sociopolitical inequality; fundamentalists work 
to change that status quo.  Munck (1995) defines social movements as strategic actors who 
operate concurrently in social and political institutional arenas against the established system; 
this is exactly what Islamic fundamentalists do.  Powell (1986) avoids the term “social 
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movement” altogether focusing instead on what he calls “extremist issue positions.”  There is 
not a more extremist issue position(s) than those of Islamic fundamentalists.  
In the social movement literature, Charles Tilly is considered one of the most 
important and influential of all social movement scholars.  In his (1982; 26) first published 
definition of a social movement, he defines it as a sustained series of interactions between 
power holders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking 
formal representation.  In later publications (1994: 7), he expands the definition by arguing 
that social movements consist of a sustained challenge to power holders in the name of a 
population living under the jurisdiction of those power holders by means of repeated public 
displays of that population’s numbers, commitment, unity, and worthiness.  Based on his 
definition of social movements, Islamic fundamentalist movements are social movements.  In 
nation-states with significant fundamentalist groups and/or powerful fundamentalist groups 
there are numerous interactions between the state and the fundamentalists who claim they 
speak on behalf of the Muslim masses.  We see this interaction with most Islamic 
fundamentalist movements, specifically, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and Hezbollah.  
Each of these will be explored in detail in the proceeding chapters.     
Social movements have been defined as a sustained challenge to power holders by a 
disadvantaged group or a population living under the jurisdiction or influence of those power 
holders (Tarrow 1996, 1994, 1993).  We see this throughout the Islamic world; it is 
oftentimes members of disadvantaged groups who turn to the fundamentalists, as shown by 
the case studies included here.  A fairly strong consensus has emerged among social 
movement scholars regarding the importance of the same three broad factors in analyzing the 
origins of collective action and/or social movements:  shifting political opportunities, 
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indigenous social networks, and the formation of collective identity.  Islamic fundamentalists 
do each of those three.  Islamic fundamentalists are named groups of citizens who have, more 
or less formally, banded together to pursue or resist social change, here I took McAdam 1996 
definition and exchanged the term social movement for Islamic fundamentalists.  Finally, 
each of these classic definitions of social movements is interchangeable with that of Islamic 
fundamentalism.   
There is a general agreement in the literature that social movements are products of 
social change; however, beyond this basic consensus in reference to origins, scholars of social 
movements differ in terms of their explanations of the movement’s conception, demise, and 
everything in between.  The most common approach used emerged out of Max Weber’s 
writing on bureaucracy (1958, 1978, and 1981) and Robert Michels’ studies of political 
parties (1962); Zald and Ash (1966) referred to this as the Weber-Michels model.44  It states 
that as a movement becomes organized in order to meet its objectives, certain phenomena are 
set into motion that tends to defeat its very objectives. The movement then becomes 
institutionalized; it loses its ideological momentum in favor of preserving its organizational 
structure and adapts to the general social environment, becoming a permanent fixture in it.45  
McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996:8) argue that most political movements and revolutions 
are set in motion by social changes that render the established political order more vulnerable 
and/or receptive to challenge.  This is highly apparent when looking at the Islamic world.  
Examples of this include, the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Lebanese civil war, the assassination 
                                                
44 Michels, Political Parties was first published in German in 1911; it was then published in English in the 
United States by Hearst International Library Company in 1915. According to Philip Cook (1971), at that time it 
seems to have had little effect on American scholars.  The book was reprinted by Free Press in 1949. It has since 
been republished by Crowell-Collier Publishing Company (1962) and by Dover Publications (1959).   
45 As argued by: Lipsky 1968; Sills 1957; Lomax 1962; Chapin and Tsouderos 1956; Zald and Denton 1963 
  59 
of Sadat, or natural phenomena such as the death of Arafat which facilitated the electoral 
success of Hamas.   
Members of any movement, in order to qualify as such, must subscribe to a set of 
beliefs which are distinct from those of the wider population.  Furthermore, those who 
subscribe to those beliefs must feel some degree of kinship with others within the 
movement’s structure.  Collective identity is a shared definition of a group that derives from 
its member’s common interests and solidarity (Taylor 1989).  Unknowingly and 
unintentionally, these social movement scholars are describing the membership of Islamic 
fundamentalist movements.  The Islamists facilitate membership in fundamentalist 
movements by concentrating on their shared Islamic identity with the masses and 
manipulating their shared socioeconomic and sociopolitical status or lack thereof.  Many 
authors argue that preexisting ties and mobilizing structures facilitate the emergence of 
collective action or social movements.46  Neil Stammers (1999) argues that social movements 
have typically been defined in the literature as collective actions constituted by individuals 
who share some common interest(s) and who also identify with one another.  Islamists count 
on this and manipulate it to their own benefit.  Previous research has shown that people join 
collective action mainly through interpersonal ties or informal networks.47  Since identities 
are created and shaped through social relations, networks play a crucial role.  People engage 
in collective action because they share certain norms and values related to a specific area of 
political contention.  In this way, participation in collective action is an identification 
                                                
46 For example: Gould 1995; Fernandez and McAdam 1986, 1988, 1988; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; McAdam, 
McCarthy and Zald 1988; Rosenthal et al. 1985; Snow, 1988 Snow, David A. (1988, 1992, 1999); Snow, Burke 
E. Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford (1986);  
47 As argued by: della Porta 1988; Could 1995; McAdam 1988; Snow 1988; Snow, David A. 1988, 1992, and 
1999; Snow, Burke E. Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford 1986; Tarrow 1994 
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process.48  Individuals with friends or acquaintances already involved in social movements 
are more inclined to take part in collective action.49  As the above Islamic fundamentalist 
literature makes clear, the ideas encompassing Islam are fundamental in the formation, 
duration, and success of Islamic fundamentalist movements.  They are acting just as the 
social movement scholars expect social movements would.   
Furthermore, McAdam and Su (2002) draw attention to the difference between 
sociologists and political scientists; they argue that political scientists are generally cynical 
about social movements having any independent outcome of their own.  Their argument can 
be summed up by the following statement, “if sociologists assume the impact of movements 
without testing for effects, political scientists, with few exceptions, continue to make the 
opposite error: assuming the ineffectuality of movements” (2002: 697).  Arguably, McAdam 
and Sue are correct; if one is to truly understand social movements, one must merge the ideas 
and objectives of the political scientists and sociologists.  Both political scientists and 
sociologists who look at Islamic fundamentalism make this same mistake.  For example, 
political scientists have largely focused on the resource aspect of social movements.  Fording 
(1979) finds that resources and a state’s liberalism appear to be most important in predicting 
elite (sociopolitical and socioeconomic) reactions to social movements.  Melucci and Avritzer 
(2000) argue that social movements are a natural result of increasing pluralism in 
                                                
48 For example Freeman 1978; McAdam 1982; Morris 1984; Calhoun 1989; Fernandez and McAdam 1989; 
Andrews 1991; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Whittier 1995; Melucci 1996 
49 For example Snow 1988; Snow, David A. 1988, 1992, and 1999; Snow, Burke E. Rochford, Steven K. 
Worden, and Robert D. Benford (986; McAdam 1986, 1988, 1996, and 2003; della Porta 1988, 1995; Gould 
1993; Kriesi 1993, 1996.  Collective action is significantly shaped by social ties between participants is not a 
recent discovery: numerous scholars have come to these same conclusions, for example: Pinard 1968; Booth and 
Babchuk 1969; Oberschall 1973; Pichvance 1975; Tilly 1978; Snow et al. 1980.  There have been a significant 
number of studies that has dealt with the processes of individual recruitment, for example: Oliver 1984; Kriesi 
1988; Opp 1989; Fernandez 1990 and McAdam 1982, 1988, and 1989; Knope and Wisely 1990; McAdam and 
Fernandez 1990; McPherson et al. 1992; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; McPherson and Rotolo 1996; Kittss 2000; 
Tindall 2000; Passy 2001.   
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contemporary society and are beginning to replace traditional forms of political participation, 
such as voting.   
I find that social movement conditions are facilitating Islamic fundamentalism; these 
social movement conditions are positively associated with increases in the number of Islamic 
fundamentalist movements present within majority-Islamic nation-state.  Furthermore, 
Islamic fundamentalist movements are caused by the same phenomena that facilitate social 
movements.  Islamic fundamentalist movements are clearly social movements, so long as the 
conditions within my fundamentalist labyrinth are met.  These include the resources found in 
Resource Mobilization theory, socio-economic inequality found in Marxism, political 
institutions and the socio-political structures found in Political Process theory, and the ideas 
found in the New Social Movement theory.        
Many scholars have looked at what determines a movement’s success or failure; 
however, most existing studies are framed explicitly in terms of the movement’s success.50  
Numerous scholars have looked at the consequences of social movements, which have mostly 
focused on the impact of movements on government policy or legislation.51  The social 
movement structure has also attracted significant scholarly attention,52 and there have also 
                                                
50 For Example: Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan 1992; Banaszak 1996; Brill 1971; Burstein, Einwohner, and 
Hollander 1995; Frey, dietz, and Kalof 1992; Gamson 1990; Goldstone 1980; Mirowsky and Ross 1981; 
Nickols 1987; Perrot 1987; Piven and Cloward 1979; Shorter and Tilly 1971; Steedly and Foley 1979.  Most of 
the existing studies are framed, explicitly or implicitly, in terms of success; for example; Amenta et al 1992, 
Banaszak 1996, Brill 1971, Burstein et al 1995, Frey et al 1992, Gamson 1990, Goldstone 1980, Mirowsky and 
Ross 1987, Nichols 1987, Perrot 1987, Piven and Cloward 1979, Shorter and Tilly 1971, Steedky and Foley 
1979.   
51 For Example: Amenta et al. 1992; Banaszak 1996; Burstein 1979, 1985; Burstein and Freudenurg 1978; 
Button 1978, 1989; Constain and Majstorovic 1994;Gelb 1989; Gelb and Palley 1987; Huberts 1989; 
MacDougal et al. 1995 
52 Studies in this area have focused on inter-organizational structure, in the form of coalition-building: Rucht 
1989; Diani 1990, 1995; Philips 1991; Hathaway and Meyer 1994; Sawer and Groves 1994; Ansell 1997, 2001.  
Or overlapping memberships: Rosenthal et al. 1985, 1997; Schmitt-Beck 1989; Diani 1995; Carroll and Ratner 
1996; Ray et al. 2001 
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been a large number of historical studies or surveys on social movements.53  The social 
movement literature has shown that participants in movements are more optimistic than non-
participants about the prospect of sociopolitical change and about the efficacy of their 
participation.54  The effectiveness of social movements depends on their ability to engage in 
bargaining activities with allies and opponents (Burstein, Einwohner, and Hollander 1995).   
Condition One: Marxism 
Building on Hegel, Marx saw history as a process wherein feudalism gave way to a 
capitalist order whose own development would produce a steadily growing proletariat 
(Bronner 1990: 247).  As the capitalist system expanded, the system further enslaved the 
proletariat.  Furthermore, in Marx’s The German Ideology of 1845, The Communist 
Manifesto, and A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, he explicitly shows that 
the political, social, and economic are one in the same (Mah, 1989: 116).  In other words, as 
the economy grows and develops, the social and political follow, this means that the state 
“should then be the servant of the bourgeoisie” (116).  In Marx’s writings, the peasantry is 
the most unrevolutionary of all social groups.  “Brutalized by centuries of exploitation and 
determined to maintain a small allotment of land, peasants were incapable of forming a 
coherent class” (Mah, 118).  In The Class Struggle in France Marx (1985) peasants, acting 
                                                
53 There have been numerous studies that look at the historical aspects of social movements, for example: 
Anderson (1967), Belchem 1990, Bennett 2003, Blackstock 2000, Caramani 2003, Chandhoke 2002, Farrell 
2000, Glenn 1984, Jarman 1997, Keck, Margaret, and Sikkink 1998, Mirala 2000, Perez-Stable 1993, della 
Porta 1998, Robert 1996. The following looked at the policing, surveillance, and repression of social 
movements: for example see: Balbus 1973; Broeker 1990, Calhoun 1995, Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003, 
Emsley 1983, Emsly and Weinberger 1991, Fillieule 1997, Goldstein 1983, 2000, 2001, Gurr 2000, Huggins 
1985, 1998, Liang 1992, Ludtke 1989, 1992, Mungere 1979, 1981, Palmer 1988, Storch 1976, Wilson 1960. For 
particular countries and periods, some general historical surveys of social movements as such do exist: For 
example see: Aminzade 1993, Armstrong 1989, Ash 1972, Birmingham 1993, Black 1969, Bright and Harding 
1984, Burke 1988, Carter 2003, Castells 1983, Clark 1959, Clark, Grayson, and Grayson 1975, Fredrickson 
1997, Gamson 1990, Hanagan 1998, 2002, Hoerder 1977, Hunt 1978, 1984, Kaplan 1992, Kriesi, Koopmans, 
Duyvendak and Giugni 1995, della Porta 1995, Tarrow 1996, Tilly 1975, 2003 
54 This includes African Americas between 1930 and 1970 (McAdam 1982), riot participants of the 1960s 
(forward and Williams 1970, Paige 1971, Seeman 1975) and European social movement protests in the 1980s 
(Finkel et al. 1989, Klandermans 1984, Opp 1988).     
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collectively constituted nothing more than a “sack of potatoes;” no revolution can stem from 
this class.    
Karl Marx was correct when he argues that individuals get involved in collective 
action when their social class has reached its breaking point; they will then unite against their 
antagonists and forcibly change the sociopolitical and socioeconomic institutions of the 
state.55  Hunt (1984) argues that Marxism contains two theories of the state.  First, the state is 
completely controlled by the dominant class.  Marx and Engels wrote in the Communist 
Manifesto, “the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common 
affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (Mah, 1989).  Secondly, Hunt (1984: 27) calls the second 
theory the “parasite state.”  Here the state is an autonomous entity that lives off of the 
resources of civil society.  Marx wrote in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte that 
“This appalling parasitic growth enmeshed the body of French society like a net that chokes 
on its pores” (Mah 1989: 116).  In both of these examples, the state dominates the people; 
they are forced to act collectively.  Furthermore, Marx argues that if the state oppresses, 
enslaves, and ignores the masses long enough, they will revolt.  He viewed the history of all 
society as a history of class struggles.  In sum, oppressed classes would mobilize around 
common conditions against the power of the dominant class via socioeconomic and 
sociopolitical oppression and consequently, they will forcibly change those socio-economic 
institutions that had previously oppressed them.  Thus, from Marx we see that the power of 
the politically powerless and economically deprived is rooted in their ability to stop the 
smooth flow of social life.  Nowhere is this more apparent than in the acts of Islamic 
fundamentalists.    
                                                
55 According to Marx there is no separation between those individuals who dominate economics with those who 
dominate politics 
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Michael Burawoy (1982:59) argues that it was not the proletarianized factory workers 
but artisans threatened by modern industry or craft workers facing deskilling who were the 
backbone of the most militant struggles of the 19th century Europe.  The transformation of the 
labor process has political repercussions beyond the factory.  Gareth Stedman Jones (1975) 
argues that the demolition of skilled workers is fundamental when looking at England after 
1850.  New forms of politics emerge when workers were stripped of their control over the 
production and replaced by modern machinery (Burawoy 1982: 10).   Patrick Joyce (1980) 
explored Stedman Jones’s argument and showed that, where labor is transformed from a 
subject guiding production into a object dominated by production, there is a increase in 
resistance (Burawoy 1982: 10).  This is exactly was going on in the Islamic world; the 
modernization process and the influx of Western materials facilitated the rise of Islamic 
militancy.    
Burawoy (1982: 13) argues that enacting legislation is just one example of the state 
acting against the economic interests of the dominant classes in order to protect their political 
interests in the reproduction of the capitalist order.  Marx and Engels argue that the only 
political interests of the bourgeoisie are to maintain the external conditions of the capitalist 
economy.  Baran and Sweezy in Monopoly Capital (1966) argue that the significant problem 
in the advanced capitalist economy was not the falling rate of profit, as Marx argues in 
Capital, but the absorption of surplus.  In the pursuit of profit, large corporations were 
producing more than could be consumed.   
Socioeconomic inequality is an integral part of my theory; however, I deviate from 
Marx insofar as the fundamentalists in the Islamic nation-states are not factory workers or 
involved in industrialization.  My theory is that it is the middle-to-lower classes are the 
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significant socioeconomic group who collectively seek institutional and socioeconomic 
change, via the fundamentalist movement.  However, they are still educated and act 
collectively via relative deprivation.  According to Runciman (1966), Gurr (1970), and 
Siddharth Chandra (2005) relative deprivation is the difference between the value expectation 
and the value capability of the individual.  Chandra (2005: 303) argues that the larger the 
difference between these two values, the greater the resulting discontent and the likelihood 
that this discontent, if felt by a large number of individuals will be manifested as upheaval.  
Karl Marx said in Relation to Wage-Labor in Capital that “A house may be large or small; as 
long as the neighboring houses are likewise small, it satisfies all social requirement for a 
residence. But let there arise next to the little house a palace, and the little house shrinks to a 
hut. The little house now makes it clear that its inmate has no social position at all to 
maintain, or but a very insignificant one; and however high it may shoot up in the course of 
civilization, if the neighboring palace rises in equal of even in greater measure, the occupant 
of the relatively little house will always find himself more uncomfortable, more dissatisfied, 
more cramped within his four walls.”  This is exactly what is going on in the Islamic world.  
Education helps the masses recognize they are being deprived of socioeconomic and 
sociopolitical equality and freedom and they either turn to or join Islamic fundmantalist 
movements.  The catalysts for the lower classes to collectively act are the Islamic 
fundamentalists who understand relative deprivation and they provide the lower classes 
spiritual, financial, and educational support.  I base this argument on the fact that the Islamic 
world has, for the most part, limited industrialization.   
The earliest social movement theorists, specifically Marx and Engels, saw conflict 
inscribed in the structure of society.  It would not have occurred to Marx and Engels to ask 
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what makes individuals engage in collective action; they would have posed the problem as an 
outcome of society’s structural and institutional evolution rather than one of individual 
choice.  Resource mobilization theorists criticized Marxism for underrating the resources 
needed to engage in collective action, its cultural dimensions, and the importance of politics.  
Marx answered the question of how individuals get involved in collective action largely in 
historically determined terms: people will engage in collective action when their social class 
comes into fully developed contradiction with its antagonists (proletariat vs. bourgeoisie).  In 
the case of the proletariat, this meant when capitalism forced them into large-scale factories 
where they lost the ownership of their resources.  Marx dealt with a problem that has worried 
activists ever since, why members of a group who should revolt often fail to do so.  
Concerned with the problem that the workers’ movement could not succeed without the 
cooperation of a significant proportion of its members, he developed the theories of false 
consciousness and relative deprivation.  The traditional theories of social movements 
(including Marxism) were seen as relatively rare, discontents were transitory, movement and 
institutionalized actions were sharply distinct, and movement actors were arational if not 
outright irrational.  The resource mobilization theorists and political process theorists 
dramatically challenged these assumptions.  
Condition Two: Resource Mobilization 
At its foundation, resource mobilization theory encompasses the idea that resources 
make a difference to the mobilization and success of social movements. 56  Also, the 
participants in social movements are inherently rational.  Resource Mobilization theory is 
based on an elite model of power; political power is concentrated in the hands of a minority.  
                                                
56 The following scholars argued this: Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978; McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Gamson 
1975; Jenkins 1981; Useem 1980; Paige 1975; Schwartz 1976; Ash-Garner 1977; Piven and Cloward 1977. 
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Its theorists stress the importance of political resources and institutions for movement 
outcomes; they suggest a link between changes in the political environment that offer social 
resources and the rise and success of movements.  The foundation of resource mobilization 
theory is the belief that resources matter in the formation and success of social movements.  
Arguably, Gamson’s (1968, 1975, and 1990) work has most forcefully put forward the basic 
tenets of resource mobilization theory.  In particular, he highlights the necessity of a social 
movement to have a strong organization, which facilitates the movement’s success.  John 
McCarthy and Mayer Zald (1977) argue that resources (money and labor) are crucial to 
understand social movement activity; resources are necessary to facilitate social conflict, and 
they must be aggregated from collective purposes.  But, resource aggregation requires some 
minimal form of organization.  Anthony Oberschall (1973) echoes this, arguing that social 
organization and integration, rather than grievances and discontent, are most conducive to a 
social movements participant’s behavior.  Oberschall argues that the dissolution of traditional 
social bonds and the lack of new forms of integration are the preconditions for collective 
action.  Thus, resource mobilization tries to explain why individuals and groups are aggrieved 
and why they protest when they do. 
What makes resource mobilization theory different from previous explanations of 
social movements is that it focuses on societal breakdown(s).  In order to mobilize politically, 
groups require resources and they must mobilize their resources, that is, use them or put them 
into effect.  Resources can be anything from material resources, such as jobs, incomes, 
savings, and the right to material goods and services, to nonmaterial resources such as, 
authority, moral commitment, trust, friendship, skills, and habits of industry.57  He adds that 
                                                
57 McCarthy and Zald (1977) defined resources as money, facilities, labor, and legitimacy; Tilly (1978) defines 
resources as land, labor, capital, and technical expertise.  Freeman (1979) distinguished tangible assets such as 
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individuals manage their resources in completely different ways:  they exchange some 
resources for other resources, they make up resource deficits by borrowing resources, and 
they recall their earlier investments.  Resources are constantly being created, consumed, 
transferred, assembled, reallocated, exchanged, and even lost.  I define resources here as 
money and population; however, I deviate from the above mentioned resource mobilization 
theorists by also including education as a resource.  Arguably, there is not a more valuable 
resource than that of a nation-state’s educational level, especially in the Islamic world.  
Resource mobilization theorists are correct in their critique of the Marxists; resources on both 
the group and state level are imperative for a movement’s formation and success.   
Resource mobilization theory emphasizes the relationships between the movement, its 
actions, the rationality of movement actors, the strategic problems confronted by movements, 
and the role of movements as agencies for social change.  At its foundation rests the 
assumption that the movement’s actions and, in turn, its members are rational.58  Participants 
in Islamic social movements are rational, although westerners often cast Islamic tactics and 
supporters are inherently irrational, specifically as it relates to terrorism or suicide terrorism.  
However, they are utilizing what little they have for their movement’s success.  Islamic 
fundamentalists do not need instant gratification; they plan ahead and rationally think through 
their actions, possible results, ramifications, and they choose the plan that gives them the 
highest possible payoffs via cost-benefit calculations.  Westerners may not agree with acts of 
terrorism, specifically, suicide terrorism; however, they must acknowledge that they are 
rational acts.   
                                                                                                                                                  
money, facilities, and means of communication from the intangible or “human” assets that form the central basis 
for movements (these include organizing and legal skills, and the unspecialized labor of supporters, and their 
time).    
58 As argued by: Gamson: 1968, 1975, 1990; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978; McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; 
Jenkins 1981; Useem 1980; Paige 1975; Schwartz 1976; Ash-Garner 1977; Piven and Cloward 1977 
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Jenkins and Perrow’s (1977: 264) study on the protest behavior of farm workers in the 
United States between 1946 and 1972 found that farm workers, who are a relatively 
powerless and a resource-poor group, were not able to organize themselves effectively.  
These workers needed help before they could mount an effective campaign.  However, 
success only occurred when liberal political elites took over the struggle after which the their 
boycott was effective and they were able to force the farm owners to the bargaining table.  
This is a perfect example of the power a relatively powerless group has when they utilize 
their resources or gain new resources.  Resource mobilization theorists have seen social 
movements as extensions of institutionalized actions and have restricted their focus to 
movements of institutional change that attempt to alter elements of the social structure 
(McCarthy and Zald 1977).  Furthermore, they organize previously unorganized groups 
against institutional elites (Gamson 1975), or represent the interests of groups excluded from 
the political system (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Tilly 1978, 1979). 
Traditional social movement theorists have emphasized sudden increases in short-
term grievances created by the “structural strains” of rapid social change led to and/or 
facilitated individuals to turn to social movements (Gusfield 1968, 1982).  However, resource 
mobilization theorists have argued that grievances are secondary.  Tilly (1978), Jenkins and 
Perrow (1977), and Oberschall (1978) argue that grievances are relatively constant, deriving 
from structural conflicts of interest built into social institutions and that movements form 
because of long-term changes in group resources, organization, and opportunities for 
collective action.         
The main pioneers of resource mobilization theory were significantly influenced by 
Olson’s (1968) collective action problem, and the rational actor model which underlay it. 
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Olson was the most prominent rational actor theorist; all the fundamental key resource 
mobilization texts make some reference to Olson, and many make quite explicit reference to 
him (Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978; Junkins 1983).  Olson outlined a concept and/or definition 
of a public good: as a public good is an item and/or phenomena that individuals cannot 
consume individually or keep to themselves.  Also, it generally entails some collective effort 
to achieve it.  Olson argues that if the benefits of a collective good cannot be withheld from 
non-participants, rational individuals are motivated to free ride on the contributions of others.  
Furthermore, he argues, that this temptation would have to be divided up among more people, 
and any one person’s contribution would be less likely to make a noticeable difference in the 
outcome.  Thus, participation in collective action is irrational.   
What characterizes a public good is when members of a given population stand to 
gain something from them, whether or not they do anything to help achieve them.59  
Consequently, one would predict that no one would pursue public goods.  Of all the resource 
mobilization theorists, Oberschall (1973) is most explicit regarding both his appropriation of 
the work of Olson and his critiques of it.  He accepts Olson’s basic model of the actor and his 
rational self-interested behavior.  However, Oberschall invokes Olson’s notion of selective 
incentives, which, he argues, are more than sufficient to draw a rational actor into a collective 
struggle.  Oberschall (1973:116) argues that Olson’s theory does not imply individual goods 
and selective incentives are not also present in group formation, yet it is precisely individual 
goods and selective incentives that can account for the emergence of leaders and activists.   
Oberschall drew a distinction between leaders of movements and rank and file 
activists.  In the case of rank and file, Oberschall argues, incentives are often provided or 
                                                
59 For example, a woman may join the suffragette movement and fight for the right to vote or she may do 
nothing and still get the right to vote because others are fighting for it.  In other words, she takes a free ride and 
suffers no consequence  
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mobilized by leaders.  Leaders can reward with praise or value goods, which can, under 
certain circumstances, punish the inactive.  In other words, leaders significantly matter.60  
Furthermore, Oberschall adds to Olson’s model by providing a means of examining the 
relationship between broad structural shifts in society and the various forms of political 
mobilization which sometimes accompany it. This is similar to the Oberschall (1973) critique 
of Olson; however he too falls short.  Oberschall draws a distinction between leaders of 
movements and rank-and-file activists.  In the case of rank-and-file, Oberschall argues, 
incentives are often provided or mobilized by leaders.  Leaders can reward with praise or 
value goods, for example, and can, under certain circumstances, punish the inactive.  In other 
words, leaders significantly matter. This is particularly true in Islamic movements, leaders are 
fundamental.  Leaders or a ruling hierarchy indicate structure.  This in turn guarantees power 
transition from within the movement and helps to eliminate instability.  Also, a leader 
provides a unifying face to the movement, facilitating unity among the movement’s members.  
Leadership would still fall under resources because the followers of a religious leader are a 
resource which is apparent in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and Hezbollah.   
Olson (1968) makes a valid point when he asserts that the benefits of a collective 
good cannot be withheld from non-participants; rational individuals are motivated to free ride 
on the contributions of others.  Thus, participation in collective action is irrational.  In other 
words, members of Islamic societies benefit from the collective actions of Islamic 
fundamentalists insofar as the actions bring collective benefits.  Thus, it would be rational for 
a Muslim individual to sit back and simply enjoy the benefits the fundamentalist movements 
                                                
60 Tilly (1999, 270) argues that it is possible that the major effects of social movements will have little or 
nothing to do with the public claims their leaders make.  The role leadership plays in movement causation has 
not received much attention from political process theorists; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988:716 argue that 
movement leadership is a matter of common sense not requiring theoretical analysis.  Aldon Morris argues that 
movement leadership is an important complex phenomenon that affects the origins and outcomes of movements.   
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provide.  However, this is not the case.  Olson’s collective action arguments do not take into 
account religion or the foundations of Islam that teach its adherents that it is their duty as 
citizens and as Muslims to collectively act for the greater good of Islamic society.  So while 
resources must be present for Islamic fundamentalism to exist in a nation-state, it alone is not 
enough.  In conclusion, the resources associated with resource mobilization theory are 
positively associated with Islamic fundamentalism.         
Condition Three: Political Process 
Political process theory is a response to resource mobilization theory.  The foundation 
of resource mobilization theory rests on the idea that resources make a difference to the 
mobilization and success of social movements.  Political process theory criticizes resource 
mobilization theory for neglecting the fact that social movements develop and act in both 
sociopolitical arenas and governmental institutions and significantly influence the trajectories 
of social movements (Eisinger 1974; Kitschelt 1986; McAdam 1999, 1982; and Tarrow 
1989).  Political process theorists argue that resource mobilization theory falls short because 
it assumes that social organization, integration, and resources, rather than grievances, 
discontent, and sociopolitical institutions are most important to a social movement’s 
participants.  Islamic fundamentalists would agree that the structure, organization, and 
resources are important to a social movement; however, their importance is conditional on the 
phenomena that facilitate the movement.  Those phenomena are specifically the grievances, 
discontent, and sociopolitical institutional inequality that lay at the heart of political process 
theory.  In other words, resource mobilization theorists are putting the cart before the horse; a 
movement cannot have resources until it has grievances.  As previous research has shown, 
Islamic fundamentalists have a very long list of socioeconomic and sociopolitical grievances.   
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Political process theory argues that changing opportunities help explain why 
movements emerge at one point in time rather than another; the differences in political 
opportunities help explain why movements are successful in some countries or reigns and not 
in others.  The political process model claims that social movements occur when expanding 
political opportunities are seized by individuals who are formally or informally organized, 
angry, and optimistic that they can successfully facilitate change in the existing sociopolitical 
structure and institutions.  This is exactly what Islamic fundamentalist movements do.  As the 
governments of Islamic nation-states open their political institutions, Islamists seize the 
opportunity to challenge the existing political system while facilitating collective action, 
doing exactly as political process theorists predict.  
These challengers are often excluded from routine decision-making processes because 
their bargaining power is weak.  The political environment is often seen as playing a crucial 
role in the dynamics that lead social movements to produce policy change; in other words, it 
acts as the catalyst.61  The view held by the political process approach is that social 
movements essentially target political authorities and institutions because they are mainly 
aimed at provoking political change (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1998; 
Tilly 1984).  The political process approach to social movements has stressed the role of 
political opportunities for a social movement’s emergence, development, and outcomes.62  
Changes in the configuration of power among parties modify the structure of political 
alliances, which are seen as a crucial resource for social movements to reach their goals.63  
Based on all of this, Islamic fundamentalist movements form, behave, and respond to and 
                                                
61 As argued by: Barkan 1984; Goldstone 1980; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1982, 1983; Piven and 
Cloward 1979, 1983; Schumaker 1975 
62 For Example: Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam 1999; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978 
63 For Example: della Porta 1996; della Porta and Rucht 1995; Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow 1998 
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facilitate change just as political process theorists say social movements do.  Therefore, 
Islamic fundamentalist movements should be considered social movements through the eyes 
of political process theory.      
Furthermore, the foundation of political process theory is the concept of a political 
opportunity structure, an idea that participation in protest activities can lead to increased 
representation.64  Changing political opportunities help explain why social movements 
emerge at one point in time, rather than another; also, the differences in political 
opportunities help explain why movements are successful in some countries or regions and 
not others.65  Numerous scholars were inspired by Tilly (1978, 1986, and 1995) and his 
argument that political opportunity structures both constrain and enable a movement’s 
mobilization.66  The broadest definition of political opportunity structure makes the argument 
tautological: Movements cannot emerge where people are unable to associate with one 
another for political purposes (Goodwin, 2004).  Tarrow (1998, 1994) defines political 
opportunity structures as being composed of both opportunities and constraints.  Eisinger 
(1974) and Tarrow (1998, 1994) suggest that movements tend to emerge and flourish in 
periods when opportunities are being expanded; they found that that people join social 
movements in response to political opportunities and then, through collective action, create 
new ones.  The is exactly what happens with Islamic fundamentalist movements and why I 
expect to see more fundamentalist movements in the middle of the political ideological scale, 
and not at the two furthest extremes, perfect democracies or perfect autocracies.     
                                                
64 As argued by: Brocett 1991; Costain 1992; Della Porta 1995, 1999; these views in turn shaped the 
opportunities for different forms of protest: Duyvendak 1995; Kitschelt 1986; Koopmans 1995; Kriesi et al 
1995; McAdam et al. 1996; Meyer 1993; Rucht 1994; Tarrow 1989, 1998.  Tarrow 1989, 1993: Participation in 
protest activities can lead to the expansion of the repertoire of the legitimate forms of political participation. 
65 As Argued by: Koopmans and Ruchet; Shorter and Tilly (1974); Tilly (1978, 1986, 1995) 
66 As argued by: Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1998 
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The political process model stresses the importance of the movement’s larger 
environment on the movement’s eventual outcome; it specifically looks at protest behavior.67  
Tarrow (1998, 1994) argues that contentious politics occurs when ordinary people join forces 
in confrontation with elites, authorities and opponents.  Contentious politics are produced 
when political opportunities broaden, when they demonstrate the potential for alliances, and 
when they reveal their opponents vulnerability.68  According to Tarrow, increasing access to 
power, realignments in the political system, conflicts among elites and the availability of 
allies give social movement participants the incentives to act contentiously and create 
sociopolitical opportunities for themselves.  In other words, structural conditions facilitate 
protests.  However, Tarrow adds that protesters may not have enough solidarity and collective 
identity to take advantage of the opportunity; also, the authorities must also be willing to 
change policy.69   Tarrow is correct; we have seen this type of behavior throughout the 
Islamic world.  The political process model stresses the importance of the movement’s larger 
environment on the eventual outcome of the movement; this is of the utmost importance 
when looking at Islamic social movements.    
Protest event analysis provides a way of measuring the effects that political 
opportunities have on protests.70  The view held by the political process approach is that 
social movements essentially target political authorities and institutions; their main objective 
is political change.  Piven and Cloward (1979) point to the important constraining role of 
institutions; they maintain that protest is more likely to have a real impact when challengers 
                                                
67 For Example: Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al 1995; McAdam 1982; Rochon and Mazmanian 1993; Tarrow 1998 
68 The following looked at the extent to which political opportunities exist to form a movement: Kriesi et al. 
1995; McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1996; McAdam Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978).  
Dahl 1961, 1967: Argues that moderation in politics is more effective than disruption 
69 This was stressed must forcefully by Tarrow (1989, 1993, 1998), among others (Della Porta 1996; Della Porta 
and Rucht 1995; Kriesi et al 1995.   
70 As argued by: Koopmans and Ruchet; Shorter and Tilly 1974; Tilly 1978, 1996, 1995 
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have a central role in institutions and when powerful allies have a stake in those institutions.  
Useem and Useem (1979) defined protest as collective actions oriented toward altering a 
social condition shared by a large number of individuals and are not limited to traditional 
forms of formal political expression.  Marco Giugni (2004) looks at the effects of disruptive 
and violent protest behavior; he reopens the debate in the literature about whether the use of 
disruptive tactics by social movements is more likely to bring about policy change than the 
use of moderate tactics.  One of his main contributions to the literature is the idea that the 
institutional arenas interact to place them in a better position to influence policy.  Amenta, 
Carruthers, and Zylan (1992) found significant support for the claim that political 
opportunities mediate the relationship between social movements and their policy outcomes.   
Protests often seem to increase during periods of reform and economic upturn.  In 
fact, political process research emerged out of the context of civil unrest, particularly among 
the black population in the United States in the late 1960s (Eisinger 1973).  Eisinger was 
interested in the use of protests among minority and deprived groups; he found that protests 
occur more frequently in cities where the political structure is closed and offers few 
opportunities for participation to minorities and deprived groups; in other words, exclusion 
facilitates protest.71  Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly (1975) argue that collective action is the result of 
what they call “breakdown theories” which stress the role that grievance, discontent, the 
                                                
71 Previous studies have found: for example, Kelly and Snyder (1980): suggested that there is no causal 
relationship between the frequency and severity of violence displayed in American cities during the 1960s ad the 
distribution of black socioeconomic gains at the local level, either by income level or by employment and 
occupational changes.  Feagin and Hahn (1973): looked at ghetto riots and found they led to limited reform but 
did lead to police policies; however, the authors do not provide systematic evidence for their argument.  Welch 
(1975) has shown that the riots led to an increase in urban expenditures for control and punishment of rioters, 
which is obviously much less in their favor.  Colby (1975) findings contradicted Welch: he found that riots had a 
positive influence on redistribution policy, though no influence on regulatory policy at the state level.  Jennings 
(1979) found some support for a positive correlation between the number of riots and the increase in recipients 
of Aid to families with Dependent Children (AFDC). 
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feelings of frustration and deprivation has in facilitating collective behavior.72  Gamson 
(1990) focuses on the effectiveness of violence; one of the major findings of his study is that 
the use of violence is often correlated with a movement’s success.73  Furthermore, he found 
that groups with single-issue demands were more successful than groups with multiple-issue 
demands.  Incentives were all positively correlated with success; also, the use of violence and 
disruptive tactics were associated with success.  Finally, successful groups tended to be more 
bureaucratized, centralized, and escape factionalism.74     
In the Islamic world, protests often seem to increase during periods of reform and 
economic upturn; this has occurred in Lebanon, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Palestine, just to name a 
few.  Eisinger (1973) may have been describing the African-Americans in the United States 
in the 1960s; however, his results partially explain the Islamic world and the rise and success 
of Islamic fundamentalist movements.  As we will see, Islamic protests occur more often in 
                                                
72 As argued by: Gurr 1970; Kornhauser 1959; Smelser 1962; Turner and Killian 1957. On the other hand: 
“Group theories” emphasize the role of social networks, organization, resources, and opportunities. As argued 
by: McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973; Tarrow 1998; Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975.   
73 The following share Gamson’s conclusion: McAdam 1983; Mirowsky and Ross 1981; Steedly and Foley 
1979; Tarrow 1998; Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975; Frey, Dietz, and Kalof 1992; Mirowsky and Ross 1981.  
Gamson’s findings have been backed up Mirowsky and Ross (1981) and Steedly and Foley (1979) and 
Goldstone (1980).  Goldston (1980) reanalyzed Gamson’s data and cast doubts over his findings and has pointed 
to a perspective on social movement outcomes that takes into account their broader political context.  The 
effectiveness of disruptive protest and movements has been analyzed thoroughly in the aftermath of the urban 
riots of the 1960s in the United States (Gurr 1980, Isaac and Kelly 1981; Piven and Cloward 1993). The effects 
of violence in the United States in the 1960s were looked at by Hahn 1970; Mueller 1978; Isaac and Kelly 1981; 
Kelly and Snyder 1980; Sears and McConahay 1973).   
74 On the other hand, Snyder and Tilly 1972 found that increases in hardship do not lead to increases in protest 
movements.  Berkowitz (1974) looked at socioeconomic changes at the neighborhood level brought about by 
ghetto riots between 1960 and 1970 and found no improvement, arguing against a positive effect of the violence 
(also see Levitan Johnston, and Taggart 1975).  Piven and Cloward (1993) found that turmoil and disruptive 
actions do provoke policy change.  A series of studies done in the 1970s and 1980s attempted to reexamine this 
argument: Albritton 1979; Betz 1974; Colby 1982; Hicks and Swank 1983; Isaac and Kelly 1981; Jennings 
1979, 1980, 1983; Schramm and Turbott 1983; Sharp and Maynard-Moody 1991 Taft and Ross (1969) found 
little evidence, based on their study of violent labor conflicts in the United States through 1968, that violence 
would help unions achieve their goals.  Snyder and Kelly (1976) reached a similar conclusion; by analyzing 
quantitative data on strikes that occurred in Italy, they were able to show that violent strikes were less successful 
than peaceful ones.  Dahl (1961, 1967) argues that moderation in politics is more effective than disruption.  
These results contradict those obtained by Shorter and Tilly (1971), who found that the use of strikes in France 
had a positive correlation between the use of violence and a movement’s success.  Research on strike activity 
has gone beyond the specific question of disruption or violence to examine broader issues related to the 
industrial conflict (Cohn 1993; Franzosi 1994; Shorter and Tilly 1974; Snyder and Kelly 1976). 
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cities where the political structure is closed and offers few opportunities for participation; 
exclusion leads to protest.  The members of Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Hezbollah 
would agree with Gamson (1990) that the use of violence is very effective.  Furthermore, 
Islamic fundamentalist movements with single-issue demands are much more successful than 
movements with multiple-issue demands.  Finally, successful Islamic movements are often 
more bureaucratized, centralized, and tended to escape factionalism; Hamas Hezbollah, and 
the Muslim Brotherhood all show this.    
Many of the critics of political process theory argue that culture plays a significant 
part in the origins and development of social movements.75  There have been few studies on 
the cultural aspects of movements except for the individual level consequences of 
participation in social movements and activism, on which there is a considerable amount of 
literature.76  One of the central themes running through the literature on social movements 
during the past decade is the observation that identity is a pivotal concept in attempting to 
understand movement dynamics.77  The core of all Islamic fundamentalist movements is 
Islamic identity.  Numerous social movement studies have shown that movement 
participation almost always modifies and sometimes even transforms participant identities; in 
other words, movement identities reflect experience in a movement as much as pre-existing 
identities.78  What makes many Islamic fundamentalist movements durable and successful is 
                                                
75 These critics include: Fantasia 1988; Snow et al. 1986; Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Morris and Mueller 1992; 
Jasper 1997; and Johnston and Klandermans 1995 
76 For Example: Abramowitz ad Nassi 1981, Demerath et al 1971, Frendrich 1974, 1977; Fendrich and Krauss 
1978; Fendrich and Lovoy 1988; Fendrich and Tarlau 1973; Jennings 1987; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Marwell 
et al 1987; McAdam 1988, 1989, 1998; Nassi and Abramowitz 1979; Whalen and Flacks 1980  
77 For Example: Garner 1996; Darnovsky, Epstein, and Flacks 1995; Taylor and Raeburn 1995; also, insurgent 
identities (Gould 1995), and identity movements (Gamson 1995) 
78 Hunt and Benford 1994; McAdam 1988; Snow and Machelek 1984; Turner and Killian 1972.  Melucci (1985) 
found that the concept of collective identity refers to the agreed upon definition of membership, boundaries, and 
activists for the group.  Taylor and Whittier (1992) defines collective identity as a shared definition of a group 
deriving from common interests, experiences, and solidarity, involving a we-feeling and this is sustained 
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their ability to transform participants’ identities.  Members often join fundamentalist 
movements to oppose sociopolitical norms, their socioeconomic status, or to revolt against 
the status quo.  It is after they join the Islamists that their identities are transformed into true 
fundamentalists.  Furthermore, Muslims who participate in Islamic fundamentalist social 
movements do not discriminate, they welcome all participants to help with their movement 
and often time their basic goals consist of opening political institutions, sociopolitical 
equality, university education, or socioeconomic mobility.  Even the most secular individual 
often joins a fundamentalist movement because of what they promise for him and his 
children.  Once involved in the movement, these individuals (or at the very least their 
children) are often transformed into ideologues.    
Political process theorists argue that changing opportunities help explain why 
movements emerge at one point in time rather than another; differences in political 
opportunities help explain why movements are successful in some countries or regions and 
not others.  Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly (1975); Gurr (1970); Kornhauser (1959); Smelser (1962); 
Turner and Killian (1957) argue that collective action arises as a result of an individual’s 
grievances, discontent, and frustration toward their government and state institutions.  These 
                                                                                                                                                  
through interaction in movement communities.  As many scholars have pointed out, people engage in collective 
action because they share certain norms and values related to a specific area of political contention.  In this 
perspective, participation in collective action is an identification process (For Example: Freeman 1973; 
McAdam 1982; Morris 1984; Calhoun 1989; Fernandez and McAdam 1989; Andrews 1991; McAdam and 
Paulsen 1993; Whittier 1995; Melucci 1996).  Johnston, Larana, and Gusfield (1994, 14) defines collective 
identity as a shared definition of a group deriving from common interests, experiences, and solidarity, involving 
a we-feeling, constructs, activated, and sustained through interaction in movement communities (also see Taylor 
and Whittier 1992).  Alberto Melucci (1989, 1996) sees the collective identity as the movement and the 
movement itself as the process.  V Taylor(1989, 771): provides a concise definition of collective identity in her 
studies of women’s movements: “Collective identity is the shared definition of a group that derives from its 
members common interests and solidarity.  Lofland’s (1995) argues that identities are developed and sustained 
through models of behavior, objects, and narratives combined in specific ritual forms, as well as artifacts, 
events, narratives, and places that have symbolic significance for sustaining an identity.  Many studies have 
shown, individuals with friends or acquaintances already involved in social movements are more inclined to take 
part in collective action (for example Snow et al. 1980; McAdam 1986, 1988; della Porta 1988, 1995; Gould 
1993; Kriesi 1993).   
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challengers are often excluded from routine decision-making processes because their 
bargaining power is weak.  The political environment is often seen as playing a crucial role in 
the dynamics that lead social movements to produce policy change.  This is especially true in 
the Islamic world because Westernization, modernization, Americanization, poverty, 
socioeconomic inequality, and a lack of democracy all facilitates Islamic collective behavior, 
specifically rise and success of Islamic fundamentalists.  The intellectual and political 
foundations of Islamic fundamentalist’s are the promise to liberate their nation’s masses from 
the oppression and degradation they face at the hands of their state leaders, Americanization, 
Westernization, and modernization.   
Condition Four: New Social Movements 
New Social Movements is the newest paradigm in the social movement literature, and 
it emerged in the advanced industrial world after the social protests of the 1960s and 1970s 
subsided.  New social movement theorists argue that recent social movements represent an 
entirely new form of social protest and reflect specific properties of advanced industrial 
societies with new goals and values.79  According to Kriesi et al. (1995) and Beck (1986), 
new social movements have certain objectives in common; in particular, ecology, antinuclear, 
and peace movements have the common goal of criticizing and fighting the risks brought by 
an increasing use of technology in society, be it nuclear energy, nuclear arms, or other 
industrial technologies.  One of the pillars to the New-Social Movement literature is that of 
the religious-right or extreme-right.  Interesting, the connection between this aspect of the 
New Social Movement literature and Islamic fundamentalism is paramount.  In Europe and 
North America the radical/religious right plays a significant role in influencing both domestic 
                                                
79 For Example: Cohen (1985: 664); Klaus Eder, (1985); Habermas 1981: 33; Kitschelt 1981: 274; Melucci 
1980: 789-791; Offee 1985: 820-821 
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issues and national politics, very similar to that of Islamic fundamentalism.  Furthermore, the 
radical/religious right acts as an outside ideological influence in the creation and duration of 
some European and North American social movements and politics.              
New social movement scholars explain the emergence and nature of the recent 
movements by explaining grievances which they argue arise from the structural conditions of 
postindustrial societies.  They argue that recent social movements represent an entirely new 
form of social protest and reflect specific properties of advanced industrial democracies.  The 
redistributive policies of the welfare state secured a level of prosperity capable of satisfying 
basic human needs.  Kriesi (1989) argues that in the United States, the significant degree of 
liberalism and dissent that the educated middle class expressed since the late 1960s led a 
number of social movement theorists to develop a new theory of a social movements.  
According to this theory, a new class of educated workers has embarked on a struggle for 
power and status against a still dominant old class of business owners and executives.  In 
sum, social movements are manifestations against the structural arrangements of advanced 
capitalism.  Also, they are a product of the ever-expanding bureaucracy of the welfare state 
and their participants are products of this new social order.  According to George Steinmetz 
(1994: 182) new social movements have been explained as an outgrowth of the interests of 
the new middle class (Brand 1982:14; Kitschelt 1985: 278) or new class (Martin 1988); the 
state-sector middle class (Cotgrove and Duff 1980; Mattausch 1989: 50-52); the service class 
(Lash and Urry 1987: 195); the old and new petite bourgeoisie (Eder 1985); and classes 
located in contradictory locations between proletariat and bourgeoisie (Write 1985; Kriesi 
1989) (Steinmetz 1994:183).      
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New social movements differ from past movements not only with respect to what or 
whom they direct their energies against, but also with respect to whose interests they 
represent.  New social movements are interested in intangible goods that would enhance the 
quality of life for all sectors of society (Kitschelt 276; Melucci 275; Offe 819, 832).  
Interestingly, this is the objective of most Islamic fundamentalist movements.  Arguably, 
membership in these movements does not follow traditional class lines but rather they fall 
into two categories: those who are paying the costs of modernization and those who have 
been marginalized by the development of the welfare state and the new middle class 
(Habermas 32, Kitschelt 276-8; and Offe 831-835).   
Alain Touraine (1981: 24) argues that in the industrial society the struggle was 
between the bourgeoisie, who exercised control over the means of production, and the 
proletarian movement, which sought to seize control over it.  Society has moved beyond that 
stage.  According to Craig Calhoun (1993), sometime after 1968 theorists began to think and 
write about new social movements;80 for example Alberto Mejucci (1988: 247) cited 
feminism, the ecology/green movement, and the anti-war/peace movement.  Others have 
added the gay movement, the animal rights movement, and the anti-abortion and pro-choice 
movements.  Pippa Norris (2002) argues that in the late 20th century in many postindustrial 
societies there was a tidal wave of citizen withdrawal from the traditional channels of 
political participation.  New social movements challenge the conventional division of politics 
into left and right and broadened the definition of politics to include issues that had been 
                                                
80 In varying degrees they emphasize post-industrial society (Touraine 1971).  The options opened by relative 
affluence and a growing middle class (Offe 1985).  The common denominate of material sustenance has been 
satisfies (Melucci 1989; Inglehart 1990) and the expansion of the welfare state (Offe 1985).  The key figures 
associated with NSM: Alain Touraine (1981), Jurgen Habermas (1987) and Alberto Melucci (1986, 1996), argue 
that the NSMs represent a new era. 
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considered outside the domain of political action (Scott 1990).  This is exactly what Islamic 
fundamentalists do.   
Reflecting what Inglehart (1977) called the “silent revolution,” the new social 
movements reject the premises of the postwar compromise between labor and capital.  
Economic growth and the material rewards that it provides are no longer endorsed if they 
entail the destruction and the natural environment and the control of collective and personal 
identities.  Earlier labor movements sought wage increases or social security benefits, while 
new social movements focus on the establishment of cooperative or alternative economic 
institutions where the quality of life at the workplace would increase job satisfaction and 
worker control.  The development of a more balanced relationship between the sexes and a 
greater respect for the natural environment dominate the paradigm.   
New social movement theorists assert that one of the most important differences 
between new and old movements lies in the tactics that each relies on to achieve its goals: 
whereas old movements operated within the established political system, new social 
movements shun normal channels of political action.  Some new social movement scholars 
have focused explicitly on the effects of violence.81  This is especially true with Islamic 
fundamentalists who use violence to meet their political gains.  Melucci (790) argues that as 
the advanced industrial state increasingly regulates and invades everyday life, the goal 
orientation of the new social movements have shifted inward in an attempt to expropriate 
dominion over their own lives from a system for supervisory institutions.  Arguably, political 
process theorists fought to secure political and economic rights from the state and other 
institutional actors; new social movements target their activities away from the state.    
                                                
81 For Example: McClurg Mueller (1978), Issaac and Kelly (1981), Kelly and Snyder (1980), and Sears and 
McConahay (1973) 
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Inglehart (1971, 1977) argues that the rising level of welfare in the postwar period has 
caused a shift in the value priorities of the younger generations socialized after war.  
According to this theory, the younger generations generally place a higher priority on non-
materialist (or post-materialist) values than do those socialized during the periods of the 
depressions or the war, circumstances when material scarcity was a real threat for most 
people.82  Inglehart suggests that support for traditional hierarchical and bureaucratic 
organizations such as political parties and churches has declined, but that the younger 
generation in affluent societies has become increasingly active in politics via new social 
movements and transnational advocacy networks.83 
New social movement theorists argue that participation in new social movements is 
not based on class cleavages.  They acknowledge that most participants in the new 
movements are members of the “new middle class,” these theorists argue that their 
participation is not based on membership in that class; it is participation by a class but not on 
behalf of a class.  In other words, movements organize across socioeconomic cleavages.  
Furthermore, new social movements are not driven by traditional materialist values such as 
higher wages, safer working conditions, and voting rights, but instead are motivated by 
qualitative values such as personal autonomy and self-actualization.  Finally, they argue that 
structural conditions may explain their intensity and nature of the grievances which underlie a 
                                                
82 Post-materialist values are precisely the values associated with New Social Movements, this has been 
documented by a number of studies: Burklin 1982, 1984; Fietkau et al. 1982; Inglehart 1981; Muller-Rommel 
1982, 1985; Reuband 1985   
83 According to Fred Rose’s (1997) critique of Inglehart: Inglehart applies an ahistorical definition of material 
needs that ignores the continued demand for material goods in wealthy states.  In other words, consumption still 
matters.  In Inglehart’s view human nature is defined as a hierarchy of needs that are first material and then, 
after those are met the individual then turns to his cultural and social needs.  But material wants, as argued by 
Rose (1997) are far more elastic than this theory suggests.  Greater material abundance has not brought the end 
of wants but rather an ever increasing demand for material goods.  Needs, therefore, must be understood as 
socially defined, and they change over time.  Also, Inglehart fails to recognize the intimate relationship between 
material interests and values among the middle class just as many new social movement theorists do. 
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particular movement.  However, they make it very clear, unlike political process theorists; 
structural conditions can only provide a partial explanation of the emergence and 
characteristics of social movements.            
The new social movement paradigm is dominated by the radical/religious right in 
Europe, this being the most prominent example found in the social movement literature.84  In 
the decades following WWII, Western European democracies enjoyed a significant degree of 
social and political stability and prosperity.  Betz (1993: 413) argues that this sustained 
economic growth, rising standards of living, the expansion of the welfare state, and the socio-
political guarantee of equality and civil liberties all contributed to a social and political 
climate conducive to political stability while eroding support for extremist solutions on both 
the left via the Marxist-Communists and right via the fascists and right-wing extremists.  Betz 
goes on to argue that the stability and consensus were short lived.  There was a resurgence of 
ideological and political turbulence in the late 1960s, rising social conflicts in the early 
1970s, and by the late 1970s, unemployment, economic problems, energy shortages, and the 
spread of mass protest.  These conditions facilitated a profound transformation of West 
European politics during the 1980s, when right-wing anti-system extremists emerged with 
significant success.  Hainsworth (1992, 1999) argues that the most striking feature of post-
war, pre-millennium European politics has been the emergence of extreme right-wing parties 
                                                
84 Numerous scholars have pointed to the lack of a generally accepted definition for the radical right: Knutter 
1991; Meijerink & Mudde & Van Holsteyn 1998; Mudde 1995, 2000; Mitra 1988.   Furthermore, Meijerink & 
Mudde & Van Holsteyn (1998), Hainsworth (1992), Payne (1995) and Mudde (1995) argue that there is no 
consensus within the field, and most authors define right-wing extremism as a political ideology that is a 
combines several different features: extreme nationalism, ethnocentrism, anti-communism, anti-
parliamentarianism, anti-pluralism, militarism, law-and-order thinking, a demand for strong political leader 
and/or executive, anti-Americanism and cultural pessimism.  In 26 definitions of right-wing extremism that can 
be derived from the literature, no less than 58 different features are mentioned at least once.  Only five features 
are mentioned, by at least half of the authors: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, and a strong-
state (Mudde 1995: 206). 
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and their ability to multiply both votes and parliamentary representation throughout Europe.  
They have emerged as significant players in national politics.85 
The similarities between Islamic fundamentalist movements and the religious right are 
paramount; for example, the literature has made it clear that it is difficult to define the nature 
of the European extreme right.86  Radical right-wing political parties are anti-system because 
of their rejection of the established socio-cultural and socio-political system.  They apply 
racial, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and/or religious criteria to define who belongs and does not 
belong.  They are opposed to the social integration of minorities, immigrants, and they 
facilitate xenophobia, homophobia, racial discrimination, and overt racism.87   The term 
radical right is used interchangeably with the terms ultra-right and extreme right and is 
generally applied to 20th century incarnations of organized intolerance.88  Stoss (1988) 
identified four characteristics with right-wing extremism.  First, exaggerated nationalism 
involving hostile attitudes toward other states or peoples; secondly, denial that all people 
                                                
85 For example: in France (Hainsworth 1999, Bresson 1995, Hargreaves 1994 and Schain 1999; in Austria 
(Schain 1999, Mayer 1998, and Hainsworth 1999); in Italy (Ferraresi 1996 and Ignazi 1997, Bull & Newell 
1995, Donovan 1995, Hainsworth, 1999, Sznajder 1995, and Ruzza & Schmidtke 1995); In Belgium (Mudde 
and Van Holsteyn 1999 and Hans-George Betz 1993); in Germany (Atkinson 1993, Backer 1995, Betz 1991, 
1994, 1993, Childs 1991, Dalton 1993, Ford 1992, Gibowsky 1995; Heitmeyer 1993, Hockenos 1993, Roberts 
1992, and Stoss 1988); in Denmark (Mudde 1998, Hainsworth 1999, and Mudde & Van Holsteyn; In Sweden 
(Hainsworth 1999); in Switzerland (Hans-George Betz 1993).  The presence of the extreme right is not, of 
course, confined to Western Northern Europe; for example, post-communist Eastern and Central Europe 
according to (Hainsworth 1999, Cox and Shearman 1999, Boulton 1990, Carter 1990, Clark 1996, Cox 1992, 
1994, Engel 1999, Laqueur 1993 Bennett 1995, and Ramet 1996).  The United States has also seen serge in the 
radical right in the last few years argues (Abanes 1996, Aho 1990, Barkun 1994, and Weinberg 1993). 
86 Hainsworth (1992, 1999) and Macridis (1989) Betz (1993, 1994) defines it as one of the most significant 
political developments of the past few years.   
87 As argued by: Ramet, 1996; Cosic, 1981; Kernber, 1990; Swynedouw, 1998; Ignazi, 1996; Westle & 
Niedermayer, 1990; Fennema & Pollmann 1998.  Macridis 1989 Griffin 1995 and Fennema & Pollmann 1998: 
immigration has become a core element of the European anti-system fundamentalist discourse.     
88 For Example: Ramet 1996; Cosic 1981; Kernber 1990.  Lipset and Raab (1970) argue that the most 
distinguishing mark of right-wing extremist movements is their preservative backlash character; they look 
nostalgically on the (sometimes imaginary) past.  Recent examples of this included the Catholic Church’s 
successful campaign to obtain a legislative ban on abortion in Poland, as explained by Kulczychi (1995), David 
and Titkow (1994), and Hole (1997).  A second example is the Romanian Orthodox Church that Romania 
facilitate the legal and social discrimination and overt state-sponsored hate crimes against gays as described by 
McGhee (2002) Ion (1995), Matthews-Green (2000), and Rimmerman (1996).   
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have equal rights of life, liberty, security, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, assembly 
and association, and an associated denial of the fundamental equality of human worth.  Third, 
there is a rejection of parliamentary-pluralist systems based on the principle of majority rule; 
and finally, a folk-ethnocentric ideology.  Falter and Schumann (1998) listed ten features as 
the core of right-extremist thinking: extreme nationalism, ethnocentrism, anti-communism, 
anti-parliamentarianism, anti-pluralism, militarism, law-and-order thinking, a demand for 
strong political leader and/or executive, anti-Americanism and cultural pessimism. 
New social movement theorists argue that social movement participants are looking to 
enhance the quality of life for all sectors of society.  As the literature shows, membership in 
these movements falls into two categories: those who are paying the costs of modernization 
and those who have been marginalized by the development of the welfare state and the new 
middle class.  The first category is most appropriate for Islamic movements.  Much of the 
fundamentalist literature suggests that modernization via Westernization and Americanization 
are helping to facilitate the rise of Islamic movements.  Furthermore, the new social scholars 
challenge the conventional division of politics into left and right and broadened the definition 
of politics to include issues that had been considered outside the domain of politics, this is 
apparent in Islamic social movements.   
Data Sources and Variables 
Again, I define a fundamentalist movement as any group, political party, or issue-
oriented militant movement which is non-secular in its beliefs, ideas, or dogmas.  It also must 
encourage, sponsor, and/or condone the lack of separation of church and state within 
government, state institutions, education, or educational institutions.  Furthermore, for a 
group to be considered fundamentalist, it must have socio-political objectives, and not just 
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religious ones.  I have created a significant data set that contains every Islamic fundamentalist 
movement that is or has been in operation from 1970 through 2006; a complete list of all 
fundamentalist movements included in my dataset is found in the appendix.  This was an 
extremely challenging task for four reasons: first, there is no existing dataset that codes or 
includes all fundamentalist groups.  Secondly, fundamentalism is inherently subjective; third, 
there is not one source that can supply all the data.  And finally, there are significant language 
barriers.  This analysis deals with over thirty states and over a dozen languages; many of the 
fundamentalist movements included here are extremely small with very little information on 
them in English, Arabic, or a language easily translated.   
It has been a daunting task to overcome these obstacles, and it is still an emerging 
project as new movements continually form, breakup, or are eliminated via the state.  I have 
utilized every known source that lists fundamentalist movements, terrorist groups, or Islamic 
political parties; however, not one source gives a complete list of every movement I have 
included in my data set.  Most of the prominent sources of Islamic fundamentalism overlap, 
meaning that you find the same groups listed in multiple sources, especially the larger more 
well known ones.  Also, most of the large anthologies of fundamentalist group lists are 
encyclopedia type entries that give only a brief overview.  I have found that there are very 
few fundamentalist anthologies, and those that are in existence document the same groups – 
ones easily found and easily researched.  If I had only included these groups my results would 
be highly biased.  Groups that are easily researched are usually either large ones or violent 
ones; in other words, groups that have been in the national news for some reason.  I have used 
every known source and taken and coded what I could from each one.   
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First, I used the U.S. State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism (1970-2006 
volumes); the problem with these sources is that the data are highly biased and repetitive.  
The U.S. State Department only looks at groups that it classifies as terrorist, and my objective 
here is to include all fundamentalist movements, not just terrorist ones.  Also, the State 
Department seldom includes additional terrorist groups, and we find the same groups 
included volume after volume, making the data highly repetitive.  
As for the fundamentalist analogies included here, the first one is: Extremist Groups: 
an International Compilation of Terrorist Organizations, Violent Political Groups, and Issue-
Oriented Militant Movements by Jeffrey Buita (1996).  Buita’s volume brings together 
information on 200 extremist groups, including 50 in the Middle East and even fewer Islamic 
extremist groups in the Middle East.  There are a few notable problems with Buita’s 
anthology; first, it is over eleven years old, and it is significantly outdated.  Also, he includes 
only the most notable and well known groups.  The second fundamentalist analogy I use is, 
Extremist Groups Information for Students (2006) published by Thomas Gale.  Gale’s two 
volume work provides an overview and history of 150 extremist organizations worldwide that 
are active today.  Gale’s volume is much more up to date than that of Buita’s; however, this 
volume also is limited in the sense that only the most well known groups are included.  Third, 
I use Stephen E. Atkin’s (2004) volume Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and 
Extremist Groups.  Atkin’s volume contains 290 organized entries that detail the most 
notorious and violent extremists and extremist groups that have been in operation for the last 
fifty years.  Fourth, I use Frank Tachau’s (1994) volume Political Parties of the Middle East 
and North Africa: The Greenwood Encyclopedia of World Political Parties.  This volume 
contains fourteen chapters concentrating on single countries and includes an in-depth analysis 
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of all current and former political parties within each specific country.  However, this volume 
also has its limitations; first, the book is almost fourteen years old, and each country included 
in the study has experienced significant political change.  Also, fewer than 15% of the total 
political parties listed in the volume constitute a fundamentalist movement.  Fifth, I used 
Hrair Dekmejian (1995) appendix in his volume entitled Islamic Revolution: Fundamentalism 
in the Arab World.  Dekmejian’s appendix lists 175 Islamist organizations on which his study 
was based.  However, Dekmejian does not list the years in which the movements operated, 
and, because of this, I attempted to verify each of the 175 organizations.  In doing this, I 
found numerous problems with his appendix.  First, out of the 175 organizations, I was only 
able to verify 127 and included each of those in my data set that were not already in my data 
set.  Of the 48 remaining groups I was unable to verify anyone of them existed, other than 
what information Dekmejian provided, specifically the organizations name and country of 
origin.  Also, Dekmejian’s volume is thirteen years old and dated.  Finally, I used James 
Sanchez (2007) dataset compiled in a book called:  Who’s Who in Al-Qaeda and Jihadi 
Movements in Iraq and the Middle East 30,631 Key Individuals, Organizations, Incidents, 
and Linkages.  This is a very well researched dataset; however, most of the information 
consisted of just individual names and was of little use.   
Another main resource I used in attaining all fundamentalist data was from MIPT 
Terrorism Knowledge Base date set located at: http://www.tkb.org/Home2.jsp.  According to 
the MIPT terrorism website it is a “one-stop resource for comprehensive research and 
analysis on global terrorist incidents, terrorism-relates court cases, and terrorist groups and 
leaders.”  The data is from the RAND Terrorism Chronology and RAND-MIPT Terrorism 
Incident databases; the Terrorism Indictment database; and DeticicaDFI’s research on 
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terrorist organizations.  The MIPT organization is a non-profit organization dedicated to 
preventing terrorism on U.S. soil or mitigating its effects.  MIPT was established after the 
April 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and is funded through 
the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Grants and training.   
Over a thousand references are included in the bibliography, many of which make 
reference to a specific fundamentalist movement either in passing, a footnote, or they were 
the topic of the academic source.  This being the case, it is an impossible task to correlate 
each of the movements included in the appendix with its source, many of which had multiple 
sources.  Recognizing these limitations, I use numerous books were used to do specific 
country analysis looking for fundamentalist movements.89  Also, Google searches were 
                                                
89 These books include: Foran, John, 1994. A Century of Revolution: Social Movements in Iran: Social 
Movements, Protest, and Contention. University of Minnesota Press; Poulson, Stephen. 2006. Social 
Movements in Twentieth-Century Iran: Culture, Ideology, and Mobilizing Frameworks. Lexington Books; 
Batatu, Hanna. 2004. The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq. Saqi Books; Pappe, 
Ilan. 2006. A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples. Cambridge University Press; Jabar, Faleh. 
2004.  Shi'ite Movement in Iraq. Saqi Books; Sanchez, James. 2007. Who's Who in Al-Qaeda & Jihadi 
Movements in Iraq and the Middle East: 30,631 Key Individuals, Organizations, Incidents, and Linkages. 
Lulu.com; Shanahan, Rodger. 2005. The Shi'a of Lebanon: Clans, Parties and Clerics. Library of Modern 
Middle East Studies; Tauris Academic Studies; Rougier, Bernard and Rascale Chazeleh. 2007. Everyday Jihad: 
The Rise of Militant Islam among Palestinians in Lebanon. Harvard University Press; Rabinovich, Itamar. 1985. 
The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985. Cornell University Press; Zunes, Stephen. 1999. Nonviolent Social 
Movements: A Geographical Perspective. Wiley-Blackwell; Sidel, John Thaver. 2006. Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: 
Religious Violence in Indonesia. Cornell University Press; Abuza, Zachary. 2006. Political Islam and Violence 
in Indonesia. Routledge Press; Sidel, John. 2007. The Islamist Threat in Southeast Asia: A Reassessment. East-
West Center Washington; Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS); Eliraz, Giora. 2004. Islam In Indonesia: 
Modernism, Radicalism, And The Middle East Dimension. Sussex Academic Press; Vickers, Adrian. 2005. A 
History of Modern Indonesia. Cambridge University Press; Cassanos, Lynda Cohen. 2005. Indonesia: The 
Growth and Influence of Islam: in the Nations of Asia and Central Asia. Mason Crest Publishers; Library 
Binding; Vicziany, Marika. 2005. Terrorism and Islam in Indonesia: Myths and Realities. International 
Specialized Book Services; Effendy, Bahtiar. 2004. Islam and the State in Indonesia. Ohio University Press; 
Ramage, Douglas. 1997. Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, and the Ideology of Tolerance. Routledge; 
Hussain, Asaf. 1983. Islamic Movements in Egypt, Pakistan and Iran: An Annotated Bibliography. Mansell 
Press; Toth, James. 1999. Rural Labor Movements in Egypt and Their Impact on the State, 1961-1992. 
University Press of Florida Press; Hopwood, Derek. 1991. Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990. Routledge 
Press; Bashier, Zakaria. 1987. Islamic Movement in the Sudan: Issues and Challenges. Islamic Foundation 
Press; Johnson, Douglas Hamilton. 2003. The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars. Indiana University Press; 
Petterson, Donald. 2003. Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict, and Catastrophe. Westview Press; Schock, 
Kurt. 2004. Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements In Nondemocracies. University of Minnesota 
Press; Moussalli, Ahmed. 1999. Historical Dictionary of Islamic Fundamentalist Movements in the Arab World, 
Iran, and Turkey: Historical Dictionaries of Religions, Philosophies and Movements. The Scarecrow Press, Inc; 
Kavlan, Muammer. 2005. The Kemalists: Islamic Revival And The Fate Of Secular Turkey.  Prometheus 
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conducted for each fundamentalist movement included here for validation and reference 
checks.  I understand this is not a perfect measure; however, it is the first large N attempt at 
coding Islamic fundamentalist groups and this makes it a significant addition to the political 
science discipline.  
Outside Ideological Force 
What I also add to the social movement literature is the presence of an outside 
ideological force.  The presence of outside ideological force plays a significant role in 
determining how many fundamentalist movements a state will have.  There are three 
significant outside ideological forces in the Islamic world: Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United 
States.  Iran and Saudi Arabia do what I call, group facilitate.  Group facilitate is when Iran 
or Saudi Arabia operate clandestine operations within different Islamic states via sponsoring 
domestic movements found within other states in order to facilitate their own interests and 
force other governments into compliance.  The United States, on the other hand, does not 
group facilitate; instead, it influences the state leadership via economic and/or military aid 
                                                                                                                                                  
Books; Howe, Marvine. 2000. Turkey Today: A Nation Divided Over Islam's Revival. Westview Press; Yavuz, 
M. Hakan. 2000. Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Religion and Global Politics. Oxford University Press; 
Maududi, Sayyid Abula’la. 2001. Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic Jihad Movement. Dayan Center 
Papers. Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and Affairs: Islamic Foundation; Burgat, Francois and William 
Dowell. 1997. The Islamic Movement in North Africa. Middle East Monograph Series: The University of Texas 
Press; Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, The. 2004. Islamic Movements: Impact on Political 
Stability in the Arab World; I. B. Tauris; Lapidus, Ira M. 2005. A History of Islamic Societies. Pluto Press; 
Baker, Raymond William. 2006. Islam without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists. Harvard University Press; 
O’Dea, Colleen. 2006. Tajikistan: The Growth and Influence of Islam in the Nations of Asia and Central Asia. 
Mason Crest Publishers; Jonson, Lena. 2006. Tajikistan in the New Central Asia: Geopolitics, Great Power 
Rivalry and Radical Islam. International Library of Central Asia Studies. Publisher: I. B. Tauris; Rashid, 
Ahmed. 2007. Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia. Penguin Book Press; Hatina, Meir. 2001. Islam 
and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic Jihad Movement. Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African 
Studies; Milton-Edwards, Beverley. 1999. Islamic Politics in Palestine. Library of Modern Middle East Studies. 
I. B. Tauris; Titus, Murray. 2005. Islam in India and Pakistan: A Religious History of Islam in India and 
Pakistan. Musnhiram Manoharlal Press; Saeed, Javaid. 1994. Islam and Modernization: A Comparative Analysis 
of Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey. Praeger Publishers. 
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and the presence of U.S. troops.  Theoretically, American ideological influence is inherently 
different than that of Iran or Saudi Arabia.  American ideological inference is top-down, 
meaning the aid is given to the state, not individual Islamic groups or movements (unless 
associated with the Islamic state).  On the other hand, Iranian and Saudi Arabian ideological 
influence is, for the most part, bottom-up; they give aid directly to groups or movements.  
There are a few exceptions to my argument concerning the United States and its top-down 
influence, specifically, the Taliban and Mujahideen in Afghanistan during the 1980s and the 
current aid it gives to Sunni groups in the Iraqi civil war; however, in both these examples 
U.S. aid was going to groups within a failed state.     
The Saudi Arabian based Muslim World League (MWL) is the largest Muslim 
Organization engaged in Dawah (charitable) activities in the world (Levitt 2006: 18).  Levitt 
(2006: 19) argues that the Muslim World League is the subject of several ongoing 
counterterrorism investigations in the United States as they relates to their donations to 
known terrorist organization like Hamas and al-Qaeda.  The MWL lists its main objectives as 
“to disseminate Islamic Dawah and expound the teachings of Islam.  To defend Islamic 
causes in a manner that safeguards the interests and aspirations of Muslims, solve their 
problems, refute false allegations against Islam, and repel inimical trends and dogma which 
the enemies of Islam seek to exploit in order to destroy the unity of Muslims and to sow seeds 
of doubt in our Muslim Brethren” (Levitt 2006: 19).  The connections to terrorism via the 
Muslim World League, and in turn, Saudi Arabia are extensive.  The Saudi Arabian royal 
family has donated hundreds of millions of dollars to Sunni fundamentalist groups throughout 
the Islamic world.  In fact, it is not possible to separate the Saudi royal family with the state 
of Saudi Arabia; they are one in the same.  Critics have argued that the money is coming from 
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royal family members and not the Saudi Arabian king.  This is true; however, the King could 
stop it at any time.  Saudi Arabia is a perfect autocracy and the autocrat has final say.       
  Following the success of Iran’s Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini embarked on an 
agenda known as Mashru al-Thawra al-Iraniyah (the Project of the Iranian Revolution).90 
This aimed at furthering Islam by reviving the Islamic Ummah (the worldwide Islamic 
nation) which was to be based in Iran and led by Khomeini whose objective was the spread of 
Islam’s influence beyond the boundaries of Iran.  Khomeini stressed that in exporting the 
revolution he did not seek to militarily invade neighboring states and did not harbor 
expansionist plans.  He argued that his goal would be achieved by means of an “invisible 
force” and the path to success lay through cultivating the populace (Khomeini, 1978, 1989).  
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards became an integral part of the program.  They were 
initially set up in 1979 as an internal security apparatus to consolidate Khomeini’s grip on 
Iran and grew to become one of the strongest institutions ever produced by the revolution and 
a primary tool for promoting Khomeini’s doctrines.  His objective was carried out through 
overt epistemic militarized intervention, as was the case in Lebanon, and through covert 
epistemic, political interference, as in the case of Algeria.  The Guards did not create a 
separate division to export the revolution; they trained and armed militant surrogates and 
agents in many camps and locations throughout Iran.  These agents then recruited Shiite 
                                                
90 Khomeini institutionalized the exportation of revolution and creation of a global Islamic rule and outlined it in 
various parts of Iran’s constitution.  The forward of the regime’s constitution reads, in part, “Given the context 
of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, which was a movement for the victory of all the oppressed over the oppressors, it 
provides the ground for continuation of the revolution inside and outside the country, specifically in spreading 
international links to other Islamic and people’s movements, tries to pave the way for the creation of unique 
global Ummah so the continuation of the struggle for the salvation of deprived and suffering nations can be 
settled.”  Another part of the forward, under the headline “Ideological Army”, reads, “The Army of the Islamic 
Republic and the Revolutionary Guards carry not only the duty of protecting the borders but also ideological 
duty, Jihad of God and struggle to spread the rule of God’s law in the world” (Abrahamian 1989,1993; Hamid, 
1981; Arjomand, 1988).  
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militants overseas to carry out operations in both the Middle East and Europe.  The Guards 
supported revolutionary activities, built an Islamic network, and had agents occupy positions 
in Iranian embassies across Europe, Africa, and Asia.  Under diplomatic cover, they recruited 
proxies and cells for operations worldwide.   
During the last twenty-seven years, the international community has seen Iran emerge 
as an ideological hegemon that has significantly influenced domestic politics and domestic 
development of Shiite Muslims.  Furthermore, during the last twenty years, the international 
community has seen Saudi Arabia achieve the same ideological hegemonic standing as Iran 
but with the Sunni Muslims.  Both enjoy a unique position in the world of Islam due to their 
strategic locations, natural resources, and historical and cultural role in the development of 
the Islamic civilization.  In the last three years we have witnessed Iranian backed Shiites and 
Saudi Arabian backed Sunnis using Iraqis as cogs to achieve regional hegemony.  The United 
States invasion or Iraq has resulted in a bloodbath with hundreds of thousands of Iraqis 
murdered, not by U.S. soldiers, but as a result of fifteen hundred years of Sunni and Shiite 
tensions that both Iran and Saudi Arabia are currently fueling to achieve regional hegemony. 
91    
                                                
91 The word hegemony comes from ancient Greek and refers to the dominance of one state over others in the 
international system; it is used in diverse and confusing ways.  David Wilkinson (1994: 374) points out those 
translators of the Greek word hegemony also use empire, dominance, supremacy, command, and leadership 
interchangeably.  Part of the problem is that unequal distribution of power is a matter of degree, and there is no 
general agreement on how much inequality and what types of power constitute hegemony.  Hegemony is often 
used to refer to different behaviors and degrees of control, which obscures rather then clarifies its analysis.  For 
example, Charles Doran (1971: 70) cites aggressive military power, while Robert Keohane (1984: 32) looks at 
the preponderance of economic resources.  Robert Gilpin (1988: 592) uses the terms imperial and hegemonic 
interchangeably to refer to a situation in which a single powerful state controls or dominates the lesser states in 
the international system.  Joshua Goldstein (1988: 281) defines hegemony as being able to dictate and/or 
dominate the rules and arrangements by which international relations, politics and economics are conducted. 
Furthermore, hegemonic states provide an international order that further their own self-interests.  Robert Cox 
(1994: 366) argues that the term imperialism has meant so many things that is has become almost meaningless 
and feels term hegemony will suffer the same fate.  Cox goes on to argue that hegemony is more than 
dominance; hegemony is a form in which dominance is obscured by achieving an appearance of acquiescence.  
According to Cox, hegemonic power is rare and transitory, it is never complete, and it tends to generate 
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Iran and Saudi Arabia have been able to exert their ideological hegemony via their 
epistemic influence. Iran uses its revolutionary guards and Saudi Arabia uses its Islamic 
charities as covers.  An Islamic epistemic community is a transnational group of believers 
(Shiite or Sunni) with shared Islamic values and beliefs.  The increasing influence of 
epistemic communities has had serious implications on all Muslim nation-states, specifically 
those states with significant gaps between the rich and poor.  I argue that epistemic 
communities are the source of political and moral direction in a society; furthermore, they 
control the knowledge and information in a given society. Decision makers are likely to turn 
to epistemic communities under conditions of uncertainty.   
In my use of epistemic communities, I rely on the work of several scholars.  Haas 
(1992) defines epistemic communities as networks of professionals with recognized expertise 
in a particular field.  Control over knowledge and information is an important dimension of 
power.  Sebenius (1992) and Adler and Haas (1992) argue that members of epistemic 
communities are transnational groups that have a common set of principled and causal 
beliefs, but they also have shared notions of validity and a shared policy goal(s).  Robert 
Keohane (1980) argues that epistemic community members are often based in several 
countries and share basic values on the subject in question, share causal models of the 
workings of the involved phenomena.   
                                                                                                                                                  
opposition which undermines itself.  Henk Overbeek (1994: 368) defines hegemony as a form of rule primarily 
based on consent, not coercion; Overbeek sees hegemony as a form of class rule and not a hierarchy among 
states.  Barry Gills (1994: 369) defines hegemony as a hierarchical structure, mediated by force that dominates 
political entities and their constituent classes.  The goal of the hegemon, according to Gills (1994: 370) is 
economic, and the hegemon desires to restructure the regional and/or international economic system to benefit 
itself and its ruling classes.  George Modelski (1994: 373) argues the term hegemony is relatively new, and he 
dates its emergence between 1970 and 1973.  He notes that the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, published 
in 1969 has no entry for hegemony in its index.  Modelski defines hegemony as a form of illegitimate leadership. 
Giovanni Arrighi (1994: 365) sees hegemon and leadership as inseparable terms and argues the hegemon leads 
smaller states on to the path of development.                
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Epistemic communities facilitate learning, negotiation, ideological development, and 
they deepen individual and collective societal knowledge on specific issues.  The epistemic 
community’s authority is the result of their recognized expertise and their ability to influence 
policy.  Peter Haas (1992) says that these features distinguish epistemic communities from 
other groups often involved in policy coordination.  Hass (1992) and Emmanuel Adler (1992: 
115) argue that epistemic communities can consist of social scientists or individuals from any 
discipline or profession who have a sufficiently strong claim to a body of knowledge that is 
valued by society.  J. Habermas (1984: 34) argues that the impact an epistemic community 
has depends on a variety of factors, including the number and strength of the social 
movements it can “catch” in its “net” of consensual understandings.  The more extensive the 
reach of an epistemic community, the greater the amount of power and influence over the 
state that the community has; the epistemic community is involved in the negotiation of 
meanings and has policymakers as its goal.  This is seen within the Islamic world via the 
United States, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.  Habermas (1984) argues that epistemic communities 
convey new patterns of reasoning to decision makers and encourage them to pursue new 
paths of policymaking; this may, in turn, lead to unpredicted or unpredictable outcomes; such 
as, terrorism or Islamic fundamentalism. 
I theoretically define a significant outside ideological force as an outside influence 
that meets ALL of the following criteria:  
 
• The outside support must be in the form of financial, military, or humanitarian aid 
from a state and not from the state where the fundamentalist group is located. 
 
• There must be a physical presence of the ideological force within the country via state 
representatives, scholars, religious leaders, state sponsored militia, military, or any 
group representing the ideological state.  Or, the members of the fundamentalist group 
must be being trained within or educated within the foreign state.   
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• To be considered a significant outside ideological force, more than one group must 
receive the above explained influence; however, if the group is counted as three 
because of its size and membership, then only one group needs to be receiving aid 
from an outside ideological force. 
 
• To be considered a significant outside ideological force, the phenomenon cannot be 
working with, for, or influenced by the state in which the fundamentalist group is 
working within.   
 
• To be considered a significant outside ideological force, the phenomenon must 
influence a fundamentalist group for two or more consecutive years 
 
• The United State’s ideological influence is excluded from this variable because U.S. 
influence is captured in the presence of U.S. troops and U.S. aid   
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Model and Hypotheses  
 
Model One: 
   
 
 
 
 
H1: Socioeconomic inequality as described by the Marxist social movement theory is 
positively associated with the number and success Islamic fundamentalist groups present 
within the nation-state.  
 
H1A: If there is significant unemployment in the nation-state there will be an increase 
in the number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state 
 
H1B: If there is significant poverty in the nation-state there will be an increase in the 
number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state 
 
H2: Resources as described by the Resource Mobilization social movement theorists are 
positively associated with the number and success Islamic fundamentalist groups present 
within the nation-state.   
 
H2A: If a nation-state’s overall population’s educational level increases then there 
will be an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-
state. 
 
H2B: If the total amount of U.S. aid increases within a nation-state then there will be 
an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state. 
Islamic 
Fundamentalism 
 
Resources 
 
 
Socioeconomic 
Inequality 
 
 
 
Political 
Institutions 
 
 
Ideas  
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H2C: If a nation-state’s GDP were to increase then there will be an increase in the 
number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state. 
 
H2D: If the total amount of ODA increases within a nation-state then there will be an 
increase in the number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state. 
 
H3: The degree of openness of political institutions as described by the political process 
social movement theorists has an inverted-U shaped relationship with the number and 
success of Islamic fundamentalist movements; the number of movements should be the 
strongest in system which are neither highly democratic nor highly autocratic.  
 . 
H3A: There is a linear negative relationship between strong autocracies and 
fundamentalist movements.  If the political system is a strong autocracy with grievous 
human rights violations there will be fewer Islamic fundamentalist movements within 
that nation-state. 
 
H3B: There is a linear negative relationship between strong democracies and 
fundamentalist movements.  If the political system is a perfect democracy with few 
human rights violations there will be fewer Islamic fundamentalist movements within 
that nation-state. 
 
H4: Ideas as described by the New Social Movement theorists are positively associated with 
the number and success Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state 
 
H4A: If there is a significant outside ideological force present then there will be an 
increase in the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements within that nation-state. 
 
H4B:  If there are U.S troops present within the Islamic nation-state then there will be 
an increase in the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements within that nation-
state.  
 
H4C: If the total amount of U.S. aid increases within a nation-state then there will be 
an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements within that nation-state. 
 
The following three hypotheses have been developed from the association between 
terrorism and the degree of Islamic fundamentalism within an Islamic nation-state, as 
measured by the total number of fundamentalist movement-years present.   
 
H5: The total degree fundamentalism in the Islamic nation-state is positively associated with 
the total degree of non-state induced violence within that nation-state.  In other words, if the 
nation-state has a large degree of fundamentalism then it will have a large number of 
terrorist attacks.  
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The goal of my dissertation is to determine the causes of Islamic fundamentalism 
while showing Islamic fundamentalist movements are social movements.  In the previous two 
chapters, I laid out my fundamentalist labyrinth that argues the causes of Islamic 
fundamentalism are the results of a combined presence of phenomena associated with the 
different social movement literatures, each being positively associated with the number of 
Islamic fundamentalist groups within the nation-state.  Furthermore, I theorized that Islamic 
fundamentalist movements are social movements and the factors that predict social 
movements also predict Islamic fundamentalist movements.  In the following chapter I 
demonstrate quantitatively that each of the social movement conditions is positively 
associated with Islamic fundamentalism.   
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Chapter Three: The Causes of Islamic Fundamentalism: A Quantitative Analysis   
The goal of chapter three is to determine through the application of quantitative 
analysis the causes of Islamic fundamentalism, and determine what phenomena facilitate the 
number of Islamic fundamentalist movements.  The main objective of chapter three is to use 
quantitative analysis to build on, and test, the theoretical claims in the previous two chapters.  
To do this, I will utilize the negative binomial fixed effects regression model, the incident rate 
ratio test, and a comparison of each independent variable’s effect on the number of 
fundamentalist movements by looking at each independent variable’s minimum, mean, and 
maximum score.92  My findings show that each of the social movement conditions is 
positively associated with the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements.  After this, I 
changed the dependent variable from the number of fundamentalist movements to the total 
number of terrorist acts, and then the total number of suicide terrorist acts.  I wanted to 
determine if the conditions found within Islamic nation-states, that are facilitating the number 
of fundamentalist movements, are also facilitating the number of terrorist attacks, and if the 
total number of fundamentalist movements are positively associated with violence; my results 
indicate they are not. 
Chapter three is divided into three sections.  The first section looks at my rational 
behind using negative binomial fixed effects models, specifically Xtnbreg.  The second 
section explains both my independent and dependent variables.  My dependent variable is the 
total number of fundamentalist movements in every predominantly Islamic nation-state for 
the last thirty six years.  Each independent variable is associated with the four social 
                                                
92 According to Stata, ir is used with incidence –rate, incidence density or person-time data.  It calculates point 
estimates and confidence intervals for the incidence-rate ratio and difference, along with attributable or 
prevented fractions for the exposed and total population. 
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movement literature conditions.  Each of the following sections contains a panel-time-series 
analysis that examines the number of fundamentalist movements in Islamic-Majority nation 
states from 1970 through 2006.   
The third section includes multiple models where I determined the relationship(s) 
between the number of fundamentalist movements and the different phenomena associated 
with each of the four different social movement schools of thought.  First, the resources 
associated with resource mobilization theorists include total population, total GDP, 
education/school enrollment, total ODA, and total U.S. financial aid.  Secondly, the 
socioeconomic inequality associated with Marxism includes measures of unemployment, 
poverty, worker’s rights, women’s political rights, and total ODA.  Thirdly, the political 
institutions associated with the political process theorist include polity, executive recruitment, 
executive constraints, political competition, political rights, extrajudicial killings, 
disappearances, torture, political imprisonment, political participation, and the Freedom 
House: Political Rights scale.  Finally, the ideas associated with new social movement 
theorists include religious freedom, education, freedom of speech, freedom of movement, 
freedom of assembly and association, the presence of an outside ideological force, total 
number of U.S. troops, total U.S. financial aid, and the Freedom House: Civil Liberties scale.  
The indicators I have chosen in my fundamentalist social movement variables are multi-
dimensional, which is why many are used more than one time in multiple conditions, 
specifically education, ODA, and U.S. aid.  However, each indicator was run only one time 
per hypotheses.   
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Analytic Design 
My data on the number of fundamentalist groups are in the form of yearly counts; 
therefore I use negative binomial regression, a variant of Poisson regression, which is often 
used to analyze event counts (Robison et al. 2006; Barron 1992; McCall and Nagin 1996; 
Cameron and Tivendi 1998).  The negative binomial model incorporates observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity into the conditional mean (Long 1997).  Thus, the conditional 
variance of my dependent variable (number of fundamentalist movements) becomes larger 
than its conditional mean, which remains unchanged.  I used the negative binomial model 
because the number of fundamentalist movements must be positive therefore, the variables 
may be missspecified if estimated with OLS regressions (King, 1988).  Poisson regressions 
are often used to analyze dependent variables that are event count data (Ahuja, 2000; King 
1988), but Poisson models are restrictive and require the mean and variance to be equal.  
According to Robison et al (2006) negative binomial regression effectively controls for 
overdispersion by adding a stochastic component to the model (Land, McCall and Nagin 
1996).  If the numbers of observations within a year are not independent, the variance may be 
greater than the mean.  If such an over dispersion exists, negative binomial models will be 
better (Cameron and Tribedi, 1990), but pooling multiple observations over time for each 
fundamentalist group violates the independence assumptions required for unbiased parameter 
estimates.  This can be corrected by clustering data through random effects (Guo 1996) or 
fixed effects models.93  The negative binomial model differs from Poisson regression by the 
                                                
93  Random effect models are used due to the clustering of the data and the correlated error structure statistical 
techniques, which can correct for design effects and unequal probability of selection, are necessary to achieve 
unbiased parameter estimates.  I can use random effects models here but statistically they would be less accurate 
than fixed effect models; however, since dispersion or unexplained variation in individual outcomes is likely to 
vary across fundamentalist groups because of unidentified reasons (for example unemployment, poverty, and the 
presence of an outside ideological force) the random effects over dispersion model is used in all analysis. This 
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adding of a residual variance parameter that captures over dispersion in the dependent 
variable (which occurs when the standard deviation is greater than the mean) (Gardnerm 
Mulvey, and Shaw 1995).  Designed for dependent variables that are counts of events, 
negative binomial models utilize a distribution that characterizes the probability of observing 
any discrete number of events, given an underlying mean count of events (Osgood 1999).  
Furthermore, negative binomial regressions are designed to handle continuous variables with 
distributions containing zero values and large positive skews.  For example, Siddharth 
Chandra and Angela Williams Foster (2005) used the negative binomial regression model in 
their analysis of the economic conditions associated with urban social disturbances in the 
United States in the 1960s.  They used state-level data in the social disturbances in 
conjunction with census data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series to test the 
relationship between measures of wage inequality and measures of social disorder.  They 
found that overall wage inequality is a significant factor in facilitating social disorder.    
The main concern I have with using the Poisson model comes from one of the Poisson 
assumptions, specifically that which requires us to assume equality between the conditional 
mean and the variance of the dependent variable.  Often, as in my data, the variance exceeds 
the conditional mean, resulting in what is called over dispersion.  The negative-binomial 
model actually accounts for over dispersion.  It is essentially a negative binomial model (a 
variant of the Poisson model) that is commonly used to deal with over dispersion parameter 
that varies across states.  Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984) suggested further refinement 
that starts with the negative multinomial model and makes additional assumptions about the 
distribution of the random effect that effectively allow the over distribution parameter to vary 
                                                                                                                                                  
type of random effects model allows dispersion to vary randomly from fundamentalist movement to 
fundamentalist movement.   
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across both regions and time.  This approach, called the negative-binomial model with 
random effects does not work with my data.  After running the Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects I was able to determine that random effects 
models were inappropriate; therefore, I decided to run fixed effects models.  Standard 
negative binomial models assume that regression coefficients are fixed between groups and 
that error terms are not correlated, these models are inadequate for complex sampling 
designs, such as my fundamentalist movement data (Goldstein 1987; Lee and Bryk 1989; 
Raudenbush and Bryk 1986).   
I used the Xtnbreg regression command in Stata; Xtnbreg is a convenience command 
for population-averaged models by using xtgee, family (nbreg) link (log) to obtain estimates. 
94  Fixed effects models have been developed for a variety of different data types and models, 
including linear models for quantitative data (Mundlak 1978), logistic regression models for 
categorical data (Chamberlain 1980), Cox regression models for event history data 
(Yamaguchi 1986; Allison 1996), and Poisson regression models for count data (Palmgren 
1981).  Also, Benner and Tushman (2002) used Xtnbreg as a statistical test in their research, 
which explored the impact that process management activities had on technical innovation.  
Drawing on research in organizational evolution and learning, they suggest that as these 
practices reduce variance in organizational routines and influence the section of innovations, 
                                                
94 Xtnbreg estimates random-effects over-dispersion models, conditional fixed-effects over-dispersion models, 
and population-averaged negative binomial models.  Here random-effects and fixed-effects apply to the 
distribution of the dispersion parameter, and not to the xβ term in the model.  In the random-effects and fixed-
effects over-dispersion models, the dispersion is the same for all elements in the same group (for example 
elements with the same value of the independent variables).  In the random-effects model, the dispersion varies 
randomly from group to group such that the inverse of the dispersion has a Beta (r,s) distribution.  In the fixed-
effects model, the dispersion parameter in a group can take on any value, since a conditional likelihood s used in 
which the dispersion parameter drops out of the estimation.  According to Stata the xtnbreg estimates 
conditional fixed-effects (fe), a maximum-likelihood random-effects (re), or a population-averaged (pa) negative 
binomial model for cross-sectional time-series datasets.  By default, the Population-averaged model is an equal-
correlation model; xtnbreg assumes corr (exchangeable).   
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they enhance incremental innovation at the expense of exploratory innovation.  They tested 
this by looking a 20-year longitudinal study parenting activity and 9,000 quality program 
certifications in the paint and photography industries.  Simons and Ingram (2003) used 
Xtnbreg and looked at the interdependence of institutional forms and the ecology of the 
Kibbutz from 1910-1997.  They tested the number of explanation s of what happened to the 
kibbutz, using an analysis of the founding rate of the kibbutz populations.  They found 
support for popular accounts that the kibbutz stagnated partly as a result of the development 
of Israel of capitalism and of alternated for structuring community relations. 
 
Data and Variables 
Dependent Variable 
I have created an important data set that contains every Islamic fundamentalist 
movement, that is, or has been, in operation from 1970 through 2007.  If the group, political 
party, or issue oriented movement meets my definition of a fundamentalist movement then it 
was included in my data set.  I understand this is not a perfect measure; however, it is the first 
large N attempt at coding Islamic fundamentalist groups and this makes it a significant 
addition to the political science discipline.  In order to determine what fundamentalist 
movements are included in my data set I sent the following conditions: first, the movement, 
group, political party, or issue-oriented militant movement which is non-secular in its beliefs, 
ideas, or dogmas.  Second, it also must encourage, sponsor, or condone the lack of separation 
of church and state within government, state institutions, education, or educational 
institutions.  Third, for a movement to be considered fundamentalist it must have socio-
political objectives, and not just religious ones.  A problem that has arisen with counting the 
number of fundamentalist movements is that the size of the fundamentalist movement is not 
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taken into account; this could have significant ramifications for the reliability of my data.  To 
rectify this, I counted large movements (movements with over 900 members) three times.  I 
chose 900 because most small fundamentalist movements throughout the Islamic world have 
less than 400 active members and medium sized Islamic movements have no more than 700 
members. Furthermore, based on my findings there are virtually no differences between a 
small and medium sized fundamentalist movements.  However, there are significant 
differences between a small or medium movements and that of a large movements, 
specifically influence, membership, resources, and power.  Furthermore, I do not have 
reliable data on the total number of members in most fundamentalist movements but I am 
able to reliably determine the movements with more than 900 members.  Finally, I ran all 
models with the total number of unique fundamentalist movements as the dependent variable 
and any differences in the results were put into footnotes and the complete tables are located 
in the appendix.     
 
Independent Variables 
I will only look at nation-states with a 40% or more Muslim population.  All 
population statistics were obtained from the Department of State’s Country Study webpage.  
The following two tables explain all variables included in my dissertation.  The following 
table lists and codes all nation-states included in my dissertation, as mentioned before.95 This 
will be a 37 year study covering the years from 1970-2007.96  The second table gives a brief 
                                                
95 The following are majority Muslim nation-states and I dropped them because they were in sub-Sahharian 
African and are inherently different culturally and historically than the Muslim-majority states included here: 
Gambia (95%), Guinea (85%), Mali (90%), Senegal (95%), Niger (90%), and Nigeria (47%). 
96 I choose 1970 to be the first year in my study because of the 1979 Iranian Revolution significantly changed 
the phenomena I am most interested in evaluating here; specifically, terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, and the 
Islamization of global politics.  Arguably, after the revolution the Muslim world significantly changed and 1979 
is the year credited as the birth year of both modern terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism.  This, way I can 
evaluate ten years before the Iranian revolution and see if the above assumption is correct.   
  109 
overview and coding explanation of all independent variable included here; for a complete 
description and coding of all Independent variables see appendix. 
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Table Six: Countries Included  
                                                
97 Bahrain gained its independence in 1971.   
98 In 1947, West Pakistan and East Bengal separated from India and jointly became the new country of Pakistan, 
East Bengal became Easter Pakistan in 1955, but the awkward arrangement and the significant separation of the 
two areas left the Bengalis marginalized and dissatisfied.  East Pakistan seceded from this union with West 
Pakistan in 1971 and was renamed Bangladesh.  Because of this I will look at both Bangladesh and Pakistan 
starting in 1972 
99 Brunei Gained independence from the British in 1984 
100 Djibouti gained independence from France in 1977 
101 See Bangladesh footnote for explanation 
102 Gained their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 
103 Gained their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 
104 Gained their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 
105 North Yemen became independent of the Ottoman Empire in 1918.  The British withdrew in 1967 from what 
would become South Yemen.  Three years later, the southern government adapted a Marxist orientation.  The 
massive exodus of hundreds of thousands of Yemenis from the south to the north contributes to two decades of 
hostilities.  These two countries formally unifies as the Republic of Yemen in 1990 
IRN Iran 
ALG Algeria  
AZE Azerbaijan  
BAH Bahrain97  
BNG Bangladesh98  
BRU Brunei99 
DJI Djibouti100  
EGY Egypt 
INS Indonesia  
ISR Israel 
JOR Jordan 
KUW Kuwait 
LEB Lebanon  
LIB Libya  
IRQ Iraq 
MAA Mauritania 
MOR Morocco  
QAT Qatar 
PAK Pakistan101  
OMA Oman 
SAU Saudi Arabia 
SYR Syria  
TAJ Tajikistan102  
TUN Tunisia 
TUR Turkey 
TKM Turkmenistan103  
UAE United Arab Emirates 
UZB Uzbekistan104  
YEM Yemen105 
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Table Seven Variables:109 
Total Population Population is the total population of the nation-state in 
question. 
GDP GDP is the gross value of all products and services 
produced within the nation-state per year. 
Official development 
assistance 
The ODA statistics comprises grants and/or loans to 
developing nation-stats and/or territories. 
American Financial Aid American Financial Aid is the total amount of American 
financial and military aid for each nation-state included in 
my dissertation and for each year (thousands of U.S. 
dollars) 
Unemployment Unemployment is the percentage of the population that is 
unemployed.   
Poverty Poverty is the percentage of the population that is living 
below their state’s recognized poverty level.  
Polity  Polity is a combined score that is computed by subtracting 
the polity autocracy score from the polity democracy score; 
the resulting unified polity score ranges from +10 (strongly 
democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). 
Executive Recruitment  The executive recruitment score ranges from 1 to 8.  1 being 
the most restricted and 8 being the most open. 
Executive Constraints  The degree of checks and balances between the various 
parts of the government is coded on a 7-point scale which 
ranges from the “unlimited executive authority” (1) to 
executive parity or subordination” (7). 
Political Competition  The competitiveness of political participation refers to the 
extent to which alternative preferences for policy formation 
and leadership roles can be pursued in the political arena.        
Political Rights Political rights data was obtained from the CIRI Human 
Rights Data Project.  The CIRI project graded countries 
between 1(most free) and 7 (least free). 
 
                                                
106 Gained their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 
107 Eritrea gained independence in 1991 from Ethiopia after a 30-year struggle with Ethiopia  
108 Gained their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 
109 For a complete list of sources and an explanation of how each variable was operationalized see Appendix   
KZK Kazakhstan106  
ERI Eritrea107  
ETH Ethiopia  
TAN Tanzania  
AFG Afghanistan 
SOM Somalia 
SUD Sudan 
KYR Kyrgyzstan108 
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Continuation of Table Seven: Variables 
Extrajudicial Killings Extrajudicial Killings are killings by government officials 
without due process of law.  These killings may result from 
the deliberate, illegal, and excessive use of lethal force by 
police, security forces, or other agents of the state whether 
against criminal suspects, detainees, prisoners, or others.  
Disappearances Disappearances are cases in which people have disappeared, 
political motivation appears likely, and the victims have not 
been found.  Knowledge of the whereabouts off the 
disappeared is, by definition, not public knowledge.  
Torture  Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, 
whether mental or physical, by government officials or by 
private individuals at the instigation of government officials.   
Political Imprisonment Political imprisonment refers to the incarnations of people 
by government officials because of: their speech, their non-
violent opposition to government policies or leaders; their 
religious beliefs; their non-violent religious practices 
including proselytizing; or their membership in a group, 
including ethic or racial groups. 
Freedom of Speech Freedom of speech includes the extent to which freedoms of 
speech and press are affected by government censorship, 
including ownership of media outlets.   
Freedom of Religion Freedom of religion indicates the extent to which the 
freedom of citizens to exercise and practice their own 
religious beliefs is subject to actual government restrictions.   
Freedom of Movement Freedom of Movement is the freedom to travel within one’s 
country and to leave and return to one’s country is a right.   
Freedom of Assembly and 
Association 
Freedom of Assembly and Association is internationally 
recognized right of citizens to assembly freely and to 
associate with other persons in political parties, trade 
unions, cultural organizations, or other special-interest 
groups.   
Political Participation 
 
Political Participation is the right of citizens to freely 
determine their own political system and leadership is 
known as the right to self-determination.    
Workers Rights Workers should have freedom of association at their 
workplace and the right to bargain collectively with their 
employers.   
Women’s Political Rights 
 
Women’s political rights include a number of internationally 
recognized rights women have  
The presence of an outside 
ideological force 
This is a dichotomous variable that looks at if there is a 
significant outside ideological force present.   
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Continuation of Table Seven: Variables 
Freedom House: Civil 
Liberties 
Civil liberties include the freedom(s) of expression and 
belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, 
and personal autonomy without interference from the state. 
Freedom House Political Rights rates countries on a scale of 
1 to 7, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free.    
Freedom House: Political 
Rights  
Political Rights include questions such as: how is the head 
of state chosen? Are the elections free and fair? Are there 
fair electoral laws? Do those who win elections have real 
power? Is there a significant opposition vote.  Freedom 
House Political Rights rates countries on a scale of 1 to 7, 
with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free.    
Troops Troops are the number of United States troops in each state 
included in my dissertation. The data consists of the number 
of military personal per country per year.  
Secondary School 
Enrolment 
Secondary school enrollment ratio is the ratio of total 
enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age 
group that officially corresponds to the secondary level of 
education.  
 
The following table breaks up the above variables by their relevance to each of the 
social-movement hypotheses.  Religious freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of movement, 
freedom of assembly and association could all be considered institutional variables.  
However, I classify them as idea variables for multiple reasons.  First, religious freedom or 
lack thereof seems to be a major facilitator in the contention in the Islamic world and religion 
is a major aspect of the new social movement literature and the new social movement 
literature is represented by the ideas category.  Freedom of speech inherently involves ideas, 
sharing them, printing them, reading them and the freedom of association is the ability to 
share those ideas.  Freedom of movement facilitates the sharing of ideas.  Finally, the number 
U.S. troops are considered an idea variable because with the troops, along comes American 
culture, American values, and American ideas.  Local communities desire the presence of 
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U.S. troops for the economic benefits.110  There are two variables that overlap multiple 
categories: U.S. aid and the Official Development Assistance statistic.  I consider U.S. aid a 
resource because of the United States is giving money but it is also an outside ideological 
force because U.S. comes with stipulations and, as I argued before, most U.S. aid is from the 
top-down and this aid significantly influences the degree of Westernization and 
Americanization within each Islamic nation-state receiving U.S. aid.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
110 I think it is important to distinguish before moving on the difference between political institutions and state repression, 
both being placed in the political institutions category.  I included variables measuring state repression because variables that 
measure the total number of individuals killed by the state or the total number individuals disappeared or tortured are perfect 
for measuring the degree of state repressiveness.   
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Table Eight: Hypotheses and Variable Categorization 
Social Movement Phenomena  Variables Included 
Resources Total Population 
GDP 
Education/School Enrollment 
ODA 
U.S. Financial Aid 
Education 
Socioeconomic Inequality Unemployment 
Poverty 
Worker’s Rights 
Women’s Political Rights 
ODA 
Political Institutions Polity 
Executive Recruitment 
Executive Constraints 
Political Competition  
Political Rights 
Extrajudicial Killings 
Disappearances 
Torture 
Political Imprisonment 
Political Participation 
Freedom House: Political Rights 
Ideas Religious Freedom 
Education 
Freedom of Speech  
Freedom of Movement 
Freedom of Assembly and Association 
The Presence of an Outside Ideological Force 
U.S. Troops 
U.S. Financial Aid 
Freedom House: Civil Liberties 
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Table Nine: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variable N Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min. Max.  
Fundamentalist Movements  1165 13.6 15.9 0 130 
Unique Fundamentalist Mov  1165 11.7 14.25 0 130 
Terrorist Attacks 1165 12.9 141 0 3966 
Suicide Terrorism  1165 .69 10.4 0 286 
Freedom House Political Rts 1112 5.7 1.2 2 7 
Freedom House Civil Liberties 1102 5.4 1.1 2 7 
Total Number of U.S. Troops 1165 1023 8843 0 200000 
Disappearances 1103 1.5 .8 0 2 
Killings 1103 1.1 .8 0 2 
Political Prison 1103 .64 .8 0 2 
Torture 1103 .76 .76 0 2 
Association 1103 .47 .63 0 2 
Movement 1103 .4 .5 0 2 
Speech 1103 .54 .62 0 2 
Religious Freedom 1103 .27 .44 0 2 
Worker’s Rights 1098 .4 2.3 0 2 
Women’s Rights 1103 1.22 .8 0 2 
U.S Aid 1124 84 341 0 6997 
Polity 1165 -5.4 5 -10 9 
Executive Recruitment 1165 3.5 2 1 8 
Executive Constraints 1165 2.4 1.5 1 7 
Executive Competition 1165 2.6 2.3 1 9 
Total Population 1165 2.56e+07 3.96e+07 111000 2.21e+08 
GDP 1017 3.15e+10 4.89e+10 1.07e+08 3.63e+11 
ODA 1081 3.99e+08 8.57e+08 -1.26e+07 2.17e+10 
School Enrolment 1070 51 28 1.3 104.04 
Unemployment 1165 20.46 14.7 0 60 
Poverty 1165 30.3 18.6 0 80 
 
Results 
Marxist Theory  
As for the first hypothesis associated with my fundamentalist labyrinth, the 
socioeconomic inequality variables associated with Marxist theory, suggest a positive and 
significant relationship between socioeconomic inequality and the number of fundamentalist 
movements within the nation state.  The percentage of the total population within the nation-
state living below the poverty is positively associated with an increase in the number of 
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fundamentalist movements.  Also, the percentage of the total population unemployed within 
the nation-state is positively associated with an increase in the number of fundamentalist 
movements.  Given these results, we see that the socioeconomic inequality is a key predictor 
of fundamentalist movements.  Helping to prove hypotheses number one that argues 
socioeconomic inequality as described by the Marxist social movement theory is positively 
associated with the number and success Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the 
nation-state.111 
Table Ten: Hypothesis One Marxism 
Population Total .0010414*** 
(.0001391) 
U.S. Financial Aid .0001556 
(.0000992) 
Official Development 
Assistance 
3.28e-06 
(3.07e-06) 
Outside Ideological Force .3603364*** 
(.0497973) 
Poverty 
 
.0081488*** 
(.0027486) 
Unemployment 
 
.0112009*** 
(.0021746) 
School Enrolment .0029332*** 
(.001304) 
Women’s Political Rights .0042975 
(,0288608) 
Workers Rights .0009748 
(.004377) 
Polity -.0023577 
(.0036526) 
Political Prison  -.080974 
(.0320378) 
Killings -.0421961* 
(.0252759) 
Freedom of Movement -.1074857** 
(.0379116) 
Religious Freedom .0270646 
(.0360475) 
Freedom of Speech .0222729 
(.0319961) 
Notes: *P < .10; **P < .05; ***P < .01. 
 
 
                                                
111 I also ran this model with the total number of unique fundamentalist groups as the dependent variable and 
both unemployment and poverty stayed positive and highly significant.  However, ODA was positive and almost 
significant at the .06 level.    
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For every percentage increase in total poverty there was a .008 increase in Islamic 
fundamentalism.  The computed IRR scores confirm these results.  The model indicates that a 
one-standard deviation increase in the nation-state’s percentage of total poverty, the expected 
number of fundamentalist movements by .010%.  Finally, I looked at the poverty variable’s 
effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, 
mean, and maximum score.  When the percentage of the total population living in poverty 
was set at its minimum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 3.89, down 
from the average of 5.06.  When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist 
movements is 13.34, up from the average of 5.06.  This shows that states with significant 
poverty have a significant increase in the number of fundamentalist movements. 
The total percentage of the state’s population living in poverty only represents half of 
the significant variables that make up the Marxist arm of my fundamentalist labyrinth; the 
second half of it consists of the total percentage of the state’s unemployed population.  Just as 
with the total poverty level, the unemployment coefficients were positive and significant.  
This indicates that unemployment is positively associated with an increase in the number of 
fundamentalist movements.  As the percent of the nation-state’s unemployed population 
increases, the number of fundamentalist movements within the nation-state also increases.  
The model results indicate that every percentage increase in total unemployment was a .011 
significance level.  The computed IRR scores confirm these results; the results imply that a 
one-standard deviation increase in the nation-state’s percentage of unemployment the 
expected number of fundamentalist groups by 013%.  Finally, I examine the poverty 
variable’s effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its 
minimum, mean, and maximum score which indicates the number of fundamentalist 
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movements expected at each setting.  When the percentage of the total unemployed was set at 
its minimum the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 5.07, up from the average 
of 5.06.  When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist groups is 9.07, up 
from the average of 5.06.  These results are very interesting because set at its minimum, the 
expected number of fundamentalist movements is still larger than the mean; this indicates that 
unemployment has an effect on the number of fundamentalist movements.   
Resource Mobilization Theory 
As for the second hypothesis associated with my fundamentalist labyrinth, the 
resources associated with the Resource Mobilization theory, my results suggest a positive and 
significant relationship between resources and the number of fundamentalist movements 
within the nation state.  Interestingly, my results indicate that only total population and 
education were positive and highly significant.  In other words, as the total population 
increases so do the total number of fundamentalist movements.  Also, as the percentage of the 
total population’s education level increases so does the number of fundamentalist 
movements.  Given these results we see that the resources are a key predictor of 
fundamentalist movements.  Helping to prove hypotheses number two that argues: Resources 
as described by the resource mobilization social movement theory is positively associated 
with the number and success Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state.112 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
112 I also ran this model with the total number of unique fundamentalist groups as the dependent variable and 
both total population and education stayed positive and highly significant.  However, ODA also become positive 
and significant.    
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Table Eleven: Hypothesis Two, Resource Mobilization 
Population Total .0001046*** 
(.0001351) 
GDP 
 
2.93e-08 
(4.67e-08) 
U.S. Troops 
 
2.89e-06 
(9.17e-06) 
U.S. Financial Aid .0001587 
(.0000982) 
Official Development 
Assistance 
3.22e-06 
(3.06e-06) 
Outside Ideological Force .3592338*** 
(.0494209) 
Poverty 
 
.00819*** 
(.0027436) 
Unemployment 
 
.0111341*** 
(.0021174) 
School Enrolment .0029673*** 
(.00121174) 
Polity -.0023019 
(.0036237) 
Political Prison  -.0340593 
(.0332401) 
Killings -.0310673 
(.0254344) 
Freedom of Movement -.072046* 
(.0382415) 
Religious Freedom .0269641 
(.0361385) 
Freedom of Speech .0487863 
(.0326389) 
Notes: *P < .10; **P < .05; ***P < .01. 
 
The population coefficients were positive and significant in all regressions when I ran 
the model using the logged value of the total population.  This indicates that the total 
population was positively associated with an increase in the number of fundamentalist 
movements.  As the size of the nation-state’s population increases by ten thousand, the 
number of fundamentalist movements increase by .0001046, this increase is relatively small.  
These results suggest that increases in a nation-state’s population facilitate more 
fundamentalist movements; the computed IRR score confirms this.  The IRR score implies 
that a one-standard deviation increase in the total population raises the expected number of 
fundamentalist movements by .00008%.  These results indicate that as the population grows, 
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there will be an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements.  Alone, these results do 
not indicate a significant amount of information; common sense tells me that the more people 
nation-states have the more of everything else it has, including Islamic fundamentalism.  
However, taken with the other variables associated with resource mobilization theory, it is 
apparent that resources are positively associated with fundamentalism.  I looked at the total 
population variable’s effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the 
variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score which indicates the number of 
fundamentalist groups expected at each setting.  When the state’s total population was set at 
its minimum the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 5.34, down from the 
average of 5.06.  When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist 
movements is 13.8, up from the average of 5.06.  These results further confirm all previous 
results and indicate that as the state’s population increases, so do the number of Islamic 
fundamentalist movements. 
Secondary school enrollment is also positive and significant, as expected and 
predicted by Marx and his theory of relative deprivation.  The education/school enrollment 
coefficients were positive and significant.  The education coefficients were significantly 
larger than that of the population variables.  The results reveal that every percentage increase 
in school enrollment there was a significance level of .003.  These results indicate that 
education was positively associated with an increase in the number of fundamentalist 
movements.  In other words, the more educated the population, the more fundamentalist 
movements there will be within the nation-state.  The computed IRR scores confirm this; the 
results imply that a one-standard deviation increase in the nation-state’s secondary school 
enrolment the expected number of fundamentalist movements by .009%.   Finally, just as 
  122 
with the state’s total population I looked at the education level variable’s effect on the 
number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and 
maximum score which indicates the number of fundamentalist movements expected at each 
setting.  When secondary school enrollment was set at its minimum the expected number of 
fundamentalist movements is 4.08, down from the average of 5.06.  When set at its 
maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 8.73, up from the average of 
5.06.  These results further confirm all previous results and indicate that as population and 
education increase, so do the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements. 
Political Process Theory 
The third hypothesis associated with my fundamentalist labyrinth is the political 
institutions associated with the Resource Mobilization theory.  My results show two things; 
first, there are two linear relationships between perfect autocracies and the perfect 
democracies and the number of fundamentalist groups.113  These findings indicate that both 
perfect democracies and perfect autocracies experience lower numbers of fundamentalist 
movements while states with opening political institutions experience more fundamentalist 
movements.  When governments disdainfully kill or torture its citizens with no regards to 
basic human rights, there will be a decrease in the number Islamic fundamentalist groups.  On 
the other hand, the more freedom of speech a nation-state has the fewer fundamentalist 
movements.  Secondly, there is an inverted-U shaped relationship with the number and 
success of Islamic fundamentalist movements; the number of movements is the strongest in 
systems which are neither perfect democracies nor perfect autocracies.  In order to prove 
hypotheses number three: The degree of openness of political institutions as described by the 
                                                
113 The definition of a perfect autocracy is obtained from the Polity IV data set that ranges from a -10 (a perfect 
autocracy) and +10 (a perfect democracy).   
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political process social movement theorists has an inverted-U shaped relationship with the 
number and success of Islamic fundamentalist movements; the number of movements should 
be the strongest in system which are neither highly democratic nor highly autocratic I ran 
different sets of models utilizing the Freedom House political rights data, CIRI human rights 
data, and the Polity IV data sets.   
Eckstein and Gurr (1975. 26) defined polity as a “simple, general definition of all 
politics or governments as subsets of the class of authority patterns.”  They defined authority 
patterns as “a set of asymmetric relations among hierarchically ordered members of a social 
unit that involves the direction of the unit”.  The direction of a social unit involves the 
definition of its goals, the regulation of conduct of its members, and the allocation and 
coordination of roles within it (page 22 of Polity IV codebook).  The original polity 
conceptual scheme was formulated and the initial Polity I data collected under the direction 
of Ted Gurr and Harry Eckstein, Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for Political 
Inquiry (NY: John Wilett and Sons, 1975).  According to the authors, the Polity project has 
become the most widely used resource for monitoring regime change and studying the effects 
of regime authority.  The Polity project has evolved through three earlier research phases, all 
under the direction of Gurr, and its most recent phase, Polity III, has updated the polity data 
through 1998.  Monty Marshall (2005) argues that Polity IV makes a concerted effort to 
distinguish the regime and authority characteristics of the effective state polity from the use 
of organized, anti-regime armed force to challenge and, possibly reject that authority (Polity 
IV Codebook: 2).   
Freedom House gave nation-sates a rating of between 1 representing the most free and 
7 the least free.  To receive a 1 on the political rights Freedom House score come closest to 
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the ideals associated with the purist example of democracy.  For example, they have free and 
fair elections, those who are elected rule, there are competitive parties or other political 
groupings, and the opposition plays an important role and has actual power. Citizens enjoy 
self-determination or an extremely high degree of autonomy, and minority groups have 
reasonable self-government or can participate in the government through informal consensus.  
The Freedom House data set has significant problems and because of this I felt is was 
imperative I use additional independent variables that are associated with the different 
conditions that the Freedom House data tries to capture.  I wanted to see if individually these 
variables are more significant than they are collectively.    
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Table Twelve: Hypothesis Three, Political Process 
 
Population Total .0010158*** 
(.0001352) 
.0009138*** 
(.0001372) 
U.S. Financial Aid .0001822* 
(.0000985) 
.0001094 
(.0001004) 
Official Development 
Assistance 
3.38e-06 
(3.05e-06) 
4.14e-06 
(3.05e-06) 
Outside Ideological Force .3376343*** 
(.0498413) 
.3517101*** 
(.0490315) 
Poverty 
 
.0089459*** 
(.0027554) 
.0088863*** 
(.0027659) 
Unemployment 
 
.0098839*** 
(.0021804) 
.0083676*** 
(.0022119) 
School Enrolment .003315** 
(.0012973) 
.002363** 
(.0012762) 
Polity -.0017713 
(.003624) 
_________ 
Polity2 __________ -.0026509 
(.0006863) 
Religious Freedom .0226563* 
(.0367818) 
.0464018 
(.0374942) 
Freedom of Speech  .051108 
(.0336594) 
.047317 
(.0337191) 
Freedom of Movement -.0678742* 
(.0380351) 
-.0477396 
(.0385758) 
Freedom House Political 
Rights 
-.0297252*** 
(.0186641) 
-.0135123*** 
(.0164182) 
Disappearances -.0491805*** 
(.0203303) 
-.0412047*** 
(.0203916) 
Killings -.0505403*** 
(.0215572) 
-.0399285** 
(.0216559) 
Torture -.109859*** 
(.027243) 
-.0918286*** 
(.0275828) 
Notes: *P < .10; **P < .05; ***P < .01. 
 
I feel the Freedom House data sets are inherently flawed; they have completely 
ignored the Palestinian people.  Arguably, no study looking at the Islamic world’s social 
movements would be accurate if the Palestinians were excluded and arguably, all results 
would be biased.  I can understand Freedom House excluding the Palestinians located in 
Lebanon, Syria, and so forth; however, they should not have excluded the ones in the 
occupied territories.  Even if Freedom House refused to give them country-status, they should 
have included them in the Israeli country data.  I have included the Freedom House variables 
and their results in the text of this chapter and not in the appendix because Freedom House 
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seems to be the norm in the literature when measuring civil and political liberties.  The 
numbers of scholars who use these all encompassing data sets are significantly high.114  As 
for any norm, it is imperative that it is acknowledge and tested and the dominate tools used 
within the field are tested; if not my results would be less credible, and it would appear as if I 
am hiding something.  Furthermore, my results back up my hypotheses that are fewer 
fundamentalist movements in perfect autocracies or perfect democracies.  The Freedom 
House results reveal that the more politically free a state is there will be a significance level 
decrease in the number of fundamentalist movements of .03.  The IRR scores implies that a 
one-standard deviation increase the nation-state’s Freedom House score will decrease by 
.04%.  When the Freedom House Political Rights were set at its minimum the expected 
number of fundamentalist movements is 10.8, up from the average of 5.06.  When set at its 
maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 5.26, down from the 
average of 5.06.  Interestingly, these results contradict the above results confirming the 
                                                
114A norm is generally defined as a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity: Marth Finnermore. 
1996. National Interests in National Security, Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Page 22.  According to Christopher Gelpe 
(1997:340) a norm is a standard that is meant to imply behavioral regularity. According to Scott Walker and Steven Poe 
(2002: 247) that the availability of human rights and freedom data was once a severe problem in the empirical study of 
human rights; however substantial challenges remain since data on many human rights issues are regularly gathered or are 
available for only a limited number of countries, and Freedom House has been a pioneer with this.  A basic JSTOR search 
indicates that there are 664 articles that have used or acknowledged the Freedom House data sets. Also, there are 264 articles 
in Project Muse that have used or acknowledged the Freedom House date set.  The following are a few examples of the norm 
in the literature:  Ari Aisen and Francisco Jose Veiga. 2006. Does Political Instability Lead to Higher Inflation? A Panel 
Data Analysis.  Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking. Pages 1379-1389. This paper shows that a higher degree of political 
instability is associates with higher inflation.  Linda Camp Keith. 1999. The United Nations International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights: Does it Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior.  Journal of Peace Research, Pages 95-118. Her 
article tested whether becoming a party to this international treaty has an observable impact on the state party’s actual 
behavior. Gilbert Valverde. 1999. Democracy, Human Rights, and Development Assistance for Education: The USAID and 
World Bank in Latin America and the Caribbean. Economic Development and Cultural Change.  Pages 401-419. This article 
looks at the state’s transition to democracy.  Staffan Lindberg. 2006. The Surprising Significance of African Elections. 
Journal of Democracy, Pages 139-151.  She looks at the value of elections in measuring democracy. Steven Poe and Neal 
Tate. 1994. Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis. The American Political 
Science Review. Pages 853-872. There cross national study explained variations in governmental repression of human rights 
to personal integrity in 153 country sample during the 1980s.  Lind Camp Keith. 2002. Constitutional Provisions for 
Individual Human Rights (1977-1996): Are They More The Mere Window Dressing? Political Science Quarterly. Pages 
111-143. Looked at the relationship between constitutions and human rights.  David Cingranelli and David Richards. 1999. 
Respect for Human Rights After the End of the Cold War. Journal of Peace Research. Pages 511-534. Scott Walker and 
Steven Poe. 2002. Does Cultural Diversity Affect Countries’ Respect for Human Rights?  Human Rights Quarterly. Pages 
237-263.  In this paper they examine the relationship between cultural diversity and the respect for several human rights.  
They basically link cultural diversity to human rights. 
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Freedom House variable.  They show that the more autocratic the state is, the fewer the 
fundamentalist movements there will be. 
Extrajudicial killings are negative and significant, as expected.  Extrajudicial killing is 
the killing of citizens within the perspective nation-state by government officials without due 
process of law.  These killings may result from the deliberate, illegal, and excessive use of 
lethal force by police, security forces, or other agents of the state whether against criminal 
suspects, detainees, prisoners, or others.  The model indicates that the more individuals a state 
kills there will be a .05 decrease in the significance level of the number of fundamentalist 
movements.  The computed IRR scores confirm this; the results imply that a one-standard 
deviation increase in the number of extrajudicial killings in a nation-state the expected 
number of fundamentalist movements with the inclusion of the CIRI Human Rights Data 
Project variables decrease by .13%.  Finally, I looked at the extrajudicial killing variable’s 
effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, 
mean, and maximum score which indicates the number of fundamentalist groups expected at 
each setting.  When extrajudicial killings were set at its minimum the expected number of 
fundamentalist movements is 7.33, up from the average of 5.06.  When set at its maximum, 
the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 3.42, down from the average of 5.06.  
These results confirm that the more citizens the state either murders or facilitates the murder 
of, there will be a significant decline in the number of fundamentalist movements.   
State sponsored acts of torture were also negative and significant, as expected.  State 
sponsored acts of torture refer to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or 
physical, by government officials or by private individuals at the instigation of government 
officials.  Torture includes the use of physical and other force by police and prison guards 
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that is cruel, inhumane, or degrading.  This also includes deaths in custody due to negligence 
by government officials.  The results reveal that the more individuals a state tortures there 
will be a significance level decrease of in the number of fundamentalist movements of .11.  
Also, the computed IRR scores confirm this; the results implies that a one-standard deviation 
increase nation-state’s sponsored acts of torture the expected number of fundamentalist 
movements will decrease by .07%.  Finally, I looked at the state sponsored acts of torture 
variable’s effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its 
minimum, mean, and maximum score which indicates the number of fundamentalist 
movements expected at each setting.  When state sponsored acts of torture were set at its 
minimum the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 6.28, up from the average of 
5.06.  When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 5.49, 
down from the average of 5.06.  These results confirm that the more the state tortures its 
citizens, the fewer fundamentalist movements.      
State sponsored disappearances are also negative and significant.  State sponsored 
disappearances are cases in which individuals have disappeared where political motivation 
appears likely, and the victims have not been found.  Knowledge of their whereabouts is not 
public knowledge.  In most instances, disappearances occur because of the victim’s ethnicity 
religion or race or because of the victim’s political involvement or knowledge of information 
sensitive to authorities.  The results reveal that the more individuals a state disappears there 
will be a decrease of in the number of fundamentalist movements significance level of .05.  
The computed IRR scores confirm this; the results imply that a one-standard deviation 
increase nation-state’s sponsored disappearances the expected number of fundamentalist 
movements will decrease by .087%.  Finally, I looked at the state sponsored disappearance 
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variable’s effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its 
minimum, mean, and maximum score which indicates the number of fundamentalist 
movements expected at each setting.  When state sponsored disappearances were set at its 
minimum the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 5.96, up from the average of 
5.06.  When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 5.01, 
down from the average of 5.06.  These results confirm that the more citizens the state either 
disappears, there will be a decline in the number of fundamentalist movements.  However, the 
decline is not as significant as it was with state sponsored killings.      
Thus far, I have not proven an inverted-U relationship exists between political 
institutions and the number of fundamentalist movements.  I have shown that two linear 
relationships exist between very perfect democracies/autocracies and the number of 
fundamentalist movements.  These findings indicate that both perfect democracies and 
perfect autocracies experience lower numbers of fundamentalist movements while states with 
opening political institutions experience more fundamentalist movements.  However, I 
suspect a much more complex relationship between political institutions and Islamic 
fundamentalism.  I suspect an inverted-U relationship; that is, there will be more Islamic 
fundamentalist movements in nation-states that are not either perfect democracies or perfect 
autocracies.  My inverted-U hypothesis is very similar to that used by Christian Davenport 
and David Armstrong (2004: 541) and what they call “more murder in the middle” 
hypothesis.  The authors claim that the ends of the political spectrum are less important for 
understanding human rights violations then those governments that lie somewhere between 
theses two extremes.  According to Davenport and Armstrong (2004:545) polity stands as the 
best comparative indicator of procedural democracy because of its incorporation of structural 
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constraints on political participation and contestation; it is also one of the most utilized 
comparative measures of democracy and the best variable to determine inverted-U shaped 
relationships (Jaggers and Girr 1994, 470; Ward 2002, 49).  Therefore, I squared all variables 
associated with polity.  If the polity variables have a significant positive effect and the 
squared term has a significant negative effect, then I prove that an inverted-U relationship 
exists.  My polity variable was not significant.  This does not necessarily disprove my 
hypothesis because two of the three multi-dimensional polity variables and their square terms 
were significant.      
We have seen this inverted-U hypothesis throughout the Islamic world in the last 
thirty seven years within perfect autocracies.  For example, in Kuwait (a perfect autocracy) a 
group called the Black Brigades, an obscure Kuwaiti Shiite revolutionary group funded via 
Iranian financial assistance formed in 1982 and it remained in Kuwait.  It existed for just a 
matter of weeks before its leaders and its few members were arrested and subsequently killed.  
A second example of this is the Generation of Arab Fury, a second obscure Kuwaiti Shiite 
revolutionary group funded via Iranian financial assistance, whose objective was to commit 
acts of violence against Saudi Arabia remained in Kuwait for just a few months in 1989 
before being completely eliminated via the execution of its leader and members.  A second 
example would be that of Saudi Arabia, a perfect autocracy.  Saudi Arabia has had numerous 
examples of very short lived, obscure fundamentalist groups that exist long enough for a 
meeting and then are subsequently eliminated.  These include groups such as the Liberation 
Party of the Peninsula this Shiite group was active in the Eastern part of Saudi Arabia in the 
months following the 1979 Iranian Revolution; its members were subsequently jailed and 
then executed.  The Al-Haramayn Brigades were a small fundamentalist movement that 
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sought to overthrow the royal family and replace it with an Islamic militant quasi-democracy; 
this group was active for just a few months in 2003.  Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was 
only active in Saudi Arabia for one month in 2004 before a single terrorist attack resulted in 
the state initiating the total elimination of everyone associated with the group or the group’s 
members. The Arabian Peninsula Freemen was active for three months in 1989 before they 
too were completely eliminated.  There are Islamic fundamentalist groups that have formed in 
Saudi Arabia during the course of the last year that the Saudi government is currently trying 
to deal with; they include Abu Mus’ab Al-Zarqawi Battalion and the Islamic Peninsula 
Movement for Change – Jihad Wing.  These do not include the groups that get their financial 
support from the state whose objective is to spread Sunni Islam.  Furthermore, perfect 
autocracies like Brunei, Qatar, Oman, Algeria until the late 1980s, or Jordan until the early 
1990s have no fundamentalist groups within them.    
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Table Thirteen: Hypothesis Three Political Process  
Population 
Total 
.0009739*** 
(.0001471) 
.001267 
(.0001453) 
.0009337*** 
(.0001444) 
.001184*** 
(.00014) 
.0009115*** 
(.0001452) 
.0011508*** 
(.0001418) 
GDP 
 
5.13e-08 
(4.76e-08) 
4.35e-08 
(4.83e-08) 
5.44e-08 
(4.79e-08) 
5.90e-08 
(4.86-08) 
6.55e-08 
(4.81e-08) 
6.02e-08 
(4.92e-08) 
U.S. Financial 
Aid 
.0001918* 
(.0000995) 
.000890* 
(.000008) 
.0001817* 
(.0000995) 
.0001847* 
(.0001012) 
.0001668* 
(.0001004) 
.000089 
(.000278) 
Official 
Development 
Assistance 
1.82e-06 
(3.15e-06) 
2.98e-06 
(3.02e-06) 
1.83e-06 
(3.14e-06) 
2.37e-06* 
(3.17e-06) 
2.32e-06 
(3.13e-06) 
4.02e-06 
(3.02e-06) 
Outside 
Ideological 
Force 
.3545735*** 
(.0508397) 
.3623780*** 
(.0521568) 
.3433839*** 
(.0514415) 
.359800*** 
(.05009) 
.3232988*** 
(.0499697) 
.400189*** 
(.38908) 
Poverty 
 
.0084663*** 
(.002766) 
.0079641*** 
(.0028967) 
.0088717*** 
(.0027507) 
.0088594*** 
(.0028814) 
.0095129*** 
(.0027756) 
.0090297*** 
(.0028881) 
Unemployment 
 
.0091122*** 
(.0022645) 
.0092893*** 
(.0023405) 
.0093075*** 
(.0022704 
.0099975*** 
(.002241) 
.0087464*** 
(.0033742) 
.0097606*** 
(.0023173) 
School 
Enrolment 
.0028423** 
(.0012996) 
.005358 
(.00197) 
.0026923** 
(.0013269) 
.0052779*** 
(.0013269) 
.001722 
(.0013369) 
.0040282*** 
(.0013297) 
Women’s 
Political Rights 
.0148381 
(.0306453) 
.023723 
(.03616) 
.0108332 
(.0306508) 
.109022 
(.39693) 
.0001003 
(.0306801) 
-.0008937 
(.031107) 
Workers Rights .0023795 
(.0044366) 
-.0005386 
(.0048987) 
.0020341 
(.0044191) 
-.000928 
(.001078) 
.001354 
(.0043977) 
-.001289 
(.002982) 
Religious 
Freedom 
.0063941 
(.0364433) 
.0174676 
(.035672) 
.0094657 
(.0363936) 
.0198611 
(.0358813) 
.0217248 
(.0367239) 
.024255 
(.0359817) 
Freedom of 
Speech  
.0422441 
(.0328622) 
.0108348 
(.0318309) 
.0434935 
(.0330333) 
.0197402 
(.032172) 
.0360241 
(.0330065) 
.0089096 
(.0320534) 
Freedom of 
Movement 
-.0027663* 
(.0334722) 
-.012246* 
(.001228) 
-.127401* 
(.0012331) 
.087761 
(0096152) 
-.0511009 
(.0439088) 
-.001897 
(.000928) 
Freedom of 
Association 
.0513346* 
(.0294458) 
.0647617** 
(.029119) 
.0476174 
(.0294187) 
.0494709* 
(.0294329) 
.0572531** 
(.0290461) 
.059201** 
(.0290074) 
Killings -,0421407* 
(.023301) 
-.052175** 
(.025405) 
-.0391002* 
(.0233593) 
-.0404736 
(.0253094) 
-.0393078* 
(.0232394) 
-.0431297* 
(.0251439) 
Political Prison -.0723979** 
(.0302151) 
-.0157883 
(.0330794) 
-.0775723*** 
(.0304657) 
-.0269632 
(.0337792) 
-.0890082*** 
(0300131) 
-.0327533 
(.0327152) 
Executive 
Recruitment 
-.0160603*** 
(.0121487) 
_________ __________ ___________ __________ _________ 
Executive 
Recruitment 
Squared  
_________ .0125879*** 
(.001302) 
__________ ___________ __________ _________ 
Executive 
Constraints  
_________ _________ .022870*** 
(.0115702) 
___________ __________ _________ 
Executive 
Constraints 
Squared  
_________ _________  -.0020019*** 
(.0016018) 
__________ _________ 
Political 
Competition 
_________ _________ __________ __________ .0185365 
(.0074425) 
_________ 
Political 
Competition 
Squared  
_________ _________ __________ __________ __________ .0015116 
(.0009545) 
Notes: *P < .10; **P < .05; ***P < .01. 
 
Concerning the multidimensional polity variables, executive recruitment was positive 
and significant.  Executive recruitment measures the ways in which the executive comes to 
occupy their positions of political authority; how institutionalized, competitive and open are 
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the mechanisms for selecting a political leader.  Executive recruitment, which was first 
conceptualized by Eckstein and Gurr (1975), involves the ways in which social 
superordinantes come to occupy their positions of political authority.  In other words, how 
open, institutionalized and competitive are the political institutions that are used in selecting 
political leaders.  Marshall and Jaggers (2005: 49) argue that in terms of modern democratic 
theory, democratic systems are defined as those polities that afford their citizens the 
opportunity to replace their political representatives through regularly competitive and open 
elections.  According to Marshall and Jaggers’s (2005) modern democratic theory, 
democratic systems are defined as those polities that afford their citizens the opportunity to 
replace their political representatives through regularly scheduled, competitive and open 
elections.  These procedural dimensions of democracy have been captured by three key 
variables from the polity data set and they include: (1) the extent of institutionalization or 
regulation of executive transfers, (2) the competitiveness of executive selection, and (3) the 
openness of executive recruitment.  The executive recruitment score ranges from 1 to 8, 1 
being the most restricted and 8 being the most open.  My analysis of executive recruitment 
provides evidence that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the openness of the 
political system and the number of fundamentalist groups.  Executive recruitment is 
significantly positive while its squared term is negatively significant, proving that an 
inverted-U relationship exists between executive recruitment and the number of 
fundamentalist movements present within the nation-state.  In other words, the relationship 
between fundamentalism and political institutions is nonlinear; political systems with open 
political institutions facilitate fundamentalism.  The executive recruitment coefficient results 
reveal that the more political free a state is the number of fundamentalist movement 
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significance level increases by .013.  On the other hand, the squared executive recruitment 
coefficients reveal that the more political closed a state is, there will be a decrease in the 
number of fundamentalist movements of .023.  The IRR score implies that a one-standard 
deviation increase in the nation-state’s executive recruitment score will increase by .019%.  
Also, the IRR scores implies that a one-standard deviation increase the nation-state’s 
executive recruitment squared score will decrease by .02%.   
Executive constraints were positive and significant and refer to the extent of 
institutional constraints on the decision-making powers of the chief executive.  The degree of 
checks and balances between the veto players in the government is coded on a 7-point scale 
which ranges from the unlimited executive authority (1) to executive subordination (7).  
Under unlimited executive authority there would be only one veto player and under executive 
subordination there would be numerous veto players.  According to Marshall and Jaggers 
(2005: 63) in Western democracies the executive branch is typically constrained by the 
legislative and judicial branches of government.  In Islamic states, their executives are 
restrained via militaries, political parties, legislatures, and most significantly the church.  
Furthermore, Marshall and Jaggers (2005:63) argues that executive constraints are similar to 
the notion of “horizontal accountability” found in the democracy literature but it assumes that 
dictators may also be bound by certain institutional constraints.  Limits on the chief executive 
may be imposed by any “accountability group” in the polity.  In Western democracies the 
executive branch is typically constrained by the legislative and judicial branches of 
government.  Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party system, 
a council of nobles or power advisors in monarchies, and the military.  My analysis of 
executive constraints provides evidence that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship 
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between the openness of the political system and the number of fundamentalist groups.  
Executive constraints are positively significantly while its squared term is negatively 
significant, proving that an inverted-U relationship between executive constraints and the 
number of fundamentalist movements present within the nation-state.   As for the executive 
constraint coefficients, the results reveal that the more veto players in a state means there will 
be a significance level increase in the number of fundamentalist movements of .023.  On the 
other hand, the squared executive constraint coefficients reveal that the more veto players in a 
state will cause a decrease in the number of fundamentalist movements of .002.  The IRR 
score implies that a one-standard deviation increase the nation-state’s executive constraints 
score will increase by .16%.  Also, the IRR scores implies that a one-standard deviation 
increase the nation-state’s executive constraints squared score will decrease by .018%.  
The results of my executive constraints and executive recruitment variables were 
similar to that of Regan and Henderson (2002) and Fein (1995), both of which found that 
there would be more repression in the middle of the political spectrum and that both 
democracies and autocracies experience lower levels of repression while semi democracies 
experience more fundamentalist groups.115  I have proven that my inverted-U hypothesis is 
valid and there will be a significant increase in the number of fundamentalist movements in 
opening political systems, just as the political process theorist predict.   
New Social Movement Theory  
As for the fourth hypothesis associated with my fundamentalist labyrinth, the ideas 
associated with the New Social Movement theory, results suggest a positive and significant 
relationship between ideas and the number of fundamentalist movements within the nation 
                                                
115 I also ran this model with the total number of unique fundamentalist groups as the dependent variable and all 
three polity variables and their squared terms became highly significant.  This further proves my inverted-U 
hypothesis.  Also, all freedom of movement coefficients became negative and highly significant.    
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state; specifically, religious ones or ones associated with an outside ideological force.  
Interestingly, my results indicate that the presences of an outside ideological force, freedom 
of speech, and freedom of religion are significant.  Given these results we see that ideas are a 
key predictor of fundamentalist movements.  Helping to prove hypotheses number four that 
argues: Ideas as described by the new social movement theorists are positively associated 
with the number and success Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state.116 
Table Fourteen: Hypothesis Four New Social Movements  
Population Total .0010717*** 
(.0001408) 
.0010753*** 
(.0001393) 
GDP 
 
1.19e-08 
(4.80e-08) 
1.31e-08 
(4.79e-08) 
U.S. Troops 
 
3.31e-06 
(9.16e-06) 
2.23e-06 
(9.13e-06) 
U.S. Financial Aid .0000959 
(.0001013) 
.0001054 
(.0001013) 
Official Development 
Assistance 
2.27e-06 
(3.14e-06) 
2.67e-06 
(3.07e-06) 
Outside Ideological Force .3555338*** 
(.0506571) 
.3630426*** 
(.0497402) 
Poverty 
 
.0077294*** 
(.0028003) 
.0078023*** 
(.0027546) 
Unemployment 
 
.0105782*** 
(.0022535) 
.0106273*** 
(.0021848) 
School Enrolment .0034866*** 
(.0013569) 
.0034651** 
(.0013525) 
Women’s Political Rights .0184314 
(.0017143) 
.0012489 
(.0043455) 
Workers Rights -.01296832 
(.0011324) 
.0048231 
(.028907) 
Polity -.00042912* 
(.0042912) 
-.0078499* 
(.0042285) 
Religious Freedom .0014164*** 
(.0352899) 
_________ 
Freedom of Speech  -.018927*** 
(.0319494) 
_________ 
Freedom of Movement -.0603762* 
(.0379705) 
_________ 
Freedom House Civil 
Liberties 
___________ -.0536345* 
(.0217175) 
Notes: *P < .10; **P < .05; ***P < .01. 
 
                                                
116 I also ran this model with the total number of unique fundamentalist groups as the dependent variable and 
freedom of movement became negative and highly significant.   Also, freedom of speech became almost 
significant and not highly significant.  Finally, the Freedom House variable also became highly significant.       
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The results reveal that if there is a presence of an outside ideological force there is an 
increase in the number of fundamentalist movements of .35.  The computed IRR scores 
confirm these results; the results imply that a one-standard deviation increase in the presence 
of an outside ideological force the expected number of fundamentalist movements by 42%.  
Furthermore, I looked at the outside ideological force variable’s effect on the number of 
fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score 
which indicates the number of fundamentalist movements expected at each setting.  When the 
variable is set at its minimum the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 4.61, up 
from the average of 5.06.  When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist 
movements is 11.0, up from the average of 5.06.  These results are very interesting because 
set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is twice as much as it 
is when set at the mean; this and the above statistical results indicate that the presence of an 
outside ideological force is a significant determinant in the number of fundamentalist 
movements.   
There are three significant outside ideological forces in the Islamic world that operate 
within Islamic nation-states: Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States.  As I explained before, 
theoretically, American ideological influence is inherently different than either Iranian or 
Saudi Arabian.  For the most part, the outside ideological variable only incorporates the 
influence of Iran or Saudi Arabia and to a minor extent other Islamic states that have met the 
five criteria to be considered an outside ideological force.  U.S. ideological influence was 
excluded from this variable but captured with two additional variables: U.S. aid and the 
presence of U.S. troops.  Not in a single model was U.S. aid or the presence of U.S. troops 
significant.       
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Religious freedom is positive and significant.  Religious freedom measures the extent 
to which individuals living within the nation-state are able to exercise and practice their own 
religious beliefs without government restrictions.  When governments restrict religious 
freedom there is an increase in the number Islamic fundamentalist movements.  The results 
reveal that if the state restricts religious freedom then there will be a .0014 significance level.  
The IRR scores imply that a one-standard deviation increase nation-state’s freedom of 
religion the expected number of fundamentalist movements .09%.  Finally, I looked at the 
freedom of religion variable’s effect on the number of fundamentalist groups by setting the 
variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score which indicates the number of 
fundamentalist movements expected at each setting.  When religious freedom was set at its 
minimum the expected number of fundamentalist groups is 5.81, down from the average of 
5.06.  When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 4.77, 
up from the average of 5.06.  These results further confirm all previous results and indicate 
that as the state restricts religious freedom, individuals will turn to fundamentalist 
movements.  
Freedom of speech is negative and significant, as expected.  Freedom of speech 
measures the extent to which the government censors an individual’s freedoms of speech and 
press.  When governments restrict freedom of speech we see a decrease in the number Islamic 
fundamentalist movements by .019.  In other words, in nation-states with more freedom of 
speech and press, there will be more ideas and thus more fundamentalist movements.  The 
results reveal that if the state restricts freedom of speech then there will be a significance 
level decrease of in the number of fundamentalist movements of .09.  Also, the computed 
IRR scores confirm this; the results imply that a one-standard deviation increase nation-
  139 
state’s freedom of speech the expected number of fundamentalist movements decrease by 
.037%.  Finally, I looked at the freedom of speech variable’s effect on the number of 
fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score 
which indicates the number of fundamentalist movements expected at each setting.  When 
freedom of speech was set at its minimum the expected number of fundamentalist movement 
is 5.18, down from the average of 5.06.  When set at its maximum, the expected number of 
fundamentalist movements is 5.42, up from the average of 5.06.  
Terrorism as a Dependent Variable 
To further test these results and the relationship between the degree of 
fundamentalism (as measured by the number of fundamentalist movements) and that of the 
number of terrorist and suicide terrorist attacks, I think it is imperative to evaluate the 
terrorist data.  The terrorism data is an integral part of the fundamentalist literature and it is 
highly problematic to separate the two.  Furthermore, it is important to assume that the more 
terrorist attacks a nation-state have then the more conducive to fundamentalism it is.  To do 
this, I will repeat my analysis of by changing the dependent variable from the total number of 
fundamentalist movements in every nation-state for the last thirty-six years to the total 
number of terrorist and suicide terrorist attacks in ever predominately Islamic state for the last 
thirty-six years.  One of the best ways to determine the degree of terrorism is to look at the 
number of suicide terrorist attacks; there is no greater act of terrorism than that of a suicide 
terrorist.  I feel the number of suicide terrorist attacks will reveal a great deal of information 
as to what state-level phenomena facilitate such violence.  I have also included the total 
number of fundamentalist movements as an independent variable in order to determine the 
relationship between the number of fundamentalist movements and terrorism.  To determine 
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the degree of fundamentalism within a nation-state by counting the total number of terrorist 
attacks and suicide terrorist attacks is not a perfect measurement, but it will tell us the 
characteristics found within each nation-state seems to be facilitating violence.  I am 
assuming that the more fundamentalist movements a state has, the more acts of terrorism that 
state will also have.  As argued in Hypothesis Number Five: The total degree fundamentalism 
in the Islamic nation-state is positively associated with the total degree of non-state induced 
violence within that nation-state.  In other words, if the nation-state has a large degree of 
fundamentalism, it will have a large number of terrorist attacks.  
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Table Fifteen: Terrorism 
Number of fundamentalist 
groups 
.0079509 
(.0070204) 
Population Total -.0001** 
(.000032) 
GDP 
 
7.68e-08** 
(1.77e-08) 
U.S. Troops 
 
.0000166 
(.0000157) 
U.S. Financial Aid .0006337*** 
(.0002611) 
Official Development 
Assistance 
 
-8.07e-10* 
(2.09e-10) 
Outside Ideological Force .3138084* 
(.1642867) 
Poverty 
 
.0100356 
(.0067464) 
Unemployment 
 
.0041539 
(.007738) 
School Enrolment .0069769* 
(.0040775) 
Freedom of speech .3874487*** 
(1245125) 
Religious Freedom  -.5575162*** 
(.1445336) 
Killings -.1412438 
(.1003568) 
Political Prisoners -.3026613*** 
(.1167829) 
Torture -.2110453* 
(.1236699) 
Movement -.107438 
(.1378888) 
Polity 
 
-.0270196 
(.1247045) 
Notes: *P < .10; **P < .05; ***P < .01. 
Interestingly, GDP, the total population, and U.S. aid were significant.  My results 
reveal that as the size of the nation-state’s population increases by ten-thousand the number 
of terrorist acts the significance level decreases by .000032.  The IRR score also indicates a 
decrease in the number of terrorist attacks; as the population grows by one ratio; there is a 
decrease of .0001 in the number of terrorist attacks.  These results partially indicate that as 
the population grows, there will be fewer acts of terrorism.  Also, with every ten-thousand 
dollar increase in GDP there is increase in the number of terrorist attacks by .0000000768.  
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The IRR score indicates that there is no relationship.  These results indicate that nation-states 
with larger GDPs and smaller populations will have more acts of terrorism when there is a 
presence of significant U.S. aid; however, financial aid from other sources has no impact.   
The U.S. aid variable is highly significant and indicates that as U.S. aid increases by 
ten-thousand dollars there is a significance level increase in the number of terrorist attacks by 
.0006337.  The IRR score indicates that also indicates an increase in the number of terrorist 
attacks, as U.S. aid increases by one ratio, there is an increase of terrorist attacks by .000366.  
I looked at the U.S. aid variable’s effect on the number of terrorist attacks by setting the 
variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score which indicates the number of terrorist 
attacks expected at each setting.  When the total U.S. aid was set at its minimum the expected 
number of terrorist attacks is 1.86, down from the average of 1.89.  When set at its maximum, 
the expected number of terrorist attacks is 4.57, significantly up from the average of 1.86.  
This shows that states with significant U.S. aid will have a significant increase in the number 
of terrorist attacks.  However, the number of U.S. troops is not significant.   
Interestingly, the outside ideological force variable is only almost significant.  This 
indicates that the presence of an outside ideological force does not facilitate violence.  What 
further makes these results interesting is that the outside ideological force variable looks 
predominantly at the presence of Iranian and/or Saudi Arabian presence and the U.S. aid 
variable looks only U.S. financial aid and with U.S. aid comes U.S. influence and conditions.  
I have interpreted these results to indicate that countries associated with the outside 
ideological aid variable (specifically Iran and Saudi Arabia) and the U.S. aid goes to different 
nation-states and states that receive significant amounts of U.S. aid are more prone to 
violence than states that receive either Iranian or Saudi Arabian ideological influence.  
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As it relates to the socioeconomic variables, neither unemployment nor poverty was 
significant.  These and all previous results indicate that unemployment and poverty facilitate 
fundamentalism, but not violent fundamentalism.  In the following case-studies I will look in 
more depth at these results, specifically at poverty and unemployment facilitating the number 
of fundamentalist groups but not violence.  Polity was also not significant.  As for the other 
significant variables, the number of state sponsored killings was also highly significant.  My 
results indicate that as the state kills more individuals the number of terrorist attacks 
significance level degrees by .303.      
Furthermore, my results reveal that for every numeric increase in religious freedom, 
there is a significance level decline in the number of terrorist attacks of .57.  According to the 
IRR score, if the nation-state’s level of religious freedom increases by one number then its 
ratio for terrorist attacks would be expected to decrease by a factor of .442, a significant 
decline.  Furthermore, freedom of speech was also highly significant and the results have the 
opposite effects as that of religious freedom.  For every significance level increase in the 
nation-state’s freedom of speech there is a increase in the number of terrorist groups of.39.  
According to the IRR score, if the nation-state’s level of freedom of speech increases by one 
number then its ratio for terrorist attacks would be expected to increase by a factor of .527, a 
significant increase.  In other words, restrictions on religious freedom and freedom of speech 
both facilitate violence.  Furthermore, and most significantly the total number of 
fundamentalist movements was not significant, disproving Hypothesis Number Five.  These 
results indicate that the number of fundamentalist movements has a positive but not a 
significant relationship in determining the number of terrorist attacks a nation-state has.  
Furthermore, with suicide terrorism as the dependent variable the total number of 
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fundamentalist movements remains positive and only almost significant.  However, U.S. aid 
is significant with the total number of terrorist attacks.   
Table Sixteen: Suicide Terrorism    
Number of 
fundamentalist 
groups 
.0638598* 
(.032855) 
Population Total .0001624 
(.0001352) 
GDP 
 
3.87e-08 
(5.50e-08) 
U.S. Troops 
 
-.0000723 
(.0004005) 
U.S. Financial Aid -.0001532 
(.0011323) 
Official Development 
Assistance 
 
-1.18e-09 
(7.99e-10) 
Outside Ideological 
Force 
.7530614 
(.8278142) 
Poverty 
 
-.0231748 
(.0286559 
Unemployment 
 
.285423 
(.0392038) 
School Enrolment -3.468986* 
(1.311) 
Freedom of speech .6326107 
(.5439463) 
Religious Freedom  -.4542267*** 
(.6053126) 
Killings .8357669 
(.6649852) 
Political Prisoners -1.546033** 
(.6340117) 
Torture .766257 
(.556864) 
Movement .0396789* 
(.0222067) 
Polity 
 
.7522871 
(.6166175) 
Finally, the best way to determine the degree of terrorism is to look at the number of 
suicide terrorist attacks; there is not a more fundamentalist act than that of a suicide terrorist 
attack.  I feel the number of suicide terrorist attacks is a great determiner of the degree of 
fundamentalism.  This is not a perfect measurement but it will tell us what characteristics are 
within each nation-state that seems to be facilitating suicide terrorism.  Interestingly, only one 
variable was significant, religious freedom.  With every numeric increase in religious 
freedom, there is a significance level decrease in the number of suicide terrorism by 3.47.  In 
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other words, the more religious freedom a state has, the fewer acts of suicide terrorism it will 
have, the IRR score results confirm this.  Finally, I looked at the religious freedom variable’s 
effect on the number of suicide terrorist attacks by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, 
and maximum score which indicates the number suicide terrorist attacks groups at each 
setting.  When religious freedom was set at its minimum the expected number of suicide 
terrorist attacks is .0092, up from the average of .0064.  When set at its maximum, the 
expected number of suicide terrorist attacks is, 0028, down from the average of .0064.  This 
shows that states with less religious freedom will have more suicide terrorist attacks.  
Interestingly, U.S. aid and restrictions on religious freedom facilitate violence and not the 
number of fundamentalist movements within the nation-state. 
Conclusion  
The goal of Chapter three was to determine through the application of quantitative 
analysis the causes of Islamic fundamentalism and determine what phenomena exists/does 
not exist within the majority-Islamic nation-state that seems to be facilitating the number of 
Islamic fundamentalist groups.  The main objective of chapter three was to use quantitative 
analysis to build on and support the theoretical claims in the previous two chapters.  In doing 
so I was able to prove that there is validity to my fundamentalist labyrinth and that each of 
the social movement conditions are positively associated with Islamic fundamentalist 
movements.   
As for the first condition in my fundamentalist labyrinth, the socioeconomic 
inequality variables associated with Marxist theory; I was able to show that unemployment 
has a significant positive relationship on Islamic fundamentalist movements; poverty as a 
positive but less significant effect, confirming the Marxist condition in my fundamentalist 
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labyrinth.  As for the second condition in my fundamentalist labyrinth, the resource variables 
associated with resource mobilization theory; I was able to show that the total population also 
has a significant positive relationship on Islamic fundamentalism.  More importantly, 
secondary school enrolment was also positive and significant in all models ran, as expected, 
and predicted by Marx and his theory of relative depravation.  As for the third condition in 
my fundamentalist labyrinth, the political institutions variables associated with political 
process theory; I was able to show that they type of political institutions a state has is 
positively associated with Islamic fundamentalism.  My results show two things; first, there 
are two negative linear relationships between very strong autocracies and the very strong 
democracies and the number of fundamentalist groups.  Secondly, there is an inverted-U 
shaped relationship with the number and success of Islamic fundamentalist groups; the 
number of groups is the strongest in system which are neither highly democratic nor highly 
autocratic.  As for the third condition in my fundamentalist labyrinth, the idea variables 
associated with new social movement theory; I was able to show that the presence of an 
outside-ideological force, specifically one from Iran or Saudi Arabia has a positive and 
significant relationship with Islamic fundamentalist movements.  Also, I was able to show 
that religious freedom is positive and significant while freedom of speech is negative and 
significant.  Finally, I was able to show that states with less religious freedom will have more 
suicide terrorist attacks.  Interestingly, U.S. aid and restrictions on religious freedom facilitate 
violence and not the number of fundamentalist movements within the nation-state. 
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Chapter Four: Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood 
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is one of the oldest and most resilient of the Sunni 
Islamic fundamentalist movements in the world.  It has for over eighty years exerted a radical 
form of opposition to the Egyptian state and existing Egyptian sociopolitical and 
socioeconomic institutions.  Arguably, the Muslim Brotherhood could be considered the 
mother movement of all Islamic fundamentalist movements; it has off-shoots in Jordan, 
Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq.117  The Brotherhood’s ideological foundations stem from 
its opposition to imperialism, liberal nationalism, secularism, Western Capitalism, 
Communism, and currently terrorism, both domestic and international within Egypt and the 
Greater Middle East.   
This chapter has three objectives; first, it qualitatively confirms the results of the 
previous quantitative chapter, and it shows that each of the social movement conditions is 
positively associated with Egyptian fundamentalism, specifically the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood.  Secondly, as a fundamentalist movement, the Brotherhood has all the same 
characteristics as that of a social movement; however, the Brotherhood acts differently than 
most social movements in the sense that it has political party aspirations and seeks votes.    
In order to meet each objective, I evaluate aspects of each of my fundamentalist 
labyrinth’s conditions on both the movement and state levels and show that each are 
positively associated with Egyptian Islamic fundamentalism, specifically the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood.  Also, I show that each of the conditions associated with my labyrinth 
                                                
117 Classic studies of the Muslim Brotherhood include: Richard Mitchell. 1969, The Society of the Muslim 
Brothers.  Also see: David Sagiv.  1995. Fundamentalism and Intellectuals in Egypt, 1973-1993; Gilles Kepel 
1985.  Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh; Saad Eddin 1986. An Islamic Alternative in 
Egypt: The Muslim Brotherhood and Sadat. In Ibrahim Egypt, Islam, and Democracy; Hamied Ansari. Egypt: 
The Stalled Society; Hasan Hanafi. 1982. The Relevance of the Islamic Alternative in Egypt. Arab Studies 
Quarterly. Page 60; Gilles Kepel. 1985. Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh   
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are significantly influenced by Egyptian state institutions, specifically the Egyptian 
presidency.  Because of this, I evaluate each of my fundamentalist conditions under the 
Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak presidencies separately.   Furthermore, in Chapter Three I 
proposed and quantitatively proved that an inverted-U relationship exists between the 
openness of political institutions and fundamentalism.  I was able to show that there are more 
fundamentalist movements in opening political systems than in either perfect autocracies or 
perfect democracies.  The three Egyptian presidencies fluctuate between perfect autocracy 
(Nasser) to an opening autocracy (Sadat) and to an autocracy that fluctuates between 
accommodation and oppression (Mubarak), so too have the number of fundamentalist 
movements fluctuated within Egypt.  Also, I will look at the outside ideological forces 
associated with Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and show that the Brotherhood itself is the 
outside ideological force, making it different than most Islamic fundamentalist social 
movements.   
Furthermore, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood also acts differently than most social 
movements because it has political party aspirations and seeks votes.  Political parties are not 
social movements, but oftentimes they arise as a result of a social movement; then they 
continue to act as a social movement and seek votes.  Very few social movements seek votes, 
and because the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood does, it makes it an interesting case-study.  
Vote-seeking movements act differently than non-vote-seeking movements with respect to 
their relations with the general population.  In this sense, and in order to receive votes, the 
Muslim Brotherhood provides significant humanitarian aid and spiritual guidance to the 
overall Egyptian population; this facilitates its electoral support.  Consequently, it has had 
significant electoral success when allowed to participate in Egypt’s politically-gilded political 
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institutions.118  Finally, the Muslim Brotherhood has been a relatively peaceful movement.  
Except for the occasional Muslim reaction to British missionary activities, they do not 
currently, and have not committed, sponsored, or facilitated acts of terrorism on Egyptian 
soil.  In this sense, the Brotherhood acts differently than both Hamas and Hezbollah, both of 
which will be evaluated in the following chapters.     
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Overview   
From its conception in the 1920s, the Brotherhood’s members were bitterly opposed 
to the British occupation and the foreign domination of Egyptian politics, economy, and 
culture.  They called for an end to Westernization, modernization, and foreign imperialism 
because, as they saw it, Egypt was losing its Islamic history, Islamic culture, and Islamic 
traditions.119  According to Jeffrey Hadden (2004), Islamic fundamentalism stems from a 
society that has strayed from its Islamic identity.  This is exactly what Egypt had done, and it 
is what facilitated the birth of the Muslim Brotherhood.  The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
is a collective group of individuals whose objective were to reclaim their Islamic identity at 
expense of the state, state institutions, secularism, and foreign domination.  The Muslim 
Brotherhood was, and is, a political-cultural and sociopolitical movement whose ideological 
foundations resulted from the contradictions between Western civilization and Islam 
(Youssef Choueiri 2002).  R.M Burrell (1989) argues that the participants in Islamic 
fundamentalist movements see it as their duty to apply “Koranic truths” to the creation of a 
new society, and these truths become the foundation of that new society’s governmental 
institutions.  On this note, the main objective of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is to return 
                                                
118 This does not count acts of terrorism or violence committed by rove members of the Brotherhood who were 
acting independently and not under the guidance and/or influence of the Muslim Brotherhood  
119 For an early look at Egyptian politics and the formation of Egypt as a modern state see: Israel Gershoni and 
James Jankowski. 1995. Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930-1945; Charles Issawi. 1954. Egypt at Mid-
Century: an Economic Survey. 
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Egyptian society and Egyptian institutions into a literal interpretation of Sunni Islamic 
scripture.  Also, as a movement, it considers the purpose of the Egyptian government the 
implementation of the teachings of Islam, while discrediting and ultimately eliminating 
secularism.  Like all fundamentalist movements, the Brotherhood plays on, and one could 
argue it even manipulates, the struggles and needs that an individual Egyptian has to the 
Movement’s benefit.    
During the 1970s and 1980s, there was a reawakening of religious ideas and social 
movements throughout the Middle East, many of these fundamentalist movements being 
offshoots of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.  Prior to the mid-1970s, ideas associated with 
nationalism dominated the greater Middle East.  Like all nationalist movements, President 
Nasser’s version of nationalism put national pride, Egyptian identity, and a unified Middle 
East above Islam and Islamic identity.  By the late 1970s, it was apparent that Arab 
nationalism had failed at its promise of Arab unity and an increase in the socioeconomic and 
sociopolitical opportunity for the Arab people.  When nationalism failed to correct the 
socioeconomic and sociopolitical inequality associated with modernization and 
westernization, fundamentalist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood became vocal about 
the need to bring Islam back into the institutions of Middle Eastern states, specifically Egypt.  
In this sense, Sayyid Qutb (1960, 1964, and 1966) is correct when he argues that radical 
Islam is largely a response to the failures of Arab nationalism.  Furthermore, when Egypt lost 
the 1967 War with Israel and when socioeconomic problems grew tenfold within Egypt, 
Egyptians lost their national pride and felt as if God had betrayed them.  Because of this, 
Egyptians in large numbers turned to Islamic movements that claimed nationalism and 
secularism facilitated Egypt’s military loss and economic problems.   
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The image of Egypt, according to the Muslim Brotherhood, was, and is, characterized 
by decay and humiliation, the corruption of Islam, the abuse and disregard of its teachings, 
and foreign values brought in via invaders completely restricted Egyptian political, 
intellectual, and spiritual growth.  The Muslim Brotherhood wanted Egypt restored to Islam, 
and it resisted Western ideologies.  According to the Brotherhood, Western ideology 
facilitates corruption (Mitchell 1969: 233).  The ultimate goal of the Muslim Brotherhood 
was the creation of an Islamic Order (Mitchell 1969: 234).  In practice, it loosely meant a 
Muslim state; however, it referred to a set of legal (not political) principles which were 
regarded as fundamental to Muslim society whatever the particular form of political order.   
Muslim Brotherhood’s Ideological Force  
Unlike the other case studies included here, the Muslim Brotherhood is the only one 
that has not been sponsored or facilitated by an outside Islamic ideological force.  However, 
outside ideological forces do exist within Egypt and they have facilitated the Muslim 
Brotherhood and other fundamentalist movements, specifically being British imperialism and 
the United States financial assistance after the 1979 Camp David Accords.  As previously 
argued, American ideological influence is from the top-down, meaning the aid is given to the 
state, rather than individual Islamic groups or movements, a phenomenon especially true in 
Egypt.  Furthermore, the brotherhood acts as an outside ideological force having sponsored 
Islamic fundamentalist movements and Brotherhood offshoots throughout the Islamic world.   
According to the Muslim Brotherhood’s Constitution, the movement, as well as all 
off-shoot Brotherhood movements must meet the following objectives: 120 
Interpreting the Quran according to the original, natural covenant; the inclusiveness of 
the Quran and its compatibility with the spirit of the times; similarity among the 
                                                
120 On September 8, 1945, the general assembly of the Muslim Brothers adopted for the first time a constitution 
for the movement.  This constitution was finalized, in eight sections on May 21, 1948 
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various Islamic schools of thought; defense, liberation, and development of the 
national treasures; raising the standard of living; social justices and social insurance 
for every citizen; participation in the national services; war against illiteracy, disease, 
poverty, and corruption; encouragement of the acts of loving-kindness; liberation of 
every Arab country and all parts of the Islamic homeland from foreign domination; 
aid to Islamic minorities everywhere; and establishment of a state with integrity that 
will function according to the laws and precepts of Islam, will protect Islam from 
within, will spread the preaching of Islam to all, and will cooperate in international 
endeavors (Banna 1966: 13).   
  
The Brotherhood’s idea of an Islamic state was bound by four principles: 1) the Quran 
is the fundamental Constitution; 2) the government operates on the concept of Islamic law; 3) 
the executive ruler is bound by the teachings of Islam and the will of the people; and 4) 
democracy is paramount in any Islamic state.121  Founded on these four principles, the 
Islamic state must have a just and efficient government, be consistent with the traditions of 
society, and be capable of securing the general welfare of its citizens (Mitchell: 246).  The 
Brotherhood argues that freedom in all its aspects is clearly proclaimed by Islam: freedom of 
thought, worship, expression, education, and possession.  These freedoms, as argued by the 
Brotherhood, are fundamental in any Islamic state (Mitchell: 249).  Islam encourages man to 
think freely without being subjected to fear or intimidation.  Freedom of Worship, according 
to Islamic law, each man may accept the faith he wishes and no one can compel him to leave 
his faith for another.  Freedom of Expression, not only a right, but it is a duty of every 
Muslim to say and write what he believes to be the truth.  Freedom of education, Islam not 
only decreed the right to education, but it made it a religious obligation.  According to the 
Brotherhood, both God and the Prophet hold learning to a divine level, and it is the true path 
to God.  Freedom of possession, Islam has decreed that a man may own whatever pleases 
                                                
121 The Muslim Brotherhood’s ideological importance extends far beyond Egypt and the Sunni Muslim world.  
For example, the Ayatollah Khomeini’s work Islamic Government (1970) is one of the most important and 
influential documents written in modern times in support of theocratic rule.  Khomeini bases much of what he 
sees as the important aspects of an Islamic state on these same three principles.   
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him, within the limits set by law; however, that property must be in proportion to its 
usefulness without excessive deprivation of luxury, and that excessive wealth must be 
distributed to the poor (Mitchell: 251).122   
Interestingly, the Muslim Brotherhood’s belief that freedom is paramount in any 
Islamic state provides great insight into the thinking of a fundamentalist movement.  The 
Muslim Brotherhood’s constitution proves to be rather insightful in understanding the 
mentality behind a fundamentalist movement, specifically what facilitates its emergence and 
success.  It personifies many of the misconceptions and bias many observers have toward 
fundamentalist movements.  Furthermore, it helps to explain some of the statistical results in 
chapter three, and contradicts much of the dominant assumptions concerning the 
restrictiveness of Islamic fundamentalism.  The regression results reveal that religious 
freedom and freedom of speech are both highly significant.  As the degree of both increase so 
do the number of fundamentalist groups found within the nation-state.   
Resources 
Resource mobilization theory argues that resources positively effect the mobilization 
and success of social movements.123  Resources are needed both within the state and within 
the movement; because of this, I evaluate resources in a two level analysis.  On the first level, 
I look at the resources of the movement and on the second, the resources of the state.  The 
large N chapter indicated that resources were needed within the nation-state to facilitate the 
                                                
122 According to the Muslim Brotherhood, all wealth belongs to society and ultimately to God.  Man merely 
utilizes it, within the limits of the law in the role of a steward.  The acquisition of wealth is possible only 
through work of any kind of variety.    
123 This is according to: Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978; McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Gamson 1975; Jenkins 
1981; Useem 1980; Paige 1975; Schwartz 1976; Ash-Garner 1977; Piven and Cloward 1977  
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presence of Islamic fundamentalist movements.  The same is true within the movement; 
resources are needed to facilitate the movement’s rise, success, and endurance.   
As previously stated, resources were defined in numerous ways, and they include such 
things as money and labor (McCarthy and Zald 1977), land, labor, capital, and technical 
expertise (Tilly 1977), or anything from material resources to nonmaterial resources 
(Oberschall 1978: 280).  I define resources here as money and population; however, I deviate 
from the above mentioned resource mobilization theorists to also include education and 
leadership.  Egypt is rich in resources, a huge population, extensive financial means, both 
educational institutions and educational incentives, and after the 1979 Camp David Accords, 
Egypt was the recipient of significant amounts of U.S. financial aid.  Also, on the group level, 
the Muslim Brotherhood has significant resources.  It has a huge membership, many of whom 
pay membership dues providing the Brotherhood with massive financial resources.  
Furthermore, education, as a resource, plays a double role in the successes and endurance of 
the Muslim Brotherhood.  The Brotherhood’s membership is largely made up of educated or 
professional Egyptians.  Also, they provide significant educational recourses via building and 
financing schools or providing educational scholarships.      
Furthermore, a significant resource excluded from the large N analysis chapter was 
that of leadership.  In chapter three, I was only interested in the national leadership and that 
was done via the polity data.  However, on the movement level, leadership is an imperative 
resource.  A movement with no leader will fail, and it will break apart into groups of rove 
individuals pressuring their own interests, very similar to what we currently see in Iraq.  
McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1988:716) argue that movement leadership is a matter of 
common sense not requiring theoretical analysis.  Aldon Morris (1984) argues that movement 
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leadership is an important complex phenomenon that affects the origins and outcomes of 
social movements.  This is further evidence that the Muslim Brotherhood has many of the 
same characteristics as social movements.     
The Brotherhood has significantly benefited from its leadership and without which, 
the movement would not have formed and experienced such longevity.  It is virtually 
impossible to separate the birth of the Muslim Brotherhood from its founder and first leader, 
Hasan al-Banna.124  In 1927, after he completed his education. he moved from rural Egypt to 
Cairo.  He saw first hand the dire conditions the average Egyptian lived in, and was shocked 
by the total socioeconomic and sociopolitical inequality and degradation the average 
Egyptian was subjected to.125  It was then that he began to teach and preach Islam; within six 
months he gathered a close-knit group of followers and in March 1928 Al-Banna named his 
movement The Movement of Muslim Brothers, and defined its mission to meet the following 
objectives: 
1. The inclusiveness of Islam was fundamental. Islam is not only a religion but also a 
state, prayer, and jihad, and obedience to Islam is also fundamental. 
2. Islam must be restored to its first teachings.  At the fifth conference of the Muslim 
Brothers in 1938, al-Banna stated “We must draw the rules of Islam from their 
original sources and understand Islam as it had been understood by the followers of 
the Prophet and their disciples from the generation of the good forefathers” (al-Banna; 
1966: 33). 
3. Pan-Islam:126 Al-Banna clearly specified that “Every millimeter of land on which the 
flag of Islam waves is the homeland to every Muslim and must be defended.  Al 
                                                
124 Brynjar Lia. 1998. The Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, 1928-
42: Hasan al-Banna was born in October of 1906, in the province of Buhayra, in the small town of Mahmudiyya, 
about ninety miles north-west of Cairo.  He graduated from Dar al-Ulum in the summer of 1927.  For a short 
time he considered the possibility of joining one of the annual governmental missions for education abroad, but 
for unknown reasons he did not do so.  Instead he accepted an appointment in the state school system in the 
Suez Canal Zone.  He remained in the school system until 1946.       
125 Hasan al-Banna. 1966. Memoirs of the Preaching and the Preacher. Cairo: Dar al-Shaha; Muhammad Shawqi 
Zaki. 1954. The Muslim Brothers and Egyptian Society. Cairo: The American University Press. 
126 Pan-Islamic ideology, the attempt to achieve Muslim unity, takes two forms, radical (which would eliminate 
borders and create a single Muslim state) and moderate (which only seeks harmony between Muslim states), 
while providing a survey of the tensions between these two themes going back to the 1860s. 
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Muslims are one nation, and the Islamic homeland is one homeland” (al-Banna; 1966: 
38). 
4. Islamic government.  In Islam, according to the teachings of the Muslim Brothers, and 
al-Banna, Islamic government is a basic precept for any state within the Middle East 
and that government must be democratic (al-Banna;1966).  
 
 
Al-Banna disapproved of the secularist policies of the nationalist government, the 
public involvement of women in society, the mixing of the sexes, and views of liberal 
intellectual leaders, he equated as a disease that afflicted Eastern nations.  Writing in 1936, 
during the Great Depression, al-Banna argued that “ the civilization of the West, proudly 
strong in its science, and for a period able to subjugate the world, is in bankruptcy and in 
decline, its political fundamentals destroyed by dictatorship, its economic system racked by 
crisis, its social order decaying” (al-Ghazali, 1994: 226).   
Just like the nation-state where the population is considered a resource, so to is the 
size of the movement’s membership.  The larger the membership base, the larger the revenue 
base – members pay dues.  Just as in the nation-state, the population pays taxes – expanding 
the state’s revenue base.  As it relates to membership, the following criteria were established 
by the Brotherhood that its members must meet before joining the movement; a candidate 
must be: 1) eighteen years of age; 2) honorable and upright; 3) able to understand the ideas of 
the Society; and 4) willing to pay monthly dues and to contribute to zakat.127  Interestingly, 
the rules of the Brotherhood says willing and not able (Mitchell: 1969; 184).  Those who 
could not pay were excused by the leader of the branch, after he ascertained that they were 
genuinely unable to do so.  After contracting to live by the laws of the Brotherhood, the 
                                                
127 The term zakat is also translated as zakah or zakat and comes from the Arabic verb zaka, which involves two 
notions in its dictionary, the first being “to increase, to grow” and the second, “to purify.”  Zakat may be defined 
simply as the third pillar of Islam, after the professing of faith and the performing of regular prayer (salat).   In a 
more formal and descriptive way, it may be defined as an obligatory payment of a varying rate on certain 
property items, fully owned and above a specified limit, given by Muslims to an Islamic authority for 
distribution or directly distributed to the eight rubrics specified in the Quran. (David Jonsson. 2006, Islamic 
Economics and The Final Jihad. Xulon Press: pages 228-229) 
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member then made an oath of allegiance to the Brotherhood.  This was a contract with God, 
to uphold the message of the Brotherhood, and to fulfill the conditions of membership, which 
included, above all, confidence in the leadership, and willingness to obey the Brotherhood 
and the teachings of Islam absolutely.128  A Brother who did not fulfill his duties or who 
violated the Movement’s principles was subject to discipline by the branch head.  If verbal 
appeals did not correct the shortcoming, the branch council or administration decided whether 
to warn, fine, suspend, or expel him.  Permission to expel an active member must come from 
the general headquarters.                    
During the movement’s first three years, its primary goal was the enlargement of its 
membership in and around Cairo.  Banna and his inner-circle of followers pursued this goal 
by direct contact with Egyptians touring the city and countryside on weekends and vacations 
(Banna and his followers all had full time jobs).  This recruitment was done via preaching in 
mosques, homes, clubs, or any other meeting place where the Brotherhood found a listener 
(Mitchell 1969).  As the membership slowly grew, the Brotherhood took an old house as its 
headquarters.  As a result of the contributions from the Suez Canal Company and loans from 
local merchants, it was able to finance the building of its first mosque in 1930; soon after it 
built a club for boys and then a school for girls which allowed the teachings of traditional 
Islam (Banna 1966 and Mitchell 1969).  As a result of this, the Brotherhood’s membership 
grew significantly, and its growing size concerned the Egyptian government and their British 
supporters.  This was partially because the Brotherhood was educating Egyptians and calling 
for freedom and democracy which threatened British’s subjugation of the Egyptians.      
                                                
128 The oath reads as follows: “I contract with God to adhere firmly to the message of the Muslim Brothers, to 
strive on its behalf, to live up to the conditions of its membership, to have complete confidence in its leadership 
and to obey absolutely, under all circumstances.  I swear to God on that and make my oath of loyalty by hum.  
Of what I say, God is Witness. Richard Mitchell. 1969: page 165 The Society of the Muslim Brothers. 
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The first clash between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government and 
their British supporters took place in 1941.  The British and Egyptian governments were 
concerned with the movement’s growing strength via its increasing membership.  Also, the 
Brotherhood incorporated into their movement significant vocal objections to the British 
presence in Egypt, the Christian missionaries in Egypt, and the Brotherhood’s formal stance 
of having sympathy with the Axis powers during WWII.  The British forced the Egyptian 
government to cancel all licenses for the movement’s publications, and their printing presses 
were closed on October 19, 1941.   
The Brotherhood’s printing press could also be considered a significant resource.  
Founded in 1933 at their second national conference, their printing press facilitated their 
ability to spread propaganda and their messages to significantly more people.129  Having 
learned from the West of the usefulness of propaganda, the press was used to both spread its 
message and to rebut the challenges of its adversaries (Mitchell 1969: 13).  In fact, the 
printing press and all the printed work(s) that resulted from it became the symbol of the 
greater Islamic movement and one of the largest projects undertaken by the Brotherhood.130  
In Chapter Three, I was able to show that there is a positive correlation between education 
and Islamic fundamentalism.  Islamic fundamentalist movements facilitate literacy because 
much of their propaganda is spread via the printed word – this is also the case for Hamas and 
                                                
129 The first general conference of the Muslim Brotherhood, in May 1933 was held to brainstorm ways in which 
to stop the activity of the Christian missionaries who were being blatantly disrespectful to Islam.  At the 
conference, they wrote and sent a letter to King Fu’ad outlining the Brotherhood’s belief in the urgency of 
brining the activities of the foreign missionaries under control.  The fourth general conference met to celebrate 
the coronation of King Faruq in 1937.  The third and fifth, in March 1935 and January 1939, were important 
organizational sessions.  The fifth conference was also the tenth anniversary of the movement and at this 
conference the Brotherhood indoctrinated their ideologies: Islam was seen as the total system, complete onto 
itself, and the final arbitrator of life in all its categories.  The foundation of Islam, and in turn the Muslim 
Brotherhood, is the Quran and the teachings of the Prophet and finally, Islam is applicable to all times and all 
places.      
130 A weekly magazine called Majallay al-Iklwan al-Muslimin and later, a second one called Majallat al-Nadhir.  
Also the most important propaganda created by the Brotherhood, the indoctrination texts for members and the 
“messages” written by al-Banna to enlighten and educate the Brothers (Mitchell page 13).   
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Hezbollah.  The reason for this is that the Egyptian state controls both radio and television 
and restricts the Muslim Brotherhood from freely utilizing the airwaves.  As for Hamas, they 
too have to rely on the printed word because radio and television stations and satellites make 
easy targets for the state of Israel.  To rectify this and to spread their beliefs, fundamentalist 
movements facilitate literacy.  This could help explain why education is positively associated 
with Islamic fundamentalism.   
Socioeconomics 
There was a correlation between the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
sociopolitical and western cultural transformation that the Egyptian society experienced 
between the 1919 constitutional revolution and the 1930s.  Changes in Egyptian class 
relations and class structure were the result of the Egyptian modernization process.  What 
resulted was a new class structure with inherent inequality, one from which the Muslim 
Brotherhood drew its political power and support.  The benefits of Egyptian modernization 
and Westernization were restricted to a few groups in Egyptian society, specifically the upper 
classes (Adams 1993).  In addition, the socioeconomic and sociopolitical difficulties of the 
1930s, rising unemployment, and the exclusionary policies pursued by the Egyptian ruling 
elite helped to contribute to the rise and success of the Muslim Brotherhood.   
In addition to the new Egyptian class structure, other socioeconomic phenomena 
contributed to the Brotherhood’s rise and success.  From 1919 on, the Egyptian population 
increased significantly, rural to urban migration accelerated, the traditional social classes 
continued to decline financially as they were replaced by a new educated and westernized 
middle class that expanded the bureaucratic structure and institutions of the state.  
Industrialization created a working class that was excluded from the benefits that the new 
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educated Middle class experienced, specifically land ownership, education, and upward 
mobility.  Furthermore, the landowning class continued to expand its power within Egyptian 
politics and society.  These social changes and demographic expansion brought a new set of 
actors to Egypt’s sociopolitical arena (specifically the educated middle class and the 
uneducated working class).  However, the large-landowners still dominated the country and 
controlled its resources and the new educated middle class was the bureaucratic support that 
helped the landed aristocracy controls the socioeconomic and sociopolitical institutions of 
Egypt.131    
The landowners enjoyed significant influence during and after the revolution of 1919.  
The 1919 constitutional revolution established a constitutional monarchy that significantly 
expanded the power and influence of the landowning elitist class.  Of the eighteen member 
commission responsible for drafting the Constitution, eleven members were large 
landowners.132  What resulted from the 1919 revolution was a parliamentary system without 
democracy, and its purpose was to guard the material interests of the upper classes.  The 
Constitution protected their property and guarded their rights both socioeconomically and 
politically while institutionalizing the subjection of the Egyptian masses.  The 1919 
revolution failed to resolve two fundamental issues facing Egypt: Egypt did not attain full 
independence from Britain, nor was it able to eliminate the monarchy’s arbitrary power.  
Instead, the revolution resulted in the formation of a new power block in which the 
revolutionary leaders (specifically, the landowners) shared power with the king and the 
                                                
131 According to Charles Issawi: The population increased from 11,287,000 in 1907 to 18,947,000 in 1947 and 
26,080,000 in 1960 (an increase of over 130 percent).  Parallel with the demographic change was an increase in 
rural-to-urban migration.  Between 1917 and 1937, the population of Cairo rose from 791,000 to 1,312,000 
(66% increase) and that of Alexandria fro 445,000 to 686,000 (55% increase).  This means that on average, that 
30,000 a year were moving from the country-side to the city 
132 Hamied Ansari. 1986. Egypt, the Stalled Society; Afaf Lurfi Marsot. 1977. Egypt’s Liberal Experiment: 
1922-1936; Selma Botman. 1991. Egypt from Independence to Revolution, 1919-1952 
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British.  It was in this socioeconomic and sociopolitical environment that helped to manifest 
the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and why the Egyptian masses turned toward them for 
guidance and salvation.   
According to Youssef Choueiri (2002: 40) Muslim Brotherhood members were 
largely drawn from the lower-middle class, such as schoolteachers, clerks, technicians, 
artisans, shopkeepers, and students.  After the outbreak of WWII, the Muslim Brotherhood 
infiltrated the police and armed forces.133  This is the result of what Marx called relative 
deprivations.  According to Runciman (1966), Gurr (1970), and Siddharth Chandra (2005) 
relative deprivation is the difference between the value expectation and the value capability 
of the individual.  In other words, the Egyptian understands what he should have, what others 
have, and what he does not have.  
The Nasser Years  
Modern Egyptian politics began in July of 1953 when Nasser became both president 
and the only veto player in Egyptian political institutions.  The political institutions in Egypt 
have for the last eighty years been ruled by autocrats; however, the degree of state control has 
fluctuated.  Political process theory is correct as it relates to the Muslim Brotherhood; Egypt’s 
social and governmental institutions significantly influence the trajectories of the Muslim 
Brotherhood (or social movements as argued by: Eisinger 1974; Kitschelt 1986; McAdam 
1999, 1982; and Tarrow 1989).  On July 23, 1952, a group of young army officers overthrew 
Egypt’s constitutional monarchy in a secular military coup.134  After a brief power struggle, 
                                                
133 According to Choueiri, during WWII al-Banna created a secret “Special Organization” which trained 
members to use firearms.  The Special Organization developed its own rules of recruitment and instruction to 
the extent of becoming a separate entity.   According to Choueiri (page 40) its leader, Abd al-rahman al-Sindi, 
often defied the orders of the Brotherhood’s leadership and carried out acts of political assassinations.  
134 For a brief historical treatment of the development of secularism in Egypt see: Daniel Crecelius (1980) The 
Course of Secularization in Egypt. In John Esposito: Islam and Development: Religion and Sociopolitical 
Change; Bassam Tibi (1988) The Crisis of Modern Islam: A Preindustrial Cultural I the Scientific  and 
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Gamal Abdel Nasser gained control of the new regime and remained its leading decision 
maker and veto player until his death in 1970.  During his tenure as President, there was a 
total disappearance of oppositional movements, political parties, associations, and both 
individual and group freedoms.  Nasser launched a significant repressive assault on all 
organized opposition.  By the mid-1950s, all of the country’s independent political groups 
were banned, and those that survived were forced underground.  Nasser preempted the rise of 
opposition activism and social movements by expanding state control via subordination of 
potential social movement members and organizations, by eliminating most social 
movements, and by imprisoning many active and potential social movement participants.  
Furthermore, he banned all opposition groups and imposed state control over the means in 
which Egyptians had formally communicated and met; specifically, buildings, halls, media 
outlets, papers, radios, and television.135  This helps confirm some of the large-N results in 
Chapter Three; specifically, some of the idea variables.  For example when governments 
restrict freedom of speech, we see a decrease in the number Islamic fundamentalist 
movements.  In other words, under President Nasser’s restrictions on freedom of speech and 
press there was a significant decline in the number of fundamentalist movements in Egypt.   
Nasser developed a preemptive strategy combining repression, redistribution, 
reeducation, and resocialization to expand his power, and it worked for a brief period of time.  
                                                                                                                                                  
Technical Age; Habib Boulares (1990) Islam: The Fear and the Hope; Halim Barakat (1993) The Arab World: 
Society, Culture and State 
135 Raymond Hinnebusch (1988) described the Nasser regime as “authoritarian populism,” which is a regime 
type that emerged during the era of decolonization throughout the Middle East and Africa and is typically the 
product of nationalist reaction against imperialism, modernization, or westernization; which is where the 
citizens struggle for independence from the colonial power via large-scale mobilization of the masses.  He 
argues that authoritarian populism often times grows out of a nationalist movement, a revolution, or a military 
coup by middle-class officers (as in the case of Egypt).   Formation of a strong independent state, free of 
imperialist domination is the main objective.  In addition, the state power is put in the service of economic 
modernization and a reformist redistribution of wealth and opportunity to the middle and lover classes, which 
was the backbone of Nasser’s revolution. 
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Egyptians who disagreed or who were openly vocal against Nasser were imprisoned.  He 
nationalized private businesses and foreign corporations and then redistributed their wealth to 
the new middle classes.  He developed an education system where young Egyptians were 
taught the Nasser way; his regime was fundamentally a reformist one.  With the massive 
redistribution of wealth, nationalization, state control over social and educational institutions, 
Nasser’s program became quasi-socialist, but he stopped short of transforming Egypt into a 
communist state.  Rather than promote radical change with organized mass support, his 
regime attempted to reconcile competing interests through populist ideology and massive 
redistribution while completely restricting Egyptian sociopolitical rights and liberties. 
Nasser claimed that political parties, in the liberal era, divided the nation and 
weakened it from within, so Nasser dissolved all political parties in 1953.  The Muslim 
Brotherhood was initially exempt from this ban, ostensibly on the grounds that it was not a 
political party but a nonpolitical religious movement (Wickham 2002: 29).  But this 
exception was more likely a result of the Nasser’s reluctance to risk a direct confrontation 
with the country’s largest and most popular Islamic movement.  This was done rather 
pragmatically by Nasser.  He knew that there would be sociopolitical turmoil if the regime 
attempted to restrict the Muslim Brotherhood because of its popular support and religious 
pretext.  Before challenging the Brotherhood, Nasser had to make sure he completely 
controlled the Egyptian political and social institutions and had successfully won the hearts 
and minds of the Egyptians. 
According to political process theorists, the political opportunity thesis claims that 
social movements emerge as a result of expanding political opportunities.  The same is true in 
reverse, the number of social movements decline as political opportunities are stripped.  
  164 
According to Goodwin (2004) social movements cannot emerge where people are unable, for 
whatever reason, to associate with one another for political purposes.  This is exactly the case 
for the social movements of Egypt during the Nasser years, including the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  Relations between the regime and the Brotherhood quickly soured when it 
became clear that the Brotherhood would not acquiesce quietly to military rule.  It demanded 
democracy and transparent political institutions.  An attempt on Nasser’s life in 1954 by a 
Brotherhood member gave Nasser the pretext he needed to ban the movement and imprison 
its leaders, without the risk of massive social upheaval.136           
Resources under Nasser 
According to Carrie Wickham (2002: 23) Nasser claimed to represent the oppressed 
sha’b (people); as a whole, a disproportionate share of state resources were channeled to 
urban, educated, and lower-middle-class youth.137  The priority accorded them was derived 
less from an assessment of their needs than from their perceived strategic importance.  In 
other words, Nasser singled out lower-middle-class youth for extra entitlements because he 
saw them as his greatest threat and because he sought to defuse their capacity to threaten his 
regime’s survival.  He was going to bribe them with education and monetary advancement, 
                                                
136 According to Alexander (2005) and Haus (2006) the assassination attempt on Nasser, October 27, 1954 was 
followed by massive celebrations throughout Cairo in celebration of his survival, the celebrations comprised 
mainly of the government-controlled transport unions and workers from the newly industrialized state, they 
went to the Brotherhood’s headquarters and destroyed it as well as all satellite offices throughout Egypt were 
burned.  On October 29, Nasser appeared at a rally held in Republic Square and launched the campaign which 
was to be waged during the next two months against the Brotherhood where its members were rounded up and 
imprisoned.  On November 2, the “People’s Tribunal” was created and officer members were put on trial, found 
guilty, and assassinated.                 
137 The following were used to learn about the Nasser presidency: Aburish, Said 2004. Nasser: The 
Last Arab. Thomas Dunne Books; Alexander, Anne. 2005. Nasser: Life and Times. Haus Pub; Gordon, Joel. 
2006. Nasser: Hero of the Arab Nation: Makers of the Muslim World. Oneworld Publications; Gordon, Joel. 
2006. Nasser's Blessed Movement: Egypt's Free Officers and the July Revolution. American University in Cairo 
Press; James, Laura. 2006. Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy. Palgrave Macmillan; Doran, Muchael, 
2002. Pan-Arabism before Nasser: Egyptian Power Politics and the Palestine Question: Studies in Middle 
Eastern History. Oxford University Press 
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while restricting their civil and political rights.  Nasser’s policy of state distribution is often 
referred to as the social contract by which the regime provided goods and services to the 
public in exchange for their political support (Wickham 2002: 23).138  To some extent the 
term is misleading; the arrangement was never a bargain entered into voluntarily by equal 
partners; instead it was a strategy of force initiated by the regime for its own purposes.  The 
Nasser social contract raised living standards in several ways: it provided education, offered 
employment in the expanding state sector, and provided subsidized food, energy, health, and 
housing to lower and middle class groups.  However, state employment, benefits, and 
services were concentrated in the cities, urban residents profiting disproportionately while 
many of rural population and rural migrants to the city were excluded (Gordon 2006).  
Because of this, the Muslim Brotherhood remained a formidable force in Egypt, and its 
support remained high specifically in areas ignored by Nasser.  On the other hand, its support 
significantly declined in areas where Nasser’s increased.  Many urban Egyptians turned 
toward Nasser and supported his political domination while disassociating themselves with 
the Muslim Brotherhood.  This was one of the major results of Nasser’s social contract.  
Furthermore, as Nasser tightened his grip on the socioeconomic and sociopolitical institutions 
of Egypt, he institutionalized a policy of false consciousness, this being the second major 
result of the social contract.  Nasser provided many urban Egyptians with universal 
education, guaranteed employment, and economic assistance to win over the hearts and 
minds of the Egyptians, tightening his grip on political power.   
                                                
138 The term social contract has been widely used in literature on Egypt: Khalid Ikram. 1981, September. 
meeting the Social Contract in Egypt. Finance and Development.  Pages 30-33; Diane Singerman. 1985. 
Avenues of Participation: Family, Politics and Networks in Urban Quarters of Cairo. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.   
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Soon after consolidating power, Nasser reorganized universities, banned independent 
student unions, purged faculty and administration, and posted secret security units on 
campuses in order to ensure complete control over the educational process.  After that, he 
launched a series of educational reforms to increase his authoritative control over Egyptian 
society.  In doing so, he increased popular access to higher education.  Arguably, with his 
total control of the educational process, he was able to ensure university students were 
learning what he wanted them to learn.  In 1954, university tuition fees were lowered, 
eligibility for university scholarships was expanded, and the educational budget of 
universities more than quadrupled (Haggai Erich 1989).139  Over the Nasser period as a 
whole, the number of students enrolled in primary education increased by 234 percent, and 
the number of students enrolled in higher education rose by 324 percent (Abdel-Fadil 1982: 
17).  Annual university enrollments climbed from 51,681 in 1952/53 to 161,517 in 1969/70.  
Islamic society is different than Western society when it comes to education; translating 
directly from the Arabic, al-muta alliin or al-muthaqqafin meaning the educated or cultured, 
they are technically not a class but a status group, defined not by occupation or wealth 
(Wickham 2003: 36).  In other words, those individuals with degrees in higher education, no 
matter their socioeconomic status, ethnicity, or occupation are considered an exclusive status 
group by Islamic culture, and they need to be revered.  Nasser knew this and manipulated this 
cultural tradition to his own benefit.  After promising members of the middle and lower 
                                                
139 During this same time period the Ministry if Education’s budget more than doubled, this raised the allocation 
for higher education from 14 percent to 22 percent of the general education budget for Egypt (Mahmound A. 
Faksh 1980: 48).   
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classes the opportunity to attend a university, his popularity soared, especially with the new 
industrialized middle class.140   
In addition to offering a university education free of charge, the Nasser social 
contract institutionalized a policy guaranteeing every university graduate a government job.  
Public employment grew by about 70% from 1962 to 1970, at a time when the growth in 
national employment as a whole did not exceed 20 percent.141  This expansion was fueled by 
the Nationalization Measure of 1961, which brought under state control about 80 percent of 
all nonagricultural activities, including all major firms of industry, finance, and construction 
(Ibrahimm 1982).  By 1969 the state employed 450,000 graduates with a secondary school 
degree or above, including more than 153,000 university degree holders or roughly 60 
percent of the entire pool of university graduates produced by the country.  This included 
virtually all of the country’s engineers, scientists, and agronomists, more than 87 percent of 
its physicians, and two-thirds of its lawyers (Ayubi 1980).  As a result of Nasser’s socialize 
and redistribution policies, his socioeconomic results were impressive; between 1955 and 
1965, Egyptian growth averaged six percent a year.  However, by the end of the 1960s, 
Egypt’s economic system plummeted, bringing all economic growth to a halt.  As Waterbury 
(1983, 1985) observed, the regime’s capacity to simultaneously finance economic growth and 
distribution eventually become strained.  This was the result of a costly and long war with 
Yemen and military defeat by Israel in June 1967.   Furthermore, Nasser’s guaranteed 
education and employment policies backfired and facilitated the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism.  Nasser’s policy of false consciousness would transform itself into relative 
deprivation.  The individuals Nasser educated realized the difference between the value 
                                                
140 For an early discussion of the “new” Egyptian middle class see: Nanfred Halpern. 1963. The Politics of 
Social Change in The Middle East and North Africa. Princeton: Princeton University Press 
141 See: Waterbury & Richards (1996) Nazih Ayubi (1980) Malcolm Kerr (1965) 
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expectation and the value capability and started to demand socioeconomic and sociopolitical 
change.   
Nasser assumed that access to university education and total control of the educational 
process would cement him as a perfect autocrat.  However, his heavy handed tactics in 
dealing with any form of political opposition generated resentment from those he educated.  
By the mid-1960s Nasser started to loosen his absolute control on the sociopolitical 
institutions.  Almost simultaneously to this, students started to retreat from passivity and 
nonviolence and began protesting and demanding more sociopolitical freedom.  By 1967 
there were massive numbers of political protests (Mabro 1974).  This being said, one can 
logically conclude that the political process theorists are correct.  Specifically, Eisinger 
(1974) and Tarrow (1998, 1994) wrote that social movements emerge and flourish in periods 
when opportunities are being gained and expanded for those who had been excluded from the 
decision making process.  Also, Tarrow (1998, 1994) argues that protests occur when 
ordinary people join forces in confrontation with elites, authorities, and opponents, just as the 
Egyptians did in the late 1960s.   
Social movements are produced when political opportunities broaden for those 
excluded from the decision making process and when their opponents (Nasser) show 
vulnerability.142  Nasser’s vulnerability was transparent as a result of the regime’s crushing 
military defeat by Israel in the 1967 War.  Fundamentalists were quick to blame the defeat on 
the jahiliyyah (literally the ignorant state but in practical terms the secular un-Islamic and 
uncivilized state).143   As a result of this, the Muslim Brotherhood made a triumphant return 
                                                
142 The following political process theorists all confirm this: Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam 1982; McCarthy and 
Zald 1996; McAdam Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). 
143 Even President Nasser resorted to religious explanations to account for the disaster nakbah that had befallen 
Egypt.  It was God’s will and Egypt’s destiny to suffer such a fate, he told his fellow Egyptians.  Only through a 
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to the Egyptian political scene.  The movement’s leadership blamed Egypt’s military loss on 
secularism and insisted that if Egypt was an Islamic state with democratic Islamic political 
institutions, Egypt would have experienced victory.  As a result of the worsening 
socioeconomic conditions and as a persistent national shame grew; massive numbers of 
individuals joined the Muslim Brotherhood movement.   
The first massive political protest in Egypt that the Brotherhood facilitated occurred in 
February 1968.  It was protesting the light sentences received by senior military officers held 
responsible for Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 war with Israel (James 1006).  Based on this, 
Tilly’s (1975) “breakdown theories” proved correct.  Tilly argued that collective action is a 
result of a collective grievance, discontent, and the feelings of frustration and deprivation.  
Egyptians felt as if they were forsaken by God and their government, specifically Nasser.  
However, Nasser died in 1970 leaving Egypt in the hands of his successor, Anwar Sadat.  
Even more so than the Nasser presidency, the Sadat presidency personifies what the social 
movement theorists argue.  Under the Nasser presidency the number of active fundamentalist 
movements was small and relatively peaceful.  This all changed under the Sadat presidency, 
there was a significant increase in the number of fundamentalist movements and their use of 
violence. The Islamic movement in the 1970s resulted from the contradictions and 
                                                                                                                                                  
return to Islam could Egypt prevent future disasters and meet the challenges posed by its enemies, domestic and 
foreign. According to John Esposito (1984) all of Egypt’s leaders since 1952 have been Muslims and have 
claimed to rule in a manner compatible with Islam.  But while Nasser portrayed his goals as consistent with 
Islamic precepts (a convergence readily affirmed by clerics on the government payroll), Islam did not figure 
prominently in either the formation or the justification of his agenda.  Nasser’s rhetoric was secular, nationalist, 
and revolutionary in tine, emphasizing the struggle against “Zionism and imperialism” abroad and against 
“capitalist exploitation” at home.  By contrast, Islam was central to Anwar Sadat’s self-image and claim to 
political authority.  Styling himself the “Believer-President”, Sadat made a public show of his personal piety; 
promoted Islamic programming in the media, schools, and universities; expanded the government’s support of 
official Islamic institutions; and used religious theses to justify the regime’s policies, including the decision to 
go to war with Israel in 1973. 
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shortcomings of the modernization process and the transformation of state society of both 
Nasser and Sadat.144   
The Sadat Years and Islamic Fundamentalism 
Nasser died in 1970 and his successor, Anwar al-Sadat had to deal with the Israeli 
wars, specifically, Yum Kippur in October 1973 where Egypt suffered from another 
significant military defeat.  He also had to deal with a stalled economy, bankrupted national 
treasury, and a highly discontented population.  Sadat’s answer was the Open Door policy 
which he initiated in 1974 and was basically a return to a capitalist economy.145  He hoped 
that this would attract large-scale Arab and international investment, investment from the 
United States and Western Europe.  However, foreign investment did not come.  According 
to Raymond Baker (1990), the reason for this was the huge and inefficient public sector and 
the system of state subsidies for basic goods and services that it administered.  In other 
words, foreign investors saw Egypt as a socialist money-pit.  Sadat was between a rock and a 
hard-place; he had no other financial options other than make peace with Israel via the Camp 
David Accords, receiving a significant amount of U.S. financial aid for agreeing to the peace 
treaty.      
Furthermore, Sadat transformed Nasser’s perfect autocracy into an opening autocracy 
with limited political participation; this facilitated the rise of fundamentalist movements.  
Here we see a confirmation of the inverted-U relationship found in Chapter Three.  The 
movement that benefited the most under President Sadat’s Open Door policy was the Muslim 
                                                
144 See Hrair Dekmejian (1981) in Michael Curtis (1981); in the same book, see Louis J. Cantori,(1981);  
“Religion and Politics in Egypt,” pages 77-90. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Egypt’s Islamic Activism in the; See Saad 
Eddin Ibrahim “Anatomy of Egypt’s Islamic Militant Groups”; John Esposito (1980); Hrair Dekmejian (1988) 
in Shireen Hunter (1988). 
145 See: Beattie, Kirk. 2000. Egypt During the Sadat Years. Palgrave Macmillan; Baker, Raymond William. 
1990. Sadat and After: Struggles for Egypt's Political Soul. Harvard University Press  
  
 
  171 
Brotherhood.  Sadat freed members of the Brotherhood from prison and allowed those in 
exile to return. Though still technically illegal, the Brotherhood was permitted in 1976 to 
publish its own newspaper, al-Dawa, which had an estimated circulation of 100,000 before it 
was shut down in 1981 (Esposito 1984; Hinnebusch 1988).  Sadat also encouraged the 
development of Islamic student associations on university campuses, in the hope of 
developing an effective counterweight to the leftist groups that dominated student politics at 
the time (Kepel 1993; Abdalla 1985).   As a result of this, membership of the Brotherhood 
soared and its influence on the state accelerated.  The ever-increasing poverty and 
unemployment also worked for the movement’s benefit.  However, they were very vocal with 
their critiques of Sadat’s friendly relations with the west, specifically the United States and 
Israel.   
In the mid-1970s, President Sadat initiated a controlled retreat from the Nasser system 
of single party rule.  This political opening began in 1975 with Sadat’s recognition of 
alternative platforms in elections for the People’s Assembly in 1976.  Encouraged by the 
overwhelming victory of the political center, Sadat permitted the conversion of these different 
ideological platforms to legal political parties.  However, admission to the party system was 
restricted to only a few actors.  For example, the Political Party Law (law 40 of 1977) 
excluded politics parties based on class, religion, or regional affiliation.146  According to 
Hinnebusch (1988), the regime’s intention was to bar the Muslim Brotherhood from forming 
its own political party.  By restricting participatory rights in this way, the regime created a 
new category of political actors, those groups and movements whose existence was tolerated 
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but restricted.  Sadat not only confined political participation to a small and rather artificial 
set of political parties, but he also restricted their right to association, views, criticism of the 
regime, and so on.  For example, criticism of the regime was to be “constructive” and was not 
to attack Sadat’s major reorganization of Egyptian foreign and economic policy.  As 
Hinnebusch (1988: 114) notes, when they crossed these boundaries in 1978, both the leftist 
National Progressive Unionist Party (NPUP) and the liberal-right New Wafd Party were 
banned from open political activity.147  In the years just before Sadat’s assassination in 1981, 
there were only three legal parties: the ruling National Democratic Party and two “loyal” 
opposition parties (center right and center left), both of which were headed by politicians very 
close to the regime and both lacking ties to any mass movement. 
Sadat expanded Nasser’s social contract programs and opened the country’s national 
universities to an unprecedented number of students, and he extended the system into the 
provinces.  He increased the proportion of students admitted to a university from roughly 40 
percent of those who took the baccalaureate exam in the early 1970s to more than 60 percent 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  In just a decade, the country’s annual output of university 
graduates nearly tripled, rising from 41,916 in 1975 to 115,744 in 1985 (Beattie 2000: 32).  
The rapid expansion of Egypt’s graduate pool placed a heavy burden on the government’s 
guaranteed-employment scheme.  Open unemployment among graduates was reflected in the 
lengthening queue for government jobs.  Unwilling to abandon the guaranteed-employment 
scheme, yet unable to hire graduates right away, the government simply extended the waiting 
period between graduation and appointment increased from three years for the class of 1979 
                                                
147 Wafd Party translates to the: New Delegation Party Hizb al-Wafd al-Jadid is a nationalist political party in 
Egypt and is currently considered as one of the main opposition parties, and so its involvement in Egyptian 
politics is considered crucial in the success as well as legitimization of any political decision. It is the extension 
of one of the oldest and historically most active political party in Egypt, the Wafd Party was dismantled after the 
1952 Revolution and reastablished in 1983.  In December 2005, it won 6 seats in the People’s Assembly 
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to ten years for the class of 1985.148  As a result of this, these educated, jobless youth started 
turning to Islamic fundamentalism for their spiritual, physical, and financial needs.149   
Under Sadat, the Muslim Brotherhood activists used communal activities at the 
grassroots level to reshape the political consciousness of Nasser’s educated youth.150  By 
focusing on impressionable young people and in areas lacking social welfare services, the 
Brotherhood’s Islamic institutions served as functional substitutes for the inadequate welfare 
apparatus of the state.  As previously explained, social service institutions function as an ideal 
tool used by Islamists to radicalize and recruit Muslim youth (Rosefsky 1997).  Furthermore, 
the Muslim Brotherhood has been active in establishing health care facilities to meet the 
diverse needs of the Egyptian populace.  One of the largest is the clinic in the Mustafa 
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in Egypt. Middle East Report. Page 22.  Hamied Ansari. 1984, March, The Islamic Militants in Egyptian 
Politics. International Journal of Middle East Studies.  Page 129 Private mosque building continued under 
Mubarak, many of which were sponsored by the Muslim Brotherhood.  According to the minister of religious 
endowments – there were 91,000 mosques in Egypt in 1991, including 45,000 private mosques and 10,000 
zawiyas.  In December 1992, the Egyptian Journal Akhir as;a set the number of private mosques at 60,000.  
Other estimates were even higher, for example, the international human rights organization Middle East Watch 
estimated that as of 1993 there were 170,000 mosques in Egypt, of which only 30,000 were operated by the 
government. See: Middle East Watch, Human Rights Conditions in the Middle East in 1993 (NY: Human Rights 
Watch, 1994). 
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Mahmud Mosque in Cairo, which treats more than 250,000 people each year.151 The medical 
service clinics are among the most widely used facilities of the fundamentalist Muslim 
Brotherhood organization, and they are found in more than 20,000 non-governmental 
mosques (Ibrahim 1988: 642).  The Islamic extremists built new schools, hospitals, rebuilt the 
roads, provided education, job training, and day-care for the poor and deprived.  Large 
segments of the lower socio-economic classes showed their appreciation by joining 
fundamentalist movement, specifically the Muslim Brotherhood.  In this sense, the Muslim 
brotherhood acts differently than most social movements.  The Brotherhood had political 
party objectives and ultimately sought vote-seeking and in order to achieve electoral success 
it had to win over the general population via providing humanitarian services.    
While the brotherhood was reconstructing itself as a national political movement, 
many smaller Islamic fundamentalist movements were gaining ground on university 
campuses, and a new generation of Islamic fundamentalism began to reshape the landscape of 
Egyptian youth.152  As the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements grew, their language 
became more confrontational toward the regime, and Sadat shifted from accommodation to 
repression.  To further perpetuate the situation, Sadat assumed that the best way to improve 
the Egyptian economy and to ensure the domestic and international; future of Egypt was to 
make peace with Israel.  In 1977 Sadat made a trip to Jerusalem.  The subsequent peace treaty 
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he signed with Israel furthered the decline of his popularity and created significant unrest 
throughout the country.  As a result of this unrest, in 1981, he ordered the arrest of thousands 
of people and placed all the country’s mosques under his direct control.  This was his most 
significant mistake, and it led to his assassination.  He was assassinated in 1981 by members 
of the Jihad Organization.153  This confirms part of the large N chapter results, specifically 
the results dealing with the religious freedom.  When governments restrict religious freedom, 
there is an increase in the number Islamic fundamentalist movements.  Furthermore, in the 
regression analysis with the total number of terrorist attacks as the dependent variable, 
religious freedom is highly significant.  This indicates that as the state’s restrictions on 
religious freedom increase so do the number of terrorist attacks.  Sadat tried to restrict 
religious freedom via invading mosques.  As a result, Egyptian terrorism significantly 
increased and Sadat paid with his life.        
Mubarak and Fundamentalism 
During Mubarak’s tenure as president, he further opened Egypt’s political institutions, 
and the façade of a multiparty system that Sadat created was further institutionalized during 
Mubarak’s tenure.  Under Mubarak the number of legal parties was expanded to thirteen.154  
The Mubarak regime, like the Sadat regime, was, and is, an autocracy; however, it is not a 
perfect autocracy.  During the 1970s and 1980s Mubarak took some tangible steps toward 
greater liberalization of the polity.  Some previously banned parties were permitted to come 
back and participate in parliamentary elections, and the unsanctioned Muslim Brotherhood 
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was allowed to join legal parties and have positions in the People’s Assembly (Ansari 1986; 
Hinnebusch 1985; Sprinborg 1989; Mustapha 1996; Korany 1998).  This political 
liberalization did not give the Islamic movement substantive policymaking power in the 
political system; nonetheless, many Islamists saw formal access to the system as a tangible 
gain because it provided a platform for Islamic ideas and Islamic frustration. 
Mubarak’s vision of political reform was self-limiting from the outset; his intention 
was not to transform the authoritarian regime, but to preserve it.155  The transition to a 
multiparty system was arguably intended to strengthen the authoritarian system by enhancing 
its capacity to contain and moderate dissent.  Egypt has been ruled under a state of emergency 
nearly without interruption since June 1967 (the only exception was from 1980 to October 
1981, the period just before Sadat’s assassination) (Tripp 1990: 19).  Under the legal 
provisions of Egyptian Emergency Laws, the state has the authority to monitor, arrest, and 
detain those suspected of activities deemed threatening to national security.  They also restrict 
the exercise of the freedoms of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Egyptian 
Constitution.  Although it remained technically illegal, by the start of the Mubarak era, the 
Brotherhood had reconstructed itself as a formal political organization and it was led by 
Hamid Abu al-Nase, an octogenarian veteran on the pre-1952 organization.   
Under the Political Parties Law, the Egyptian Shura Council’s Committee for Political 
Party Affairs is empowered to legalize new parties.  The committee has seven members: the 
                                                
155 See: Carrie Wickham. 2002. Mobilizing Islam. Columbia University Press; Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and 
Paul Noble. 1998. Comparative Experiences of Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner) also see: John Entelis and Lisa Arone. 1992. Algeria in Turmoil: Islam, Democracy, 
and the State. Middle East Policy page 27 1992.  Some of the opposition parties, specifically the Muslim 
Brotherhood proposed inviting international monitors to witness the election process (the government had once 
again turned down the parties' oft-denied request for judicial supervision). The government, citing its desire to 
protect Egypt's "internal affairs" from foreign "meddling," refused the international-monitors idea and attacked 
the opposition for trying to undermine Egyptian sovereignty. See Egypt: Human Development Report, 1995 
(Cairo: Institute of National Planning, 1996); Heba Handoussa and Gillian Potter, eds., Employment and 
Structural Adjustment: Egypt in the 1990s (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1994). 
  177 
chair, who was speaker of the Shura Council; the Ministers of Justice, Interior and People’s 
Assembly Affairs; and three additional members appointed by the president.  During the 
1980s, the committee rejected petitions for the formation of about ten political parties.  
Groups whose petitions were denied could appeal the decision in an administrative appeals 
court.156 Mubarak claimed that neither the Egyptian masses nor the opposition parties were 
mature enough to function in an open democracy.  As he observed in a speech at Alexandria 
University in July 1992: “We are suffering from irresponsible political party activity.  I 
understand that political party activity must be for the homeland and citizens benefit.  The 
party that does not act for the good of the citizens and to improve their living standards – to 
tell you the truth – does not deserve to live.  In our democracy, we exploit the citizens’ 
simplicity.  We have a high rate of uneducated people.  Because of this simplicity and the 
high rate of uneducated people, we can infuse very dangerous ideas into the people’s minds.  
Democracy can be soundly established when you have educated people, people who can read 
and write.  Are you asking me to open the door wide with the illiteracy rate I have here?  If 
this will work, please tell us”157 
Socioeconomics 
During Mubarak’s presidency poverty grew faster than anytime in Egypt’s history.  
By 1991, Egypt’s national debt had climbed to a record high of $50 billion; this is greater 
than its entire 1990 GNP of $40 billion.  Between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s, per-
capita GNP fell by 10 percent, and, average real wages fell by 14 percent (Egypt: Human 
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Development Report, 1995).  At the same time, unemployment continued to rise, reaching 
about 20 percent, twice the level of the mid-1970s.  Mubarak faced a daunting challenge to 
implement socioeconomic change because Egypt is still burdened with the many of the social 
projects created by Nasser (Al-Awadi, 2004).  If Mubarak privatized the Egyptian economic 
infrastructure, it would involve more than three hundred public-sector corporations with a 
total work force of over 1.5 million, overhauling a four-million-member bureaucracy, and if 
families are taken into account, over 25 million Egyptians would be affected.  Further 
complicating this is the fact that many of these Egyptians are unionized workers who are 
Mubarak’s main supporters.  In other words, the government’s hands are tied.  As a result of 
the poverty and flourishing unemployment outside of those industries controlled by the 
government, the Muslim Brotherhood became more popular than ever (Hesham Al-Awadi 
2004). 
There are more than four hundred ashwaiyat (slum) areas near Cairo and Alexandria 
and one out of every five Egyptians lives within these slums.  For example, the Munira-West 
near Cairo covers a little more than a mile and has over a million people crowed in it 
(Ibrahim 1996).  Interestingly, before 1992 Munira-West did not appear on any official map 
of Cairo.  This could mean one of two things; that, the slum population grew so rapidly that 
the state and map makers had no idea of its existence or that the state simply wanted to keep 
these slums hidden.  Furthermore, Munira-West did not have running water, a sewage system, 
a single police station, school, or hospital until the late 1990s (Ibrahim 1996).   Munira-West 
is less than two miles from the wealthy Cairo suburb of Zamalek. The contrasts between 
Munira-West and Zamalek are significant.  Zamalek has only a tenth of Munira-West’s 
population but covers an area ten times as large.  Zamalek has multiple schools, 
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technologically advanced and Westernized hospitals, multiple police stations, electricity, and 
sewage systems.  The disparity in per-capita income is also huge: $15,000 per year in 
Zamalek versus $150 in Munira-West (Ibrahim 1996). 
These two neighborhoods are only two miles apart, and they representing Egypt's 
socioeconomic extremes.  In between are the vast middle and lower-middle classes which 
have been feeling increasingly squeezed as a result the worsening socioeconomic conditions 
in Egypt.  A major avenue of the Muslim Brotherhood’s outreach has been directed to the 
educated youth in the shabi neighborhoods of Egypt’s cities and provincial towns.  There is a 
massive movement underway in the Egyptian slums by illiterate and semi-literate parents to 
provide their children with higher education; those with education began to enlighten the 
uneducated.  Consequently, the Muslim Brotherhood won supporters by providing relief from 
squalid conditions in Egypt’s underfinanced but open-to-all universities (Hesham al-Awadi 
2004).  As a result of the educational assistance, humanitarian assistance, and employment 
assistance the Muslim Brotherhood provides, it has had relatively significant electoral success 
when able to participate in Egyptian elections.  This makes the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
different than most social movements.      
Vote-Seeking 
Mubarak’s approach to the increasing membership of nonviolent Islamist opposition, 
specifically the Muslim Brotherhood, alternated between accommodation and oppression.  
The Muslim Brotherhood maintained its own national and regional offices; issued public 
statements; and published its own journal, but it was barred from having its own political 
party.  Although it technically remained an illegal organization, the Brotherhood was allowed 
to participate in the 1984 and 1987 elections as a junior partner of the Wafd and Labor 
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Parties, respectively, and in 1987, Brotherhood candidates also ran as independents (al-
Awadi 2004: 17).  In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Brotherhood ran candidates in elections 
for governing boards of many of the country’s student unions, university faulty clubs, and 
professional associations (al-Awadi 2004: 21).158  It appears that the state tolerates the 
Egypt’s civil society organizations (CSOs) only when it needs their support for international 
events, such as the September 1994 UN Conference on Population and Development in 
Cairo, United States and/or Western European high-profile diplomatic visitors, or when it 
feels pressed in its fight against militant Islamism.  However, once the crisis has passed or the 
dignitaries leave, the state turns on the CSOs and reasserts its control.159  
The Muslim Brotherhood has dominated most of the elections dealing with 
professional associations in Egypt, including those of the lawyers and doctor syndicates.  This 
is a significant indicator of the degree of alienation in Egyptian civil society has toward the 
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state.  Taken together, the 25 syndicates (nikabat) have a total membership of three million 
and form the foundation of Egypt's civil society.  Muslim Brothers members account for only 
15 percent of the total membership of these syndicates; however, they have had significant 
success in internal-leadership elections.  Rather than contest state power directly, the Muslim 
Brotherhood gradually appropriated public influence by running members in syndicate 
elections.  Non-Brotherhood members voted in large numbers for the Brotherhood candidates 
as a protest vote against the Mubarak government.160  Brotherhood member, Osman Ahmad 
Osman served as chair of the Engineers Association from 1979 to 1990 and introduced its 
social services programs that became the hallmark of the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
administration for the professional associations (al-Awadi 2004: 73).  As the leading voice in 
the Engineers Association, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to establish a private hospital, 
housing projects, a consumer’s cooperative, a social welfare fund, group insurance, and a 
social club for members of the syndicate (al-Sayed 1993).  Consequently, membership in the 
Muslim Brotherhood movement also significantly increased as their popularity within the 
professional syndicates increased. 
As a result of the electoral success the Muslim Brotherhood had with the syndicates, 
the Mubarak regime launched a major counter-initiative against them in the mid-1990s.  
Mubarak’s assault on the Muslim Brotherhood represented an abrupt departure from the 
reluctant toleration accorded to nonviolent Islamist groups during the first decade of his rule.  
In the 1990s, the state reversed its liberalization stance and imposed greater restrictions on the 
opposition, especially the Muslim Brotherhood.  The reversal began when the regime issued 
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Electoral Law 206, which redrew (or gerrymandered) voting districts in a blatantly unfair 
way to privilege the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) candidates.  The ruling party 
continued to receive financial subsidies from the state, and it maintained its monopoly over 
the radio and television during the election campaigns (al-Shourbaji 1994; Auda and Ibrahim 
1995).  Beginning around 1993, against a backdrop of mounting violence by Islamist 
militants, the regime began to denounce the Muslim Brotherhood as an illegal organization 
with ties to extremists groups even though it had no ties to violent fundamentalist groups.  
The charges brought against Muslim Brotherhood leaders suggested that the regime found 
them threatening, not because they were terrorists, but because they were not.  I would argue 
that it was the Brotherhood’s electoral takeover of Egypt’s professional associations and its 
growing credibility as a moderate non-terrorist Islamic movement that forced the Mubarak to 
curtail its growing political power because it was a threat to his own political power.  
Four factors help explain the reversal in Mubarak’s liberalization.  First, during the 
1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood took advantage of its national platform to raise its demands 
for Islamic ideas, challenging the regime’s policies with regards to international security, 
economic planning, foreign relations, use of torture, lack of democracy and human rights in 
Egypt (Radhi 1990, 1991; al-Tawil 1992).  By refusing to play a quiescent role in parliament, 
the Muslim Brotherhood challenged the legitimacy of the state regime.  Secondly, while the 
political inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood was intended to contain its influence, by the 
late 1980s it had became the leading opposition force in parliament with 36 seats.  Other 
political parties began vying for an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood and the “Islamic 
alliance” that united the Brotherhood with the Labor and liberal Parties in 1987 (Auda and 
Ibrahim 1995).  Thirdly, the legitimacy of the Muslim Brotherhood in parliament spilled over 
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into civil society, and its syndicate leadership became a vehicle for the expression of its 
political goals and a soapbox for it to criticize the regime.  This also allowed the Muslim 
Brotherhood to mobilize financial resources to aid social and political causes, which 
significantly impacted their membership (Qandil 1995, 1996).  Such influence was deemed 
threatening to Mubarak because it turned the Brotherhood into an alternative to the state.  
Finally, the inclusion of the Brotherhood did not result in the containment of the violent 
fundamentalist movements.  The state’s strategy during the 1980s was to isolate the militants 
by rewarding the Brotherhood with political access.  The Gama’a and Islamic Jihad shunned 
parliamentary participation on religious grounds.  They believed democracy was heresy 
because it allowed the people to rule rather than the word of God.  Yet despite this 
fundamental objection, they did not hesitate to criticize the Brotherhood for failure to 
advance Islamic aims through institutional participation.  Aboud Zumur, the leader of Islamic 
Jihad, criticized the Brotherhood for failing to secure a political party during the 1990s by 
pointing out that “whereas France, Germany, and Italy permit the formation of a religious 
party, Egypt is proud of the fact it does not permit such a party” (Ahmed 1995: 109). 
In 1995 the regime detained eighty-one of the Brotherhood’s leading activists, 
including former members of parliament, university professors, association officials, and 
businessmen.  The defendants were tried in military courts, and forty-four of them received 
sentences of up to five years with hard labor.161  Since 1995 hundreds of Brotherhood 
activists have been detained, and many have received prison sentences after trials in military 
                                                
161 According to al- Awadi (2004) those who received the maximum sentence included two of the Brotherhood’s 
most influential leaders – Isa al-Iryan (former member of parliament and assistant secretary general of the 
Doctor’s Association) and Abd al-Muni Abu-l-Futuh (secretary general of the Doctor’s Association and 
secretary general of the Federation of Arab Doctors).  Both were charged with “directing an illegal organization 
aiming to impede the rule of law and the Constitution.  They were also charges with providing financial 
assistance to the families of terrorists and using their association positions to help Islamic militants abroad. 
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courts.162 For a complete list of all the Muslim Brotherhood political prisoners currently in 
Egyptian prisons see appendix number four.   
Terrorism 
As the formal inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1980s turned into 
outright political oppression in the early 1990s, two of the most violent fundamentalist 
movements in Egypt, the Gama’a and Islamic Jihad made it clear that they felt vindicated 
using violence because of the hypocrisy associated with the Mubarak regime.  In one 
communiqué, the Gama’a rhetorically asked, “What has the Muslim Brotherhood, since its 
inception until now, achieved of the goals and objectives of Islam, the hopes and needs of the 
Muslims, and the duties and requirements of the age?”  It added, “What is astonishing is that 
every time the Muslim Brotherhood rushes to issue their statements of moral condemnation, 
denunciation, and disavowal for all that is jihad – they call it terrorism – the more the 
government redoubles its constraints against them and strikes them nonstop” (Communiqué 
in al-Hayat August 8, 1995).  In its publication al-Mojahedin, Islamic Jihad wrote, “All the 
peacefulness and gradualism upheld by the Muslim Brotherhood during their political 
struggles, and their work through the regime’s legitimate, legal channels did not save them 
from being handcuffed, tried in front of military courts, and dragged to prisons” (al-Hayat 
January 28, 1996). 
                                                
162 The following all look at the way Egypt is currently treating Egyptian fundamentalism; specifically, the 
Muslim Brotherhood: Susan Sachs, 2000. War on Fundamentalism Silences Dissent in Egypt. International 
Herald Tribune. August 5; Mona el-Tahawy, 1999, October 23. Egypt Cracks Down on Islamist Activists. The 
Guardian; United Press International 2000, September 19. Egypt’s Islamists Blast Government for Election 
Ban; Amnesty International. Egypt: Run-up to Shura Council Elections Marred by Wave of Arrests. May 15, 
2001; Simon Apiku, 1998, November 8. Islamists Barred from Student Elections.  Middle East Times; E. S. 
McKee. 2000, July 17. Fading Fundamentalists. Jerusalem Report; Steve Negus. 1997, April 3. Down but Not 
Out: The Muslim Brotherhood Keep a Low Profile, but Their Main Activity, Charity Work – Still Does On.  
Cairo Times; Andrew Hammond, 1996, December 7. Brotherhood Crisis Takes on New Proportions. Idle East 
Times; Roula Khalaf. 2001, March 9. Egypt’s Survey. Financial Times.  
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Islamic militancy in the 1990s did not produce a targeted state response.  Instead, 
repression was brutal, swift, and indiscriminate.  State repression encompassed not only the 
hard-core militants of the Gama’a and Islamic Jihad, but also supporters, sympathizers, 
families, and, for that matter, anyone wearing a beard with a trimmed mustache (see Human 
Rights Watch 1993; Amnesty International 1996).  The arrest numbers in the 1990s indicate 
that the state haphazardly arrested individuals.  Between 1992 and 1997, more than 47,000 
people were arrested, in 1998 and 1999 that the state released more than 7,000 of these 
prisoners (al-Hayat Aprial 27, 1999).  In addition to mass arrests, the regime began taking 
hostages, whereby the state detained the families and relatives of suspected militants until the 
militants turned themselves over to the authorities or admitted to what the state told them 
(Human Rights Watch 1995).  Those arrested were regularly mistreated and tortured.  The 
torture was indiscriminant and state repression was heavy-handed.  For the first time since 
1981, the state began referring Islamists, including Muslim Brotherhood members, to military 
courts where justice was delivered hastily and without an appeal process.  In the mid-1990s, 
the state adopted a shoot-to-kill policy, completely sidestepping military courts.  As a result 
of this Egypt got under control all of their domestic fundamentalist groups.  According to the 
polity data, during the mid-1990s Egypt was very close to a perfect autocracy and it based 
managed to suppress significant numbers of fundamentalist movements.      
Unlike the following chapters that concentrate on Hamas and Hezbollah, the Muslim 
Brotherhood has condemned all acts of terrorism as counter-productive and has refused to 
participate in violence.  In this sense, it acts like most other social movements.  However, 
after two decades of relative peace and stability, terrorist operations began a violent Jihadist 
campaign against Egypt, one that began with terrorist attacks in Sinai, on October 7, 2004, 
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targeting Israeli tourists, killing 34 and injuring over 150 others.  The Abdullah Azzam 
Brigades, an unknown al-Qaeda affiliate movement, claimed responsibility.163  On April 24, 
2006, the Abdullah Azzam Brigades continued its violence, a day before the Egyptian 
national holiday marking the handover of Sinai by Israel to Egypt, three bombs exploded 
nearly simultaneously in the Sinai resort of Dahab, killing at least 23 people and wounding 
more than 80, mostly Egyptians.  Two days later, a suicide bomber blew himself up in front 
of representatives from the international organization Multinational Force of Observers 
(MFO) near the border crossing to Gaza in northern Sinai, and less than a half hour later a 
second suicide bomber on a motorbike attacked an Egyptian police vehicle at another location 
in the same area.  The Abdullah Azzam Brigades get support from Al Qaeda via Saudi 
Arabian charities in Egypt.  Muslim Brotherhood leader Isam al-Aryan claimed Egypt had 
reached a "boiling point" due to the lack of political reform.  Furthermore, it is interesting to 
note that Egyptian Islamist movements quickly denied responsibility for each of these 
                                                
163 This was only the beginning of the violence that is assumed to have been either facilitated by or committed 
by members of the Abdullah Azzam Brigades: on March 29, 2005 an Egyptian man stabbed and wounded two 
Hungarian tourists in Cairo in revenge for Western policies towards Iraqis and Palestinians.  This was followed 
soon after by the April 7, 2005 bombing near the Khan al-Khalili bazaar in Cairo, which killed three tourists and 
wounded 18 others.  Two weeks later, Ihab Yousri Yassin, pursued by the police, launched himself from the 
bridge behind the Egyptian museum in Cairo and subsequently detonated a bomb, wounding seven, including 
two Israelis, an Italian and a Swede. Soon after this incident, Yassin's sister and his fiancée armed with guns 
opened fire on a tourist bus in the Sayyida Aisha neighborhood. This marked the first time that a woman had 
ever engaged in Islamist violence in Egypt. Sherifa Zuhur, "A New Phase for Jihad in Egypt?" Terrorism 
Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 3, No. 10 (May 19, 2005); on July 23, 2005, two car bombs and a suitcase 
bomb ripped through hotels and shopping areas in Sharm el-Sheikh, killing 88 and wounding over 200, making 
the attack the deadliest in the Egypt’s history. The bombing coincided with Egypt's commemoration of Nasser's 
1952 overthrow of King Farouk. Again the Abdullah Azzam Brigades claimed it carried out the bombings. 
Additional claims were later made by two other groups calling themselves the Tawahid and Jihad Group in 
Egypt and Holy Warriors of Egypt.  In the Tawahid statement the group said it was continuing its "war to expel 
the Jews and Christians from the land of Islam.  The war has begun by targeting the axis of Zionist evil and 
immorality in Sinai, where Moses spoke to God (Paz, 2005): article entitled "From Riyadh/East to Sinai," by the 
Saudi Abu Abbas al-Aedhi 
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terrorist attacks and condemned them.  Specifically, many members of Gama'a issued a 
public statement urging their followers to halt all operations and to renounce violence.164   
In Conclusion  
The goal of my dissertation is to determine the causes of Islamic fundamentalism 
while showing Islamic fundamentalist movements are social movements.  In the previous 
chapters, I laid out my labyrinth theory that argues the causes of Islamic fundamentalist is the 
result of a combined presence of phenomena associated with the different social movement 
literatures, each being positively associated with the number of Islamic fundamentalist groups 
within the nation-state.  Furthermore, Islamic fundamentalist movements are social 
movements and the factors that predict social movements, predict Islamic fundamentalist 
movements.   
The oldest and most resilient of the Islamic fundamentalist movements is that of the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.  The Brotherhood has for generations exerted a radical form 
of opposition on the Egyptian state and existing Egyptian political institutions.  By using the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as a case-study, my results were threefold; first, I was able to 
show qualitatively that there was validity to my fundamentalist labyrinth and each of my 
social movement conditions are positively associated with the rise and success of the Muslim 
                                                
164 The following all look at this newest wave of terrorism in Egypt: Stephen Ulph "Possible Terrorist Attack 
Foiled in Egypt," Terrorism Focus, Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 3, No. 11 (March 21, 2006); Murad B. Al-
Shishani, "Egypt Breaks-up al-Ta'efa al-Mansoura Jihadist Group," Terrorism Focus, Jamestown Foundation, 
Vol. 3, No. 16 (April 25, 2006); Reuven Paz, "Arab volunteers killed in Iraq: an Analysis," PRISM Series of 
Global Jihad, No. 1/3 - March 2005; Mohammed Al Shafey, "Dahab Bombers Inspired by Al-Qaeda," Asharq 
Alawsat, April 29, 2006; Diana Mukkaled, "Al Zarqawi… Between Myth and Reality," Asharq Alawsat, May 1, 
2006; Neveen Mahish and Sherine Abdel-Razek, "The guessing game," Al-Ahram Weekly Online, 27 April - 3 
May 2006; Jailan Halawi and Salonaz Sami, 'shattered dreams," Al-Ahram Weekly Online, 27 April - 3 May 
2006; Michael Slackman, "Peacekeepers Targets of New Sinai Attacks," NYT, April 27, 2006;  
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Brotherhood.  The Brotherhood acted, formed, and had all the characteristics that the social 
movement scholars argue social movements have.  However, the Brotherhood is different 
from the traditional social movement because its vote-seeking pursuits and humanitarian 
programs help facilitate its electoral success.   
 
 
 
 
  189 
Chapter Five: Hamas as a Social Movement  
The goal of my dissertation is to determine the causes of Islamic fundamentalism and 
in doing so I show that an Islamic fundamentalist movement is inherently a social movement.  
In the previous chapter I evaluated the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and was able to show 
that my theory not only has quantitative validity, but it also has qualitative validity as it 
relates to Egypt, specifically looking at the Muslim Brotherhood there.  I was able to show 
that each of the social movement conditions is positively associated with the rise and success 
of the Muslim Brotherhood.  The Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest and most resilient of the 
Sunni Islamic fundamentalist movements.  Also, its doctrine is based on anti-terrorism.  For 
contrast, I choose the Palestinian territories, specifically looking at Hamas as my second case-
study.  Hamas has become one of the most violent Sunni Islamic fundamentalist movements, 
as well as one of the most electorally successful.  In this chapter, I will further prove my 
theory and in doing so, I will show that Hamas is a social movement; therefore, I will 
reconfirm the fact that Islamic fundamentalist movements are social movements.   
I selected Hamas as my second case study because Palestinian issues are central to 
understanding contemporary Middle Eastern socioeconomic and sociopolitical structures.  
Also, Hamas is one of the most well known and populous fundamentalist movements, making 
it an important case.  The following chapter has two objectives; first, to confirm the results of 
the previous chapters show that each of the social movement conditions is positively 
associated with Palestinian fundamentalism, specifically Hamas.  Secondly, as a 
fundamentalist movement, Hamas, like the Muslim Brotherhood, is a social movement; 
however, Hamas acts differently than most social movements in the sense that it has formed a 
political party and has had electoral success.  Also, Hamas is one of the most violent of all the 
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social movements.  Most social movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood, do not 
commit or facilitate acts of terrorism like Hamas.  As a result, my second objective is to show 
how Hamas acts differently than a traditional social movement, including the Egyptian and 
Palestinian Muslim Brotherhoods.    
In order to meet each objective, I evaluate aspects of each of my fundamentalist 
labyrinth’s conditions on both the movement and state levels, and I show that each are 
positively associated with Palestinian Islamic fundamentalism.  To truly understand 
Palestinian fundamentalism, it is imperative that I evaluate the historical development of 
Palestinian fundamentalist movements, most of which formed from the Palestinian Muslim 
Brotherhood, born from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.  The historical story told here is 
significant because it shows the development of Islamic fundamentalism through an actual 
example. My historical journey concludes with the argument that confirms Hamas began as 
predicted by the social movement scholars.  Then, I explain the ideological makeup of Hamas 
and argue that much of its ideological foundations are found in its printed works, a significant 
resource for the movement.  In doing so, I explain Hamas’s ideological development from a 
resistance movement into full scale social movement.  
Following this, I evaluate Hamas’s relations, differences, and similarities with other 
Palestinian social movements.  In chapter three I proposed and quantitatively proved that an 
inverted-U relationship exists between the openness of political institutions and 
fundamentalism.  I was able to show that there are more fundamentalist movements in 
opening political systems than in either perfect autocracies or perfect democracies.  The 
Palestinian territory has never been either a perfect autocracy or a perfect democracy, and it 
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has experienced significant numbers of Islamic fundamentalist movements.  Also, Hamas has 
been a recipient of significant outside ideological Sunni influence from Saudi Arabia.   
Hamas acts differently than most social movements because it has transformed itself 
simultaneously into both a legitimate and successful political party as well as a terrorist 
organization.  Also, in order to achieve electoral success and to win over the hearts and minds 
of the Palestinian people, Hamas has become the Palestinian territories most significant 
provider of social services.  It is nearly impossible to find the point of demarcation between 
the Hamas terrorist and the Hamas social service providers because they are often times the 
same individual.  Furthermore, Hamas is able to use its overt political and charitable 
organizations as a financial and logistical support network for its terrorist operations (Barnard 
2006).  The majority of social movements, including the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, do 
not do this.   
 
Introduction to Hamas 
The Islamic world does not see Hamas as a terrorist organization; rather it is seen as a 
multidimensional social movement that is involved in wide scale political, economic, social, 
cultural, and charitable activities.  It is also seen as a movement with an ideological network 
of political and social ties to political parties, organizations, and states.  Additionally, it has 
official representatives in every Muslim state, and it has supporters throughout the Arab and 
Islamic world.  Hamas is an organized mass-effort with its main goal of bringing about 
change in Palestinian socioeconomic and sociopolitical institutions, acting as predicted by 
social movement scholars.165   
                                                
165 The social movement scholars that argue this include: Kyriacos Markides 1974; Cemeron 1969; King 1956; 
Heberle 1951; Toch 1965; Smelser 1963; Turner and Killian 1957; Rush and Denisoff 1971; Gusfield 1970 
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Hamas is an acronym for Harakat al-Muqawam al-Islamiyah, or the Islamic 
Resistance Movement, and it is an Arabic word meaning zeal (Levitt 2006: 8).  It is a 
Palestinian Islamist movement that emerged in December 1987 as an outgrowth of the 
Palestinian branch of the Egyptian based Muslim Brotherhood.  Hamas was founded with the 
goals of eliminating the state of Israel and replacing it with an Islamist state in all of what 
was once British Mandatory Palestine and liberating all the Palestinian people from 
occupation.166  To meet these objectives, Hamas was going to partake in jihad and to facilitate 
the Palestinian people to also participate in jihad.  Hamas adopted the principles contained in 
the PLO’s National Charter of 1968.  According to the Charter, foregoing territorial parts of 
Palestine was tantamount to forgoing part of Islam; Palestine as a whole could be liberated 
only by violent jihad. 
Hamas’s sociopolitical strategies seek to counter what it perceives as the 
secularization and Westernization of Arab society, and to become internationally recognized 
as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, a distinction held by the PLO since the 
1974 Arab League conference.  Hamas’ slogan, as stated in Article 8 of the group’s charter, 
reflects the fundamental importance of violent jihad via religiously sanctioned resistance 
against the enemies of Islam: “Allah is the target, the Prophet is its model, the Koran its 
constitution: Jihad is its path and death for the sake of Allah is the loftiest of its wishes.”167  
To meet their goals, Hamas employs a three-pronged strategy: (1) social welfare activity that 
builds grassroots support, (2) political activity that competes within Palestinian political 
institutions, and (3) guerilla and terrorist attacks that target Israeli soldiers and its citizens.      
                                                
166 The British Mandate Territory includes: the land that is today comprised of Israel, the West Bank, and the 
Gaza Strip 
167 Canadian Secret Intelligence Services (CSIS), “Terrorist Group Profiler”, June 2002.  The report is 
references in Stewart Bell, “Hamas May Have Chemical Weapons: CSIS Report Says Terror Group May Be 
Experimenting”, National Post (Canada), December 10, 2003.   
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Hamas’s political importance is the direct result of the public support it has amassed 
via its grass-roots movement.  This support goes beyond its religious doctrine and its 
supporters go beyond those who subscribe to its fundamentalist ideology and dogma.  
Arguably, this is the direct result of its ability to meet its own goals, specifically, its 
humanitarian and educational objectives.  In fact, Gil Seden (1994) argues that some 
observers point out that hundreds of thousands of its Palestinian supporters “don’t even know 
what the inside of a mosque looks like.”  Hamas relies on its political and social activists and 
organizations to build facilitate grassroots support for its movement, to expand its base, to 
fund operatives, to support or supply jobs, social services, and education, and to serve as the 
logistical and financial support network for the movement’s terror cells.  What follows is a 
historical journey into the development of Islamic fundamentalist movements; this process 
was alluded to in Chapters One and Two.    
 
History of Fundamentalism in Palestine 
Overall, the characteristics, make-up, ideology, and political discourse of Hamas 
reflect its organizational roots and its historic ties to the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, 
which was born from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.  Interestingly, almost every 
Palestinian fundamentalist movement has had its beginnings as a result of the Palestinian 
Muslim Brotherhood.  The establishment of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood was 
motivated by the concern that the members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt had for the 
Palestinians; from 1936 to 1939 the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood supplied moral and 
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material aid to the Palestinian cause, eventually leading to its first successful offshoot and the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was born.168   
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was able to mobilize significant resources for the 
Palestinian cause, most importantly massive popular support.  It also utilized its educational 
resources by writing letters of protest to the British authorities (Britain held the Mandate for 
Palestine and quasi-occupied Egypt).  On the occasion of the anniversary of the Balfour 
Declaration,169 the Muslim Brotherhood wrote to the British ambassador in Egypt that “the 
cause of Palestine is the cause of every Muslim;” it warned Britain that if it continued to 
suppress the Palestinians, they would facilitate an all out jihad against Britain (Hroub 2000: 
13).170  It was not until 1943 that a genuine Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood organization was 
actually formed, the Makarem Society of Jerusalem; it would later become the Muslim 
Brotherhood of Palestine after WWII.171  What facilitated this was arguably the establishment 
                                                
168 The Palestinian revolt between 1936 and 1939 is also known as The Great Palestinian Revolt of 1936.  The 
first visit by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to Palestine occurred when two members of the organization, 
Abdel Rahman al-Sa’ati and Muhammad As’ad al-Hakim, toured Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria in August 1935 
to spread the Brotherhood’s message.  There is no indication that this visit resulted in the establishment of 
branches of chapters of the Brotherhood in Palestine, and it appears that for several years relations between the 
Palestinians and the Brotherhood remained limited to the exchanges of letters expressing pleasantries and 
solidarity for more information about the Islamic trend at the time, see Mohsen M Saleh. The Islamic Trend in 
Palestine and its effects on the struggle Movement 1917-1948. Kuwait: AL-Falah Library. 1988 
169 The Balfour Declaration of 1917, in an official letter from the British Foreign Office to Great Britain’s 
Foreign Secretary, to Lord Rothschild, who was seen as a representative of the Jewish people.  The letter stated 
that the British government “viewed with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish 
people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood 
that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities 
in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country”   
170 Saleh (page 436); Al-Banna (page 259): For a more detailed view of the doctrines of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and its stand on the question of Palestine, see Abd al-Fattah El-Awaisi, The Muslim brotherhood’s 
Conception of the Palestine Question.  Cairo: Islamic House of Publishing and Distribution, 1989.    
171 See: Rabi al-Madhoon. The Islamic Movement in Palestine, 1928-1987, Shu’un Filastiniyya October 1988, 
pages 10 -50 (had translated).  Bayan Nuwayhid al-Hout. The Political Leadership and Institutions in Palestine, 
1917-1948. Beirut: Institute for Palestinian Studies. 1986; Bashir Nafi. 1988. Arabism, Islamism and the 
Palestinian Question, 1908-1941. Reading, UK: Ithaca Pres.; Also for the history of the Palestinian movements 
see: See: Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 
24, 77–80; Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1985), pp. 16–20; Islam, Democracy, the State and the West: A Round Table 
with Dr. Hasan Turabi, May 10, 1992, sponsored by the World and Islam Studies Enterprise and the University 
of South Florida, Committee for Middle Eastern Studies  
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of the state of Israel in 1948, the defeat of the Palestinians in the Israeli War of Independence, 
and the subsequent loss of significant parts of the Palestinian territory.  However, a single 
Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood movement only lasted for a brief period of time because 
significant portions of the Palestinian territories became occupied by Israel, what was left fell 
under either Jordanian or Egyptian government control.  This division had a significant effect 
on the subsequent course and effectiveness of the Muslim Brotherhood.  The Brotherhood in 
the West Bank was soon incorporated into the Brotherhood of Jordan and in the Gaza Strip 
the Brotherhood was incorporated into the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.172 
One significant difference between the Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip and its 
counterpart in the West Bank after 1948 was that the Jordan Branch continued to be active in 
the national effort to end the Israeli occupation via jihad (Hroub 2000: 23).  This reflects my 
inverted-U hypothesis; the Jordanian branch of the Brotherhood operated in political 
institutions that were not completely closed, as compared to the West Bank branch of the 
Brotherhood which operated in a perfect autocracy.  Soon after the West Bank branch was 
incorporated into the Egyptian Brotherhood, both were banned and declared illegal by 
President Nasser.  Those members who were not jailed where forced underground.  After 
1954, the Egyptian branch of the Brotherhood became a secret organization and almost 
disappeared (Abu Amt 1987).  As a result, membership was reduced to only a small number 
of individuals.  This development represented a setback in the effort to resist Israeli 
occupation and peacefully liberate Palestine, which was the main objective in the 
Brotherhood’s platform.  In the first half of the 1950s, disenfranchised members of the 
                                                
172 The following all give historical reference to the significance the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the 
formation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine and in turn the formation of Hamas: Abed-Qotob, Sana 
(1995); Abu-Amr, Ziad. (1994); Azem, A. J. (1977); Bar, Shmuel (1998); Burgat, François, and William Dowell 
(1993); Cohen, Amnon (1980); Fricsh, Hillel (1994); Kramer, G. (1994); Meijer, R. (1997); Miller, Aaron David 
(1983) 
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Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip organized military cells, and two secret organizations were 
formed to engage in armed struggle: Youth for Vengeance and the Battalion of Justice.  
These movements provided the inspiration for the idea of Fateh, the Palestine National 
Liberation Movement (PLO).  Palestinian Brotherhood members were tired of the peaceful 
resistance campaign and the Fateh and the PLO began focusing on the military aspects of 
resistance to Israeli occupation.  They bypassed the doctrinaire and ideological issues that 
were the foundations of the Muslim Brotherhood and instead started concentrating on 
nationalist and not religious ideas while utilizing terrorism.173   
In the early 1960s Fateh split from the Muslim Brotherhood.  Fateh rather than the 
Brotherhood represented Palestinian aspirations for liberation from Israeli occupation and it 
championed Palestinian nationalism via armed struggle, and in time, the members of the 
Battalion of Justice and the Youth of Vengeance joined the Fateh. 174  The Palestinian 
Brotherhood followed their brethren in Egypt and operated a completely passive movement. 
Haled Hroub (2000: 29) argues that the outbreak of the 1967 war and the devastating and fast 
defeat of the Arab armies on all fronts took the Arabs and Palestinians by surprise.  From a 
regional perspective, Egypt’s defeat significantly cost it its regional standing and freed the 
Gaza Strip from Nasser.  With the defeat of the Arab world’s supreme military power, the 
                                                
173 Abdullah Abu Azza. 1992. The Islamic Movements in the Arab Countries. Kuwait: Al-Qalam Publishing 
House: this book is the most compete source detailing the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza 
and Fateh during the Fatah’s emergence.  Abu Azza headed the Brotherhood’s organization in Gaza during the 
Israeli occupation from November 1956 to February 1957, when he was arrested by occupation authorities.  
Azza said that he opposed the idea of the Fateh and was instrumental in formulating the Brotherhood’s position 
opposing it.  He resigned from the Brotherhood in 1972 and later was appointed a member of the Palestine 
National Council, continuing to serve until the late 1980s, when he resigned to protest the resolution declaring a 
Palestinian state and recognizing Israel. Page 25  
174 Emile Sahliyeh. 1988. In Search of Leadership: West Bank Politics since 1967 (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings) chapter 2.  Also, Hillel Frisch, “The Evolution of Palestinian Nationalist Islamic Doctrine: 
Territorializing a Universal Religion,” Canadian Review in Nationalism 21, nos. 1–2 (1994): 51–53. Yezid 
Sayigh, “The Armed Struggle and Palestinian Nationalism,” in Avraham Sela and Moshe Ma`oz. 1997. The 
PLO and Israel: From Armed Conflict to Political Solution, 1964–1994 (New York: St. Martin’s Press), pp. 23–
35. 
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Palestinians realized they could not rely on the Arab armies for protection and had to change 
to a self-reliance policy, propelling the power and popularity of the PLO and Fatah.   
However, both the PLO and Fatah suffered from factionalism, internal rivalry, and 
excessive corruption.  As a result, they were unable to bring solutions to the Palestinian 
socioeconomic and sociopolitical problems, specifically the extreme unemployment and 
poverty associated with the oppression and degradation because of Israeli occupation.  The 
inability or unwillingness of both movements to improve the socioeconomic and 
sociopolitical life of the Palestinians inside the occupied territories diminished their 
legitimacy while increasing the appeal of Islamic fundamentalism among the Palestinians.  
By the late 1970s the average Palestinian had enough.  Tired of the excessive poverty and 
lack of any socioeconomic or sociopolitical mobility, they turned in great numbers to Islamic 
fundamentalist movements, specifically the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood.       
 Furthermore, both the Palestinians and their fundamentalist activists were inspired by 
the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and the Islamization of Iran.  As a 
result, the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood’s popularity soared.  However, by the beginning 
of the 1980s, the exclusive hold the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood had over Palestinian 
fundamentalist activists was significantly challenged.  This was due to the emergence of 
Saraya al-Jihad al-Islami (Islamic Jihad) which embraced violent resistance to the Israeli 
occupation.  Islamic Jihad was formed in the Gaza Strip by Muslim Brotherhood leaders who 
broke away from the original movement in protest against its unwillingness to committee acts 
of terrorism against Israeli occupation (Hatina 2001; Alexander 2002; Kolocotronis 1990).  
According to Hroub (2000: 32), this appeared to be a replay of the discourse launched by the 
founders of Fateh at the time they had split from the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the 
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Muslim Brotherhood faced a more critical situation this time because activists did not have to 
forsake their Islamic identity in joining Islamic Jihad, unlike the Fatah or the PLO.  Islamic 
Jihad constituted a merger between Islam and terrorism; it was a way of engaging in 
resistance activities in the armor of an Islamic identity.175  Numerous social movement 
scholars have shown that people join collective action mainly through interpersonal ties, 
social relations, or informal networks.176  In other words, Palestinians engage in collective 
action via joining fundamentalist movements because they share certain norms, values, and a 
shared identification process.177  This shared Palestinian identification process was the result 
of the socioeconomic and sociopolitical hardships placed on them by Israeli occupation.   
At this time in the Palestinian territories, both unemployment and poverty were 
strangling the Palestinian people; and they were being denied basic human rights.  There was 
a radicalization occurring among the Palestinian people, on facilitated by their socioeconomic 
inequality.  As a result of this radicalization, there was also a significant shift in the 
ideological and political practices of the Muslim Brotherhood in the mid-1980s.  Between 
1982 and 1983, the Brotherhood began a policy of violent demonstrations as a result of Israeli 
occupation of Islamic mosques.  In other words, the Israeli government crossed the threshold 
from simple occupier to a religious occupier.  This occupation facilitated a significant surge 
in violence participated by members of even the most peaceful fundamentalist movements.  
                                                
175 Iyad Barghuthi. 1990. The Islamization and politics of the Palestinian occupied lands (Jerusalem: Markaz al-
Zahra' lil-Dirasat wal-Abhath), pp. 65–75; Thomas Mayer. 1988. The awakening of the Muslims in Israel 
(Giv`at Haviva: ha-Makhon le-Limudim `Arviyim), pp. 42–55; Wajih Kawtharany, Three eras in the Arab and 
Islamic renaissance project, al-Mustaqbal al-`Arabi, no. 120 (February 1989): 4–25 had translated; Abdullah 
`Azzam, al-Difa The defense of Muslims’ lands, the most important of individual’s duties. 1987. (Jidda: Dar al-
Mujtama), pp. 20–21 
176 As argued by: della Porta 1988; Could 1995; McAdam 1988; Snow, David A. (1988, 1992, 1999); Snow, 
Burke E. Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford (1986); Tarrow (1994) 
177 As is relates to the identifying process and social movements see: Freeman 1978; McAdam 1982; Morris 
1984; Calhoun 1989; Fernandez and McAdam 1989; Andrews 1991; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Whittier 
1995; and Melucci 1996 
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This confirms part of the large N chapter results, specifically the models with the total 
number of terrorist attacks as the dependent variable.  When governments restrict religious 
freedom, there is a significant increase in the number terrorist attacks.  When the Israeli 
government occupied Palestinian mosques, we saw a significant increase in violent 
fundamentalism even from fundamentalist groups with doctrines that condemn the use of 
violence. 
To further complicate the situation, the Islamic Jihad began anti-Israeli terrorist 
attacks in the early 1980s, which created a new atmosphere in the Gaza Strip and united 
Islamists and nationalists in armed struggle.  In the summer of 1985 the Brotherhood decided 
to revolutionize the masses and started facilitating a mass popular uprising.  By 1985-86 
significant numbers of Palestinians living in the occupied territories were fed-up with their 
socioeconomic and sociopolitical inequality, and most joined their religious brethren in the 
anti-Israeli demonstrations.  Here there is a meeting of two of the social movement 
conditions, socioeconomic inequality and resources, both being positively associated with 
Islamic fundamentalism.  Also, the Palestinians were acting just as the political process and 
Marxist social movement scholars predicted.    
As the outbreak of the Intifada drew nearer in 1987, public anger increased 
significantly when the Israeli army stormed the Islamic University in Gaza where thousands 
of students had gathered for prayer service for four members of the Islamic Jihad who had 
been killed by the Israeli army.  The Israeli troops opened fire on the students, wounding 
dozens (Schiff and Yaari 1989).  The significance behind the university massacre had to do 
with the high esteem Islam holds for education.  The Palestinians saw education as the only 
hope for their children and the university massacre threatened to take away the only resource 
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they had left, an educated youth.  Consequently, even more mass demonstrations broke and 
by December of 1987 (Hroub, 2000: 39).  
Rashad al-Shawwa, the mayor of Gaza, summed up the situation in an interview 
broadcast about the Israeli military raids on December 10, 1987, the third day of the Intifada: 
“One must expect these things after twenty years of debilitating occupation.  People have lost 
hope.  They are frustrated and don’t know what to do.  They have turned to religious 
fundamentalism as their last hope.  They have given up hoping Israel will give them their 
rights.  The Arab states are unable to do anything, and they feel that the PLO, which is their 
representative, also has failed” (Aryeh Shelev, 1991: 13).  On December 11, 1987, the 
Political Bureau of the Brotherhood in Gaza met and agreed that it was the perfect moment to 
directly confront Israeli occupation.  At the meeting, the first communiqué of The Islamic 
Resistance Movement (acronym in Arabic is “Hamas”) was written, and those present – 
Sheikh Yassin, Abdul Aziz al-Rantisi, Salah Shehedeh, Muhammad Sham’ah, Isa al-
Nashshar, Abdel Fattah Dukham, and Ibrahim al-Yazuri became the founders of Hamas.178  
Here, as with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, leadership becomes a significant resource in 
the formation and success of Hamas.   
There is one major ideological difference between Hamas and both the Egyptian and 
Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood movements.  Hamas disputes the Brotherhood’s view that 
                                                
178 Born January 1, 1929, Yassin was nearly blind and a paraplegic, he was assassinated in 1994 by an Israeli 
gunship. Dr. Rantisi was born in 1948 and assassinated by Israel in 2004 via a missile being fired into his 
moving car in Gaza . Shehedeh (born in 1953) was the head of the military wing of Hamas; he was assassinated 
by Israel on July 22, 2002 via a bomb dropped directly on his house in the middle of the night. Muhammad 
Sham’ah was assassinated on March 29, 1998. Information on death of Isa al-Nashar is unknown.  Dr. Yazuri is 
an academic and the executive director of the Islamic Center in Gaza, he is the only one of the original founders 
to still be alive.  Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari. 1989. The Palestinian Uprising – Israel’s Third Front. New 
York: Simon and Schuster; Ahmed bin Yusef, The Islamic Movement (Hamas): An ephemeral event or 
permanent alternative?; The pamphlet: “The Intifada in Two Year: Characteristics and Trends. Tampa Fl: 
Islamic Palestine Committee.  Also see: Ahmad, Hisham (1994); Israeli, Raphael (1990); al Jarbawi, Ali. 
(1994); Kjorlien, M. L. (1993); Lahman, Shay (1982); Legrain, J. F. (1997); Litani, Y. (1989); Maqdsi, 
Muhammad (1993); Mayer, Tomas (1990); Satloff, Robert (1989); Schiff, Z., and E. Ya`ari (1989) 
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all of Islam (or the Muslim nation) must first be brought back to the true path of Islam before 
it can start a violent jihad against non-believers.  Hamas insists that a violent jihad must be 
now and not later.  In other words, the degree and support of violence is a major distinction.  
Furthermore, most Muslim fundamentalist movements that have split from the Palestinian 
Brotherhood share Hamas’s critique, including Islamic Jihad, Gama’ah al-Islamiyah (Islamic 
Group), and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.  However, in the mid-1980s even the Muslim 
Brotherhood was supporting minimal violence, only after Israeli religious occupation and that 
violence subsided after Israeli forces withdrew from Palestinian Mosques and the first 
Intifada subsided.   
The formation of Hamas coincided with the outbreak of the first Intifada.179 
In the early months of the Intifada, Hamas did not call for mass demonstrations, fearing that 
this might lead to a direct confrontation with the Israeli security forces, and jeopardize the 
movement’s fragile existence before it took root among the Palestinian people. Another 
concern was that Hamas had limited resources, specifically financial support and group 
membership, as compared with that of the PLO and Fatah.  Hamas therefore directed its 
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followers to take only those actions that had religious overtones, such as fasting, praying, and 
facilitating the spiritual needs of the Palestinians.  This was the reason for the relatively 
tolerant attitude displayed by the Israeli government toward Hamas during the first year of 
the Intifada, as compared with that toward the PLO and other Palestinian fundamentalist 
movements.  Simultaneously, the PLO was having significant difficulties because of its 
expulsion from Lebanon in 1982, nullifying the Palestinian’s military option and weakening 
the PLO politically in the Arab world.  Also, the Palestinians in the Israeli occupied territories 
were trying to build sociopolitical institutions and strengthen the Palestinian civilian society 
without the PLO or Fatah (Ahmad 1994).  Furthermore, Hamas’s active participation in the 
Intifada threatened the PLO’s hegemonic and political domination of the Palestinian arena.180  
With the outbreak of the Intifada, Hamas and the PLO clashed head-on, both claiming 
exclusive authority. 
It was not until June 1989, eighteen months after the outbreak of the Intifada, that the 
Israeli government declared Hamas to be a terrorist organization, outlawing it.  Hamas called 
on the Palestinians to cooperate in both violent and nonviolent actions. The former included 
throwing stones and firebombs, building barriers, clashing and/or killing Israeli security 
forces, attacking and/or killing Israeli collaborators and settlers.  In regard to nonviolent 
activities, Palestinians were asked to sever their economic ties with Israel and develop local 
institutions that would provide the same public services to Palestinians.  Hamas also 
encouraged Palestinians to engage in civil disobedience by disobeying Israeli laws, not 
paying taxes or fines, and strikes.  According to Snyder and Tilly (1971), Eisinger (1973) 
                                                
180 Concerned that Hamas might fragment and weaken the Intifada effort, the PLO, specifically Arafat charged 
that Hamas was established with the direct or indirect support of Israel and has reiterated this accusation since 
the formation of Hamas, although the occurrence of such accusations seems to correlate with the amount of 
tension between Hamas and the PLO at any given time 
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description of the civil rights movements in the 1960s, this aspect of the Hamas movement is 
very similar.  These American civil rights activists used in civil disobedience in a successful 
attempt to change their sociopolitical institutions.  Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly’s (1975) breakdown 
theory hypothesis argues that collective action arises as a result of grievances, discontent, and 
the feelings of frustration and deprivation, this is how Hamas formed.181 
Herbert Blumer (1951) argues a social movement starts, as essentially two or more 
people aligning their actions around a common goal, seeking to establish a new order of life, 
just as Hamas.  Hamas began as a small group of frustrated individuals who joined forces in 
order to liberate their people from an occupying force and to establish a new order of life 
based on Islamic teachings.  Furthermore, Blumer goes on to argue that in its beginning, a 
social movement is an amorphous, poorly organized, and without form, but it eventually 
takes on the character of a society.  Based on the above story on the development of 
Palestinian fundamentalism, one can concluded Blumer is completely correct as it relates to 
Hamas.   
Furthermore, the purpose of social movements for Melucci and Avritzer (2000) is to 
provide representation for the unrepresented; this is what Hamas has done.  Hamas has given 
a political voice to those Palestinians who have been excluded from the corrupt and foreign 
dominated socioeconomic and sociopolitical Palestinian institutions.  Hamas has been 
dedicated to working against the Palestinian status quo established by the Fatah and Arafat, 
just as Dubet and Thaler (2004) stress for social movements.   
The Ideological Foundation of Hamas 
As with the Muslim Brotherhood there are two levels of resources, one on the state 
level and a second on the group level.  One of Hamas’s greatest resources on the group level 
                                                
181 As argued by: Gurr 1970; Kornhauser 1959; Smelser 1962; Turner and Killian 1957 
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is the literature it produces and subsequently provides the Palestinian people to read.  This 
literature includes the Hamas Charter, political memoranda, communiqués, and most 
importantly the Islamist leaflets that appeared after the first Intifada (1987) began.  The 
Bayanat are two-page leaflets that are mass produced and freely handed out to all 
Palestinians.  They encouraged martyrdom by reminding young Palestinians the meaning of 
jihad, perseverance, and sacrifice.  On a tactical level, these pamphlets have directed 
Palestinians on the methods of violent protest, encouraged suicide bombings, and even 
provided how-to manuals on how to counter Israeli attacks. Hamas has published these 
broadsheets in volume collections since 1991.182   Hamas encourages and facilitates literacy, 
confirming the educational level results from the previous quantitative chapter.  The results 
from Chapter Three indicate that nation-states with higher education levels produce more 
fundamentalist movements.  Interestingly, Hamas is a perfect example of why.  As previously 
explained, the Israeli government can easily attack television and radio stations, completely 
paralyzing the media infrastructure of the Palestinians.  Hamas was able to combat this 
potential paralysis by utilizing the printing press, and they had to facilitate literacy and 
education in order to guarantee readership.   
A Hamas pamphlet, justifying the creation of the organization, provides the following 
rationale: 
In the seventies there were many indications that the PLO may be prepared to 
accept a lesser settlement than is indicated in the Palestine National Charter.  Then, in 
the eighties, following the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran War, the Palestinian cause was 
marginalized at both the Arab and international levels.  And the policies of the Zionist 
entity have become more obdurate and arrogant with the encouragement and support 
of the United States of America, which signed a strategic cooperation agreement with 
Israel in 1981.  In this period, the Golan Heights have been annexed, Israeli destroyed 
                                                
182 They are titled, “Wathaiq Harakah Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiyah (Hamas): Min Wathaiq Al-Intfadah Al-
Mubaraka” (Documents of the Islamic Resistance Movement “Hamas”: Documents of the Blessed (Palestinian) 
Uprising 
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Iraq’s nuclear reactor, and it then invaded Lebanon and laid siege to Beirut in 1982, 
which constitutes the greatest insult to the Arab umma since the 1967 war.  The 
Islamic movement in Palestine perceives a great challenge stemming from two 
factors:     
First: the retreat of the Palestinian cause to the lower rung in the ladder of 
Arab priorities; second, the retreat of the Palestinian revolution (PLO) from pursuit of 
the strategy of armed struggle until Palestine is liberated to acceptance of the 
settlements that has been forced on the Palestinian people…. In the light of these two 
retreats, and the accumulation of the negative effects of the tyrannical and repressive 
Zionist occupation of the Palestinian people, and the fact that the Palestinian people 
inside Palestine, but not outside it, were ripe for resistance, there arose the need for a 
Palestinian solution based on Islamic Jihad, the first manifestations of which were 
found in Usrat al-Jihad in 1981, and Sheikh Ahmad Yassin’s group in 1983.183 
 
 
Hamas’s Intifada activities were conducted under the direct guidance and control of 
Ahmad Yassin (1997).  Before his assassination, he was behind the contents of the 
movement’s leaflets.184  Several studies on the ideology and political worldview of Hamas 
argue that Hamas sees the ongoing conflict in Palestine as a narrow ideological struggle 
between Judaism and Islam.185  The general interpretation is that Hamas’s principal 
motivation for declaring Jihad on Israel is the ideological conflict between Islam and 
Judaism.  This interpretation is short-sided; a study of the literature produced by Hamas, 
                                                
183 From the Hamas “Introductory Memorandum” 
184 According to Reuvan Aharoni (1994); Al-Sheeikh Adwin (1989); and Y. Litani (1992): Hamas often drew on 
images and events from the history of Islam to underscore the religious character of its conflict with Israel and 
also to substantiate its claim for perseverance (thabat, sumud, tamassuk) and faith (iman) in the final victory of 
Islam, no matter what the current difficulties of the Arab and Muslim community (umma) were. To validate its 
argument that Israel was bound to be defeated by Islam, the leaflets of Hamas frequently talked of Islam’s great 
victories over its enemies in Palestine, upholding the names of Muslim military heroes: Ja`far Ibn Abi Talib, 
who fought Byzantium in the Battle of Mu`tah (629 c.e.); Khalid Ibn al-Walid, who commanded the Battle of 
Yarmuk (636 c.e.) and was called by Muhammad “the sword of Allah”; Salah al-Din, who vanquished the 
Crusaders at the Battle of Hittin (1187 c.e.); and the Mamluk sultan, Baybars, who defeated the Mongols in the 
Battle of `Ayn Jalut (1260 c.e.).  Furthermore, the Khaybar affair also attracted Hamas’s attention. Many Hamas 
leaflets concluded with the call “Allah akbar” (Allah is great) “the hour of Khaybar” has arrived, “Allah akbar 
death to the occupiers.” Khaybar was a wealthy Jewish community in the Arabian Peninsula. According to a 
Muslim tradition, the Jews of Khaybar betrayed Muhammad by serving him poisoned meat that eventually 
killed him. The Prophet and his followers had conquered Khaybar in 628 c.e.  
185 See: Meir Litvak, The Islamization of Palestinian Identity: The Case of Hamas (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan 
Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1966); Stephen C. Pelletiere, Hamas and Hezbollah: The Radical 
Challenge to Israel in the Occupied Territories (Carlistle, PA: U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies 
Institute, 1994); and Pinhas Inbari, “The Palestinians Between Terrorism and Statehood” (Brighton, UK: Sussex 
Academic Papers, 1996). 
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pertaining to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, reveals that Hamas’s position is more 
multidimensional.  Hamas uses Islamic discourse to mobilize and energize the masses and to 
criticize official Palestinian and Arab organizations for either negotiating or supporting 
negotiations with Israel.  However, taken as a whole and over time, Hamas has evolved its 
views; it no longer justifies its movement in purely ideological-religious terms where it is 
Muslims verses Jews (or Christians).  For example, issues like fighting for one’s rights, land, 
values, justice, and the importance of education and democracy have become fundamental in 
Hamas publications.   
Furthermore, in the years that followed the founding of Hamas, its political view of 
Israel has become more sophisticated.  Concerning Israel, Hamas’s perspective evolved to 
differentiate clearly between Judaism as a religion and Zionism as a political movement.  It 
based its policy on the premise “that the primary enemy of the Palestinian people as well as 
the Arab and Islamic umma is the Zionist entity and the Zionist movement.”186  Hamas saw 
the Zionist movement as its enemy because it was viewed as an “aggressor” rather than a 
religious dogma.187   
After the June 1992 general elections in Israel the Labor Party, headed by Yitzhak 
Rabin, took over the leadership of Israel and promised to make peace with the Palestinians; 
this was done via the Oslo Agreement.  The conclusion of the Oslo Agreement, and the 
signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) between Israel and the PLO in September 
                                                
186 “Hamas’s interim policies in political relations” in internal Hamas memo shown dated April 16, 1995 
187 The following outlines Hamas’s view of the distinction between Judaism and Zionism: The non-Zionist Jew 
is one who belongs to the Jewish faith, whether as a believer or do to accident of birth, but does not relate to the 
above ideas and takes no part in aggressive actions against our land and our umma.  The Zionist, on the other 
hand, is one who embraces the aggressive Jewish ideology and becomes an instrument for the realization of 
those ideas on our land and against our umma.  On this basis, Hamas will not adopt a hostile position in practice 
against anyone because of his ideas or his creed but will adopt such a position if those ideas and creed are 
translated into hostile or damaging actions against out umma and our nation (Hamas leadership interview, 
Filastin al-Muslima, April 1990). 
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1993 significantly challenged Hamas’s relevance, and in turn, its existence.  By 1993 Hamas 
movement’s military activity against Israel outweighed both the Fatah and the PLO and the 
DOP put an end to the Intifada.  In addition, the PLO’s agreement to stop all hostile acts 
against Israel threatened to stop Hamas’s freedom of military action and provoke a head-on 
confrontation with the PLO.   
The effect of the Oslo Agreement on Hamas was reflected in the internal documents 
circulated among the movement’s senior members, and it conveys a sense of total despair 
stemming from their awareness that their movement was on the brink of elimination.  
Hamas’s most significant concern was for the future of jihad against Israel, and it decided to 
continue the strategy of jihad which they perceived as the ultimate source of their legitimacy.  
At the same time, Hamas called on its members to preserve the “unity of Palestinian ranks” 
and to work to bring together all opponents of the Oslo Agreement, Islamists, and secular 
alike.188  This was done via humanitarian acts Hamas started to employ to ensure its existence 
and enhance its resources.  The Hamas ruling hierarchy consists of cunning and rational 
political strategists; they saw the potential derailing of their movement and in order to stop it 
they channeled their resources to meet the humanitarian needs of the Palestinians.   
The Hamas leadership explicitly forbids assassinations of all Palestinian political 
enemies because it did not want to alienate the Palestinian majority, another cunning 
decision.  A series of statements by the Hamas leadership, including Sheikh Yassin, 
categorically rejected political assassinations.189  Furthermore, Hamas condemned the 
                                                
188 By the end of September 1993, 73 percent of the Palestinians in the occupied territories supported the Oslo 
accord and the peace process. See Beverly Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics in Palestine (London: Tauris 
Academic Studies (1996) 
189 See: See for example: Hamas leaflet dated September 22, 1993; Periodic statement no 108 of October 5, 
1993; and the statement by Sheikh Yassin in the Jordanian paper Al-Sabeel on November 2, 1993 (had 
translated) 
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assassinations of Fateh figures who where killed as a result of their acceptance of the 
September 1993 Oslo Agreement; according to Khalid Hroub (2000: 213) it also participated 
in their funerals and demonstrations denouncing their assassinations.190  Also, Hamas 
strongly denounced some newspapers for reporting that the movement was considering 
assassinating Arafat, reiterating its opposition to assassinations.191  Hamas defines the limits 
of political discourse and warns members: “Discourse should not be simply for posturing; it 
should not be a form of flexing our muscles in competition; and it should not breed new 
enemies and disputes.”192  The following is an excerpt from a letter Sheikh Yassin wrote from 
prison – his tone is surprisingly calm and moderate: 
“No doubt the Palestinian people are agitated and unhappy today, they are pained by 
the ignominy, capitulation, and abasement of the Palestinian cause at the hands of a 
group of our own people who signed documents recognizing the state of Israel, 
thereby relinquishing all out lands, traditions, holy place,, and culture which Israel has 
usurped.  To put the best face on it, let us say that they tried and failed but let them 
not saddle us with this error and its attendant calamities.”193 
 
Being isolated politically was a clear concern for Hamas; to counter this, Hamas 
initiated a campaign to expand its base of support and increase its membership, a significant 
resource.  At the Palestinian level, it collaborated with other fundamentalist movements 
opposed to the settlement; this collaboration later developed into the Alliance of Palestinian 
Forces.  At the Arab and Islamic levels, it tried to mobilize popular support and force their 
opposition to a settlement with Israel so that it would not become politically isolated and 
rendered marginal.  Also, at the local level, Hamas started to build a social infrastructure to 
help meet the daily needs of the Palestinian people.  Hamas carved out a distinctive niche for 
                                                
190 See leaflet: The Hamas Movement Condemns the Assassination of al-Saftawi as a Criminal Act” October 12, 
2993 
191 See letter from Hamas in Roznamet Pakistan dated April 16, 1997 (had translated) 
192 “Al-Risala” (The Epistle) an internal Hamas document dated April 6, 1994 (had translated) 
193 Sheikh Ahmad Yassin “Letters” Al-Wasat, November 11, 1993 (had translated) 
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itself on the Palestinian political scene by becoming a social-service provider and by 
demanding the PLO to hold free general elections for a legislative body among the 
Palestinian people.194  Hamas was now seen as a significant threat to both Israel and the PLO; 
to rectify this threat Israel started mass deportations of Islamic militants, which were 
facilitated by the PLO.   
Hamas’s escalation of its military activity was an indirect result of the presence of the 
415 Hamas deportees in south Lebanon in December 1992 where they were trained by 
Hezbollah in the success and use of suicide attacks and the construction of car bombs 
(Pelletiere 2004)  Hamas members were fascinated by the effectiveness Hezbollah’s attacks 
had against Israel and the United States.  Indeed, it was Hezbollah’s terrorist attacks that 
ended the American presence in Lebanon and forced Israel to withdraw. Thus it was no 
coincidence that Hamas’s first suicide operation was carried out shortly after the deportees 
had returned to the occupied territories.  What further alienated Hamas and helped facilitate 
the second Intifada was the May 1996 ascendancy of a right-wing government in Israel in, led 
by Benjamin Netanyahu.  Netanyahu’s government sponsored a major shift in Israel’s 
approach to the Oslo process and resumed building settlements in the occupied territories, 
once again radicalizing the Palestinian people. 
Hamas and Other Palestinian Movements 
                                                
194 Statement issued by Hamas Political Bureau on April 26, 1994. Ismali Haniyah, a prominent member of the 
Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip, justified the demand for political participation: “Taking part in the elections 
will guarantee us a legitimate political presence when the election is over.  We will be sure to be informed about 
and participate in the making of laws by the elected council under which civil society will be governed”194 (page 
66: March 2, 1996), Sheikh Yassin, the spiritual guide of Hamas, may be regarded as the principle theorist of 
non-isolationism the movement.  In his letter from prison cited above, the debate about the participation in 
elections and came out in favor of participation: “If the council shall have the authority to legislate, why should 
we not practice opposition within this council as we do in the street?  We can demonstrate that Islam has a 
presence which must be reckoned with and not leave our foes an unchallenged opportunity to do as we please.” 
Yassin letter dated October 3, 1993. and included in Al-Wasat, November 11, 1993 
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The PLO is the umbrella movement of all the Palestinian resistance movements, 
groups, and factions, and it has been dominated by Fateh, the strongest and most powerful 
group, which was led for decades by Yasser Arafat.195  The Hamas Charter treats the issue of 
relations with Palestine resistance organization more as a moral than a political issue (Hroub 
2000: 110). Under the section “Patriotic Movements in the Palestinian Arena,” the Charter 
explains that there is mutual respect between Hamas and all Palestinian movements as long as 
they do not throw allegiance to either the “Communist East” or the “Crusading West,” and 
expresses readiness to cooperate with Israeli occupation (Hamas Charter).  Hamas initially 
expressed some reservations in its Charter about recognition of the PLO.  In the wake of the 
Oslo and Cairo Agreements, these reservations culminated in the accusations of a total sellout 
on the part of the PLO and a Hamas declaration that the PLO no longer represented the 
Palestinian people or its aspirations.196  Hamas made it clear that its attacks on the PLO were 
not directed at its members or the movement itself, but rather at its corrupt and imperialist 
leadership.197  The Charter described the PLO membership as being “as close as it could be to 
                                                
195 Steinberg Matti. “The PLO and Palestinian Islamic Fundamentalism.” Jerusalem Quarterly, no. 52 (1989): 
37–54; Usher, Graham. “Arafat’s Opening.” New Statement and Society 8, no. 381 (December 1, 1995); Ya`ari, 
Ehud. Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah. New York: Sabra Books, 1970; Kassim, Anis F. “The Palestine 
Liberation Organization’s Claim to Status: A Juridical Analysis Under International Law.” Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy 9, no. 1 (1980): 19–30.  Any discussion of Hamas’s relations with the PLO is 
really a discussion of Hamas’s relations with Fateh.  There have not been distinct differences in Hamas’s policy 
toward the PLO and Fateh.  Consequently, formal relations between the PLO and Hamas used to be reflected in 
the field as the mode of conduct between Fateh and Hamas, which were often characterized by patterns of 
tension and rivalry and sometimes even physical clashes  
196 On April 6 and 13, 1994, shortly before the signing of the Cairo agreement on the establishment of a self-
governing Palestinian authority in Gaza and Jericho, two suicide operations were carried out in `Afula and 
Hadera, two Jewish towns in Israel, by the Battalions of `Izz al-Din al-Qassam, Hamas’s military wing. 
Publicly, these operations were portrayed as avenging the massacre in Hebron of thirty Palestinians by a Jewish 
settler on February 25 of that year. Although this argument was directed to the Palestinian people, these 
operations also were aimed at enhancing Hamas’s bargaining position regarding the anticipated PLO based PA, 
by pressuring Arafat to communicate with Hamas and seek political coexistence. 
197 Hamas also spoke out about interpersonal social relations, especially during the Intifada.  Its leaflets 
condemned deviant behavior and corruption, encouraged economy, and condemned spendthrift behavior.  It 
warned against establishing monopolies and raising prices.  One leaflet even discussed traffic problems and 
appealed for observance of traffic rules.  For examples of leaflets containing detailed of social and educational 
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the Islamic Resistance Movement.  After all, did it not include among its membership the 
fathers, brothers, relatives, and friends of Hamas members?  How could a good Muslim turn a 
cold shoulder to his father, brother, relative or friend?   We have but one homeland, one 
affliction, one shared destiny, and one shared enemy.” The Charter then addressed the PLO’s 
“secularist line,” criticizing it severely while attempting to leave the door ajar for some future 
development.  “The day that the PLO shall adopt Islam as a way of life, we shall be its 
soldiers and fodder for the flame with which it shall consume the enemy.”198 
In the mid-to-late 1990s the Palestinian territories were going quasi-democratic with 
the PLO forming the Palestinian National Council (PNC).  The Hamas leadership realized it 
needed to compromise.  Hamas had four conditions before joining the PNC: that the PLO had 
to stop making concessions; that there should be no legitimization of the “Zionist” presence 
in any part of Palestine; that Palestinian organizations be allocated seats commensurate with 
the actual size of their membership; and that real democracy should be practiced with respect 
to freedom of expression for leadership in the discharge of its responsibilities.199  The PLO 
rejected Hamas’s democratic aspirations.  It maintained that Palestinian elections would be 
very difficult, if not impossible, to hold.  Furthermore, Hamas demanded seats proportionate 
to the actual size of its movement.  The seats were divided among three categories: factions in 
the resistance movement and other organizations inside Palestine, popular organizations and 
associations outside Palestine, and independents.  Hamas belongs to the first category, but in 
that category Fateh is the largest organization and 40 seats were assigned to it.  The second 
largest organization is the PFLP, which had 15 seats.  The PLO proposed that Hamas should 
                                                                                                                                                  
messages on various issues.  See Periodic statements no. 14 of April 1988, no 22.  of June 1988, no 36 of 
February 25, 1989, and no. 86 of May 7, 1992 
198 The Hamas Charter  
199 The text of the Hamas Memorandum to the PNC, dated April 6, 1990 
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have a number of seats somewhere between the Fateh and the PFLP, which would have made 
it the second largest organization in the PNC.  According to Hamas, the remaining seats (over 
400) would be controlled directly or indirectly by Fateh (Ghosheh 1995).  Hamas refused to 
accept this compromise because the only government that was acceptable to the Palestinian 
people was a total and transparent democracy.  It could also be argued that this was simply 
more Hamas rhetoric, and it was only interested in self-serving seat numbers and not the 
Palestinian people, reflecting the results of the last year and Hamas’s actions.   
Hamas has significant ideological differences with the PLO. The ideology of Hamas 
is a synthesis of Islamic religious ideals and Palestinian nationalism.  Hamas states its intent 
to establish an Islamic state in Palestine, and its literature draws heavily upon Islamic 
ideology and Koranic verses. The PLO charter, on the other hand, is a semi-secular 
movement with a call to Palestinian nationalism.  Hamas is a more efficiently run 
organization than the heavily bureaucratized and overly structured PLO with its corrupt 
leadership.  Hamas, as with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, has a significant and active 
leadership, a major resource.  As for the financial aspect, Hamas receives significant amounts 
of religious donations specifically from devout Muslims in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 
states.200 
Hamas’ main rival within the Palestinian terrorist movement is the smaller and 
significantly violent Islamic Jihad.201  The Islamic Jihad considers Hamas a copycat 
                                                
200 Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states contribute to the PLO before it sided with Iraq during the Gulf war. 
Hamas also supported Iraq in the war but was much less conspicuous because it was so closely identified with 
the Palestinian population in the territories. Hamas wisely avoided open confrontation with Saudi Arabia and the 
Gulf states. 
201 Islamic Jihad (Al-Jihad Al-Islami fi Filstin) originated in the 1970s among Palestinian students in Cairo, 
notably Fathi Shiqaqi, a former leftist who grew disillusioned with the secular Palestinian movements and joined 
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.  By the mid 1970s, he had rejected the teachings of the Brotherhood, which 
held that the destruction of Israel must await an “internal jihad” to reform and unify the Islamic world, and 
embraced the 1979 revolution in Iran as a model of action.  Hamas, in contrast, remains committed to the 
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movement who was utilizing its hard work and military operations that it had sown years 
before the Intifada began.202  The relationship between Hamas and Islamic Jihad warrants 
attention because of the close identity of the ideologies and political agendas of the two 
movements, as well as their common Islamic fundamentalist foundations.  Throughout the 
1990s, there were no real ideological differences between them.203  However, they differ on 
two fundamental points; first, Hamas demands total democracy and transparency; the Islamic 
Jihad does not.  Secondly, Hamas provides significant social service to the Palestinian people; 
the Islamic Jihad provides minimal social services.  Islamic Jihad made little effort to develop 
a social and educational infrastructure or to attract a mass following.  The Hamas Charter 
describes the relations of Hamas with Islamic Jihad in general as follows: “The Islamic 
Resistance Movement regards the other Islamic movements with respect and appreciation.  
Even if differences arise in one perceptible or viewpoint, there is agreement between them on 
several other perspectives and viewpoints.  If their intentions are pure and if they are true to 
God, Hamas regards these movements as an exercise of independent judgment in theological 
matters provided that their conduct remains within the confines of Islam” (Hamas Charter).   
The Palestinian territories have a large number of Islamic fundamentalist movements.  
Unlike Egyptian political institutions and presidential power, the political institutions found 
                                                                                                                                                  
Muslim Brotherhood.  Although a number of other radical Palestinian Islamists inspired by the Islamic Republic 
in Tehran adapted the name Islamic Jihad as a cover for terrorist activity, the faction started by Shiqaqi is one 
that flourishes today (others include Islamic Jihad-al-Aqsa Battalions established in Jordan in 1982 by followers 
of Sheikh As’ad Bayyud al-Tamimi; Islamic Jihad – The Temple, a faction of the Fatah movement which 
emerged in the early 1980s; and the Islamic Jihad Squad, and Islamist offshoot of the Palestinian Popular 
Liberation Force (PPLF) started by Ahmad Muhanna in the 1980s). 
202 The following were used in reference to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad: Ziad Abu-Amr, 1994. Islamic 
Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad. Indiana University Press; 
Meir Hatina. 2001, Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic Jihad Movement. Moshe Dayan Center for 
Middle East Affairs; Beirut; Yonah Alexander. 2002. Palestinian Religious Terrorism: Hamas and Islamic Jihad. 
Transnational Publishers; and Jamilah Kolocotronis. 1990. Islamic Jihad: An Historical Perspective. American 
Trust Publications 
203 For example see the interview with Islamic Jihad’s former secretary general, Fathi al-Shikaki in Al-Sharq al-
Awsat March 17, 1995 (had translated)  
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within the Palestinian territories have never experienced a perfect autocracy, nor have they 
experienced a perfect democracy.  This being said, my inverted-U hypothesis concerning 
opining political institutions, proven true in Chapter Three, is further validated with Palestine.  
The following table compares the total number of fundamentalist movements, terrorist 
attacks, and suicide terrorist attacks in both Egypt and the Palestinian territories.  
Interestingly, if we control for population, Egypt has eight to ten times more citizens than the 
Palestinian territories but less than half of the number of Fundamentalist movements.  This 
helps to validate my theory that each of the social movement conditions is positively 
associated with Islamic fundamentalism.  
Table Seventeen: Comparison of Egypt and Lebanon 
Year Number of 
Fundamentalist 
Movements in 
Egypt  
Number of 
Fundamentalist 
Movements in 
Palestine 
Number 
of 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
in Egypt 
Number 
of 
Suicide 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
in Egypt  
Number 
of 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
in 
Palestine 
Number 
of 
Suicide 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
in 
Palestine 
1970 12 19 0 0 0 0 
1973 17 23 0 0 0 0 
1976 15 28 0 0 0 0 
1979 16 30 0 0 2 0 
1980 18 31 0 0 1 0 
1985 14 34 0 0 7 0 
1988 16 39 6 0 0 0 
1991 14 32 1 0 2 0 
1994 13 29 16 0 5 0 
1997 18 27 2 0 1 0 
2000 16 31 0 0 167 0 
2001 16 33 0 0 326 7 
2002 15 33 1 0 432 16 
2003 16 34 0 0 164 6 
2004 19 33 3 0 351 9 
2005 23 39 7 2 479 9 
2006 23 42 2 1 26 1 
2007 26 52 2 0 16 0 
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Hamas Electoral Success and Charitable works 
Long before democratization became a dominant foreign policy aspect of the United 
States, with respect to the Middle East, Hamas had advocated democratization and the 
creation of a transparent government open to all people for over a decade.  Hamas argues that 
if Palestinian democracy is to be successful, it must be inclusive and embrace all segments of 
Palestinian society, including Jews and Christians.204  This is very similar to the arguments of 
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.  Since its establishment, Hamas recognized the possibility 
of using Western democracy as the means for gaining influence and power.  Hamas 
spokesmen have constantly declared that the movement will not exploit democracy in order 
to rise to power and to implement a tyrannical Islamic regime.  In this sense, Hamas acts 
differently than most social movements.  It has transformed itself from a social movement 
into a relatively successful political party.     
Inside the Palestinian territories there are significant numbers of mosques, schools, 
orphanages, summer camps, and sports leagues sponsored by Hamas.  Hamas’ objective is to 
engage in incitement and radicalization of society, facilitating individuals to die as martyrs.  
                                                
204 Al-Zahhar, a prominent Hamas member in the Gaza Strip, studied the results of 23 elections at institutions in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip over a twelve-month period in 1991-92.  The institutions included the Nablus, 
Qalqilya, and Ramallah chambers of commerce; the Union of Jerusalem Electricity Company Employees; the 
Teachers Training Institutes in Ramallah and Qalandia; the College of Arts at Jerusalem University; the student 
union at Hebron University, the polytechnic, the Arab College for the Medical Professions, the West Bank 
Engineers’ Union; and the unions of employees at al-Najah University and the Maqasid Charity Hospital.  The 
institutions in the Gaza Strip included the Union of UNRWA Employees, the chamber of commerce, the 
Medical Society, the Society of Engineers, the Society of Lawyers, and the Accountants Society.  According to 
the aforementioned study, 96,256 voters participated in the elections in the West Bank.  Of the total 50.88 
percent , or 48,971 people, voted for the National Bloc (which supports the resistance organizations belonging to 
the PLO), whereas 45.81 percent, or 44,091 individuals voted for the Islamic Bloc (which supports Hamas); the 
remaining votes, 3.12 percent of the total, went to independents.  In the Gaza Strip, 34,221 voters participated, 
of whom 42.62 percent , or 18,016, cast their ballots for the National Bloc, while 42.62 percent, or 16,050 
people, voted for the Islamic bloc; and independents received 4.53 percent of the total.  Hamas has cited the 
election outcomes as evidence that it enjoys the support of 40 to 50 percent of the Palestinian public.  (The 
results of the study were published in AL-Quds (Jerusalem) on November 10, 1992 as week as in Majallat al-
dirasat al-Filastiniyya, Winter 1993. (216-217). However Jimmy Carter and his organization were highly 
troubled by these results (page 116). 
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It provides logistical and operational support for weapons smuggling, reconnaissance, and 
suicide bombings, and it provides day jobs for field commanders and shelter fugitive 
operatives.  As asked by Matthew Levitt (2006:5), why did Hamas surprise everyone when it 
won 44.5% of the vote and became the majority party in the Palestinian legislature in the 
January 2006 election?  His answer is rather simple; Hamas provides desperately needed 
social services to needy Palestinians. To help operate this complex organization and 
encourage financial donations, Hamas operates websites in Arabic, English, Russian, French, 
Farsi, Urdu, and Malay, all of which are run off computer servers in the United States, 
Russia, Ukraine, and Indonesia.205   
 Hamas has scored significant political successes in the last two years.  On December 
15, 2005, Hamas won the local elections in the Palestinian territories – this included the 
election of a significant number of women.206  Also, Hamas has benefited from the internal 
struggles between veteran members and the younger generation within Fateh, which resulted 
in significant looses for Fatah in local parliamentary elections. This helped to increase 
Hamas’s victory in the elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council in January 2006.207  
                                                
205 C.S.S. Special Information Bulletin, Marketing Terrorism: Hamas Exploitation of the Eastern European 
Internet Infrastructure to Operate its Sites, December 2004: http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/1_05/m_t.htm 
206 The elections resulted in Women winning seats in most districts and legislative constituencies.  In some cases 
women candidates won as a result of the quota system, but at least 32 out of the 51 seats gained in the first round 
of the local elections run in January 2005 were as a result of the popular vote.  Nevertheless, in the polls to date, 
only 18 percent of candidates standing for local elections have been women – many accounted for as a result of 
the quota.  Rates of participation in the local election polls by registered women voters, however, were 
encouraging with the Palestinian Central Elections Committee recording a rate of nearly 50 percent.  See: 
Beverley Milton-Edwards. 2005, Winter. Prepared for Power: Hamas, Governance and Conflict. Civil Wars. 
Pages 311-329 
207 As it relates to democratization in Palestine see: Andoni, Lamis (Spring 1996); Eisenberg, Ethan (1996); 
Ghanem, As`ad; Robinson, Glenn (1997). Arnon, Reguler, "Ha-Hamas hevisa et ha-Fatah ba-bhirot ha-
meqomiyot" ("Hamas defeats Fatah by a landslide in the local elections"), Ha'aretz, (December 18, 2005). 
Internet: http://new.walla.co.il/?w=//826541. In the fourth round of elections, held on December 15, 2005, 
Hamas won in six of the seven largest authorities. As a result of this, Hamas rules in local authorities where 1.1 
million Palestinians reside compared to the 700,000 Palestinian residents that are under the authority of Fatah. 
One-half million people reside in authorities where independent representatives won or where neither of the two 
major parties received a clear majority, and some 900,000 reside in authorities that are set to hold elections in 
February 2006 such as Hebron, Tul-karm, Gaza City, and Khan-Yunis where Hamas won the majority here too.  
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Hamas candidates won about 35% of the 306 individual races and took control of nine 
municipal councils in December 2004 municipal elections.208  A year later, in January 2006, 
Hamas won a landslide victory over the incumbent Fatah, taking control of 74 seats (out of 
132, or 56%) in parliamentary elections that included both national and district lists.   
Egypt viewed the electoral success of Hamas as a significant concern because it could 
facilitate inspiration for strengthening the Muslim Brotherhood political objectives inside 
Egypt.  Like Egypt, the United States and the European Union took a significant interest in 
seeing Fateh win the majority in the Legislative Council.209 The United States and the 
European Union made it clear that if Hamas won the general elections for the Palestinian 
Legislative Council, they would stop the supply of foreign aid to Palestine which they did.210  
                                                                                                                                                  
"Hamas ma'niya bil-indimam ila al-hukuma ba'da al-intikhabat al-tashri'iyya" ("Hamas interested in joining the 
government following elections to Palestinian Legislative Council"), Al-Quds, (December 19, 2005), p. 1. 
(Arabic); "al-Sulta tudafi'u 'an haq Hamas bi-khawd al-intikhabat" ("Palestinian Authority protects Hamas's 
right to participate in elections"), al-Jazeerah, (December 19, 2005).  Furthermore, Hamas’s decision to 
participate in Palestinian elections came only after the group canvassed its field operatives in order to measure 
their chances of electoral success.  According to Hamas operative Yakub Abu Etzav, arrested in August 2005, 
this input was the forwarded to Hamas operatives in Saudi Arabia for a final decision.   
208 According to: Mark Tessler and Jodi Nachtwey (1999) Palestinian Political Attitudes: An Analysis of Survey 
Data from the West Bank and Gaza. Islamic Studies: The attitudes and behavior of ordinary citizens are 
increasing important in this environment.  Participation in the 1996 elections was almost 80 percent.  For 
example, reflecting, according to one observer, “a popular yearning for participation in the political process that 
will determine the Palestinian’s future”.  In these elections, as in local elections and in the activities of 
Palestine’s numerous political factions more generally, competition for support at the grassroots level is a 
culture that is “hospitable to democratic values and practices”.  Ordinary men and women, he continues, 
“overwhelmingly support a democratic political system and show readiness to participate in the political 
process.  They support freedom of the press, the rights on the opposition, and the right of women to political 
participation”  
209 Danny Rubinstein, "Ha-pahad meha-Hamas garam le-Abu Mazen levater" ("The fear of Hamas caused Abu 
Mazen to waive"), Ha'aretz, (December 23, 2005). Internet: http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/  
pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=661664&contrassID=1. "Fatah tuwahhid Qa'imataha wa-Munathamat al-Tahrir 
tatamasak bi-maw'id al-intikhabat" ("Fatah unites its list and the PLO sticks to the appointed election date"), al-
Jazeera, (December 23, 2005). Internet: http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/  
C668705D-2F73-4304-A96D-22AA6B0166AA.htm 
210 Corinne, Heller, "Hamas Poll Win Threatens Aid for Palestinians", Reuters, (December 18, 2005). Internet: 
http://today.reuters.com/news/ newsArticleSearch.aspx?storyID=94307+18-Dec-2005+RTRS&srch=hamas; 
"Uruba tuwaqqif musa'adatiha lil-falastiniyin idha wasalat Hamas lil-Sulta" ("Europe will halt aid to Palestinians 
if Hamas rises to power"), al-Jazeera, (December 18, 2005). Internet: http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/ 
exeres/FAAFB196-1069-4FBE-9824-B1691F56AB78.htm; "Tahdir Amrici min musharaqat Hamas bil-
intikhabat al-tashri'iyya" ("American Warning against Hamas Participation in Legislative Council elections"), 
al-Jazeera, (December 17, 2005). Internet: http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/ exeres/912E15CC-3E97-40B1-AEB3-
7A4A96411BB0.htm. 
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In response, senior Hamas officials denounced the American and European interference in the 
Palestinian elections and condemned the foreign interference.  It argued that the international 
pressure points to a “clear and biased tendency in favor of Israel.”211  What has resulted has 
been a literal split within the Palestinian people.  Hamas now controls the Gaza Strip and the 
Fatah controls the West Bank.     
Hamas’s electoral success was a direct result of its humanitarian and social service 
programs that it provided the Palestinian people.  In this sense, Hamas did not act like most 
social movements.  The majority of social movements do not take on the number and scale of 
social programs like Hamas.  Also, most social movements do not make it their objection to 
gain electoral success via providing humanitarian aid to individuals within their state.  
Hamas’ concern with social issues can be found in the extensive infrastructure and 
institutions they have established for charitable social services, and the significant numbers of 
                                                
211 “Europe will halt aid to Palestinians if Hamas rises to power", Ibid; "Al-Sulta tarfud al-tadakhul al-Amrici 
bil-intikhabat al-falastiniyya" ("Palestinian Authority denounces American involvement in Palestinian 
elections"), al-Jazeera, (December 17, 2005). Internet http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/649DD618-1358-
4BE6-8ACD-0ADE8FAD1D2B.htm; "Hamas tafuzu bi-baladiyat al-mudun wa-tarfudu al-mawqif al-Amrici" 
("Hamas wins in the municipalities and rejects the American stance"), al-Jazeera, (December 17, 2005). 
Internet: http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/744BF036-4289-4084-9D73-FC7675066912.htm; "Liqa' al-ustadh 
Khalid Mash'al ma'a qanat al-Manar al-fada'iya lil-barnamaj 'madha ba'd'" ("Meeting with Mr. Khalid Mash'al 
on the satellite television network al-Manar for the program 'What After?'"), The Palestinian Information 
Center, (December 25, 2005). Internet: http://www.palestine-info.net/arabic/hamas/hewar/2005/khaled1.htm.  
On Friday, December 23, 2005, thousands of Hamas supporters marched in Gaza in protest of the criticism 
announced by the EU and the US on the movement's participation in the elections. The protestors called upon 
Abu Mazen to hold the elections as scheduled. Hamas Spokesman Mushir al-Masri said that "we came to tell the 
US and Bush and anybody else that labels Hamas as a terror organization that we became the choice of the 
whole nation." Nidal, al-Mughrabi, "Thousands Join Hamas March against US, EU in Gaza", Reuters, 
(December 24, 2005). Internet: http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2005/12/24/worldupdates/2005-12-
24T000652Z_01_NOOTR_RTRJONC_0_-229273-1&sec=worldupdates; Mash'al: Hamas ta'tazim tashkil tayar 
watani wase' ma'a al-fa'izin fi al-majlis al-tashri'i al-falastini al-murtaqab" ("Mash'al: Hamas aims to form wide 
national mainstream with the victors of the upcoming elections to Palestinian Legislative Council"), al-Quds 
(PA), (December 25, 2005), p.4. 'Abd al-Ra'uf, Arna'ut, "Hal turid harakat Hamas haqan… an tahkuma?" ("Does 
Hamas really want…to rule?"), al-Ayyam (PA), (December 25, 2005). "Berosh reshimat Hamas la-bhirot: Isma' 
il Haniyya" ("At the head of Hamas list for elections: Isma'il Haniyya"), Ynet, (December 14, 2005). Internet: 
http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3184451,00.html. (Hebrew); Moshe El'ad, "Hamas ha'atractivi" ("The 
attractive Hamas"), Ynet, (December 14, 2005). Internet: http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-
3183171,00.html. (Hebrew); Nizar, Ramadan, "Hamas bayna al-i'tiqalat wa-al-intikhabat" ("Hamas between the 
arrests and the elections"), Falastin al-Muslima (London), (December 2005), p.29 
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Palestinians who depend on the health care, vocational training, education daycare, and 
charitable works Hamas provides.   
However, Hamas was acting rational and provided the social services it did to 
guarantee its survival and growth.  Also, Hamas was still trying to change the sociopolitical 
institutions of Palestine, in this sense, still acting like a social movement.  Also, these social 
services could be considered a resource.  These activities led to a rise in Hamas’ popularity 
and facilitated it to become one of the most important sources of influence within the 
Palestinian territories.  Hamas has used its charities to strengthen its own standing among 
Palestinians at the expense of most Palestinian social movements, specifically, the Palestinian 
Authority, Fatah, and the Islamic Jihad.  Hamas’ political leader, Ismail Abu Shanab, told 
Jessica Stern that, before Hamas came into being in 1986, there were no social welfare 
facilities that that benefited the Palestinian masses.  Prior to 1986, the priority was not to 
work on social, education, and welfare programs and Hamas changed this.212  The charity 
committees, mosque classes, student unions, sports clubs, summer camps, and other 
organizations run by Hamas are places where Palestinian youth are recruited into Hamas.  As 
a senior U.S. State Department official noted, funding any part of Hamas enhances the 
group’s credibility and provides it “the, opportunity to recruit people through its charitable 
activities”213  
                                                
212 Stern, Terror in the Name of God, 41.  Contrary to his claim that the focus at this time was purely social and 
political, not military, Palestinian author Khaled Hroub lists several “military cells organized by the Muslim 
Brotherhood,” including: Yahya al-Ghuoul’s Mujahideen of Mifraqa Group, Salah Shehadah’s Group Number 
44, and Mohammad Sharathah’s Group Number 101, all of which conducted various attacks against Israeli 
interests from 1985 to 1987.  See Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice, 35.   
213The following is a list of institutions tied to Hamas, which are described as “our institutions” (Levitt, 2006: 
82): in the Gaza Strip: The Islamic University; the Islamic Complex; the Islamic Association; al-Salah 
Association; the Young Woman Association; al-Wafa Association for the Elderly; the Orphans Center; some al-
Zakah (zakat) committees; some general service committees that received new licenses, such as the 
Organization of the Truth and the Law.  In the West Bank: al-Zakah Committee; al-Tadhoman Al-Eslami 
Committee; al-Tadoman Charitable Association; al-Zakah Committee in Jenin (which established a hospital); al-
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Speaking in 2001, Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin asserted that Hamas 
distributes between $2 and 3 million in monthly handouts to the relatives of Palestinian 
suicide bombers, “martyrs” killed in attacks on Israelis, and prisoners in Israeli jails.  An 
Israeli government report found that families of Hamas activists killed or wounded while 
caring out terror attacks and those imprisoned for their involvement in attacks received 
payments of up to $5,000, representatives more than a year’s pay.  Therefore, it serves as an 
important financial incentive for Palestinians to conduct terrorist attacks.214  By comparison, 
in 2005, the al-Isah Charitable Society provided an average stipend of $328 to the families of 
martyrs, $170 to detained prisoners, $201 to families of prisoners, and $508 to wounded 
operatives.215 
Documents captured during Operation Defensive Shield revealed that the al-
Tadhoman Charitable Society, a Hamas charity, provided funds for the families of 
Palestinians “martyred” in suicide bombings or clashes with Israeli forces.  One document 
included a table listing all suicide bombers and other “martyrs” from the Nablus district 
between January and March 2002.  Most were Hamas operatives, though the list also 
                                                                                                                                                  
Aqsa Institutions; the Association of Islamic Studies and Cultures in Jerusalem; al-Zakah Committee in 
Ramallah interestingly, al-Qaeda cells in Europe operated in a remarkably similar fashion, recruiting disaffected 
Muslim youth from neighborhood soccer teams, substance abuse programs, jails and radical mosques.  Seem for 
example, Sebastian Rotella, “A pool of Militants: Europe Holds Fertile Soil for Jihads,” Los Angeles Times, 
December 5, 2001.  For state department conclusions, see U.S. House Committee on Financial Services, 
Testimony of E. Anthony Wayne, Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State, 
“The Hamas Asset Freeze and other Government Efforts to Stop Terrorist Financing,” September 24, 2003, 
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/092403eaw.pdf 
214 For example, in 2005 the average monthly salary for an average worker in the Gaza Strip was $372 and $516 
for an average worker in the West Bank.  For Yassin estimate, see Lee Hockstader, “Palestinians Find Heroes in 
Hamas; Popularity Surges for Once-Marginal Sponsor of Suicide Bombings,” Washington Post, August 11, 
2001.  For Israeli report, see MFA, “Hamas Use of Charitable Societies to Fund and Support Terror.” For the 
Author interview with Israeli intelligence analyst, Jerusalem, Israel, June 2002       
215 Wages extrapolated from average daily wage of Palestinian workers in the territories and multiplied over a 
thirty-day period.  From Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Survey (January-March 2005), 
Round (Q1/2005): Press Conference on Labor Force Results (Ramallah: April 28, 2005), 
www.pcbs.org/press_r/LaborQ1_05E.pdf.  Averages were calculated by averaging the distinct payments to 
specific individuals or families.  Larger payments were made to groups of persons or families, but these had to 
be excluded as the number of families each payment was disbursed to was unknown.  C.S.S. Special 
Information Bulletin 
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included operatives from the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and various Palestinian security organizations.  
The last column of the table describes the circumstances of the terrorist operation carried out 
by each qualifying operative, making clear that the members of both al-Tadhoman and the 
Union of Good fully understand that funds from their charities were used as rewards for the 
families of suicide bombers.  Interestingly, the ages of the terrorists in this list ranged from 15 
to 42, the average age was 25.9 years old.   
The network of social services that Hamas set up enabled it to keep in touch with the 
concerns of the poor and working classes and to influence their religious conduct, political 
choices, and beliefs.  The individuals directing these societies won the trust of the public, 
particularly when the public compared them to the corruption found in the PLO/Fata and 
Islamic Jihad.  A Reuters article concerning Islamic charitable activities reported that a 1994 
charity event organized in the Gaza Strip by a Hamas affiliate, the Islamic Reform Society, 
had raised $200,000 for the society’s charitable projects.  According to Reuters, many people 
who were not Hamas supporters nevertheless chose to make their donations through Islamic 
societies indirectly affiliated with the movement.  It quoted one person who had donated 
$8,000 as saying that, although he did not like Hamas, he had given it money because he 
trusted his donation would reach its intended target.  Another contributor said that he was a 
follower of Fateh but politics had nothing to do with charitable activities; he added that it was 
his religious duty to donate part of his income to charity and would give money to whomever 
he thought could be trusted with it (Reuters, 1994).216 
                                                
216 A second area, in which Hamas was active, was in the provision of social justice on the basis of the Shariah.  
This is another example of the importance of leadership and how is a necessary aspect of the rise and success of 
fundamentalist movements.  This area concerns almost exclusively the activities of Sheikh Yassin before and 
during the Intifada and up to the time of his arrest in May 1989.  During the 1980s, Sheikh Yassin became a 
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Education as a Resource 
Hamas saw education as a significant resource, and it was considered imperative for 
the future of their movement to ensure Palestinian education.  Education suffered 
considerably due to the repeated strikes during the Intifada, and schools were closed for 
months at a time between 1987 and 1993 (Hroub 2000: 238).  Hamas differed from the PLO 
during the Intifada on the subject of declaring general strikes affecting schools.  The PLO 
insisted on the participation of all students in the general strike, which led to the closing of all 
schools, whereas Hamas excluded educational establishments from general strikes and called 
on students to attend classes.217  In order to compensate for the time lost by students due to 
the prolonged closure of their schools, Hamas devised the temporary solution that used 
mosques in various regions as substitutes for local schools which were put under the 
supervision of educational committees.  Evening classes were held with teachers adhering to 
school criteria, not religious criteria.  There are separate articles in the Hamas Charter that 
explicitly deals with the education of future generations and the role of Muslim women.  For 
                                                                                                                                                  
very prominent religious figure in the Gaza Strip.  He acquired the reputation of being an honest, fair, and 
upright individual that spares no effort to help people, and of being unstinting with his material and moral 
support.  This reputation won him enormous respect.  People began to come to him to arbitrate and resolve their 
disputes, and they accepted his judgments.  A 1988 Agency France Press (AFP) reported on the delays in Israeli 
courts, the loss of Palestinian trust in them, biased anti-Palestinian rulings, and the effect of the collective 
resignations by police in protest of the poor status of justice in the Gaza Strip, and the report argues that these 
are the reasons why Hamas had to deal with the Palestinian’s legal issues.  Hamas leaders were carrying out the 
role of the police and the courts by handling small torts, personal real estate, and financial disputes among the 
population of Gaza.  The performance of these judicial functions by Muslim fundamentalist, according to AFP, 
was not a cause for concern among the supporters of the PLO, who saw Hamas as undertaking the function of 
adjudication and social regulation during troubled times. This situation gave Hamas a measure of moral 
authority in the Occupied Territories, especially if one considers that it was not Hamas’s duty to administering 
justice. Carried in the Jerusalem daily. Al-Quds, November 16, 1988; Ziad Abu ‘Mmr Islamic Fundamentalism 
in the West Bank and Gaza (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1994 page 70 
 
217 In its Periodic statement no. 45 on July 21, 1989, Hamas appealed to students to attend classes; the 
statement’s heading read: “Read, in the name of they God, the Creator.  Learning and studying are a sacred right 
that we safeguard; no one outdoes us in this regard.” Meanwhile, the Unified National Leadership release no. 42 
called on all teachers and students to go on strike; according to the Jerusalem Post, July 31, 1989, many 
Palestinians ignored the unified National Leadership’s leaflet because the prevalent sentiment of the population 
tended to support Hamas’s call for schools to remain open. 
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example, the Charter says: “Building Muslim society is a necessity in the struggle for 
liberation.” “Muslim women have a role in the liberation struggle that is no less important 
than the role of men; woman is the maker of men, and her role in guiding and educating the 
generations is a major role.”  This role, as Hamas conceives it, is to educate children and 
prepare them for “their contribution to the jihad that awaits them.”  Again, as explained 
before, Muslims see the importance of education differently than the West.  This is especially 
true with the Palestinians.  Hamas’s views on education endeared the movement to the 
Palestinian people.  However, their desire to facilitate literacy and education was rather self-
serving, as previously explained.   
The Outside Ideological Force 
During the last twenty years, the international community has seen Saudi Arabia 
achieve an ideological hegemonic standing with Sunni Muslims, specifically Hamas.  Saudi 
Arabia exerts its ideological hegemony via their Islamic charities that act as epistemic 
influence.  An Islamic epistemic community is a transnational group of believers (Shiite or 
Sunni) with shared Islamic values and beliefs.  I argue that epistemic communities are the 
source of political and moral direction in a society, because they control the knowledge and 
information in a given society.  Decision makers are likely to turn to epistemic communities 
under conditions of uncertainty.  Haas (1992) defines epistemic communities as networks of 
professionals with recognized expertise in a particular field.  Control over knowledge and 
information is an important dimension of power.  Based on this, Hamas is a recipient of 
significant outside ideological and financial aid from Saudi Arabia whose charities act as an 
epistemic community.     
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One of Hamas’s largest benefactors is the Saudi Arabian based Muslim World League 
(MWL).  The MWL is the largest Muslim Organization engaged in dawa (chartable) 
activities in the world (Levitt 2006: 18).  The MWL is the subject of several ongoing 
counterterrorism investigations in the United States as it relates to their donations to Hamas 
and al-Qaeda.  The MWL lists its main objectives as “to disseminate Islamic Dawah and 
expound the teachings of Islam.  To defend Islamic causes in a manner that safeguards the 
interests and aspirations of Muslims, solves their problems, refutes false allegations against 
Islam, and repels inimical trends and dogma which the enemies of Islam seek to exploit in 
order to destroy the unity of Muslims and to sow seeds of doubt in our Muslim Brethren” 
(Levitt 2006: 19).  The connections to terrorism via the MWL, and in turn Saudi Arabia, are 
extensive.218  The Saudi Arabian royal family has donated hundreds of millions of dollars to 
Sunni fundamentalist groups throughout the Islamic world.  It is not possible to separate the 
Saudi royal family with the state of Saudi Arabia – they are one in the same.   
According to Levitt (2006), a senior U.S. official assessed that as much as half of 
Hamas’s income comes from Saudi Arabia.  Saudi Arabian financial aid is not considered an 
outside ideological force, it is considered a resource.  However, this is a perfect example of 
the difficulty of separating the two independent variables, and it shows how they overlap.  In 
this case, each is positively associated with Hamas.  Israeli intelligence calculated in 2002 
                                                
218 Quote from Michael Dumper, Islam and Israel: Muslim Religious Endowments and the Jewish State 
(Washington, DC: Institute for Palestinian Studies, 1994) 1-2.  The nature of the MWL’s ties to terrorism is 
extensive and includes both senior officials and branch offices.  A senior MWL official in Pakistan, Wael 
Hamza al-Jiaidan, is listed as a specially Designated Terrorist by the US Treasury Department.  And in March 
2002, the northern Virginia officers of both the MWL an done of its subsidiaries, the International Islamic Relief 
Organization (IIRO), were raided by a Treasury Department task force searching for evidence that the groups 
were raising or laundering funds for al-Qaeda, Hamas, or Palestinian Islamic Jihad (MWL objectives listed at  
:About the Muslim World League, http://www.arab.net/mwl/about.htm (March 2003).  For treasury designation 
of Wal Jiaidan, see U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Terrorism: What You 
Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions, Washington DC, August 1, 2005.  For IIRO and MWL raids, see Judith 
Miller, “Raids Seek Evidence of Money-Laundering, New York Times March 21, 2002.  For information on the 
Muslim World League’s ties to terrorism, see U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance, Testimony of Matthew Levitt, Charitable and Humanitarian).  
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that between 40 and 50 percent of its total operating budget came from Saudi Arabia.  This 
financial support comes from a variety of sources, including the Saudi Arabian government, 
the personal accounts of the royal family, and from the Saudi Arabian socioeconomic elite.  
Whatever the source, it boils down to the fact that this money (specifically sent to Al-Qaeda 
and Hamas) would not have been possible without the approval of the Saudi regime.219  
According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Saudi Arabian 
government turned a blind eye to the flow of funds to movements like Hamas that mix both 
charitable and terrorist activity in Israel.   
Saudi Arabia saw Israel as an occupying state that constantly used excessive force 
against Palestinian freedom fighters; virtually the opposite image from Americans who saw 
them as terrorists (Cordesman and Obaid 2005).  As early as 1994, Palestinian sources noted 
that “the widespread belief is that Hamas has received money from the government of Saudi 
Arabia” such support, according to Levitt (2006: 189) was believed to have continued after 
the Persian Gulf War as a way of punishing the PLO for its support of Iraq during the first 
Gulf War.  In January 1999, Palestinian security officers reported that Hamas’ Orphan Care 
Society in Bethlehem received $35,000 from Saudi Arabia without informing the Palestinian 
Ministry of Endowments (Abu-Amr 2006: 88).220  In 1997, the Italian press reported that 
Palestinian officials complained that “Riyadh’s help to Hamas has grown; over 140 billion 
lira has been collected in Saudi Arabia.”221    In 2003, during a congressional hearing, it was 
                                                
219 The U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Public Affairs, Written Testimony of David D. Aufhauser, 
General Counsel, Before the House Financial Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations, September 24, 2003.  Also see Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Financial Sources of the 
Hamas Terror Organization” July 30, 2003: http://israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAHOnmu0    
220 See the C.S.S. Special Information Bulletin: Spotlight on a Hamas Dawah Institution in the West Bank: A 
File of Palestinian Preventive Security Documents Identified the Bethlehem Orphan Care Society as Hamas 
Affiliated.  January 2005: www. Intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/1_05/dawah.htm 
221 Guido Olimpio. February 27, 1997. Palestinian Sources – Saudis Increasing Funding to Hamas. Milan 
Corriere della Sera.  
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reported that the Saudi royal family established a royal edict for the creation of special 
accounts for humanitarian assistance to Palestinians called “Accounts 98.”222   
Among the documents seized by Israel was a letter of thanks from the head of Hamas 
affiliated Charities addressed to Saudi officials, including King Fahd, thanking his regime for 
its support for the orphans of martyrs and for fighters wounded in the Intifada.  Furthermore, 
the Saudi Committee for Support of the al-Aqsa Intifada, a government committee 
established in September 2000 and headed by Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abdel 
Azis, reportedly raised more than $100 million in its first two years of operation, much of 
which went directly to Hamas.  The Committee’s website declared that it provided $5,333 to 
the family of every Palestinian killed in the Intifada, total disbursements of $133 million as of 
May 2002.      
 
Hamas and Terrorism 
For Hamas, the goal of military action, or terrorism, is necessary to liberate Palestine.  
In 1992 Hamas formed its military wing, the Martyr Izzidin al-Qassam Brigades.  The 
military wing of Hamas operates cells under the control of four or five relatively independent 
geographical commands.  An Israeli journalist by the name of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, who 
follows Hamas, estimates that the full time membership of the Qassam cells may be as few as 
60 to 100 due to arrests and deportations over the past two years.  That estimate seems low in 
view of the wide pattern of Hamas attacks, but the secrecy of the Qassam cells make it very 
difficult to determine actual numbers. The cells are also thought to have become more 
                                                
222 U.S. House Committee on Financial Services. The Hamas Asset Freeze and Other Government Efforts to 
Stop Terrorist Funding. September 24, 2003. Also, Canadian intelligence identified Saudi Arabia as a crucial 
source of Hamas’s foreign funding: A 2002 Canadian Secret Intelligence Service (CSIS) intelligence report, 
Terrorist Group Profiler: Hamas.  
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proficient in disguising their operations and the size of their memberships.  Sheikh Yassin 
said that “Hamas’s policy is one of realizing the goals of the Palestinian people.  If these 
goals are achieved by peaceful means, then there would be no need for other sorts of 
action.”223 
In an interview with National Geographic, Miriam Farhat, who was elected to 
Parliament as a member of Hamas in January 2006, admitted that it was she who instilled in 
her son the desire for martyrdom and “brought them (her sons) up to become martyrs, to be 
martyrs for the name of Allah.”  Her martyred son Muhammad’s old bedroom was adorned 
with posters of martyred Palestinians and featured a photo of Mohammed on the computer 
screensaver.  Furthermore, a female adherent of radical London preacher Sheikh Omar Bakri 
Mohammad, speaking to a group of Muslim women at a conference said that: “It’s important 
that our children have a passion for jihad.  Make sure that you nurture your children.  A 
Muslim woman will say to them (the children): we don’t have friendship with the kufr 
(infidel).  We want to put fear into the hearts of the enemy.  We want to make sure that our 
children carry the spirit of jihad in their hearts.”224  
Academics, journalists, politicians, foreign governments, policy makers, and 
international institutions, specifically ones in the Islamic world, oftentimes downplay the role 
that the Hamas social welfare network plays in radicalizing society and financing, supporting, 
and facilitating Hamas terrorism.225  For the most part, they subscribe to the myth that Hamas 
                                                
223 Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Al-Quds Press May 7, 1997 (translated) 
224 Interview by Lisa Ling, “Female Suicide Bombers: Dying to Kill,” National Geographic Explorer, 2004.  
For Sheikh Mohammad, see Mark Huband, “Radical Muslims Turn to Words of War: Tensions Between Older 
and Younger Followers of Islam have Complicated Attempts to Reduce the Rise in Extreme Attitudes since the 
attacks of September 11, 2001” Financial Times, January 20, 2005.   
225 A Tel Aviv University study on Palestinian suicide bombers found that no single psychological profile 
describes the wide variety of Palestinian suicide bombers, researchers Shaul Kimhe and Shmuel developed a 
series of prototypical categories that combine both clinical and social psychological causes.  Their primary 
findings found that whatever the typology off the potential terrorist (religious fanatic, nationalistic fanatic, 
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charity is disconnected from Hamas terror.  For example, the International Crisis Group 
issued an April 2003 report which, while condemning Hamas terror attacks, implicitly 
concluded that the social welfare services provided by humanitarian organizations associated 
with Hamas are some how legitimize the movement overall.226  Along these lines, the 
Washington Post had a column that argued Hamas is a nationalist movement engaged in 
social work, the perpetrators of Palestinian suicide and other attacks should be described in 
the press as militants or gunmen, while those who execute attacks in the name of al-Qaeda 
should be identified as terrorists.  The Boston Globe had a very similar column arguing much 
the same: “tag Hamas, for example, as a terrorist organization is to ignore the more complex 
role it plays in the Middle East”.227  On the other hand, the United State’s State Department 
said that “as long as Hamas continues to rely on terrorism to achieve its political ends, we 
should not draw a distinction between their military and humanitarian arms, since funds 
provided to one can be used to support the other.”  The Treasury Department was clearer still: 
“No matter how terrible the plight of the Palestinian people, there can be no justification for 
                                                                                                                                                  
avenger, or exploited) that every type requires, according to the researchers, “a social environment that is 
supportive of such an attack; media that disseminates the information among the supportive population; spiritual 
leadership that encourages such attacks; and financial and social assistance for families of suicide terrorists after 
their death.”  Together, these conditions create a comprehensive social environment that may be referred to as 
the culture of suicide terrorists that has been created within Palestinian society (Shaul Kimhi and Shmuel Even, 
“Who Are the Palestinian Suicide Terrorists?” Strategic Assessment (Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies), Tel 
Aviv University, September 2003) 
226 ICG April 2003 report from International Crisis Group “Islamic Social Welfare Activism in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories: A Legitimate Target?” Middle East Report, no 13 (2003), http://www.intl-crisis-
group.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=933 
227For the Washington Post column, see Michael Getler, “The Language of Terrorism”, Washington Post, 
September 21, 2003.  For a rebuttal of this column, see U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs, Testimony of Matthew Levitt, “Untangling the terror Web: the need for a strategic understanding of the 
crossover between international terrorist groups to successfully persecute the war on terror,” October 22, 2003.  
For the Boston Globe column, see Christine Chinlund, “The Ombudsman; who should Wear The Terrorist 
Label?” Boston Globe, September 8, 2003.    
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the killing of innocents.  In our view, toleration of such terror by anyone is nothing short of 
complicity.”228   
The terrorism literature scholars argue that there are three major facilitators of 
terrorism, and they include political systems that restrict citizens political and civil liberties, 
worsening economic systems, and the negative effects of modernization.  All of them are 
present in the Palestinian territories, and they seem to be helping facilitate terrorist attacks.  
However, one could argue that most of the sociopolitical restrictions, poverty, and lopsided 
Westernization and modernization are the direct result of Israeli occupation.  Hamas has been 
one of the most active fundamentalist movements when it comes to using suicide terrorism, 
specifically against Israelis.  When it comes to the Palestinians, Pape’s (2005) assumption 
that suicide bombing is strategically rational in the sense that it often pays off for the 
movement facilitating the attack, does not work when dealing with Hamas.  The Israeli 
counter-attacks do not benefit the Palestinians and have led to the assassination of most of the 
leadership in both Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.  However, suicide terrorism is the only 
strategic option the Palestinians have in countering the state of Israel.  This partially explains 
the popularity of the strategic choice hypothesis in the terrorism literature, specifically 
Harrison, 2003; Madsen, 2004; and Sprinzak, 2000. 
The Conclusion  
The Islamic world does not see Hamas as a terrorist organization but as a 
multidimensional social movement.  Hamas seeks to counter what it perceives as the 
secularization and Westernization of Palestinian society, and to become internationally 
                                                
228 For the State Department, see U.S. House Committee on Financial Services, Testimony of E. Anthony 
Wayne, Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State, “The Hamas Asset Freeze 
and Other Government Efforts to Stop Terrorist Financing,” September 24, 2003. For the Treasury Department, 
see U.S. House Financial Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Testimony of 
David Aufhauser, General Counsel, United States Department of the Treasury, September 24, 2003.      
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recognized as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.  Hamas’s political importance 
is the direct result of the public support it has amassed via its grass-roots movement.  This 
support goes beyond its religious doctrine, and its supporters go beyond those who subscribe 
to its fundamentalist positions.  Because of this, Hamas has emerged as the largest and most 
successful fundamentalist movement in Palestine and one of the largest Sunni fundamentalist 
movements in the Islamic world.       
In order to prove that my fundamentalist labyrinth has validity and that each social 
movement condition is positively associated with Palestinian fundamentalism and that 
Palestinian fundamentalist movements are inherently social movements, I evaluated many 
different aspects of the Palestinian territories and Palestinian fundamentalism.  First, I looked 
at aspects of each of my fundamentalist labyrinth’s conditions on both the movement and 
state levels, proving that each are positively associated with Palestinian Islamic 
fundamentalism.  Secondly, I told the historical story of Palestinian fundamentalism, its 
formation, development, and duration.  The historical story I tell here is significant because it 
shows the development of Islamic fundamentalism through an actual example.  Third, I 
explained the ideological makeup of Hamas and argue that much of its ideological 
foundations are found in its printed works, a significant resource for the movement.  Fourth, I 
evaluated Hamas’s relations, differences, and similarities with other Palestinian social 
movements.  I was able to show that there are more fundamentalist movements in opening 
political systems than in either perfect autocracies or perfect democracies, validating my 
inverted-U hypothesis.  Fifth, I looked at how Hamas has been a recipient of significant out-
side ideological Sunni influence from Saudi Arabia.  Finally, I looked at how Hamas acts 
differently than most social movements on three interconnected levels; first is has 
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transformed itself into a legitimate and successful political party and terrorist organization.  
One the second level, in order to achieve electoral success and to win over the hearts and 
minds of the Palestinian people, Hamas has become the Palestinian territories most 
significant provider of social services.  And on the final level, Hamas commits significant 
acts of terrorism.  However, the Hamas’ actions may be different than a traditional social 
movement, but its desire to survive and its goals are the same.  In the following chapter I 
evaluate Lebanon, specifically looking at Hezbollah.   
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Chapter Six: Hezbollah 
Surely the party of God (Hezbollah) shall be triumphant. 
– Surat al-Ma’idah, 55, The Quran 
 
Hezbollah has become the most significant Shiite social movement in the Islamic 
world, second only to the 1979 Iranian revolution.  In the United States and Western Europe, 
Hezbollah is seen as a terrorist movement.  However, according to the Islamic world, 
Hezbollah is considered a significant social movement and a major political party with 
humanitarian endeavourers sustaining an entire population – the Lebanese Shiites.  Hezbollah 
was formed in the 1980s as a radicalized Shiite military movement with the main objective of 
removing Israeli forces from Lebanese soil.  By the late 1980s it had transformed into a major 
Lebanese Shiite social movement.  By the 1990s it had developed a significant social service 
apparatus and formed a legitimate political party.  By the beginning of the new millennium, 
Hezbollah matured into a significant Middle East strategic player capable of influencing 
states, conflict, and peace within the greater Middle East.   
Israeli-Islamic conflicts have dominated the greater Middle East for over six decades.  
Hezbollah has been the only Islamic entity, with the exception of the Palestinians, to continue 
armed conflict with Israel.  Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon on May 24, 2000, was 
regarded as a significant victory by Hezbollah.  Israel’s withdrawal enhanced Hezbollah’s 
regional reputation and simultaneously strengthened its commitment to the use of military 
force, working within Lebanese political institutions, and to continue its humanitarian/social 
service endeavors.  Furthermore, Hezbollah’s self-described victory over Israel in its 2006 
war makes it the only Arab/Muslim group, movement, or state to ever defeat Israel, 
catapulting it into a phenomenon celebrated throughout the Islamic world.  As a result of its 
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humanitarian endeavors, and perceived victories over Israel, Hezbollah has become the 
largest and most successful movement in the history of Lebanon; its membership numbers are 
estimated to be more than 200,000. 
The goal of my dissertation is to determine the causes of Islamic fundamentalism and 
in doing so I show that an Islamic fundamentalist movement is inherently a social movement.  
In the previous two chapters I was able to show that each of the social movement conditions 
found in my fundamentalist labyrinth is positively associated with the rise and success of 
Egyptian and Palestinian fundamentalist movements.  In the following chapter I have two 
objectives; first, I show that the same social movement conditions found in my 
fundamentalist labyrinth are positively associated with Lebanese fundamentalist movements, 
specifically Hezbollah.  Secondly, Hezbollah behaves just as the social movement scholars 
predict for social movements; therefore, Hezbollah is a social movement.  However, 
Hezbollah acts differently than most social movements.  As compared to Hamas and the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah acts the most unlike a social movement. However, 
it is still a significant fundamentalist movement.    
To meet the above objectives and to truly understand the formation and success of 
Hezbollah, it is imperative that I evaluate the historical development of the Shiite people, the 
circumstances that have facilitated their collectivization, and the manifestation of Shiite 
fundamentalism.  The historical story I tell here is different from the one I told concerning 
Hamas.  With Hamas, I was able to show how Islamic fundamentalist movements evolve and 
develop from other fundamentalist movements.  With Hezbollah, the historical story has very 
little to do with the evolution and development of fundamentalist movements.  Instead it is 
the evolution and development of the Lebanese Shiites.  In other words, I present two 
  234 
different historical explanations for the causes of Islamic fundamentalism.  After this, I 
evaluate the formation and ideological foundations of Hezbollah.  In doing so, I further 
confirm the validity of my inverted-U relationship and show that there are more 
fundamentalist movements in opening political systems than in either perfect autocracies or 
perfect democracies.  Lebanon has never been a perfect autocracy or a perfect democracy, 
and it has overtime experienced a significant number of Islamic fundamentalist movements.  
After this, I evaluate the ideological influence Hezbollah has been subjected to via Iran.  
Finally, I show three ways in which Hezbollah acts differently than most social movements.  
First, it has formed a political party and has had significant vote-seeking success.  Secondly, I 
evaluate the social services Hezbollah provides to the Lebanese Shiite community and 
explain how their social service apparatus has catapulted its political success.  Finally, 
Hezbollah has the weapons capability and military technology equal to many developing 
states – no social movement has such advanced weaponry.   
This being said, Hezbollah is still a social movement, and it has many of the same 
characteristics of a social movement.  No other social movement in the history of Lebanon 
has organized and institutionalized itself as well as Hezbollah.  Also, Hezbollah has managed 
to attract a massive following and has significantly changed the Lebanese sociopolitical 
institutions and established norms.  Hezbollah is another example of my labyrinth analogy 
where we have all of the social movement conditions being positively associated with the 
formation and success of Hezbollah.  What follows is the historical explanation for the causes 
of Lebanese Shiite radicalization and ultimately Lebanese Shiite fundamentalism, specifically 
Hezbollah.       
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The History of the Shiite Lebanese  
Lebanese Shiites have endured centuries of socioeconomic and sociopolitical 
oppression and degradation at the hands of both the Lebanese Sunnis and Christians.  
Lebanese Shiite settlements have been facing persecution since the Eleventh Century; 
however, Shiite fundamentalist movements did not come into being until the 1970s.  This 
presents an interesting quagmire and helps address the main objection I have here, e 
determination of the causes of Islamic fundamentalism.  To do so, it is imperative that I tell 
the historical story of the Shiite Lebanese because it shows their development and 
radicalization, which ultimately leads to the creation of Hezbollah.  Furthermore, in 1970s 
each of my fundamentalist labyrinth conditions were present and positively associated with 
Lebanese fundamentalism.  By the 1970s, Shiite desperation had reached its climax and the 
presence of the PLO ignited nine hundred years of built-up hostility.       
From the eleventh century on, the Shiites found refuge in the area of Jabal Amil 
(South Lebanon) and the Biq’a Valley.229  Initially, the Shiites settled in the lower parts of 
Mount Lebanon and the coastal cities.  However, with the downfall of the Fatimids and with 
the military expeditions launched by the Mamluks between 1291 and 1305, the Shiites were 
expelled from these areas.230  The Shiite lands were confiscated by the Mamluks (Sunnis) 
because the coastal cities were constituted vital trade centers and they needed the Shiite lands 
to facilitate more trade, to in turn generate more wealth.  Following this, the Shiites were 
                                                
229 The Biq’a Valley is also translated Beqaa and Bekaa.  The Romans called the Biq’a Valley the “Breadbasket 
of the Empire” and today it remains Lebanon’s most important farming region.  It is located about 19 miles from 
East Beirut.  The Valley id between the Mount Lebanon to the west and the Anti-Lebanon Mountain ranges to 
the east.  The Valley is relatively small; it is about 75 miles in length and on average 10 miles wide.     
230 The Fatimids claimed to be decedents of Fatima, the daughter of Muhammad and wife of Ali, the fourth 
caliph and Shiite Imam.  These were Shiite missionaries who attempted to spread Shia Islam throughout the 
Middle East; Lebanon was only one of many areas where they extended their short rule.  The term Mamluks 
translates from Arabic into “owned” also (mameluk, mameluke, or mamluke) was a slave soldier who was 
converted to Islam and served the Muslim caliphs and the Ayyubid sultans during the Middle Ages.  Over time 
they became a powerful Sunni military caste, and sized as much land and power as possible between 1250-1517. 
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expelled from the mountains because they overlooked the coastal roads, and according to the 
Sunnis, the Shiites attacked their trading routs from above.  As a result of this land 
confiscation and forced relocation, the Shiites ended up in the lower parts of Mount Lebanon 
and the Biq’a Valley (Ahmad Hamzer 2004: 9).      
Under Sunni Ottoman rule over Lebanon (1516-1922), the Shiites lost even more land 
and were stripped of any sociopolitical authority and independence they had by the expanding 
Christian Maronite and Drunze communities (Hamzer 2004: 9).  As a result of this, the 
Shiites were left with the some of the most rural land in Lebanon.   Furthermore, the Shiites 
faced significant discrimination at the hands of the Ottomans (Sunnis) and the Christians.  
Unlike the Christians and Sunnis, who had their own court systems, the Shiites were placed 
under the jurisdiction of Sunni courts where they faced significant discrimination within the 
law.231  It was not until the 19th Century that a localized institutional political system 
emerged.  In 1841 the Ottoman governor of Beirut introduced the first formal Lebanese 
political institution with the establishment of the Creation for the Mountain Council 
(Shanahan 2005: 25).232  However, the only significant and lasting decision the Council 
would make was that it divided, what would become Lebanon, into two sections – one 
dominated by Sunnis and one by Christians.  The Shiites were forced under the jurisdiction of 
one of the two sections.        
                                                
231 For the pattern of Lebanese Shiite settlements see: Kama; Salibi (1988) A House of Many Mansions 
(London: I. B. Tauris); Philip Hitti (1967) Lebanon in History: From the  Earliest Times to the Present (London: 
Macmillan); Wajih Kawtharani (1994) The Political and Social Trends of Mount Amil (Beirut: Bahsun Press); 
Ahmad Rida (1963) The Opening of South Lebanon, 1788-1840 (Cambridge; Harvard University Press).  For 
the discrimination Shiites face see: Iliya Harik. 1972 Fall. The Ethnic Revolution and political Integration in the 
Middle East. International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies; pages 313-324; Albert Hourani ( 1947) 
Minorities in the Arab World (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Leila Meo (1956) Lebanon, Improbable 
Nation: A Study in Political Development (Bloomington: Indiana University Press) 
232 According to Rodger Shanahan (2005: 25): The Council for the Mountain was established purely for the 
purpose of hearing complaints about, and creating a new schedule, for the levying of taxes. It represented the 
first attempt to gain a consensus about a single political issue from all the major confessional groupings.  The 
Council membership consisted of three Druze, three Maronites, three Sunni, one Shiite, one Greek Catholic, and 
one Greek Orthodox. The Council only existed for a brief period of time,    
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After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Lebanon became a French colony and France 
became the Christian Maronites protectorate (Jaber 1997: 9).  During this time, France 
expanded Lebanon to the South, the Biq’a Valley, and part of the coastal plain, which all 
belonged to Syria.  After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the French sought a mandate over 
Syrian territories that had been part of the Ottoman Empire.  The European San Remo 
Conference of 1920 gave France the right to assume mandatory rule over the Ottoman land 
that would become modern Lebanon (Shanahan 2005: 29).  In other words, the borders of 
modern-day Lebanon did not exist until the 1920s.    The newly encompassed Syrians, 
specifically, the Sunni Muslims, considered themselves Syrian and did not wish to be part of 
Lebanon, especially a Christian dominated Lebanon.  The Syrian Shiites had faced the same 
degradation and land confiscation that the Lebanese Shiites had faced and never associated 
themselves with Syrian nationalism.  The Maronite Christians courted the Syrian and 
Lebanese Shiites and were correct in their assumption that the Shiites would not want to be 
part of a Sunni-dominated Lebanon.  They forged an alliance with the Christians and in 1926 
France permitted the Shiites to establish their own religious courts and practice their religion 
freely, as a reward for their alliance (Jaber 1997: 9).  As a result of WWII, France was unable 
to govern its colonies and Lebanon was granted its independence.     
Effects of Imperialism  
Lebanon’s political structure after its independence was based on the National Pact 
(al-Mithaq al-Watani) of 1943, which vested legislative, executive, as well as military 
positions proportionality with the demographic size of the country’s recognized sectarian 
groupings.  The Maronite Christians, then the largest of the sectarian sects, according to the 
official census of 1932, were accorded the presidency.  The Sunni Muslims, the second 
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largest sectarian sect, were given the premiership.233  Finally, the Shiite Muslims, the third 
largest sect, were given the speakership of the Parliament, a relatively powerless position 
compared with those granted to the Christians and Sunnis.234  According to Hala Jaber 
(1997:10), even at the time, suspicion was cast on the validity of the census, and the 
Christians refused to allow another.235 
The National Pact never took into account changing demographics.  The Shiites had 
increased from being the third largest community in the 1930s to Lebanon’s largest single 
sectarian group by the 1970s.  This steep rise the in the Shiite population threw Lebanon’s 
political system and institutions into deadlock.  Hamzer (2004: 13) argues that the Shiite 
population increased from 100,000 to 250,000 between 1921 and 1956; it had remained 
proportionally stable at about 19% of Lebanon’s total population.  Between 1956 and 1975, 
however, the Shiite population tripled, from 250,000 to 750,000, boosting their proportional 
size to almost 30% of the total population.  As a result of the National-Pac, the sociopolitical 
institutions were inherently inflexible and not designed to accommodate demographic 
changes (Rania Maktabi 1999).  According to Samir Kahalaf (1973: 117) the population of 
Beirut tripled between 1952 and 1964 as a direct result of the Shiites leaving their farms and 
                                                
233 The first French census was carried out in 1921, to gauge the demographic makeup of the newly mandated 
territory.  The people recorded in this census were recognized then for the first time as Lebanese (Rania 
Maktabi. 1999. The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited. Who are the Lebanese? British Journal of Middle East 
Studies. Pages 225-240 
234 There are eighteen different religious groups in Lebanon; the major ones are the Shiites, Sunnis, Christian 
Maronites, Greek Orthodox, and Drunze Muslims.  The following explain the Lebanese political system and 
were used here: Nezih Richani. 1998. Dilemmas of Democracy and Political Parties in Sectarian Societies: The 
Case of the PSP in Lebanon. Palgrave Macmillan; J.B. Odeh. 1984. Lebanon: Dynamics of Conflict a Modern 
Political History. Zeb Books; Leila Meo. 1976. Lebanon, Improbable Nation: A Study in Political Development. 
Greenwood Press; Meir Zamir. 2000. Lebanon’s Quest: The Road to Statehood, 1926-1939. I.B. Tauris: Raghid 
el-Solh, 2004. Lebanon and Arabism: National Identity and State Formation. I.B. Tauris; Rodger Shanahan, 
2005. The Shi’a of Lebanon: Clans, Parties, and Clerics. Tauris Academic Studies; Eyal Zisser. 2000. Lebanon: 
The Challenge of Independence. I.B. Tauris; and Carole Dagher. 2002. Bring Down the Walls: Lebanon’s Post-
War Challenge. Palgrave Macmillan.       
235 According to the 1932 census, out of the total population of approximately 793,000, the Shiites numbers just 
155,000 (Shanahan, 2005: 31).  
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moving to the southern suburbs of Beirut for employment.236  This rural-to-urban migration 
further complicated the changing demographic situation within Lebanon.  Prior to the late 
1950s, Beirut had been a Christian majority city.  By the 1980s, the Shiites had become 
Lebanon’s largest single secular community with almost 1,400,000 people, surpassing both 
the Maronite and Sunni populations, which were estimated at nearly 800,000 (Hamzeh 2004: 
13).   
Unlike Egypt and the Palestinian territories, pre-civil war Lebanon had experienced 
elections and competitive electoral politics, both parliamentary and presidential; however, 
these elections and the electoral procedures where inherently restrictive toward the Shiites.  
In the three decades from independence in 1943 until the outbreak of war in 1975, nine 
parliaments and five presidents were elected.237  The parliamentary framework of modern 
elections in Lebanon was established in the 1926 Constitution.  Elections were held regularly 
during the French Mandate period with the exception of interruptions during WWII.  
Throughout the Mandate period, two-thirds of the parliament was elected on the basis of 
universal male suffrage (women first voted in the 1950s); French authorities appointed the 
remaining one-third.  The practice of appointment ended at independence in 1943 (Landau 
1961; Suleiman 1967, Salem 1965). In the period between independence and the outbreak of 
the Lebanese Civil War in 1975, Lebanese electoral law remained the same.  Seats in 
parliament were apportioned on the basis with the Christian-Sunni-Shiite ratio, based on the 
1932 census figures.   
                                                
236 Samir Khalaf and Per Kongstad. 1973. Urbanization and Urbanism in Beirut: Some Preliminary Results. 
Found in: L. Carl. Brown, From Madina to Metropolis. Princeton: Darwin Press.  
237 Political life in Lebanon has never been organized around the role of political parties.  The pre-Civil War era 
(1943-1975) was characterized by the inability of the state institutions, especially the parliament, to allow for 
greater party representation.  Nevertheless, in 1968 elections saw the highest percentage of party members 
winning parliamentary seats, a maximum of 30%.  In the 1972 elections, this percentage dropped to 28%, and in 
the 1968 elections, it rose slightly too about 30%. 
 
  240 
The Shiites at that time were significantly underrepresented in census figures.  For the 
most part, they lived in the rural and less developed areas of Lebanon and counting them with 
the best intensions of accuracy would have been difficult.  However, the Christians and 
Sunnis were not seeking accuracy in the 1932 census and wanted to make sure the Shiites 
were significantly undercounted.  Arguably, the reason for this was because each Lebanese 
district was allocated legislative seats based on the size of the district’s total population.  
Further complicating this was the fact that the Lebanese parliament was a candidate-centered 
electoral system rather than a political party-based electoral system.  This meant that the 
Lebanese political party system was highly decentralized, and it encouraged candidates to 
band together in lists, although they technically ran as individuals.  Voters, regardless of their 
political affiliation, ideological beliefs, or religion, voted for all seats in their district, 
meaning that the majority religious group within the district won the legislative seats.  To 
make sure Shiites were underrepresented, many districts were gerrymandered to intentionally 
make Shiites a minority within the district, guaranteeing more Christian or Sunni legislative 
representation.  This was made easier with the significant numbers of Shiites migrating to 
Beirut; all the Christians had to do was gerrymander city districts helping Christians and 
Sunnis stay in the majority.  Furthermore, there was no unifying agent to bring the Shiite 
population together as a voting bloc; individual candidates had to attract votes on their own, 
stripping the political party of any real significance.  What resulted was a majoritarian type 
democracy where the Shiites were excluded from most decision making authority and 
subjected to the will of the Christians and Sunnis.  Being the minority in the legislature meant 
Shiites were being continuously outvoted on legislation that was designed to restrict their 
socioeconomic and sociopolitical mobility.     
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Paralleling the political inequality, the Shiites were bureaucratically and economically 
oppressed.  The Shiites were also under-represented in the bureaucracy.  According to 
Hamzeh (2004: 12) Lebanese population and employment statistics show that in the 1946, 
40% of the highest posts in the civil society were occupied by the Maronites, 27% by the 
Sunnis, and only 3.2% by the Shiites.  This meant that within Lebanon’s political and social 
and bureaucratic institutions the Shiites were not accorded a political and economic role 
commensurate with their numerical size.  Furthermore, Lebanon experienced significant 
economic growth after the 1950s.  The growth was lopsided and resulted in slow 
socioeconomic development for the Shiites, who where treated as a lower-laboring and 
agricultural class.  The Shiites belonged to the most socioeconomically disadvantaged social 
group within Lebanon.  They lived in the less-developed, most rural areas, or the ghetto 
regions within Beirut.  Because of this, they had inadequate education, limited sanitation and 
healthcare, high unemployment, and they faced significant discrimination within and outside 
of the Lebanese political and social institutions (Hamzer 2004 and Haril 1972).  In comparing 
the Shiites with that of the Christians and Sunnis, who were overrepresented among the urban 
elite, within universities, and in every professional filed within Lebanon, the Shiites were 
overrepresented among the poor and the lower working classes (Picard 1993).   
As a result of 900 years of institutionalized degradation and discrimination that the 
Shiites experienced at the hands of the Sunnis and Christians, there was a massive amount of 
built-up rage that was waiting for a catalyst to spark it.  That catalyst was the presence of the 
PLO in southern Lebanon.  According to Anne Barnard (2006); Carrie Wickham (1997); 
David Rapoport (2001); Ami Pedahzur, William Eubank, and Leonard Weinberg (2002); and 
Bruce Hoffman (1999), Islamic fundamentalism directly resulted from the displacement of 
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the Palestinians.  As it relates to the formation of Shiite fundamentalism, the displacement of 
the Palestinians did not create or facilitate Lebanese Shiite radicalization – it simple 
perpetuated it.     
The PLO and Israel 
A Palestinian refugee population has lived in Lebanon since the creation of the state 
of Israel in 1948.  Unlike Egypt, where there are no Palestinian refuges, there is a significant 
presence of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.  These Palestinians could be considered an 
outside ideological force because they meet many of the criteria used to define a significant 
ideological force.  Specifically, the PLO was an outside military and ideological force within 
Lebanon and was not working with, for, or influenced by the Lebanese state.  As a result of 
the Arab-Israeli wars, specifically the Six Day War in 1967, the number of Palestinians 
increased in Lebanon to 350,000 (Jaber 1997; 13).  By the early 1970s, Lebanon became the 
PLO’s only base, following its expulsion from Jordan for facilitating the Jordanian civil war 
1970-1971.  Tens of thousands of well armed Palestinian guerillas moved to South Lebanon 
in 1971.238  Initially, the Shiites had sympathized with the Palestinian cause, and many of 
them joined the Palestinian movement.  In fact, in the aftermath of the 1948 Arab defeat, 
Sayyid Abdul Husayn Sharaf al-Din organized a guerrilla group named al-ja’fariyyah. 239   
This group consisted of Shiite and Palestinian students who were trained to launch attacks at 
the Lebanese-Israeli boarder against Israeli solders and settlers.  However, this partnership 
was short lived because of the violence and degradation the Lebanese Shiites were being 
                                                
238 Ritchie Ovendale. 1992. The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Wars. London: Longman. The Cairo Argument was 
reached on November 2, 1969 and West Beirut between the PLO and Lebanon concerning the presence of PLO 
resistance fighters within Lebanon.  The agreement allowed Palestinian terrorists (freedom fighters) in southeast 
Lebanon – it allowed the Palestinians to carry out armed struggle against Israel from South Lebanon, 
239  A cleric born and educated in Iraq, he was an active participant in the Lebanese Shiite nationalist movement. 
IN 1920 he headed the delegation to Damascus to argue for an independent greater Syria (Lebanon and Syria 
would be one state).  He was one of the first major public Shiite scholars: Rodger Shanahan; The Shia of 
Lebanon: Clans Parties and Clerics. 2005. Tauris Academic Studies: New York  
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subjected to by the militant Palestinians.  The control that the PLO had over South Lebanon 
made the Shiites fear that the PLO would take control of their land and transform it into a 
Palestinian state.  On the Israeli side, the Palestinian military presence in South Lebanon was 
a direct threat to Israel’s northern settlements.  In response to the Palestinian presence, Israel 
invaded South Lebanon in 1978, and it occupied areas as far north as the Litani River for the 
purpose of creating a “security zone” that would prevent direct attacks by Palestinian 
militants. 
According to Hala Janer (1997: 7) Israel’s invasion was the brain-child of Ariel 
Sharon, the Minister of Defense in Prime Minister Begin’s government.  Sharon’s objective 
was to drive the PLO from Israel’s northern border and push them into Northern Lebanon.  
Israel called their campaign Operation Litani.  However, thousands of Shiites died and more 
than a quarter of a million became displaced persons and relocated to the southern suburbs of 
Beirut (Hamzer 2004: 16).  The southern suburbs of Beirut were once a middle class, 
residential district, but as the numbers of Shiites grew, the population expanded into areas 
that were not designed for living.  The Shiites began to squat and to build makeshift 
communities in places such as the city dump and Beirut’s common sewer.  The suburbs 
gained a reputation as the Shiite’s slums, commonly referred to as the “Belt of Misery” (Janer 
1997: 145).  As a result, the previous Christian and Sunni residents were forced to relocate to 
different areas of Beirut, creating even more animosity between the three major religious 
groups.   
On March 19, 1978, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 425 which called 
for the unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops and the deployment of the United Nations 
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) along the Lebanese-Israeli border (Hamzer 2004; 16) .  
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The PLO agreed to cease its military activity, and Israel partially withdrew, handing over 
Shiite land to the Christian Maronite militia, further antagonizing the Shiite-Christian 
relationship.  Hamzer (2004:16) argues that by 1982, the storehouse of Shiite grievances had 
overflowed.  However, Israeli withdrawal was short lived; Israel invaded for a second time 
during the summer of 1982.  This second invasion was called Operation Peace for the 
Galilee, and this time the Israeli military occupied significant parts of Beirut at the Christian 
militia’s request.  This caused significant damage and life loss to the Shiite population in 
Southern Lebanon and Beirut.  The invasion of Beirut led to the killing of 18,000 individuals 
and the wounding of more than 30,000 Shiites (Ovendale 1992).  The invasion of 1982 and 
the subsequent Israeli occupation of South Lebanon helped facilitate the birth of Hezbollah.  
The Shiites felt that Israel was targeting them as a community (Wright 1988).  The Lebanese-
Israeli accord brokered by the United States and signed on May 17, 1983, left South Lebanon 
under complete control of Israel, further propitiating the displacement and radicalization of 
the Shiites.  The Shiites viewed this as an Israeli land grab facilitated by the United States.      
Interestingly, few months after Israel’s invasion in 1982, there was very little Shiite 
opposition or resistance to the invasion.  They were grateful to the Israelis for freeing them 
from the violence and terror facilitated by the Palestinians.  The PLO had become a state 
within a state and its members were accused of rape, torture, murder, extortion, and so on.  
Therefore, it can be assumed that the removal of the PLO from the South appeared to be of 
mutual benefit for both the Israelis and the Shiites.  The Shiite change in attitude occurred 
rather rapidly as they became aware that Israel was not going to leave Southern Lebanon, 
despite having achieved its main objective of driving the Palestinians from Lebanon.  Why is 
this?  The only logical reason Shiites could conclude was an Israeli land-grab of some of the 
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richest farm areas in the Middle East (Schiff 1985).240  In early 1983, the Israeli Defense 
issued the first draft of their plan to form the “Organization for a Unified South.”  The plan 
was in effect similar to one used in the West Bank, whereby the Israeli military established 
bases in every village or town and administered control on a small scale, these military forces 
were called the National Guard.  In 1948, David Ben-Gurion, the founder of the State of 
Israel, spoke about creating a Christian state in Lebanon which would form an alliance with 
Israel.  This, according to Hala Jaber (1997: 16-17), was Ariel Sharon’s plan and it further 
perpetuated the Lebanese civil war.  It has been estimated that during the Yitzhak Rabin’s 
government 1974-77, the Maronite militias received $150 million from Israel (Jaber 1997 and 
Hamzer 2004).  Also, the Israelis would encourage the Christian militia to join the National 
Guard.     
During 1983-1984, Israeli forces isolated South Lebanon from the rest of the country 
by blocking all passages to Beirut.  This had a significantly negative impact on the economy 
of South Lebanon.  The Shiites’ livelihood depended on the sale of their fruit and vegetable 
produce to Beirut and northern Lebanon.  This forced the Southern Lebanese into further 
poverty and many lost their farms.  As a result, membership in Shiite military resistance 
movements increased.241  Furthermore, Israeli raids were carried out in villages suspected of 
harboring resistance fighters.  Anyone who was suspected of knowing or being related to 
someone within the resistance was arrested.  The resistance organization was formed called 
                                                
240 When the Zionists had presented the territorial demands at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, they 
originally asked for Israel’s northern boarder to include all of Southern Lebanon and end at the Litani River 
(which in the 1978 invasion they occupied Lebanon up to the Litani river).     
241 Terrorism, National Liberation, Or Menace? Strategic Studies Institute Monographs, U.S. Army War 
College. Pages 29-35; Hussein Agha. 2004, September 23. “A note on Hezbollah” in Hezbollah and the 
Lebanon-Israel border, bitterlemons-international 2004, at http://www.bitterlemons-
international.org/previous.php?opt=1&id=57; Gary Gambill. 2002.  Hezbollah's Strategic Rocket Arsenal. 
Middle East Intelligence Bulletin. at www.meib.org/articles/0211_l2.htm. 
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the Lebanese National Resistance (LNR) and was dominated by Amal, which was the largest 
and most organized violent Shiite resistance movement.   
Amal evolved from the first Shiite mass-movement in Lebanon, Movement of the 
Deprived, which was formed in 1974.  The Movement of the Deprived was a mass protest 
movement aimed at forcing the government to address the lack of social services provided to 
Shiites (Shanahan 2005: 107).  In 1975 Amal became the military arm of the Movement of the 
Deprived.  According to Shanahan (2005: 107), Amal was initially trained by the Palestinian 
Fatah Movement.  Both movements were formed by Imam Musa al-Sadr.  The Movement of 
the Deprived was the first Shiite mass movement and helped mobilize Shiites to become 
politically aware, and in turn, they became more politically active.  They began demanding 
that the Lebanese government grant the Shiites full political recognition and reform the 
socioeconomic and sociopolitical institutionalized inequality within Lebanon.  By the late 
1970s al-Sadr transformed himself into a Shiite national hero and was seen as the savior of 
the Lebanese Shiites.  However, in August of 1978, al-Sadr disappeared on a visit to Libya.  
His disappearance was blamed on the Israelis, PLO, and the Lebanese Christians.242  As a 
result, he was turned into a martyr, and the movement significantly militarized itself, and 
Amal was born.  This being said, each of the social movement conditions is positively 
associated with the birth of Amal.  First, the Lebanese Shiite population was experiencing 
significant socioeconomic inequality.  Secondly, as a result of a charismatic and dedicated 
leader, the population of the movement increased significantly, and it developed an 
organizational structure.  Thirdly, Lebanon was not a perfect democracy or a perfect 
autocracy, indicating the Shiites had some sociopolitical freedom, and in turn started 
                                                
242 In Rodger Shanahan’s appendix (2005: 189) he writes that the Libyans claimed al-Sadr collected his luggage 
in Rome after a flight from Libya, but most observers believe that he disappeared in Libya.   
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demanding more.  Fourthly, there was a presence of an outside ideological force, the militant 
members of the PLO.     
To further complicate this situation, Bashir al-Gemayel, who was elected president 
(he was a Christian) in 1982, was killed in an explosion on September 14, 1982.  His death 
was avenged by Christian militias that entered the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee 
camps in Beirut’s southern suburb and between September 16-18; with machine-guns, they 
killed at least 1,500 Palestinians (Palmer-Harik 2004: 35).  During this, Ariel Sharon’s troops 
blockaded the refugee camp and stopped the Palestinians from fleeing, while ensuring that 
the Christian militants were allowed to leave after the massacre.243  Hamas has been very 
vocal concerning its defense of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon and has condemned the 
removal of Palestinians from Lebanon.  Also, they have argued that Palestinians in Lebanon 
have “suffered more calamities, slaughter, and torture than any where else.”244      
Furthermore, Israel turned on the Shiite clerics who were leading the resistance.245  
Religious leaders were deported from their own country, or they were assassinated.  As a 
result, the Shiite resistance began to employ a deadly weapon, young Shiite fighters who 
volunteered to drive vehicles packed with explosives into Israeli targets, simultaneously 
killing themselves. These became the first suicide terrorist acts and are a qualitative example 
                                                
243 As argued by: Zeev Schiff and Ehud Yaari. 1984. Israel’s Lebanon War; Israel’s Prime Minister, Ariel 
Sharon was taking defensive measures in 2001 to avoid being brought to trial in a Belgium court on charges of 
alleged involvement in the Sabra and Shatila Refugee Camp massacres raised by 40 relatives of victims.  In 
February 1983, Israel’s Kahan Commission of Inquiry found that Israel was not directly responsible for the 
massacre, but determined that Sharon bore personal responsibility.  He then resigned his portfolio but stayed in 
the cabinet.  In late spring of 2002, it was determined by the Belgian tribunal that the case against Sharon was 
not admissible on grounds that he it s present exerting his function as head of state.  Because of his stroke and ill 
health, he will never be brought to justice.              
244 Hamas Periodic Statement no 32. of November 25, 1988.  Also in Hamas Periodic Statement no. 27 of 
August 3, 1988 where Hamas condemns the Sabra and Shatila massacre.    
245 According to Rodger Shanahan (2005. The Shi’a of Lebanon: Clans, Parties, and Clerics) the function of 
clerics in the Shia community are significantly different than those of the Christian and Sunni communities.  
They act neither as an ordained priesthood not as intermediaries between believers and God.  Rather, their main 
function is as scholars of jurisprudence.  In other words, they act as interrupters of the shari’a as found in the 
Quran and the sunna (which is the teachings of the early Imams, handed sown through the generations).   
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of the quantitative results from Chapter Three.  In Chapter Three, it was shown that there is a 
positive correlation between state interference with religious freedom and terrorism.  Also, 
there is a positive correlation between the restrictiveness of religious freedom and Islamic 
fundamentalist movements indicating that there should be a significant increase in Lebanese 
fundamentalist movements, and there was.      
 
The Birth of Hezbollah 
When Israel launched its invasion in June of 1982, Lebanon’s leading Shiite clerics 
were in Tehran, attending the annual Islamic Conference.  Iran immediately volunteered to 
help the Shiite population living in southern Lebanon and the Iranian Guards, or the “Quds 
Brigades” (Jerusalem Brigades), were immediately dispatched to Lebanon and the Shiite 
fundamentalist movement began.246  However, Hezbollah was not officially established until 
1985 when its Manifesto was officially written and the movement’s policies and objectives 
were institutionalized.  Hezbollah’s “Open Letter to the Downtrodden of Lebanon and the 
World” formally declared the existence of the Movement.  According to the Manifesto, 
Hezbollah had several objections and views on foreign and domestic relations.  First, the 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s teachings would be the foundation of Hezbollah’s political, social, and 
military doctrines.  Secondly, Hezbollah outlined its objection to the state of Israel, on the 
grounds that it occupies Muslim lands.  Thirdly, it states Hezbollah’s opposition to 
colonization and imperialism, specifically the American imperial ambitions in the Middle 
                                                
246 According to Ahmad Hamzer (2004: 25) the founding members of Hezbollah had tried several different, such 
as Islamic Amal, the Islamic Movement, Islamic Jihad, and the Revolution Committees.  When no agreement 
was reached concerning the name, a committee of nine traveled to Iran to seek the opinion and permission of 
Khomeini over the new name.  His instructions were to adopt a new name that would unite all Islamists.  The 
new formation took the name of Hezbollah – the Party of God – after a verse in the Quran: “those who accept 
the mandate of God, his profit and those who believed, LO! The Party of God, they are the victorious” (Surat al-
Ma’ida, 5:56). 
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East and for its support of Israel.  Fourthly, it explains how the current Lebanese political 
system is flawed, and argues that the current political system and its “sectarian privileges” are 
the root causes of Lebanon’s problems.  The Hezbollah Manifesto states that “We are not at 
all interested in any projection for political reform within the framework of the rotten 
sectarian system” (Hezbollah Manifesto).  It then goes on to say: “We urge adoption of the 
Islamic system on the basis of free and direct selection by the people, not the basis of forceful 
imposition, as some people imagine” (Hezbollah Manifesto).247       
 In its manifesto, Hezbollah defines itself as a movement struggling for the faithful 
Lebanese who believe in Islam, resistance, and the liberation of Lebanon.248  According to 
Hezbollah, their movement restores Islamic culture, political, and religious unity, which had 
been destroyed by the various philosophical doctrines of Western culture; specifically, the 
Americanization and Westernization of the Islamic world.  Hezbollah contends that Western 
culture has encouraged Muslims to pursue their own interests rather than God’s, and the 
spiritual needs of the greater Islamic community.  Hezbollah blames the United States for all 
the region’s catastrophes, describing it as the foremost enemy of all Muslims around the 
world: “We shall proceed to fight the vice at its very root, the first roots of such vice being 
the United States.”  It goes on to say that the United States is the “mother of all malice.”  
Arguably, Hezbollah’s resentment towards the United States resulted from the fact that it 
backed Israel and vetoed all the United Nations attempts at forcing Israeli withdrawal from 
Lebanon in 1982.  “Israel attacked our country, destroyed our villages, slaughtered our 
                                                
247 Text of the “Hezbollah’s Open Letter to the Downtrodden of Lebanon and the World” Translated in Norton, 
Amal and the Shi’a. page 67 
248 Nasrallah, interview Al-Wasat, May 13, 2000. See also: Hezbollah: Identity and Goals. September 6, 2000. 
www.hizbollah.org Shaul shai, “terror in the name of the Imam - twenty years of Shiite terrorism 1979-1999” 
(Herzliya - IDC, Israel, 2001) pp. 23-28. Al-Nabulsi, “Will Lebanon become an Islamic republic?” 
http://www.elaph.com/ElaphWeb/ElaphWriter/2006/8/170391.htm, as quoted in 
http://www.memri.org.il/memri/LoadArticlePage.asp?language=Hebrew&enttype=4&entid=2037 
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children and dishonored our sanctity, they unleashed criminals who practiced massacres 
against us and the United States continues to support Israel and prevent us from deciding our 
destiny” says Hezbollah in its manifesto.249 
Without Iran’s financial and spiritual assistance, Hezbollah would have never 
succeeded.  Iran’s objection was to spread its Islamic revolution within Lebanon with the 
ultimate aim of establishing a Lebanese Shiite regime.  Hezbollah was initially dependent on 
Iranian for support; however, over the last 25 years the movement has become largely self-
sufficient due to its institutionalization and a significant increase in the size of its 
membership.  Still to this day, Hezbollah members receive military training in Iran, 
specifically in guerilla warfare, intelligence and terrorism.  The acquisition of Iranian 
knowledge and practical skills has transformed Hezbollah into a quasi-Iranian brigade in 
Lebanon.250 Hezbollah’s initial goal was to launch a revolt against the Israeli occupation.  In 
this sense, Hezbollah formed differently than most social movements, including Hamas and 
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, as it relates to launching and then facilitating military 
activities.  However, Hezbollah’s military operations evolved into a massive social movement 
that unified the Shiite Lebanese through their collective identity.     
The one phenomenon associated with the creation of social movements that perfectly 
mirrors the formation of Hezbollah is that of collective identity.  According to many social 
movement scholars, for a social movement to succeed it is fundamental that the movement’s 
                                                
249 According to Joel Beinin (2003) (The Israelization of American Middle East Policy Discourse.  Social Text. 
Duke University Press): Even among Islamic radicals there is significant dissent from bin Laden’s views; 
specifically from Hezbollah.  President Bush’s addition of Hezbollah to the official list of terrorist organizations 
on November 2, 2001 was applauded by Israel and its supporters.  (Press release of the American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee, November 14, 2002, page 139 for web address).  Yet, Sheikh Muhammad Fadl Allah, the 
spiritual leader of Hezbollah, condemned the attacks on September 11 and argued tin the Lebanese press that 
they ware incompatible with the Koran, and the Muslim code of Jihad (page 136). 
250 Shimon Shapira, Hezbollah between Iran & Lebanon, United Kibbutz Red Line publisher, p. 125 and Shaul 
Shai, Terror in the Service of the Imam, 20 years of Shiite Terror. The International Policy Institute for Counter-
Terrorism; Yoram Schweitzer, “Iranian Transitional Terrorism”, www.ict.org.il, 24 May 2001. 
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participants share a collective identity.251  Members of any movement, in order to qualify as 
such, must subscribe to a set of beliefs which are distinct from those of the wider population.  
Furthermore, those who subscribe to those beliefs must feel some degree of kinship with 
others within the movement’s structure.  This is what Hezbollah has successfully used to its 
benefit, the shared identity of Shi’ism; specifically, their shared experiences with 
sociopolitical and socioeconomic oppression and degradation.  As a result, Hezbollah’s 
membership significantly increased.  Hezbollah gave a voice to a group who had previously 
been silenced within Lebanese sociopolitical and socioeconomic institutions.  Previous 
research has shown that people join collective action mainly through interpersonal ties, or 
informal networks.252  Since identities are created and shaped through social relations, the 
preexisting Shiite networks played a crucial role in the formation of Hezbollah.  The Shiites 
engaged in collective action because they shared certain norms and values related to a 
specific area of political contention; specifically, a shared depravation and a shared hatred for 
the Palestinian and Israeli occupation.  Arguably, the ideas encompassing Islam are 
fundamental in the formation, duration, and success of Islamic fundamentalist movements.  
Hezbollah subscribes to a set of beliefs which are distinct from those of the wider Lebanese 
Christian-Sunni population.   
Syria and War 
Hezbollah is well-armed, well-trained, and equipped with highly sophisticated 
weaponry which is capable of reaching a significant portion of Israel.  Currently, Hezbollah is 
estimated to have some 13,000 rockets and missiles. These include the SA-7 surface-to-air 
                                                
251 For example: Gould 1995; Fernandez and McAdam 1986, 1988, 1988; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; 
McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988; Rosenthal et al. 1985; Snow, 1988 Snow, David A. (1988, 1992, 1999); 
Snow, Burke E. Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford (1986); 
252 As argued by: della Porta 1988; Could 1995; McAdam 1988; Snow (1988); Snow, David A. (1988, 1992, 
1999); Snow, Burke E. Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford (1986); Tarrow 1994 
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missile and the Fajr-5 surface-to-surface rockets.  In May 2000, the Israel Defense Forces 
withdrew from Lebanon terminating eighteen years of occupation.  Moreover, after 2000 
Syria has taken an active role in arming Hezbollah and the Palestinian Intifada.253 Syria lost 
the Golan Heights to Israel during the 1967 Six Day War, and it has remained a point of 
contention ever sense.  For the Syrians, Hezbollah remains the only bargaining chip with 
which they have to pressure the Israeli government into returning their strategic plateau (Luft 
2002).  Unlike Iran, Syria does not have an ideological connection with Hezbollah; their 
interest with the Hezbollah is self-serving.  After 1990, Syria has been an important source of 
support for Hezbollah’s terrorist and guerrilla activity against Israel.  Iran has given 
Hezbollah the ideological legitimacy and all the political, financial, and some of military 
support it needs. However, without Syria's military, strategic, and logistic support, Hezbollah 
could not have achieved its current military status.  Syrian assistance has helped transform 
Hezbollah into a regional partner with Syria and the operational arm of the Syrian army in its 
confrontation with Israel.254 This odd alliance between Hezbollah and the secular Ba’thist 
                                                
253 The Saudi proposal, which first came to light in mid-February, “offered Israel full normalization 
with the Arab world in exchange for a full withdrawal from all territory occupied . . . since 1967." Yet, Syria did 
not want to give up "its bargaining card in future negotiations" by promising normalization before Israel 
withdrew from the Golan Heights. Hence, although Syria joined twenty-one other Arab League states in 
endorsing the proposal, Hezbollah "rockets began flying over the border two days later."  Moreover, 
Hezbollah’s leadership was quick to denounce the very notion of a compromise solution soon after the Saudi 
proposal surfaced. In early March, Husayn al-Khalil, Nasrallah's political assistant, warned the Palestinians 
against "falling in the trap of truces and entering the game of polarization," calling on them to "stick to their 
rights and not to get involved in the games of international politics" ("Ra'd: Resistance Has Right to Support the 
Palestinians," al-Nahar, March 12, 2002). Then, on March 24, three days before the Arab Summit opened, 
Nasrallah called for the continuation of the Palestinian armed struggle, declaring that the "conflict must end with 
the liberation of Palestine from the river to the sea." He also called for a national conference "to resist the 
settlement" of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. See Hasan Nasrallah, interview by Hiyam Shahud, London al-
Majallah, March 24, 2002; and Jubran Tuwayni, "Lebanon's Role” Beirut al-Nahar, March 21, 2002 
254 For the strategic and military relationship between Syria and Hezbollah see: Gary Gambill and Ziad 
Abdelnour, "Hezbollah: Between Tehran and Damascus," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 4, no. 2 (February 
2002), at www.meib.org/articles/0202_l1.htm; Eyal Zisser, "The Return of Hizbullah," Middle East Quarterly 9, 
no. 4 (Fall 2002),at www.meforum.org/article/499; Yossi Baidatz, "Bashar's First Year: From Ophthalmology to 
a National Vision" (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001); Ely Karmon, "A 
Solution to Syrian Terrorism," Middle East Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 2 (June 1999), pp. 23-34; Gambill, 
"Hezbollah's Strategic Rocket Arsenal," and Lenny Ben-David, "Iran, Syria, and Hizballah-Threatening Israel's 
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regime in Syria, which killed 20,000 Syrian Muslim Brothers in 1982, has resulted from two 
inherent enemies coming together to defeat a common enemy.255  During the rule of Bashar 
Al-Assad, a significant change occurred in the relationship between Syria and Hezbollah; 
with the power transition from father to son.  Hezbollah became Syria's strategic partner in 
Lebanon.  Political alliances are sometimes formed by states with little in common besides 
converging foreign policy goals, as in the case of the Hezbollah-Syrian military alliance. 
As it relates to Israel, Hezbollah has been the only non-Palestinian Arab/Islamic 
movement or state to continue an armed struggle against Israel via the weapons provided by 
Syria and Iran.  Furthermore, Hezbollah has become an influential terrorist force in the West 
                                                                                                                                                  
North," Jerusalem Issue Brief, vol. 2, no. 3 (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, July 17, 2002). According to 
the "IDF Intelligence Chief Views Hezbollah-Syria Ties, PA Chaos, Saudi Stability". The Jerusalem Post, July 
26, 2004.  Hezbollah has acquired a considerable quantity of arms from Iran and Syria and has deployed them in 
Southern Lebanon in field cells exclusively controlled by the organization (Hezbollah land). The Head of Israeli 
intelligence, Maj.Gen. Farkash, has stated that the organization has approximately 13,000 short-range rockets, 
about 500 medium-range rockets and several missiles with a range of 115 - 215 km/s. The organization sees 
these weapons as a means of deterrence against Israel and has even defined its policy on the issue. Amos Harel, 
"Hezbollah's Terror Factory in the PA", Ha'aretz, 11 January 2005 and "Syria After Lebanon, Lebanon After 
Syria?" International Crisis Group, Middle East Report, N°39 - 12 April 2005, at 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east_north_africa/ arab_israeli 
conflict/lebanon/39_syria_after_lebanon_lebanon_after_syria.pdf 
255 During the 1980s Hezbollah killed hundreds of people in terrorist attacks against Western targets: the 
bombings of the U.S. embassy in Beirut in 1983 and 1984; the twin 1983 suicide attacks on U.S. and French 
peace forces in Beirut. In a 1998 interview, Mustapha Tlass, the ex-Syrian minister of Defense, boasted that he 
gave the green light to the Islamic organizations to act against the American and French forces in Lebanon. 
However, he said, facetiously, he did not permit operations against the Italians because he was enamored of the 
Italian film star, Gina Lolobrigida.  During the 1960s two highly contrasting groups emerged in Syria.  First, the 
Baath (Renaissance) Party, its motto is” Arab unity from the Atlantic to the Gulf” The secular trend gathering 
steam in Syria along with other factos discussed below, spurred the Society of Muslim Brothers to revolt in the 
provincial city of Hamah in April 1964.  The government permanently outlawed the fellowship after the Syrian 
army crushed the rebellion.  Air force General Hafiz al-Assad, a Ba’athist, came to power a few years after that 
incident, after Syria had suffered a second defeat by Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.  Destabilization of his 
government became the Muslim Brotherhood’s goal and a series of assassination attempts against Baath party 
professionals, government figure and security agents.  In 1976, a protest against the assistance provided by the 
Assad government to Christian militias struggling against a Muslim-leftist coalition in Lebanon was launched 
and three years later, in June of 1979, in a direct challenge to Assad, the Brotherhood struck again, killing 83.  
The following year, they faced significant crackdowns by government forces.  The final straw for the Ba’athist 
regime was a three week long revolt staged by the Brotherhood in 1982: these armed fundamentalist held off 
army regulars until Assad ordered heavy artillery to level the whole sections of the city where the fighters were 
concentrated.  After this attack, bulldozers razed the area and rapidly repaved it.  Ever since this incident, the 
Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood has kept a low profile (See: Patrick Seale. 1988. Asad: The Struggle 
for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press); Umar Abd-Allah (1983) The Islamic Struggle in 
Syria (Berkeley: University of California Press); Fred Lawson (1982, November-December) Social Basis off the 
Hamah Revolt. MERIP Report).  
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Bank and Gaza, and it has established a network of terrorist cells and training camps in 
Lebanon with the assistance of the Syrians.  In addition, according to Israeli intelligence 
sources, in 2004, Hezbollah financed terror cells that operated in the Palestinian territories 
with a sum ranging from $750,000 to $1.5 million a year. During 2005, Hezbollah succeeded 
in increasing the level of terrorism by raising the sum paid for facilitating suicide attacks 
committed by either Hamas or Islamic Jihad to $100,000, while in the past the amount was 
only $20,000.256 Hezbollah members have also attempted to infiltrate Israel in recent years.  
Since November 2000, Israelis have uncovered several cells of Israeli Arabs recruited by 
Hezbollah for intelligence and terrorist missions within Israel itself.257  
                                                
256 “ IDF Intelligence Chief Views Hezbollah-Syria Ties, PA Chaos, Saudi Stability". The Jerusalem Post. July 
26, 2004. Zohar Palti and Matthew Levitt . "Special policy forum report Hizballah's west bank foothold". 
June,18 2004. Nasrallah Speech , Al-Manar, October 30, 2004 , see also: 
http://www.intelligence.org.il/sp/1_05/hezbollah.htm (had translated):  Hezbollah set up a network of terror cells 
in these areas, instructed them, on several cases from their Lebanese training camps, on how to carry out attacks, 
manufacture weapons, guerilla techniques, and pushed them to perpetrate attacks. In addition, according to 
Israeli intelligence reports, in 2004, Hezbollah financed approximately 70-80% of the terror cells in the field 
amounting to 1,500,000 dollars a year. Hezbollah was also involved in smuggling weapons to the Palestinians. 
257 One of the earliest examples of such infiltration occurred in 1996, when Hussein Mikdad, a Lebanese Shiite 
terrorist, blew himself up while trying to make a bomb in his room at an east Jerusalem hotel. He had entered 
Israel a few days earlier with a forged British passport. A member of Hezbollah, Mikdad had served as 
accountant to Shaykh Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, the organization's spiritual leader, before being chosen for 
terrorist training.  Since 1996, at least two other Hezbollah operatives have attempted to infiltrate Israel and 
gather information on behalf of both the organization and Iran. In 1997, Hezbollah member Stefan Smirks, a 
German citizen and convert to Islam, was arrested in Israel following a tip-off from German intelligence. 
Similarly, Lebanese-British citizen Jihad (or Gerard) Shuman was arrested in January 2001 while attempting to 
enter Israel in order to take photographs of potential targets. See Isabel Kershner, "The Changing Colors of Imad 
Mughniyah," Jerusalem Report, March 25, 2002.  The first terrorist cell was uncovered in November 2000, 
when seven residents of the Western Galilee village of Abu Snan were arrested "on charges of spying for 
Hezbollah and plotting to abduct Israeli soldiers on its behalf." In June 2001, three Israeli Arabs from Yafi'a and 
Kfar Kanna were indicted "for plotting to steal weapons from an IDF base and send information to Hezbollah." 
In September 2001, four Israeli Druzes in Rama and Daliat al-Carmel were arrested "on charges of smuggling 
weapons into Israel from Lebanon." In June 2002, Israeli citizen Nissim Nasser, a Lebanese Jew, was "indicted 
on charges of spying for Hezbollah"; specifically, he had attempted to provide the organization with 
photographs and maps of Israeli targets for large-scale terrorist attacks. In July 2002, "Israeli officials 
announced that they had uncovered a Hezbollah plot to kidnap Israelis abroad," an operation devised by an 
Israeli Arab who had moved to Lebanon in 2000 and become a Hezbollah operative. Also that month, Israeli 
authorities arrested "four Arab Israelis who smuggled weapons and transmitted intelligence to Hezbollah in 
return for drugs." All quotes from Gary Gambill, "Hezbollah's Israeli Operatives," Middle East Intelligence 
Bulletin 4, no. 9 (September 2002); available online (www.meib.org/articles/0209_l2.htm). See also Arieh 
O'Sullivan, "Hezbollah Recruiting Israeli Arabs," Jerusalem Post, February 19, 2002 
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Martin Kramer (1996) argues that Hezbollah is a political movement which sees 
politics as an inseparable part of religion and every act of violence has a clear and rationale 
objective, and it always weighs benefits against costs.258  In other words, Hezbollah is 
politically rational and would do nothing to jeopardize its support base, specifically, the 
Lebanese Shiite community, because they are Hezbollah’s most important resource.   
Significant Outside Ideological Force  
Following the success of Iran’s Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini embarked on an 
agenda known as Mashru al-Thawra al-Iraniyah (the Project of the Iranian Revolution).259 
This aimed at furthering Shiite Islam by reviving the Islamic Ummah (the worldwide Islamic 
nation), which was to be based in Iran and led by Khomeini, whose objective was the spread 
of Islam’s influence beyond the boundaries of Iran.  Khomeini stressed that in exporting the 
revolution, he did not seek to militarily invade neighboring states and did not harbor 
expansionist plans.  He argued that his goal would be achieved by means of an “invisible 
force” and the rout to success lay through cultivating the populace (Khomeini, 1978, 1989).  
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards became an integral part of the program.  They were 
initially set up in 1979 as an internal security apparatus to consolidate Khomeini’s grip on 
Iran and grew to become one of the strongest institutions ever produced by the revolution and 
                                                
258 This article was published in Heartland - Eurasian Review of Geopolitics, 2-2005, July 2005, 
(http://www.eheartland.com.) 
259 Khomeini institutionalized the exportation of revolution and creation of a global Islamic rule and outlined it 
in various parts of Iran’s constitution.  The forward of the regime’s constitution reads, in part, “Given the 
context of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, which was a movement for the victory of all the oppressed over the 
oppressors, it provides the ground for continuation of the revolution inside and outside the country, specifically 
in spreading international links to other Islamic and people’s movements, tries to pave the way for the creation 
of unique global Ummah so the continuation of the struggle for the salvation of deprived and suffering nations 
can be settled.”  Another part of the forward, under the headline “Ideological Army”, reads, “The Army of the 
Islamic Republic and the Revolutionary Guards carry not only the duty of protecting the borders but also 
ideological duty, Jihad of God and struggle to spread the rule of God’s law in the world” (Abrahamian 
1989,1993; Hamid, 1981; Arjomand, 1988).  
 
  256 
a primary tool for promoting Khomeini’s doctrines.  His objective was carried out through 
overt epistemic militarized intervention, as was the case in Lebanon, and through covert 
epistemic, political interference, as in the case of Algeria.  The Guards did not create a 
separate division to export the revolution; they trained and armed militant surrogates and 
agents in many camps and locations throughout Iran.  These agents then recruited Shiite 
militants overseas to carry out operations in both the Middle East and Europe.  The Guards 
supported revolutionary activities, built an Islamic network, and had agents occupy positions 
in Iranian embassies across Europe, Africa, and Asia.  Under diplomatic cover, they recruited 
proxies and cells for operations worldwide and their most successful attempt at exporting the 
Iranian Revolution was through Hezbollah.         
A large section of the Iran’s Intelligence Ministry (one of Iran’s largest bureaucracies) 
is focused on terrorist activities and espionage abroad; specifically in Lebanon via Hezbollah.  
The Islamic Propaganda and Communications Organizations is a massive part of the 
Intelligence Ministry in the Iranian foreign bureaucracy and is present in dozens of countries 
and has hundreds of millions of dollars in its budget.  Besides laying the groundwork for 
exporting terrorism and fundamentalism, it is engaged in recruiting Muslims for the regime’s 
terrorist squads, including Hezbollah.  The rise and sustenance of radical Islamic groups 
would not have been made possible without financial and military assets of Iran.  Hilal 
Khashan (1997: 7) said that shortly after the triumph of Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979, 
Islamic fundamentalism came into hostile contact with the West as members of the 
Revolutionary Guards occupied the US embassy in Tehran taking numerous Americans 
hostages.  Following this, Iran's fundamentalist epistemic communities in Lebanon launched, 
on October, 23 1983, two separate attacks against US Marines and French troops in Beirut, 
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killing more than 300 individuals.  Soon after, these epistemic communities transformed 
themselves into Hezbollah.  In the aftermath of these two suicide attacks, a wave of Western 
hostage-taking and airline hijackings dominated the Western psyche and media coverage.260  
It is in this atmosphere of commotion that the first writings on militant Islam appeared in 
print. Bernard Lewis claimed that the Iranian revolution demolished the division of the 
Islamic world into Soviet and American spheres of influence and proved that Islam can stand 
on its own between the two superpowers without committing itself to either of them.  Lewis 
(1990) argued that all Muslims especially admired this aspect of the revolution. 
We do not wish to impose Islam on anyone we hate those who impose their beliefs 
and regimes on us and we do not want Islam to reign Lebanon by force.  But we 
confirm that we are convinced by Islam as an ideology and as a system and call on 
everyone to make its acquaintance and to follow it Sharia (law) as we call upon them 
to adopt it as a religion and to abide by its teachings whether on the personal, political 
or community level (Khomeini, 1988). 
 
The origins and development of Hezbollah represent a successful example of Iran’s 
efforts to export its Islamic revolution beyond its boarders.  Hezbollah declared its allegiance 
to Iran and the Ayatollah Khomeini; however, it is not a monolithic body totally subservient 
to Iran.  Rather it is a coalition of Lebanese Shiite clerics each of whom have their own views 
and networks of followers as well as ties to Iran’s clerical establishment.  Iran has been one 
of the most consistent sources of external support for Hezbollah in terms of bureaucratic 
                                                
260 Other examples of Iranian backed attacks in Lebanon include: In April 1983, A truck loaded with explosives 
blew up in from of the American embassy in Beirut.  Sixty-one were killed and 120 injured. On October 23, 
1984 The headquarters of the U.S. Marines in Beirut was destroyed in a suicide attack by Iran’s terrorist 
surrogates, resulting in 241 deaths. In March 1984, William Buckley, an American citizen living in Lebanon, 
was abducted by Iranian terrorist surrogates.  He was secretly taken to Tehran, were he was killed in 1985 by the 
Revolutionary Guards. December 3, 1984 Peter Kilburn, a librarian at the American University of Beirut, was 
abducted by Iran’s terrorist surrogates and killed in 1986. May 22, 1985  Michel Seurat, a French writer, was 
kidnapped by Mullahs agents in Lebanon.  He was murdered three years later by the hostage-takers.  June 1985, 
A TWA Boeing 127 was hijacked en rout to Rome and was diverted to Beirut.  One of the passengers on board 
was a diver in the U.S. Navy and was executed by the hijackers. On July 31, 1989 Colonel William Higgins, an 
American officer working for the United Nations in Lebanon, was abducted and executed by the Iranian 
regime’s agents. 
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links, operational support, finances, and political guidance.  However, as Graham Fuller 
(1990) has noted, “Iran provided Hezbollah with material, ideological, and spiritual support 
but directed it not towards Shiite political goals in Lebanon but Iran’s geopolitical enemies 
Israel and the United States.”  Iran provides Hezbollah with approximately $100 million 
annually and supplies it with an array of arms, mostly via the Damascus airport. Hezbollah’s 
operational infrastructure was developed, almost entirely, with extensive Iranian backing. 
This aid included financial support, transportation of weapons, and training the organization’s 
activists.261  The Iranian Revolutionary Guards are still deployed in Lebanon and still provide 
support to Hezbollah. This support includes both financial and military support; the Iranians 
have significantly built up Hezbollah’s military and operational capabilities.262   
                                                
261 In addition to the Iranian aid, over the years, Hezbollah has strived to establish additional financial sources 
all over the world as follows: Fundraising in Lebanon and worldwide: Hezbollah raises millions of dollars a year 
in Lebanon and around the world (particularly among the Shiite Muslim communities). The money in Lebanon 
is raised through the "Assistance to the Islamic Resistance Fund", which belongs to Hezbollah. Worldwide, the 
fundraisers operate through charitable funds and local Shiite community centers. Legitimate business activities: 
Alongside commercial companies that belong to Hezbollah or to its charitable organizations, Hezbollah activists 
are also involved in an array of legitimate business activities, such as the oil trade, real-estate, and small 
businesses. Criminal activities in Lebanon and worldwide: Hezbollah activists are involved in two main fields – 
narcotics and counterfeiting. The organization's activists also deal in cigarettes, car theft, and credit card fraud.  
Receipt of part of the Lebanese government's budget: Hezbollah’s parliamentary faction, government ministers, 
and representatives in the municipalities are able to obtain Lebanese government funding for financing projects 
within the Shiite population centers in Lebanon. "Terrorist and organized crime groups in the tri-border area 
(TBA) of South America", Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, July 2003. See also 
http://www.canadafreepress.com/2006/hagmann071806.htm; 
http://www.adl.org/learn/extremism_in_the_news/Islamic_Terrorism/Hezbollah_Mahmoud_Kourani.htm; 
Police link Ecuador drug ring to Hezbollah - Authorities bust operation suspected of financing Muslim group 
(http://msnbc.msn.com/id/8312121); “Paraguay: Daily Reports More Evidence of Barakat's Contributions to 
Hezbollah”, Asuncion ABC Color (Internet Version) Tuesday, May 28, 2002; “Romanian Intelligence Report 
Cites Hezbollah, Islamic Liberation Party Activity” Bucharest Ziua in Romanian 13 Feb 02 p.7 (ZIUA 
Wednesday, February 13, 2002) 
262 Over the years, large quantities of top-quality weapons have been transferred to Hezbollah, including: 
advanced anti-tank missiles, katyusha rockets, cannons and various anti-aircraft missiles, SA-14 and SA-7 
shoulder missiles, small-scale naval warfare equipment, ultra lights, UAVs, and advanced weapons systems 
such as ground-to-ground long range rockets. Iran financed Hezbollah with approximately $100 million in the 
1980s (Wege, 1994: 158).  Taheri (1994:116), Wege (1994:158) both noted that Iran used bank accounts in 
Austria and Switzerland to transfer funds to Hezbollah.  In 1989 the amount was reported to be between 3 and 
10 million per-month. See: Tally Kritzman. 2000, August 29. "Arrest of Hezbollah Supporters in the U.S.A: 
Successful anti-terrorist action or a drop in the bucket?". International Institute for Counter Terrorism.  
http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=129. See also: Zohar Palti and Matthew Levitt. Special 
policy forum report Hezbollah’s west bank foothold, June,18 2004;  Zvi Bar'el, 'Nothing like spending the war 
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Iran began charting a more pragmatic course in international relations after the death 
of the Ayatollah Khomeini and vowed it would no longer export terrorism and make a 
considerable effort to work within international institutions.  The ideological change in Iran's 
top leadership was mirrored in Hezbollah’s leadership (Richard Norton 1991).  After the 
death of the Ayatollah Khomeini and as soon President Rafsanjani consolidated his power as 
the Iranian President, he called for openness and the relaxation of Iran's relations with the 
West.  Simultaneously, Hezbollah’s leadership urged the party to seek a foothold in the 
Lebanese political system and to reach out to political leaders outside the fundamentalist 
camp (Martin 1990; Martin 1997).  Hezbollah’s leadership held that it was impossible for 
them to wage jihad against the West when Iran itself was calling for a truce. They advocated 
rapprochement with other fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist movements and favored 
emerging into the mainstream of Lebanese politics.  Hezbollah rationalized its decision to 
enter Lebanon’s parliament by arguing that its members had been elected by the people and 
had not been appointed by the government.  After 1992, Hezbollah argued that working from 
the inside the Lebanese political institutions allow it to influence change and monitor 
events.263   
However, as Iranian politics change so does Hezbollah.  For example, when the right-
wing ideologue, Ahmadinejad became President, he helped facilitate the Second Israeli-
                                                                                                                                                  
in Beirut,' Haaretz, February 19, 2003.  In his book “Axis of evil – Iran, Hezbollah and Palestinian terrorism”, 
Shaul Shai calculated the number of attacks carried out by Shiite terrorists and Iranian entities between 1980 and 
1999. According to the information, 260 terrorist attacks were carried out in the international arena (excluding 
terrorist attacks in Lebanon and the Iran/Iraq war) with the following distribution: Kidnapping hostages – 67 
attacks; hijacking/blowing up airplanes – 12 attacks; detonating explosive devices and vehicle bombs – 82 
attacks; assassinations – 97 attacks 
263 Schweitzer, Y. “Suicide Terrorism: Development and Main Characteristics” in Countering Suicide 
Terrorism, ICT & ADL, 2002; Shay, S. Terror in the Service of the Imam – 20 Years of Shi’ite Terrorism. The 
International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, The Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya. 2001, pp. 65-66; 
Danny Stone, TV series “100 Years of Terror” – Chapter 4 – The Hezbollah and Acts of International Terror; 
Shay, S. & Schweitzer, Y. “Al Aqsa Intifada Strategies of Asymmetric Confrontation”, Faultlines Writings on 
Conflict Resolution. Bulwork Books and The Institute for Conflict Management, 2001 
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Lebanese War.  It is interesting that Nasrallah makes sure to emphasize that Hezbollah is 
primarily an independent Lebanese movement with only a religious affiliation to Iran.  
However, the leadership contradicts itself. In an interview he gave to the Iranian newspaper 
Al-Sharq, Ali Akbar Mohtashemi264 addressed the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran. 
He stated that “Hezbollah is part of the Iranian ruler-ship; Hezbollah is a central component 
of the Iranian military and security establishment; the ties between Iran and Hezbollah are far 
greater than that those between a revolutionary regime with a revolutionary party or 
organization outside its borders.”265   
During the last twenty-seven years, the international community has seen Iran emerge 
as an ideological hegemon that has significantly influenced domestic politics and Shiite 
Muslim movements worldwide.  The most successful Shiite movement that it has facilitated 
has been Hezbollah.  Iran has exerted its ideological hegemony via their epistemic influence. 
Iran uses its revolutionary guards as covers to spread its ideological influence.  An Islamic 
epistemic community is a transnational group of believers with shared Islamic values and 
beliefs.  Iranian epistemic influence has been the source of political and moral direction of 
Hezbollah, and, in turn, it has influenced and changed Lebanese society.  Sebenius (1992) 
and Adler and Haas (1992) argue that members of epistemic communities are transnational 
groups that have a common set of principled and causal beliefs, but they also have shared 
notions of validity and a shared policy goal(s).   In this sense the Iranian Revolutionary 
                                                
264 One of the founders of Hezbollah, former Iranian ambassador to Syria and Lebanon, and former Iranian 
Minister of Interior 
265 Regarding Nasrallah’s statement that his organization maintains ties with Syria and Iran, but is 
independent,seehttp://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3307177,00.html. Mohtashemi interview can be 
found in http://www.memri.org.il/memri/LoadArticlePage.asp?language=Hebrew&enttype=4&entid=2037 
A similar description was published in “Al-Sharq Al-Awsat” in May 2006. The newspaper quoted an Iranian 
figure who told a group of Western statesmen in London that Iran attributes great importance to Hezbollah and 
that the organization “is one of the elements of our strategic security. It serves as an Iranian front line of defense 
against Israel. We do not agree that it needs to be disarmed” 
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Guard’s objective was the spreading of the Islamic Shiite beliefs.  Haas (1992) defines 
epistemic communities as networks of professionals with recognized expertise in a particular 
field.  The Iranian Revolutionary Guards consist of many types of individuals.  They are not 
only armed individuals, but they are also a network of professors, doctors, and engineers who 
have control over knowledge and information and are sharing that knowledge with Shiite 
movements world wide.  Iranian sponsored epistemic communities facilitate learning, 
negotiation, ideological development, and they deepen individual and collective societal 
knowledge on Shi’ism.  J. Habermas (1984: 34) argues that the impact an epistemic 
community has depends on a variety of factors, including the number and strength of the 
social movements it can “catch” in its “net” of consensual understandings; in other words, the 
more extensive the reach of an epistemic community, the greater its power and influence.  
Hezbollah’s military, ideological, social, and political successes have been the direct result of 
Iranian ideological influence.  Based on all of this, it can be logically concluded that the 
resources and ideological support Iran provides is positively associated with Lebanese 
fundamentalism, specifically Hezbollah.  
Leadership as a Resource  
Hezbollah, like Hamas, is headed by a collective leadership, leadership being a 
significant resource on the movement level.266  Aldon Morris (1984) argues that movement 
leadership is an important and complex phenomenon that affects the origins and outcomes of 
social movements.  Hezbollah’s leadership is a very complex phenomenon that has facilitated 
its origins and has had a major impact on its development and success.  Hezbollah is led by a 
seventeen member Shura Council which is elected by the Shiite Central Council, an assembly 
                                                
266 For the structure of Hezbollah see: Nasrallah interview, Al-Wasat May 13. 2000; Hezbollah: Identity and 
Goals: www.Hizbollah.org; Hamzeh 1993, 2000, 1997a, 1997b, 2004; Martin Marty and Scott Appleby (1993), 
Fundamentalism and the State; Jeffrey Goldberg. 2002, October 14. In The Party of God, The New Yorker 
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of almost two hundred party founders, for a period of three years (Hamzer 2004: 45).  The 
council consists of fifteen Lebanese members and two Iranian members representing Iran’s 
interests within Hezbollah.  The leadership apparatus consists mostly of clergy, along with a 
few lay members.267  The Council is responsible for the movement’s operations on each of its 
three levels (social, political and military) and it is aware of all the movement’s activities, and 
it is responsible for running all of the Hezbollah’s components.  Decisions made by the 
Council are reached either unanimously or by majority vote.  In case of deadlock, matters are 
referred to Wali al-Faqih Ali Akbar in Iran who is the supreme jurist (Hamzah 1993).  Also, 
the Council’s decisions are always implemented.  The actual operation of the party is 
entrusted to a General Secretariat headed by a General Secretary and his deputy.  These are 
usually members of the Supreme Shura Council (Hamzer 2004: 48).   
The next level of Hezbollah’s leadership consists of four Organs.  The first Organ is 
the Politburo. The Politburo consists of 15 members and consists of the Enforcement, 
Recruitment, and Propaganda offices.  This Organ plays a significant role in the 
reinforcement of Hezbollah’s doctrines and contributes extensively to the recruitment of 
Shiites to join Hezbollah and control the Hezbollah media empire.268  The second organ is 
                                                
267 The lay members or the non-Ulama have to demonstrate faith in the fields of health, social affairs, and 
finance and information services.  Until 1989, the ratio of clerics to laity in the Shura Council’s makeup was six 
to one.  When the party opened up to increased representation of the laity’s rank and file after the 1989 Ta’if 
Agreement, the ratio become four clerics to three laity.  However, the 2001 election of the Shura Council 
represented a shift back to a six-to-one ration in favor of the clerics. The current Shura Council was elected in 
August of 2004 and the previous elections took place in July of 2001. The majority of the members currently on 
the Shura Council have been serving on the Council alongside Nasrallah since the early 1990’s. Currently, all of 
its members, except the head of the Jihad Council Imad Mugniyah, are religious scholars.  
268 See: Hamzer, 2004: 58-61: the research and propaganda section runs two radio stations, Sawt al-Iman (Voice 
of Faith) and Sawt al Nidal (Voice of Struggle), and one television station called al-Manar (the Beacon). In 
addition, there are two publications: al-Ahed (the party's main mouthpiece), which appears weekly, and the al-
Bilad, which appears monthly.  Hezbollah operates a media empire, in comparison to other terror organizations. 
The leaders of the organization, who are aware of the power of rhetoric and the media on public opinion and the 
enlistment of activists, operate a number of mass media means: Al Manar (The Beacon) television - The main 
mouthpiece of the organization which is televised via satellite to millions of viewers worldwide. In December 
  263 
Jihad al-Bina' (Holy Reconstruction Organ) and it provides all of the social service support 
associated with Hezbollah (Hamzah 1993). 
The third organ is the Security Organ and is divided into three sections. The Party 
Security section is in charge of protecting party leaders and members. The Central Security 
section operates a network of surveillance and intelligence-gathering operations inside and 
outside the Lebanon. The Operational Security section concentrates on the planning of 
international security, specifically against Hezbollah’s enemies.269  The fourth organ is the 
Combat Organ, which is composed of two main sections: the Islamic Resistance (al-
Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah), and the Islamic Holy War (al-Jihad al-Islami) (Hamzah 1993). 
While the first one was in charge of suicidal attacks against Western and Israeli targets, the 
second one leads more conventional attacks against Israeli troops in south Lebanon.  The 
Combat Organ is under the direct supervision of the Shura Council. Al-Muqawamah al-
Islamiyyah is not an independent combat army; rather, it is composed of members who are 
combatants in times of need, combatants who return to their normal occupation when not 
required. This makes it virtually impossible to attack Hezbollah’s soldiers, and in order to do 
so Hezbollah’s enemies would have to strike significant numbers of the population, as shown 
last year in the Israeli-Hezbollah War.  The following two pages contain two diagrams; the 
first shows the structure of Hezbollah’s leadership hierarchy and the second shows the 
interconnectedness of Iranian ideological and financial assistance to Hezbollah and its 
leadership hierarchy.         
                                                                                                                                                  
2004, France banned the station's broadcasts by satellite in France, a week later; the United States also declared 
that the station was broadcasting propaganda in support of terrorism. 
269 Al-Shira (1992, 12-13), Al-Ahed (1992, 5), Faksh (1993, 77) argue that Iran donated $90 million to the 
Security Organ of Hezbollah. However, after 1989 Iran cut its financial assistance to Hezbollah to upwards of 
90%, the party's leadership has lowered the activity of this organ to the minimum requirements needed for the 
protection of the party leaders 
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Hezbollah’s Internal Structure 
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***The Above diagram is based on A. Nizar Hamzeh's diagram.  Hamzeh, Nizar. 1993. Lebanon's Hezbollah: 
from Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation. Third Word Quarterly. 
 
Iranian Ideological Influence with Hezbollah 
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Humanitarian Aid and Electoral Success 
 
During the last fifteen years of elections, Hezbollah put a significant amount of effort 
and money in wooing the lower socioeconomic Lebanese class.  The Hezbollah hierarchy 
correctly assumed it would have mere success with more social services it provides.  In this 
sense, Hezbollah is acting differently than most social movements.  Most Shiites feel that 
Hezbollah has provided valuable services, and it has ranged from employment and education 
to provision of public utilities, to distribution of food, and the construction of houses, 
hospitals, and clinics.  Furthermore, the Financial Aid Committee of Hezbollah, which works 
closely with Muasassat al-Shaheed (The Martyr's Foundation), spent over $90 million from 
1982 to 1986 on the needs of dependents of persons killed or wounded in fighting the 
Lebanese civil war and Israel (Harik 1994 37-38).     
Through its community-action networks, mosques, schools, job training centers, 
hospitals, and clubs Hezbollah has been able to mobilize tens of thousands of Shiites to its 
cause.  Also, Hezbollah has managed to increase its membership via its Al-Hawzat al-
'ilmiyyah (circles of learning) where it goes into the community and recruits young and poor 
individuals to join the movement.  A movement’s size and membership numbers is a 
significant resource.  Furthermore, Hezbollah has its Holy Reconstruction Organ which 
provides significant social-service support. For example, Hezbollah’s Islamic Health 
Committee has established numerous hospitals, clinics, civil defense centers, and pharmacies, 
free of charge to the Lebanese masses.  SPIHC (1989) pointed out that in the hospital (Dar 
al-Hawra') for women and children, over 59,255 women and 10,490 children are examined 
and treated every year.  Hezbollah maintains that the Lebanese government does not care 
about the socioeconomically deprived population within Lebanon.  Because of this, 
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Hezbollah has had to tackle poverty itself and in doing so, it embarked on and succeeded in 
an ambitious enterprise to build an entire social welfare infrastructure for the Shiite 
community.  Furthermore, it is currently in the process of rebuilding that social welfare 
infrastructure because it was destroyed during last year’s Israeli-Hezbollah war.  The 
following tables show the extent of Hezbollah’s humanitarian aid: 
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Table Eighteen: Hezbollah’s Humanitarianism 1983-1987270 
 Location Date 
Hospitals   
  1. Khomeini Hospital Ba'albek-Biqa 1986 
  2. Dar al-Hawra' for women 
and children Beirut-southern suburbs 1986 
Infirmaries (Mustawsaf) Beirut-Southern Suburbs  
  1. al-Imam al-Rida Madi str. 1983 
  2. al-Imam al-Hasan Farhat str. 1985 
  3. al-Imam al-Husayn al-Karamah str. 1985 
  4. al-Imam al-Sadik Beir Hasan 1985 
  5. Sayyid al-Shuhada</TD Burj al-Barajnah 1985 
  6. al-Imam Ali Laylaki str. 1986 
  7. al-Imam al-Khui Khaldah Blvd. 1986 
  8. al-Sayyida Zaynab al-Jinah 1987 
Infirmaries (Mustawsaf) South Lebanon  
  1. al-Imam Hasan Bin Ali Tayrdabbah 1985 
  2. al-Imam Husayn Bin Ali Ayteet 1985 
  3. al-Imam al-Mahdi al-Ghaziyyah 1986 
  4. al-Imam al-Hadi Khurbat Sulum 1986 
  5. al-Imam al-Rida Ayn Buswar 1986 
  6. Mobile Infirmaries Servics 12 villages next to the Israeli security belt zone 1986 
Infirmaries (Mustawsaf) Biqa  
  1. Mustawsaf Mashghara Mashghara 1985 
  2. Mustawsaf Suhmur Suhmur 1985 
  3. Mustawsaf Ayn al-Tinah Ayn al-Tinah 1986 
Dental Clinics Beirut-Southern Suburbs  
  1. al-Ghubairi Clinic Al-Ghubairi Main str. 1987 
  2. Harat Hurayk Clinic Harat Hurayk Main str. 1987 
Pharmacies   
  1. al-Shaheed (the Martyr) 1 Beirut-Burj Abu Haydar 1985 
  2. al-Shaheed 2 Southern Suburbs 1987 
  3. al-Shaheed 3 Southern Suburbs 1987 
Civil Defence Centres   
  1. Main Headquarters Soutehrn Suburbs--Beir al-Abed 1985 
  2. Branch 1 Southern Suburbs—al-Sheyah 1986 
  3. Branch 2 Beirut--Burj Abu Haydar 1985 
  4. Branch 3 South Lebanon—Ayn Buswar 1986 
  5. Branch 4 South Lebanon—Khurbat Sulum 1986 
  6. Branch 5 South Lebanon—al-Ghaziyyah 1987 
 
                                                
270 The information contained in this table came from the reports concerning Hezbollah’s Islamic Health 
Committee services during the Civil War and right after.  Al-Ahed. August 1989.  Also see: Nizar Hamzeh. 
1993. Lebanon’s Hezbollah: From Islamic revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation.  Third World Quarterl 
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Table Nineteen: Projects Implemented by Hezbollah from 1988-2002271 
  
Type Under Construction Built and/or Rehabilitated  
Schools 11 24 
Private Homes 3 9640 
Small businesses/shops  0 800 
Hospitals 3 2 
Infirmaries  5 3 
Mosques 44 56 
Cultural Centers 5 3 
Agricultural Centers 7 0 
 
As a result of the significant aid Hezbollah provides the Lebanese Shiite community, 
it has become the most successful political movement in the history of Lebanon.  Hezbollah’s 
victory in the May - June 2006 elections raised its representation in the Lebanese Parliament 
to 11 representatives and 25 additional representatives in its coalition bloc with the country's 
other main Shiite party, the Amal Movement.  Every election, since 1992, Hezbollah has 
formed an impressive and organized electoral campaign with headquarters swarming with 
volunteers. 272   Hezbollah’s electoral campaigns are grass-roots movements composed of 
party members and thousands of party workers; both males and females volunteer their time 
and work day and night contacting voters and transporting them to voting centers.   
                                                
271 Figures found in Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh 2004: page 50-51.  Data was originally obtained from the Holy 
Struggle Construction Foundation: Its Twelfth Spring: 1988-2000 (Beirut: Jihad al-Bina, 2002)   
272 During the 1992 and 1994 elections it was reported that they were under the direct supervision of Iran 
(Dekmejian 1997; al-Hudd 1993; al-Bayan 1994; al-Habashi 1994).  Furthermore, it was also reported that a 
number of Iranian secret intelligence specialists supervised the election.  As it related to the 1992 elections, 
Nizar Hamzeh (1993) reported that Hezbollah’s security apparatus was active monitoring every move inside and 
outside the polling booths.  She said that Hezbollah’s security interfered numerous times with voters, making 
sure they had the correct ballot cards and forcibly made voters vote for Hezbollah candidates. Furthermore, the 
same reports cited by Hamzeh (1993) said that Hezbollah’s Security bribed employees in government 
departments in various electoral districts to release hundreds of identification cards of dead people, which were 
used for voting by Hezbollah’s members.  Whether these reports are true or not, the fact remains that no 
Lebanese political party or traditional leader has ever created as effective an electoral machine as that of 
Hezbollah. 
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Up until 2006, Hezbollah refused to accept a cabinet position or even cast a vote of 
confidence for a government because, as the movement saw it, it was bound by God’s laws, 
not human laws.  Politically, Hezbollah argued that it stayed out of the Lebanese cabinet 
because it would have to defend decisions that might be unfavorable or contradictory to the 
party’s interest.  Such decisions include ending the resistance to Israel, disarming the party 
and their Islamic Resistance movement, and peace negotiations and normalization with Israel.  
This all changed after the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War.  After 2006, the Hezbollah leadership 
changed the movement’s platform and decided to take part in the Lebanese cabinet.  Musawi 
(the current General Secretary) said the party's decision to take part in the Cabinet did not 
mean less focus on its goals as a resistance group: “There is no conflict between taking on 
more political responsibility on the internal political arena and keeping up the resistance 
work.  The group will maintain its resistance, and its readiness to face any Israeli aggression 
as long as the Zionist danger is there.”  Nizar Hamzeh (2007), a Lebanese Hezbollah expert, 
argues that the party cannot afford to be left out of the cabinet because it is under 
international pressure to disarm and it needs to be in the center of what is going on. It would 
be very dangerous for them not to participate.273  Therefore, it can be argued that Hezbollah is 
acting rationally, just as the resource mobilization theorists predict for social movements.    
                                                
273 Report by Javad Montazeri "In Interviews With Experts 'Extended' Discusses Iran and the Developments in 
Lebanon," E'temad (reformist daily published in Tehran), March 14, 2005; Michael Herzog, "The Hezbollah 
Conundrum," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch, No. 981, March 29, 2005, at 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05. php?CID=2286; "Fadlallah Tells Al-Nahar: The Shiites Are 
Not Sectarian and Not Inside a Shell, But They Have Priorities; Weapon of the Resistance Is Necessary and Will 
Be Removed Once Danger of Israeli Aggression Is Over", Al-Nahar, March 25, 2005; "Lebanon, a New Stage" 
program, featuring an interview with Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid, head of Hezbollah’s Political Council, by 
Ghassan Bin-Jiddu, in Beirut - Al-Jazirah, March 10, 2005; Ra'uf Shahuri, 'Plan B in the Battle of Disarming 
Hezbollah,' Beirut Al-Anwar, 27 May 27, 2005; Adnan El-Ghoul, Nasrallah reveals Hezbollah’s strategy of 
political alliance, , June 6, 2005; Majdoline Hatoum, 'Hezbollah: Politics, resistance don't conflict,' Daily Star, 
June 18, 2005. 
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Part of the reason for Hezbollah’s political domination in the Lebanese parliament is 
that Lebanon has a candidate-centered electoral system and not a political party-based 
electoral system.  This means that the Lebanese political party system is highly decentralized, 
and Hezbollah has managed to dominate it because it is a party-centered movement.  Prior to 
Hezbollah, the Lebanese parliament was highly chaotic and a strong executive emerged, like 
most individual-based electoral systems.  Hezbollah has changed this by facilitating 
organization and coalition-building within the parliament, hence decreasing the power of the 
executive.  This is inherently different from both the Egyptian and Palestinian political party 
systems, both of which are political party based.  In this sense, Hezbollah’s organization and 
structure is a major resource when compared to the other political parties in the Lebanese 
political system.   
Hezbollah urges that Lebanon must adopt an Islamic government; however, it insists 
that an Islamic government cannot be imposed by force.  The question of implementing an 
Islamic government has been tied to the idea of majoritarian democracy where the majority 
rules.  Hezbollah sees a majoritarian democracy as a perfect political system because it is 
guaranteed electoral victory because it represents the religious majority within Lebanon.  
Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah said: “I do not wish an Islamic state by 
force or violence, rather we prefer to wait for the day that we succeed in convincing our 
countrymen – by means of dialogue and in an open atmosphere – that the only alternative id 
the founding of an Islamic state” (Shanahan, 2005: 126).  According to Rosenstone and 
Hansen (1993) social movements facilitate democracy.  I do not think they were taking about 
the majoritarian democracy Hezbollah supports; however Hezbollah has facilitated 
democracy and transparent democratic institutions within Lebanon.  Furthermore, as argued 
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by Shaykh Qasim: “If Islam becomes the choice of the majority, only then will it be 
implemented.  If not it will continue to coexist with others on the basis of mutual 
understanding, using peaceful and political means to reach peaceful solutions and that is how 
the case should be to the non-Islamists as well” (Hamzed, 2004; 29).  
Based on the historical story I told concerning Lebanon’s history and the formation 
and success Hezbollah has had with vote-seeking, it can be concluded that Lebanon has never 
been a perfect autocracy and as a result of this, it has had significant and consecutive numbers 
of fundamentalist movements.  The number of fundamentalist movements reached its peak 
during the Lebanese civil war.  This being said, my inverted-U hypothesis concerning opining 
political institutions, demonstrated in chapter three, is further validated with Lebanon.  The 
following table compares the total number of fundamentalist movements, terrorist attacks, 
and suicide terrorist attacks in Egypt, the Palestinian territories, and Lebanon.  
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Table Twenty: Comparison of Lebanon, Egypt, and Palestine   
Year Egypt  Palestine Lebanon  Terrorist 
Attacks 
in Egypt 
Suicide 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
in Egypt  
Terrorist 
Attacks 
in 
Palestine 
Suicide 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
in 
Palestine 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
in 
Lebanon 
Suicide 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
in 
Lebanon 
1970 12 19 15 0 0 0 0 8 0 
1973 17 23 22 0 0 0 0 12 0 
1976 15 28 47 0 0 0 0 16 0 
1979 16 30 53 0 0 2 0 13 0 
1980 18 31 53 0 0 1 0 16 0 
1985 14 34 66 0 0 7 0 80 10 
1988 16 39 74 6 0 0 0 29 2 
1991 14 32 64 1 0 2 0 6 1 
1994 13 29 38 16 0 5 0 14 0 
1997 18 27 29 2 0 1 0 2 0 
2000 16 31 25 0 0 167 0 2 0 
2001 16 33 25 0 0 326 7 8 0 
2002 15 33 25 1 0 432 16 21 0 
2003 16 34 25 0 0 164 6 10 0 
2004 19 33 25 3 0 351 9 3 0 
2005 23 39 25 7 2 479 9 23 0 
2006 23 42 26 2 1 26 1 9 0 
2007 26 52 27 2 0 16 0 1 0 
 
In conclusion 
The development of the Hezbollah includes six different stages:  First; the Creation 
Stage (between 1975 and 1982): during this stage, different Shiite movements formed and 
worked independently within the context of the Lebanese civil war and attacked more 
organized and centralized Sunni and Christian factions. Second, the Establishment Stage 
(1982 and 1983): during this stage there was extreme violence and significant acts of 
terrorism toward not only toward Sunnis and Christians but also toward Israeli occupation 
forces.  During this stage Iran took an active role in financing and organizing the different 
Shiite movements.  Third, the Consolidation Stage (between 1983 and 1985): during this 
stage the ideological framework of Hezbollah was established and small Shiite movements 
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started merging together; Iran expanded its financial and ideological interference while 
providing significant weaponry. Fourth, the Expansion Stage (between 1986 and 1991): 
during this stage Hezbollah started its humanitarian campaign toward the Shiite masses 
negatively affected by the civil war and began to institutionalize itself. The radical violence 
continued simultaneously, peaking at the end of the 1980s. Fifth, the Institutionalized Stage 
(between 1992 and 2000): during this stage Hezbollah institutionalized itself and integrated 
itself into the Lebanese political system while also institutionalizing its charitable institutions. 
Sixth, the Regional Actor Stage (Between 2001 and present): during this stage Hezbollah 
become a significant actor in the Islamic world, much of this is the result of its military 
success over Israel.  Finally, Hezbollah’s organizational structure is based on three different 
branches that sustain each other: military, political, and social service provider.   
The goal of my dissertation is to determine the causes of Islamic fundamentalism and 
in doing so I show that an Islamic fundamentalist movement is inherently a social movement.  
In the previous two chapters I was able to show that each of the social movement conditions 
found in my fundamentalist labyrinth is positively associated with the rise and success of 
Egyptian and Palestinian fundamentalist movements.  In this chapter I was able to reconfirm 
these results as it relates to Lebanese fundamentalism, specifically Hezbollah, which has 
become the most significant Shiite fundamentalist movement in the Islamic world.  However, 
as compared to Hamas and the Egyptian and Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood movements, 
Hezbollah acts significantly less like a social movement.  But, Hezbollah is still an important 
case-study in the sense that it helps show how each of my fundamentalist labyrinth’s social 
movement conditions are positively associated with Lebanese fundamentalism.  Also, the 
historical story I told here is important because it shows the evolutionary development of the 
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Lebanese Shiites, which ultimately leads to their radicalization and then the formation of 
Hezbollah.  This historical story is different from the one I told concerning Hamas.  With 
Hamas, I was able to show how Islamic fundamentalist movements evolve and develop from 
other fundamentalist movements.  With Hezbollah, the historical story has nothing to do with 
the evolution and development of fundamentalist movements but instead the evolution and 
development of the Lebanese Shiites.  Finally, I evaluated three ways in which Hezbollah 
acts differently than most social movements; first, they have formed a political party and have 
had significant vote-seeking success.  Secondly, Hezbollah provides social services to the 
Lebanese Shiite community and this social service apparatus has catapulted its political 
success.  Finally, Hezbollah has the weapons capability and military technology equal to 
many developing states – no social movement has such advanced weaponry, including Hamas 
and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.   
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion  
In the last two decades we have seen a significant surge in the number of Islamic 
fundamentalist movements, and there has not been a concise reason as to why.  I began this 
project with the goal of determining the causes of Islamic fundamentalism, and, in so 
showing that an Islamic fundamentalist movement is inherently a social movement.  I have 
done so.  Each of the social movement conditions found in my fundamentalist labyrinth is 
positively associated with Islamic fundamentalism.  In other words, I have been able to 
determine what phenomena exist within the nation-state that facilitate Islamic 
fundamentalism.  Based on this, it is safe to assume that my dissertation is substantially 
important.   
To determine the causes of Islamic fundamentalism it is best to employ a labyrinth 
analogy, and it consists of four social movement conditions.  The four conditions that make 
up my fundamentalist labyrinth can be found in the four social movement literatures, and they 
include: resources associated with resource mobilization theory; opening political institutions 
as associated with political process theory; socioeconomic inequality associated with 
Marxism; and the ideas, be they religious or freedom of thought, associated with new social 
movement theory.  Not one of the four social movement literatures acknowledges, or is able 
to explain Islamic fundamentalism.  Taken as a whole, each plays a vital role in my 
fundamentalist labyrinth.  Social movement theorists have excluded Islamic social 
movements, specifically Islamic fundamentalism, from each of their respective sub-fields 
because they do not fit into any one of their theories.  However, by merging the different 
theories to form a new theory in the social movement literature, I have been able to explain 
the causes of Islamic fundamentalism. 
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Furthermore, I have created the first dataset that contains every Islamic 
fundamentalist movement that is or has been in operation from 1970 through 2006.  The 
fundamentalist dataset has a total N (total number of fundamentalist groups) of 16,072 and a 
total number of unique fundamentalist movements of 983.  With this dataset I was able to 
determine what state-level phenomena are positively associated with Islamic fundamentalism.  
Also, with each case-study I was able to show three different ways in which fundamentalist 
movements form.  Hamas is the result of an evolutionary process where fundamentalist 
movements evolve and develop over time.  The formation of Hezbollah has nothing to do 
with movement evolution; instead it is the result of the evolution of the Shiite people and 
their eventual radicalization.  Finally, the formation of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has 
nothing to do with movement evolution or evolution and radicalization of the Egyptian 
masses.  Instead, its formation is the result of significant changes in the sociopolitical and 
socioeconomic Egyptian institutions.  Each fundamentalist movement forms in a different 
way; the process does not matter in the eventual outcome.  What matters is the presence of 
each of my social movement labyrinth conditions, all of which ultimately are facilitating 
Islamic fundamentalism. 
The first condition found within my fundamentalist labyrinth is Marxism.  Karl Marx 
was correct when he argues that individuals get involved in collective action when their 
social class has reached its breaking point; they will then unite against their antagonists and 
forcibly change both the socioeconomic and sociopolitical intuitions.  Thus, from Marx we 
see how the power of the politically powerless and economically deprived is rooted in their 
ability to stop the smooth flow of social life.  Nowhere is this more apparent than in the acts 
of Islamic fundamentalist movements.  Socioeconomic inequality is positively associated 
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with the number and strength of Islamic fundamentalist movements.  Specifically, high 
percentages of unemployment and poverty are positively associated with Islamic 
fundamentalism. This was confirmed with the fundamentalist movements in Egypt, Palestine, 
and Lebanon.  A significant aspect of Marxism is his theory of relative deprivation. This is 
exactly what is going on in the Islamic world.  Education helps the masses recognize they are 
being deprived of socioeconomic and sociopolitical equality and freedom, and they either 
turn to or join Islamic fundmantalist movements as they did in Egypt.  On the other hand, the 
catalysts for the lower classes to collectively act are the Islamic fundamentalists who 
understand relative deprivation and who provide the lower classes spiritual, financial, and 
educational support.  
The second condition in my fundamentalist labyrinth consists of the resources 
associated with the Resource Mobilization theory.  Resources are positively associated with 
Islamic fundamentalism.  At its foundation, resource mobilization theory encompasses the 
idea that resources make a difference to the mobilization and success of social movements.  I 
define resources as money and population; however, I deviate from the traditional resource 
mobilization theorists to also include education and leadership as resources.  Arguably, there 
is not a more valuable resource than that of a nation-state’s educational level, especially in 
the Islamic world.  In other words, the higher the education level within the nation-state, the 
more fundamentalist groups is existence.  This was confirmed in Egypt, Lebanon, and 
Palestine.  Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood each facilitate literacy 
and education.     
The third condition in my fundamentalist labyrinth is the degree of openness of the 
political institutions associated with the political process theory.  The key foundations of 
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political process theory includes the importance that political institutions play in facilitating 
social movements, and the idea that participation in protest activities can lead to increased 
representation.  Many political process theorists argue that collective action arises as a result 
of an individual’s grievances, discontent, and frustration toward their government and state 
institutions.  This is especially true in the Islamic world because Westernization, 
modernization, Americanization, poverty, socioeconomic inequality, and lack of democracy 
all help facilitate Islamic collective behavior, specifically the rise and success of Islamic 
fundamentalists.  I was able to show that both perfect democracies and perfect autocracies 
have fewer fundamentalist movements while states with opening political institutions have 
more fundamentalist movements.  Also, when governments disdainfully kill or torture their 
citizens without regard to basic human rights, there will be a decrease in the number Islamic 
fundamentalist movements.  On the other hand, the more freedom of speech a nation-state 
has, the fewer fundamentalist movements it has.  There is an inverted-U shaped relationship 
with the number and success of Islamic fundamentalist movements; the number of 
movements is the strongest in systems which are neither perfect democracies nor perfect 
autocracies.  In other words, there are more fundamentalist movements in the middle of the 
political spectrum.  This was verified in the Sadat and Mubarak presidencies in Egypt, the 
Palestinian territories, and Lebanon, the latter experiencing the most Islamic fundamentalist 
movements and happening to have the most open political institutions as compared to Egypt 
and Palestine.    
The final condition in my fundamentalist labyrinth are variables associated with the 
new social movement theory.  There is a positive relationship between the presence of ideas 
and Islamic fundamentalism.  New social movement theorists argue that social movement 
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participants are looking to enhance the quality of life for all sectors of society and that 
membership in social movements fall into two categories: those who are paying the costs of 
modernization and those who have been marginalized by the development of the welfare state 
and the new middle class.  Also, the rise and success of the Religious-Right plays an integral 
part in the new social movement literature; arguably, it is a pillar of the literature itself.  The 
first category is the case for Islamic movements.  Modernization via Westernization and 
Americanization are helping to facilitate the rise of Islamic fundamentalist movements.  One 
major similarity between the European/American Religious Right and Islamic 
fundamentalism is that both share the idea of religion and believe in the lack of secularism in 
everyday life, specifically in the sociopolitical and socioeconomic institutions.  Furthermore, 
the new social movement scholars challenge the conventional division of politics into left and 
right and broaden the definition of politics to include issues that had been considered outside 
the domain of politics; this is apparent in Islamic social movements.  New social movement 
participants are interested in intangible goods that would enhance the quality of life for all 
sectors of society.  This is also the objective of Islamic fundamentalists.  Furthermore, the 
radical/religious right acts as an outside ideological influence in the creation and duration of 
some European and North American social movements and politics.  There are three 
significant outside ideological forces in the Islamic world that operate within Islamic nation-
states: Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States.  Each is positively associated with Islamic 
fundamentalism.  Religious freedom also plays an important role here; not only when 
governments restrict religious freedom do we see an increase in the number Islamic 
fundamentalist movements, but we also see a significant increase in terrorism.  This was 
reconfirmed under the Sadat and Mubarak presidencies when both restricted and occupied 
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religious institutions.  This was also seen in both Lebanon and the Palestinian territories when 
Israeli troops occupied mosques.        
My dissertation makes significant contributions not only to the field of political 
science and its respective subfields of international relations and comparative politics but also 
to sociology, religious studies, and Islamic studies.  I have added what could become a 
significant theory to the social movement literature; the first large-N analysis in the Islamic 
fundamentalism literature; and, I have married the social movement literature and the Islamic 
fundamentalist literature, further blurring the point of demarcation between international 
relations and comparative politics in the political science literature.  The implications of my 
study are paramount because Islamic fundamentalism is currently one of the greatest threats 
to the modern nation-state and international politics.  Finally, there are two broader 
implications from my dissertation; first, we now know what state-level phenomena are 
positively associated with Islamic fundamentalism.  This, in turn means we, as a global 
community, can start the process of combating the violence and terrorism associated with 
Islamic fundaments movements.  Secondly, I have provided a positive analysis of the Islamic 
world and hopefully facilitated greater cultural and religious awareness.   
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Appendix One: Variables and Coding  
Total Population274 Population is the total population of the nation-state in 
question. 
GDP GDP is the gross value of all products and services 
produced within the nation-state per year. 
Official development 
assistance275 
The ODA statistics comprises grants and/or loans to 
developing nation-stats and/or territories. 
American Financial Aid American Financial Aid is the total amount of American 
financial and military aid for each nation-state included in 
my dissertation and for each year (thousands of U.S. 
dollars) 
Unemployment276 Unemployment is the percentage of the population that is 
unemployed.   
Poverty Poverty is the percentage of the population that is living 
below their state’s recognized poverty level. Again, the 
World Bank’s data on unemployment and poverty is very 
limited and arguably, racist.  To rectify this, I have used the 
CIA World Fact Book From 1989-2005 
http://www.theodora.com/wfb/abc_world_fact_book.html.  
For data prior to 1989 I used numerous sources and they 
                                                
274 Population, GDP, and ODA statistics were obtained from the World Bank Development 
Statistics.  The World Bank draws on a Varity of sources for the statistics published in the World 
Development Indicators.  They include the World Bank, the United Nations, the International 
Monetary Fund, and from country reports to the World Bank.  Bank staff estimates are also used 
to improve correctness or consistency.  For most countries, national accounts estimates are 
obtained from member governments through World Bank economic missions.  Most social data 
from national sources are drawn from regular administrative files, special surveys, or periodic 
census.  The World Bank argues that considerable effort has been made to standardize the data, 
but full comparability cannot be assured, and care must be taken in interpreting the indicators.  
Data coverage may not be complete because of special circumstances for economies experiencing 
problems affecting the collection and reporting of data. However, the World Bank did not have 
any accurate statistics for the Palestinian territories; to obtain the Palestinian data I used the 
Palestinian Bureau of Statistics: All Palestinian data can be found at:  http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/ 
275 The World Bank got the ODA data from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) list of aid recipients.  However, 
grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. Also excluded are aid to more 
advanced developing and transition countries as determined by the DAC 
276 The world banks data on unemployment and poverty is very limited and arguably, racist.  It 
does an excellent job at collecting data from the Christian world but seems to ignore the Muslim 
world.  Also, data that existed in the World Bank data set was incorrect; the World Bank collects 
the data based on what the specific nation-states report.  It is a known fact that states do not report 
accurately 
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277 These books and articles include: Farrukh Iobal. 2006. Sustaining Gains in Poverty Reduction 
and Human Development in the Middle East and North Africa. World Bank Publications: NY, 
NY; Wassim Shahin. 2000. Earnings Inequality, Unemployment, and Poverty in the Middle East 
and North Africa. Greenwood Press; New York; M. El-Ghonemy. 1998. Affluence and Poverty in 
the Middle East. Rutledge Press; Michael Bonine. 1997. Population, Poverty, and Politics in 
Middle East Cities. University of Florida Press; World Bank. 2004. Unlocking the Employment 
Potential in the Middle East and North Africa: Toward a New Social Contract.  Iranian data was 
obtained from: Fatemi, Khosrow. November 1980. International Journal of Middle East Studies. 
The Iranian Revolution: It’s Impact on Economic relations with eh United States. Pages 303-317; 
James Scoville. October 1985. The Labor Market in Pre-Revolutionary Iran. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change. Pages 143-155; the following link looks at Iranian 
unemployment: www.phil.frb.org/money_in_motion/lessons/MonetaryPolicyGrades9-12.pdf; 
Algerian data was obtained from: Meredeth Turshen. November 2004. Armed Violence and 
Poverty in Algeria: A Mini Case Study for the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative November 
2004. Center for International Cooperation and Security. Pages 1-18.  
www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/country/nafr_pdf/mideast-algeria-2004.pdf; Abbi 
Kedir and Andrew Mckay. February 2005. Chronic Poverty in Urban Ethiopia" Panel Data 
Evidence. International Planning Studies. Pages 49-67. 
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cips/2005/00000010/00000001/art00004?crawl
er=true. World Bank Data article: 
wbln0018.worldbank.org/.../de9638da553fbfbf8525678a0070b1af/94da822c24124e0b85256b220
05c3e4b? 
 Stefan Dercon. September 2000. Changes in Poverty and Social Indicators in Ethiopia in the 
1990s. Found at: 
www.economics.ox.ac.uk/members/stefan.dercon/CHANGES%20IN%20POVERTY%20AND%
20SOCIAL%20INDICATORS.pdf; Asmamaw Enquobahrie. March 2004. Understanding 
Poverty: The Ethiopian context: Paper was presented at the Gambian AAPAM Roundtable 
Conference in Gambia: 
unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/AAPAM/UNPAN025674.pdf; Terrazas, Aran 
Matteo. June 2007. Beyond regional Circularity: The Emergence of an Ethiopian Diaspora. 
www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=604; Francis Teal. March 2000. 
Employment and Unemployment in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview. Center for the Study of 
African Economies: University of Oxford. www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2000-
OiA/pdfpapers/teal.PDF 
Banglades Uemployment ratesee:http://banglapedia.search.com.bd/HT/U_0017.htm 
www.indexmundi.com/bangladesh/unemployment_rate.html;   
http://www.airninja.com/worldfacts/countries/Bangladesh/unemployment.htm 
Iraq: CIA Reports: Iraq Eonomic Data 1989-2003:  
https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/chap2_annxD.html 
www.einnews.com/iraq/newsfeed-iraq-unemployment; Human Development Report. 2006. 
http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_BRN.html; Bahrain: Eradicate 
Extreme Poverty and Hunger. 
http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_BRN.html 
 Brunei: http://www.populstat.info/Asia/bruneig.htm; Tanzania: International Monetary Fund. 
September 2004. Tanzania: Poverty Reducton Strategy Paper Progress Report. 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04282.pdf; Tanzania: 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04282.pdf; Also used was the United Nations 
  284 
include numerous books and articles concerning Middle 
Eastern poverty and unemployment.277 
Polity  Polity is a combined score that is computed by subtracting 
the polity autocracy score278 from the polity democracy 
score279; the resulting unified polity score ranges from +10 
(strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).280   
                                                                                                                                                  
Unemployment and poverty statistics at: 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cdb/cdb_series_xrxx.asp?series_code=29999; Palestinian Data: 
http://www.mena.gov.ps/part3/economy.htm; 
http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/mdgs/c82ccc8f-341b-487b-9ed3-eff0c0604887.pdf; Onn 
Winckler. 1997. Rapid Population Growth and the Fertility Policies of the Arab Countries and 
North Africa. Middle Eastern Natural environments. Pages 444-466.   
http://environment.yale.edu/documents/downloads/0-9/103winckler.pdf 
278 An eleven point Autocracy scale is constructed.  The operational indicator of autocracy is 
derived from coding of the competitiveness of political participation, the registration of 
participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the 
chef executive using the following: 
Authority Coding 
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (xrcomp) 
     (1) Selection     +2 
Openness of Executive Recruitment (xropen) 
Only if xrcomp is ceded selection (1) 
(1) Closed       +1 
(2) (2) Dual/designation   +1 
Constraints on Chief Executive (xconst): 
(1) Unlimited authority   +3 
(2) Intermediate category   +2 
(3) Slight to moderate limitations  +1 
Regulation of participation (parreg) 
      (4) Restricted     +2 
      (3) Sectarian     +1 
Competitiveness of Participation (parcomp): 
      (1) Repressed     +2 
      (2) Suppressed     +1 
279 The democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10).  The operational indicator of 
democracy is derived from coding of the competitiveness of political participation, the openness 
and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints of the chief executive using the 
following: 
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (xrcomp) 
(3) Election     +2 
(2) Transitional    +1 
Openness of Executive Recruitment (xropen) 
Only if xrcomp is election (3) or transitional (2) 
(3) Duel/election      +1 
(4) Election      +1 
Constraint of Chief Executive (xconst): 
(7) Executive parity or subordination   +4 
  285 
 
Executive Recruitment  Executive recruitment involves the ways in which social 
superordinantes come to occupy their positions of political 
authority; how institutionalized, competitive and open are 
the mechanisms for selecting a political leader.  Democratic 
systems are defined as those polities that afford their 
citizens the opportunity to replace their political 
representatives through regularly scheduled, competitive 
and open elections.  These procedural dimensions of 
democracy have been captured by three key variables from 
the polity data set and they include: (1) the extent of 
institutionalization or regulation of executive transfers, (2) 
the competitiveness of executive selection, and (3) the 
openness of executive recruitment.  The executive 
recruitment score ranges from 1 to 8.  1 being the most 
restricted and 8 being the most open. 
Executive Constraints  Executive Constraints refers to the extent of institutional 
constraints on the decision-making powers of the chief 
executive.  The degree of checks and balances between the 
various parts of the government is coded on a 7-point scale 
which ranges from the “unlimited executive authority” (1) 
to executive parity or subordination” (7). 
Political Competition  According to Marshall and Jaggers (2005: 68) the polity 
dataset measures two dimensions of political competition: 
(1) the degree of institutionalization, or regulation, or 
political competition and (2) the extent of government 
restriction on political competition.  Participation is 
institutionalized or regulated to the extent that there are 
binding rules on how political preferences are organized and 
expressed.  The competitiveness of political participation 
refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for 
policy formation and leadership roles can be pursued in the 
political arena.        
                                                                                                                                                  
(6) Intermediate category     +3 
(5) Substantial limitations     +2 
(4) Intermediate category      +1 
Competitiveness of Political Participation (parcomp) 
(5) Competitive     +3 
(4) Transitional    +2 
(3) Factional      +1 
280 All data was obtained from the Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and 
Transitions, 1800-2004.  Principle Investigators: Monty Marshall (Center for Global Policy at the 
George Mason University) and Keith Jaggers (Colorado State University). 2005. Center for 
Global Policy. School of Public Policy: George Mason University. www.cidcm.umd.edu//polity 
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Political Rights Political rights data was obtained from the CIRI Human 
Rights Data Project.281  The CIRI project graded countries 
between 1(most free) and 7 (least free).282 
 
Extrajudicial Killings Extrajudicial Killings are killings by government officials 
without due process of law.  These killings may result from 
the deliberate, illegal, and excessive use of lethal force by 
police, security forces, or other agents of the state whether 
against criminal suspects, detainees, prisoners, or others.283   
 
Coding Scheme: 
Political or Extrajudicial Killings are: 
(0) Practiced Frequently (50 or more) 
(1) Practiced Occasionally (From 1-49) 
(2) Have not occurred (Zero) 
Disappearances Disappearances are cases in which people have disappeared, 
political motivation appears likely, and the victims have not 
been found.  Knowledge of the whereabouts off the 
disappeared is, by definition, not public knowledge.  In most 
instances, disappearances occur because of the victim’s 
ethnicity religion or race or because of the victim’s political 
involvement or knowledge of information sensitive to 
                                                
281 CIRI Human Rights Data Project: The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset 
contains standards-based quantitative information on government respect for 13 internationally 
recognized human rights for 195 countries, annually from 1981-2004. It is designed for use by 
scholars and students who seek to test theories about the causes and consequences of human 
rights violations, as well as policy makers and analysts who seek to estimate the human rights 
effects of a wide variety of institutional changes and public policies including democratization, 
economic aid, military aid, structural adjustment, and humanitarian intervention.  The CIRI 
Human Rights Dataset: Contains measures of government human rights practices and contains 
measures of specific human rights practices and it describes a wide variety of government human 
rights practices. 
282 They based political rights on the ability for people to participate freely in the political 
process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete 
for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a 
decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate.   
283 In most cases, the US State Department and Amnesty International indicate cases of political 
killings by explicitly referring to these killings as “political”. A victim of politically-motivated 
killings is someone who is killed by a government or its agents as a result of his or her 
involvement in political activities or for supporting (implicitly or explicitly) the political actions 
of opposition movements against the existing government.   
284 Often, victims are referred to by governments as “terrorists: and labeled a threat to national 
security.  Knowledge of the whereabouts of the disappeared is, by definition, not public 
knowledge.  However, while there is typically no way of knowing where the victims are, it is 
typically known by whom they were taken and under what circumstances.  In many instances, 
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authorities.284 
 
The Coding Scheme: 
Disappearances: 
(0) Have occurred frequently (50 or more) 
(1) Have occurred occasionally (From 1 to 49) 
(2) Have not occurred (Zero) 
Torture Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, 
whether mental or physical, by government officials or by 
private individuals at the instigation of government officials.  
Torture includes the use of physical and other force by 
police and prison guards that is cruel, inhumane, or 
degrading.  This also includes deaths in custody due to 
negligence by government officials.   
 
The Coding Scheme:285 
Torture is  
(0) Practiced frequently (50 or more) 
(1) Practices occasionally (from 1 to 49) 
(2) Not practiced (Zero) 
 
Political Imprisonment Political imprisonment refers to the incarnations of people 
by government officials because of: their speech, their non-
violent opposition to government policies or leaders; their 
religious beliefs; their non-violent religious practices 
including proselytizing; or their membership in a group, 
including ethic or racial groups.286   
 
The Coding Scheme 
Are there any people imprisoned because of their political 
religious or other beliefs?287 
(0) Yes and many (50 or more) 
(1) Yes, but few (From 1 to 49) 
(2) None (Zero) 
                                                                                                                                                  
victims are taken under false pretense, such as having been taken away for questioning due to 
suspicion of some political action that is in oppositions to the government.   
285 The coding scores above are based on the number of instances of torture (persons tortured) 
that occurred in a country during the year in question and only in that year 
286 A “political of consciences” is someone that was imprisoned because of his/her beliefs.  A 
political prisoner is a prisoner of consciences.  They also include prisoners that are imprisoned as 
a result of their religious beliefs, or practices.  CIRI treats both political prisoners and prisoners of 
conscience as the same. 
287 Total Prisoners = New Prisoners taken + Old Prisoners still being held – Old Prisoners no 
longer being held 
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Freedom of Speech Freedom of speech includes the extent to which freedoms of 
speech and press are affected by government censorship, 
including ownership of media outlets.  Censorship is any 
form of restriction that is placed on freedom of press, speech 
or expression.  Expression may be in the form of art or 
music.  There are different degrees of censorship.  Complete 
censorship denies citizens freedom of speech, and does not 
allow the printing or broadcasting media to express 
opposing views that challenge the policies of the existing 
government.   
 
Coding Scheme: 
Government censorship and/or ownership of the media are: 
(0) Complete 
(1) Some288 
(2) None289 
(9) Not mentioned  
 
Freedom of Religion Freedom of religion indicates the extent to which the 
freedom of citizens to exercise and practice their own 
religious beliefs is subject to actual government restrictions.  
Citizens should be able to freely practice their religion and 
proselytize (attempt to convert) other citizens to their 
religion s long as such attempts are done in a non-coercive, 
peaceful manner.  Does the government respect rights 
including the freedom to publish religious documents in 
foreign languages?  Does religious beliefs affects 
membership in a ruling party or a career in government?  
Does the government prohibit promotion of one religion 
over another and discrimination on the grounds of religion 
or belief?  Does the government restrict the teaching or 
practice of any faith?  Does the government discriminate 
against minority religious groups? 
 
Coding Scheme: 
There are restrictions on some religious practices by the 
government: 
(0) Yes 
                                                                                                                                                  
The coding scores above are based on the number of political prisoners held by the government 
ruling the county one is coding.  This indicator is not merely based on the number of political 
prisoners taken in a given year, but rather the number of political prisoners held in a given year 
288 Some censorship means the government places some restrictions yet does allow limited rights 
to freedom of speech and press.   
289 No censorship means the freedom to speak freely and to print opposing opinions without fear 
of prosecution.  It must be noted that none in no way implies absolute freedom, as there exists in 
all countries some restrictions on information and/or communication 
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(1) No 
      (9) Not mentioned 
Freedom of Movement Freedom of Movement is the freedom to travel within one’s 
country and to leave and return to one’s country is a right.  
There are governments that do not allow citizens to travel 
within their own country of birth or that restrict the 
movement of certain groups based on political or religious 
grounds.  There are countries that do not allow citizens to 
leave.  There are countries were even if one is allowed to 
leave there are restrictions on the duration of the stay 
abroad.  Citizens can lose their property and other assets if 
they leave for a very long time; some citizens have to get 
permission to leave, and others, when they leave, are not 
allowed to return or if they are allowed to return the 
government makes it very difficult. 
 
Coding Scheme: 
Domestic and Foreign Travel is: 
(0) restricted290 
(1) Generally unrestricted291 
(2) Not mentioned 
Freedom of Assembly and 
Association 
Freedom of Assembly and Association is internationally 
recognized right of citizens to assembly freely and to 
associate with other persons in political parties, trade 
unions, cultural organizations, or other special-interest 
groups.  This variable evaluates the extent to which freedom 
of assembly and the association are subject to actual 
governmental limitations to restrictions (as opposed to 
strictly legal protections).   
 
Coding Scheme 
Citizens’ rights to freedom of assembly and association are: 
 
(0) Severely restricted or denied completely to all 
citizens292 
(1) Limited for all citizens or severely restricted or 
denied for select groups293 
(2) Virtually unrestricted and freely enjoyed by 
practically all citizens294 
                                                
290 ZERO: A government receiving a ZERO restricts all citizens’ freedom of movement or 
restricts the movement of a significant number of citizens based on their ethnicity, gender, race, 
religion, political convictions, or membership in a group.   
291 ONE:  A country receiving a ONE provides for freedom of movement for most or all of its 
citizens.  It must be noted that generally unrestricted does not mean the absence of all restrictions 
and complete freedom of movement.  In many countries, there are minor prohibitions or 
restrictions imposed on this right 
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Political Participation 
 
Political Participation is the right of citizens to freely 
determine their own political system and leadership is 
known as the right to self-determination.  Enjoyment of this 
right means that citizens have both the legal right and the 
ability in practice to change the laws and officials that 
govern them through periodic, free, and fair elections held 
on the basis of universal adult suffrage.   
 
Coding Scheme: 
Political Participation is: 
(0) Very limited295 
(1) Moderately free and open296 
(2) Very free and open297   
Workers Rights Workers should have freedom of association at their 
workplace and the right to bargain collectively with their 
employers.  In addition, they should have other rights at 
work.  The 1984 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
agreement of the World Trade Organizations requires 
reporting on worker rights in GSP beneficiary nation-states.   
It states that internationally recognized worker rights 
include: (a) the right of association; (b) the right to organize 
and bargain collectively; (c) a prohibition on the use of any 
form of forced or compulsory labor; (d) a minimum age for 
                                                                                                                                                  
292 ZERO: a government receiving a ZERO routinely denies or severely restricts all citizens’ 
freedom of assembly and association or restricts this right for a significant number of citizens 
based on their gender, race, religion, or other criteria 
293 ONE: a government receiving a ONE typically places some restrictions on assembly and 
association for all citizens, or severely restricts or denies these rights to particular groups.   
294 TWO: a country receiving a TWO provides for freedom of assembly and association virtually 
all its citizens.  It must be noted that this in no way implies absolute freedom to assemble and 
associate.  Even in the freest democracies there are minor prohibitions or restrictions imposed on 
these rights; particularly if they credibly threaten national security, public safety and/or order, or 
if the exercise of these rights infringes unduly on the rights of others 
295 In a state receiving a score of ZERO, the right to self-determination through political 
participation does not exist either in law or in practice.  The government systematically retaliates 
against citizens who seek to possess this right through intimidation, threats, violence, arrest, 
detention, and other coercive methods of control 
296 In a state receiving a score of ONE, citizens have the legal right to self-determination.  
However, in practice there are some limitations that inhibit citizens from fully exercising this 
right fully.  Instances where government respect for citizens’ right to self-determination is 
described as “somewhat limited,” “partial.” “not fully guaranteed,” will be coded as a ONE.    
297 In a state receiving a score of TWO, citizens have the right to self-determination under the 
law, and exercise this right in practice through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis 
of universal suffrage.  The electoral process is transparent and fair.  There are no allegations of 
vote tampering, electoral fraud, and official intimidation of citizens/opposition political parties 
that can be corroborated by independent election observers.   
  291 
the employment of children; and (e) acceptable conditions 
of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and 
occupational safety and health. 
 
Coding Scheme 
Worker’s rights are: 
(0) Severely Restricted298 
(1)  Somewhat Restricted299 
(2) Fully Protected300  
Women’s Political Rights 
 
Women’s political rights include a number of internationally 
recognized rights these rights include: 
The right to vote 
The right to run for political office 
The right to hold elected and appointed government 
positions 
The right to join political parties 
The right to petition government officials 
 
Coding Scheme: 
Regarding the political equality of women: 
(0) None of women’s political rights are guaranteed by 
law. There are laws that completely restrict the 
participation of women in the political process 
(1) Political equality is guaranteed by law.  However, 
there are significant limitations in practice. Women 
                                                                                                                                                  
298 A county will be coded a ZERO if the government did not protect the rights of almost all 
private workers rights to freedom of association at the workplace.  Governments that restrict 
unions from political activity; governments that also fail to act in the face of employer 
discrimination of workers trying to organize or specific attacks on unions. Also, the government 
does not protect the right to bargain collectively.   
299 A state having one or more of the following it will be coded a ONE: Many public employees 
are not allowed freedom of association at the workplace or are not allowed collective bargaining 
rights.  Teachers of doctors are not allowed freedom of association at the workplace or are  not 
allowed collective bargaining rights.  There is forced or compulsory labor (defined as work or 
service exacted under the menace of penalty and for which a person has not volunteered).  If 
children under the age of 14 are working.  Discrimination in hiring or treatment.  There is no 
minimum wage. Sympathy strikes are not allowed. Strikes for political reasons are not allowed. 
There is one union allowed per industrial sector, territorial jurisdiction, or occupational 
classification, but that union operates independently from government authority. 
300 A state should be coded a TWO if it meets ALL of the following conditions: The government 
protected the rights of the vast majority of workers in the private sector to freedom of association 
at the workplace.  The government protected the right to bargain collectively for the vast majority 
of workers in the private sector and includes private sectors workers right to strike.  A country 
wills till have a TWO id police, military, firefighters, or emergency workers are not allowed to 
strike.  And no other significant problems regarding protections of worker’s rights were 
mentioned.   
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hold less than five percent of seats in the national 
legislature and in other high-ranking government 
positions 
(2) Political equality guaranteed by law.  Women hold 
more than five percent but less than thirty percent of 
seats in the national legislature and/or in other high-
ranking government positions 
(3)  Political equality is guaranteed by law and in 
practice.  Women hold more than thirty percent of 
seats in the national legislature and/or in other high-
ranking government positions.  
The presence of an outside 
ideological force 
This is a dichotomous variable I created that looks at if there 
is a significant outside ideological force present.  To be 
considered a significant outside ideological force ALL of 
the following criteria MUST be present per each year:  
 
• The outside support must be in the form of financial, 
military, or humanitarian aid from a state and not 
from the state where the fundamentalist group is 
located. 
 
• There must be a physical presence of the ideological 
force within the country via state representatives, 
scholars, religious leaders, state sponsored militia, 
military, or any group representing the ideological 
state.  Or, the members of the fundamentalist group 
are being trained within or educated within the 
foreign state.   
 
• More than one group must receive significant 
influence; however, if the group is counted as three 
because of its size and membership then only one 
group needs to be receiving significant aid from an 
outside ideological force. 
 
• The outside ideological force cannot be working 
with, for, or influenced by the state in which the 
fundamentalist group is working within.   
 
• For the outside ideological force to be considered 
significant if must influence a fundamentalist group 
for two or more consecutive years 
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Freedom House: Civil 
Liberties301 
Civil liberties include the freedom(s) of expression and 
belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, 
and personal autonomy without interference from the state.  
The more specific list of rights considered vary over the 
years.  Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 
(least free).  Civil Liberty questions are classified in four 
categories. Each survey question is answered with a number 
of raw points between zero (no, absolutely false) and 4 (yes, 
completely true).  Usually, the sum of these raw points is 
used to calculate a country’s Civil Liberties Rating.  The 
survey team may make small adjustments for factors such as 
extreme violence that cannot be reflected in survey 
questions.302 
Freedom House: Political 
Rights 
 
Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least 
free).303 
                                                
301 Source: Freedom House. 2005. Freedom in the World 2005: The Annual Survey of Political 
Rights and Civil Liberties.  Available at: FreedomHouse.org.  New York: Freedom House 
302 The civil liberty questions: 
1. Freedom of expression and belief: measures freedom of press, religious freedom, and 
freedom of cultural expression 
2. Association and Organizational rights: measures freedom of assembly and organization, 
the ability to create trade unions and other free private organizations 
3. Rule of law: Ascertains if there is an independent judiciary, protection from political 
terror, and equal protection under the law 
4. Personal autonomy and individual rights: includes free private discussions, property 
rights, personal autonomy, and personal freedoms 
303 The following are the questions associated with the Freedom House political rights scale: 
1. Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through free 
and fair elections?  
2. Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?  
3. Are there fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling, and honest 
tabulation of ballots?  
4. Are the voters able to endow their freely elected representatives with real power?  
5. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive 
political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these 
competing parties or groupings?  
6. Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic possibility for 
the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?  
7. Are the people free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, 
religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group?  
8. Do cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups have reasonable self-determination, 
self-government, autonomy, or participation through informal consensus in the decision-
making process? 
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Troops304 Troops are the number of United States troops in each state 
included in my dissertation. The data consists of the number 
of military personal per country per year.  Data has been 
obtained from the Global U.S. Troop Development, 1950-
2005.305 
Secondary School 
Enrolment 
Secondary school enrollment ratio is the ratio of total 
enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age 
group that officially corresponds to the secondary level of 
education. Estimates are based on UNESCO's classification 
of education levels. Secondary provides general or 
specialized instruction at middle, secondary, or high 
schools, teacher training schools, vocational or technical 
schools; this level of education is based on at least four 
years of instruction at the first level. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
304 Dataset was compiled my Dr. Tim Kane, Research Fellow, Center for Data Analysis, The 
Heritage Foundation 
305 website: www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/troopdb.cmf 
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Appendix Two: Unique Groups as Dependent Variable  
  
Hypothesis One: Marxism                
  
Population Total .0007277*** 
(.0001631) 
1.000728 
U.S. Financial Aid .0000193 
(.000115) 
1.000019 
Official Development 
Assistance 
5.92-06* 
(3.51e-06) 
1.000006 
Outside Ideological Force .4674005*** 
(.0577304) 
1.59584 
Poverty 
 
.0073815*** 
(.0029839) 
1.007409 
Unemployment 
 
.0166113*** 
(.0025079) 
1.01675 
School Enrolment .006033*** 
(.0014485) 
1.006051 
Women’s Political Rights .0392059 
(.0351259) 
1.039985 
Workers Rights -.0017028 
(..004901) 
.9982987 
Polity -.0050991 
(.0043614) 
.99649139 
Political Prison  .0084847 
(.0368259) 
1.008521 
Killings -.0354128 
(.0292921) 
.9642422 
Freedom of Movement -.0803545* 
(.0441738) 
.9227892 
Religious Freedom .0500086 
(.0423628) 
1.05128 
Freedom of Speech .0640035* 
(.0379194) 
1.066096 
Notes: *P < .10; **P < .05; ***P < .01. 
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Hypothesis Two: Resource Mobilization                              
  
Population Total .0007625*** 
(.00016) 
1.000763 
GDP 
 
8.33e-08 
(5.31e-08) 
1 
U.S. Troops 
 
3.14e-06 
(8.56e-06) 
1.000003 
U.S. Financial Aid .000032 
(.0001136) 
1.000032 
Official Development 
Assistance 
5.61e-06** 
(3.47e-06) 
1.000006 
Outside Ideological Force .4634161*** 
(.0574529) 
1.589495 
Poverty 
 
.0075836*** 
(.0029653) 
1.007612 
Unemployment 
 
.0160083*** 
(.0024373) 
.0024767 
School Enrolment .0062856*** 
(.001423) 
1.006305 
Polity -.0045804 
(.0043056) 
.9954301 
Political Prison  .0228405 
(.0378395) 
1.023103 
Killings -.0378825 
(.029178) 
.9628261 
Freedom of Movement -.0757751* 
(.0441027) 
.9270246 
Religious Freedom .045059 
(.0422123) 
1.04609 
Freedom of Speech .0709265* 
(.0381243) 
1.073502 
Notes: *P < .10; **P < .05; ***P < .01. 
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Hypothesis Four: New Social Movements                               
  
Population Total .0012506*** 
(.0001645) 
.0012304*** 
(.0001638) 
GDP 
 
7.51e-08 
(5.78e-08) 
8.46r-08 
(5.81e-08) 
U.S. Troops 
 
-2.25e-06 
(9.66e-06) 
-1.55e-06 
(9.72e-06) 
U.S. Financial Aid .0000177 
(.000124) 
.0000503 
(.0001248) 
Official Development 
Assistance 
3.81e-06 
(3.76e-06) 
4.19e-06 
(3.70e-06) 
Outside Ideological Force .3555338*** 
(.0506571) 
.367800*** 
(.060197) 
Poverty 
 
.0084732** 
(.0032711) 
.008573** 
(.0032205) 
Unemployment 
 
.0185884*** 
(.0027548) 
.0186926*** 
(.0026824) 
School Enrolment .0074567*** 
(.0015747) 
.0073571*** 
(.0015792) 
Women’s Political Rights .0002785 
(.0017645) 
.0245883 
(.037462) 
Workers Rights -.0090786 
(.0009176) 
-.0017832 
(.0049525) 
Polity -.0007081 
(.0052594) 
-.0003363 
(.0052317) 
Religious Freedom .0431137** 
(.0449701) 
_________ 
Freedom of Speech  .0008386* 
(.0390537) 
_________ 
Freedom of Movement -.1266609*** 
(.0463356) 
_________ 
Freedom House Civil 
Liberties 
___________ -.029231** 
(.0264882) 
Notes: *P < .10; **P < .05; ***P < .01. 
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Hypothesis Three: Political Process                                
 Polity Variables 
Population Total .0007271*** 
(.0001649) 
.0010971*** 
(.0001724) 
U.S. Financial Aid .0000316 
(.0001151) 
.000795 
(.0001257) 
Official Development 
Assistance 
5.81e-08* 
(3.50e-06) 
2.91e-06 
(3.78e-06) 
Outside Ideological Force .4606825*** 
(.0581662) 
.4164054*** 
(.0404815) 
Poverty 
 
.0079388** 
(.0030051) 
.0094938*** 
(.0032654) 
Unemployment 
 
.0164339*** 
(.0025846) 
.016868*** 
(.0028151) 
School Enrolment .0063741*** 
(.0014691) 
.0070899*** 
(.00145103) 
Polity -.0047815 
(.0043501) 
__________ 
Polity2 __________ 
 
-.000733 
(.0009573) 
Religious Freedom .0383089 
(.0411846) 
.0424891 
(.047479) 
Freedom of Speech  .0142223 
(.0410733) 
.01218913 
(.0412773) 
Freedom of Movement -.1213392*** 
(.0468029) 
-.1127868*** 
(.0477281) 
Freedom House Political 
Rights 
.0005265 
(.0229986) 
-.0046229 
(.0200294) 
Killings -.0329742* 
(.0255133) 
-.050563* 
(.0299616) 
Torture -.0213006** 
(.033846) 
-.0159055** 
(.390052) 
Notes: *P < .10; **P < .05; ***P < .01. 
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Hypothesis Three: Political Process                               
  Exrec Exrec-Squared 
Population 
Total 
.000728*** 
(.000171) 
.0007554*** 
(.0001675) 
.0010949*** 
(.0001714) 
.0010603*** 
(.0001748) 
.0009478*** 
(.0001441) 
.0009512*** 
(.0001437) 
U.S. Financial 
Aid 
.0000666 
(.000114) 
.0000387 
(.0001145) 
.0001012 
(.0001226) 
.0001064 
(.0001234) 
.0001065 
(.0001129) 
.0001074 
(.0001128) 
Official 
Development 
Assistance 
4.10e-06 
(3.58e-06) 
4.69e-06 
(3.57e-06) 
2.90e-06 
3.77e-06 
5.57e-06 
(3.80e-06) 
6.12e-06* 
(3.63e-06) 
6.21e-06 
(3.63e-06) 
Outside 
Ideological 
Force 
.4787494*** 
(.0586843) 
.487487*** 
(.0495989) 
.440967*** 
(.047985) 
.429001*** 
(0500189) 
.4141337*** 
(.0558368) 
.4156351*** 
(.0556862) 
Poverty 
 
.0077217*** 
(.0029878) 
.0076399*** 
(.0030129) 
.0091843*** 
(0032263) 
.0075819** 
(.0032992) 
.003377*** 
(.0022337) 
.0033609** 
(.0022327) 
Unemployment 
 
.014927*** 
(.0025861 
.0158765*** 
(.0025702) 
.0171081*** 
(.0027784) 
.0177083*** 
(.0028232) 
.0140407*** 
(.0022696) 
.013996*** 
(.0022733) 
School 
Enrolment 
.0063417*** 
(.0014283) 
.0061918*** 
(.0014354) 
.0069154*** 
(.0015509) 
.0081693*** 
(.0015633) 
.0043908*** 
(.0013134) 
.0044131*** 
(.0013095) 
Women’s 
Political Rights 
.0315135 
(.0367708) 
.0224587 
(.0367416) 
.0235056 
(.0392037) 
.0088022 
(.025693) 
-.0089885 
(.0344629) 
-.0080137 
(.0343447) 
Workers 
Rights 
-.0000301 
(.0049129) 
-.0005386 
(.0048987) 
-.0013117 
(.0050016) 
-.0018728 
(.000878) 
-.0014547 
(.0050575) 
-.0014009 
(.0050572) 
Religious 
Freedom 
.0286023* 
(.0428189) 
.0319412 
(.0424704) 
.0322565 
(.0462838) 
.0332154 
(.0452226) 
.040414 
(.0389702) 
.0398854 
(.0389089) 
Freedom of 
Speech  
.0561845 
(.0386068) 
.0474379 
(.0380653) 
.0175027 
(.0404864 
.0254491 
(.0401669) 
-.0148472 
(.0349133) 
-.0152799 
(.0349325) 
Freedom of 
Movement 
-
.0447993*** 
(.0448532) 
-
.0443387*** 
(.045279) 
-
.1197671*** 
(.0466831) 
-.087660*** 
(.0098761) 
-.0627478** 
(.0436489) 
-
.0620482*** 
(.0437431) 
Freedom of 
Association 
.0810361** 
(.0358506) 
.079316** 
(.0358973) 
.0668489* 
(.0361924) 
.0672267* 
(.0361954) 
.0741782** 
(.0357923) 
.075214** 
(.0357371 
Disappearances -.0150776 
(.0298667) 
-.082197 
(.0298717) 
-.0204052 
(.0299149) 
-.0200756 
(.0298911) 
-.0210778 
(.0297593) 
-.0205262 
(.0297492 
Killings -.0575254* 
(.0316718) 
-.0447721* 
(.0270646) 
-.0568608** 
(.0289533) 
-.0423884 
(.0314921) 
-.0464668* 
(.0255919) 
-.0464413* 
(.0255912) 
Torture .0392728 
(.0414281) 
-.0021423 
(.0351396) 
-.0207869 
(.0389424) 
-.095322** 
(.0391982) 
-.0935278** 
(-.0935278 
-.0948934** 
(.0390744) 
Executive 
Recruitment 
.038524*** 
(.014344) 
________ _________ _________ __________ _________ 
Executive 
Recruitment 
Squared 
_________ -.003019*** 
(.0013415) 
__________ _________ __________ _________ 
Executive 
Constraints 
_________ ________ .0107128** 
(.0142839) 
__________ __________ _________ 
Executive 
Constraints 
Squared  
_________ ________ _________ -
.0003637*** 
(.0020456) 
__________ _________ 
Political 
Competition 
_________ ________ _________ _________ .0069663*** 
(.0087201) 
_________ 
Political 
Competition 
Squared 
_________ ________ _________ _________ _________ -.007289** 
(.3735376) 
Notes: *P < .10; **P < .05; ***P < .01. 
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Appendix Three: Fundamentalist Data Set 
Groups Name Year 
Founded 
Year 
Ended 
Leader Membership Group 
Location 
Year Number 
of 
Terrorist 
acts  
Number 
of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
1920 
Revolution 
Brigades306 
2003 Current Al-Zawba’I, 
Hatim 
Unknown Iraq 2004 
2006 
1 
1 
0 
0 
28 May 
Armenian 
Organization 
 
1977 Mid-
1990s 
Al-Baghdadi, 
Abdullah and 
Nikolas 
Leonidis 
Inactive Turkey 1977 2 0 
313307 2003 Current 
 
  
Unknown Unknown Pakistan 2003 1 0 
Abdullah 
Azzan 
Brigades308 
2004 Current Unknown Relatively 
Small 
Egypt  2005 
2006 
4 1 
Abu Al-
Abbas309 
2004 Inactive 
after 
2004 
Unknown Less than 20 Iraq 2004 1 0 
Abu Al-Rish 
Brigades310 
1993 Current Unknown Unknown West Bank 2005 
2006 
1 
14 
0 
0 
Abu Bakr Al-
Siddiq 
Fundamentali
st Brigades311  
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2004 
2006 
 
2 
1 
0 
0 
Abu Bakr 
Salafi 
Brigades 
 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2005 6  
Abu Bakr as-
Siddiq Saddiq 
Salafi 
Brigades 
 
2004 Current Unknown Unkn0wn Iraq 2005 2  
Abu Hafs Al-
Masri Brigade 
(Al-Qaeda in 
Europe)  
2003 Current Bendouda, 
Richard and 
Serhane ben 
Abdelmajid and 
Abdennabi 
Unknown Spain/ 
England 
2004 
2005 
 
5 
4 
 
1 
4 
                                                
306 This is a Sunni Islamic group in the Iraqi insurgency 
307 An anti-Shiite terrortist group that is composed of a number of other terrorsit groups that have been banned in 
Pakistan 
308 Al-Qaeda affiliated group;  
309 Fatah Hawks: Militant offshoot of the al-Fatah movement   
310 Militant offshoot of the mainstream al-Fatah movement, usually the groups is/was involved in simple 
shootings and motor attacks against Israeli settlers or soldiers in the Gaza Strip  
311 Also known as Salafist Brigades of Abu Bake al-Siddiq 
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Konjaa 
Abu Hafs El-
Masri 
Brigades312 
 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
 
2002 Current Al-Qaeda 
Affiliated  
Small Egypt 
Iraq 
Indonesia 
 
 
2003 
2004 
Violent 
Violent 
Many 
Many 
Abu Mus’ab 
Al-Zarqawi 
Battalion 
 
2006 Current Unknown Less than 100 Saudi 
Arabia 
Lebanon 
2006 1 0 
Abu Nayaf al-
Afghani 
(Al-Qaeda in 
Europe) 
2004 Inactive 
after 
2004 
Unknown Unknown Spain 2004 1 0 
Abu Nidal 
Organization
313 
1974 Current Isa, Zein and 
Tawfiq Musa 
and Luie Nijmeh 
Inactive 
400 
Palestinian  
Syrian 
Lebanon 
Iraq 
 
(Syria, 
Libya, Iraq) 
1976 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
 
3 
11 
5 
4 
8 
15 
16 
3 
12 
3 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Abu 
Zubaydah314 
 
2000 Current Al-Qaeda 
affiliated  
 
Very Small Jordan 
Palestine 
Saudi 
Arabia 
 
 Violent  
Achik 
National 
Volunteer 
Council 
(ANVC) 
1995 Current Unknown Unknown Bangladesh    
Al-Ittihad al-
Islami315 
 
1967 Current Unknown Unknown Eritrea 
Somalia  
 
1996 
1997 
2002316 
 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
Aden Abyan 
Islamic 
Army317  
1994 Inactive 
after 
2002 
Al-Atwi, Saleh 
Haidara and 
Usam Al-Masri 
30 Yemen  1998 
2002 
1 
1 
0 
0 
                                                
312 Group is named for an Al-Qaeda commander: Abu Hafs el-Masri (from Egypt) 
313 Abu Nidal Organization is the name by which Western intelligence and law-enforcement agencies refer to 
the umbrella organization compromising the Fatah Revolutionary Council and other Palestinian terrorist groups 
all headed by Sabri Khalil al Banna. Also known as Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Arab Revolutionary Council, 
Fatah Revolutionary Council, Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims   
314 This a obscure Al-Qaida affiliated military training committee  
315 Also known as the Islamic Union and/or Islamic Unity 
316 According to CNN and the United States State Department Al Ittighad al-Islami is on the top of the list of 
suspects for the Israeli owned hotel bombing in Kikambala, Kenya in November 2002, I will assume here that 
this group is responsible for this terrorist act.   
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and Zein al-
Abideen 
Afgan Arabs 
(Mujahideen) 
1986 Inactive 
after 
1992 
 Large318 Afghanista
n319 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Yemen 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Tunisia 
Iraq 
Libya 
 
   
AL-Ahway 
Brigades320 
2005 Current Aber, Yhayb  
Hamud Farhan 
and Sami Saud 
Hamas Al-
Ma’azizi and 
Ali abd-al-
Wahid Bani 
Unknown Iraq 2005 1 0 
Al-Ahwaz 
Arab People’s 
Democratic 
Front321 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iran 2005 4 0 
Al-Ali Bin 
Falah 
 
2001 2001 Unknown Unknown Yemen  2001 1 0 
AL-Aqsa 
Martyrs 
Brigades322 
2000 Current Abayat, Atef 
and Alaa al-
Hams 
Unknown Palestinian  
Israel 
2002 
2005 
2006 
6 
14 
100 
2 
0 
1 
Al-Arifeen 
Squad (The 
Holy Men)323 
2002 Current Unknown 300 Pakistan  2002 
2005 
2006 
3 
3 
2 
0 
0 
0 
Al Asalah324  
 
2002 Current Ghanim Al-
Buaneen 
Small Bahrain    
Al-Badr325 1970 Inactive 
after 
2002 
Afghani, 
Shahbaz and 
Janisar Akhtar 
and Ahmed 
Hamza 
300 Pakistan 2002 
 
1971 
1972 
1 
 
Many326 
0 
                                                                                                                                                  
317 Its main objective is the overthrow of the Yemeni government and removal of the West, specifically the 
United States from Yemen. Also known as: Aden Islamic Army, Army of Mohammad and the Jaish Aden al-
Islami, Islamic Aden Army, Islamic Army of Aden, Islamic Army of Aden-Abean (IAAA), Jaysh Adam, 
Muhammad’s Army   
318 Because of group size and/or membership; group will be counted three times  
319 The major consequence of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s was the formation of the cadre of 
Afgan Arabs willing to carry on war with the West.  Volunteers came from all over the Muslim world to 
perform Jihad against the Soviet Union.  These volunteers started arriving in 1986, partly stimulated by Saudi 
Arabian Airlines (state owned) giving 75% discount flights to Peshawar, Pakistan, for joining the Mujahideen.  
The nationalities of the Mujahideen are as follows (as estimated by the British Intelligence Source: 5000 Saudi 
Arabians; 3,000 Yemenis; 2,800 Algerians; 2,000 Egyptians; 400 Tunisians; 370 Iraqis; and 200 Libyans   
320 Also known as Calamities Brigades, Horros Brigades, al-Ahwal Horroes Brigades. This is a Sunni group 
321 London based separatist group dedicated to the independence of Iran’s Khuzestan region (home to the 
majority of Iran’s ethnic minority)  
322 Their goal is the creation of a Palestinian state 
323 Also known as al-Arifeen Squad and Lashkeri-Jaiba (The Holy Men) 
324 Al Asalah is the political wing of the Islamic Education Society.  The group promotes a hard-line 
interpretation of Islam which rejects much of Bahrain’s modernism as well as encouraging religious observance.   
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Al-Bara Bin 
Malek 
Brigades327 
 
2005 Current Al-Ansari, Abu 
Doujana 
Unknown Iraq 
Jordan 
2005 MANY MANY 
Al-Braq328 1978 Inactive 
after 
2002 
Qureshi, 
Qureshi 
Unknown Pakistan 2002 1 0 
Al-Borkan 
Liberation 
Organization
329 
(the Volcano 
Organization) 
1984 Inactive 
after 
1985 
Unknown Inactive Italy 
Libya  
(Palestinian
)  
1984 
1985 
2 
1 
0 
0 
Al- Dulaymi 
Tribe330 
 
2003 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq    
Al-Fahd Al-
Asward 
Forces 
2006 Current Unknown Unknown Palestinian  2006 1 0 
Al-Faruq 
Forces331 
 
2003 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 
 
 
2003 Violent  
Al-Faruq 
Brigades 
(Media 
Commission 
for the 
Mojahedin in 
Iraq) 
2003 Current Al-maghribi, 
Abd al-Azim 
Unknown Iraq 2003 1 0 
Al-Fatah 1957 Current Arafat  Over 
10,000332 
Palestinian  
 
(Saudi 
Arabia 
Israel)  
2006 
2005 
2004 
2003 
2002 
2001 
2000 
1993 
1991 
1990 
1989 
1988 
1987 
1986 
1985 
1982 
1981 
1980 
3 
33 
21 
19 
56 
14 
3 
1 
1 
1 
3 
6 
6 
9 
8 
3 
2 
6 
0 
2 
4 
4 
15 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
                                                                                                                                                  
325 Group was formed by the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (Pakistan’s version of a secret service)  
326 This group was accused of participating in the massacre of 10,000 ethnic Bengali intellectuals in East 
Pakistan (Bangladesh) during the Pakistani Civil War     
327 This is a specialized cell of suicide bombers  
328 Translates into The Lightning  
329 This in anti-liberation group that carried out assassination attacks against Libyan diplomats in Europe in the 
mid 1980s.  Sources accuse the PLO leader Yasser Arafat of being behind the group.  Libya provided a large 
amount of money to the PLO.   
330 A powerful Sunni movement based in Anbar province but spread throughout central Iraq and Baghdad – 
members include American backed government individuals and Iraqi Mujahideen   
331 Iraqi Ba’thist resistance force  
332 Because of group size and/or membership; group will be counted three times 
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1979 
1978 
1977 
1976 
1975 
1974 
1973 
1972 
1971 
1970 
 
6 
7 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
5 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Al-Fatah 
Uprising333 
1983 Current 
 
Muragha, Sa’id 
Musa 
1,000 Palestinian  
Jordan 
Lebanon 
Syria 
 
(Syria)  
 
1990 1 0 
Al-Fath al-
Mubin Troops 
2006 Current  Unknown Unknown Palestinian 
Israel 
 
2006 1 0 
Al-Fuqra 1980 Current Hashemi, 
Mubarak Ali 
Jilani 
3000 Pakistan    
Al-Fursan 
Brigades 
(Knights 
Brigades)334 
2005 Current Al, Dubrani, 
Khalid al-
Ghafur 
Unknown Iraq 2005 1 1 
Al-Gama’a 
Al-
Islamiyya335 
 
(Islamic 
Group) 
1977 Current  Abdel-Rahman, 
Hamdi and 
Rifa’I el-
Dawalibi and 
Fouad el-
Dawalibi 
500 Egypt 
Afghanista
n 
Lebanon 
 
(Iran) 
 
1998 
1997 
1996 
1995 
1994 
1993 
1992 
1 
2 
2 
8 
14 
7 
3 
 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
Al-Haramayn 
Brigades336 
2003 Inactive 
after 
2003 
Unknown Unknown Saudi 
Arabia  
2003 1 0 
AL-Imam Ali 
Brigades  
 
2006 Current Unknown 100 Iraq 2006 1 0 
Al-Intiqama 
al-Pakistani 
(Revenge of 
the Pakistani 
People)337 
2002 Inactive 
after 
2002 
Unknown Unknown Pakistan  2002 1 0 
Al-Islah  
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Somalia  2005 1 0 
                                                
333 Al-Fatah Uprising was founded as a mutiny within al-Fatah against the PLO leader Yasser Arafat’s autocratic 
leadership. 
334 The Knights Brigades was led by Saddam Hussein’s former adviser Khalid Abd al-Ghafur al-Dubrani before 
his assassination in 2004.   
335 This is a highly decentralized group. The group developed after President Sadat released any members of the 
non-violent Muslim Brotherhood from prison. Members who rejected its non-violent stance fragmented off into 
a variety of violent Islamic groups. Their main objective if a violent jihad and the overthrow of President 
Mubarak’s regime and the establishment of an Islamic state 
336 Also known as: al-Haramain Brigades (Two Mosques Brigades)  
337 Also known as: Revenge of Jihadi, Revenge of the Pakistanis, Revenge of the People of Pakistan  
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Al-Islambouli 
Brigades of 
Al-Qaeda338 
1995 Current Islamboui, 
Muhammad 
Unknown Pakistan  2004 3 3 
Al-Ittihadd al-
Islami 
(Islamic 
Union) 
 
1980 Current  Aweys, Sheikh 
Hassan Dahir 
2,000339 Somalia 
Ethiopia  
1996 2 0 
Al-Jama’a al 
Salafia 
 
2003 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq  Violent  
Al-Jam’iya 
al-Salafiya al-
Mujahida340 
 
2003 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq  Violent 
 
 
Al-Gama’a 
al-Islamiyya 
(al-Jihad)341 
1977 Current Abdel-Rahman, 
Hamdi and 
Rifa’I Ahmed 
Taha and Fouad 
el-Dawalibi 
500 Pakistan 1995 
2005 
1997 
1996 
1981 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
1 
0 
Al-Gama’a 
al-Islamiyya 
 
1977 Current Unknown Small Afghanista
n 
Egypt  
 Violent  
Algerian 
Renewal 
Party342 
1989 Current Unknown Very small Algeria    
Al-Haramain 
Foundation343 
 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
 
2003 Current Unknown Unknown Saudi 
Arabia 
Somalia 
Indonesia 
Pakistan 
Tanzania  
 
 Violent   
Al-Hasan al-
Basri-Brigade 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2005 
2006 
Violent 
Violent 
Many 
Many 
Al-Jamieen344 
 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
 
1994 Current Saudi 
Government 
Unknown Saudi 
Arabia  
   
Al-Jihad 
Brigades 
2005 Current Unknown 
 
 
Unknown Iraq 2005 1 0 
All Tripura 
Tiger Force  
 
1990 Current Unknown 600 Bangladesh     
Al-Madina345 2002 Inactive 
after 
2002 
Unknown 50 Pakistan 2002 3 0 
                                                
338 It is assumed that this group is an offshoot of the International Justice Group 
339 Because of group size and/or membership; group will be counted three times 
340 Sunni group 
341 Sunni group 
342 The PRA is a small moderate Islamist party.  The party is resolutely antisocialist, actively endorsed economic 
liberalism and foreign investment, it spoke out against the importation of “foreign models” of development.  
343 Originally founded as a Saudi charity and has sense converted into a terrorist movement  
344 Group has been accused of being controlled by Saudi intelligence  
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Al-Majd 
Brigades 
 
2006 Current Unknown Unknown Palestinian  2006 1 0 
Al-
Mansoorain346 
2003 Current Lone, Firdaus 
and Omar 
Mukhtar 
Unknown Pakistan 2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
1 
1 
3 
2 
0 
1 
0 
0 
Al-Mendar 
Islamic 
Society 
(Islamic 
National 
Tribune)347 
2000348 Current Unknown Unknown Bahrain    
Al-
Muhajiroun 
(The 
Emigrants)349 
1983 Current Uknown Unknown Saudi 
Arabia  
   
AL-Nasireen 2002 Current Unknown Unknown Pakistan 
Kashmir  
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2 
1 
1 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Al-Mawaz 1999 Inactive 
after 
Unknown Inactive Pakistan 1999 
2000 
1 
1 
0 
0 
                                                                                                                                                  
345 Al-Madina is a Kashmiri militant group responsible for terrorist acts against the Indian-controlled Kashmir.  
The group’s goal is the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan.  
346 Kashmiri militant group responsible for terrorist acts against the Indian-controlled Kashmir.  The group’s 
goal is the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan.  
347 This is the political wing of the Al Eslah Society and is associated with the Muslim Brotherhood  
348 Unsure of the Date of formation; however they won four seats in Bahrain’s 2006 general election, down form 
eight in 2002 so I placed the date of formation in the mid 1990s  
349 This is an Islamist group that campaigns for a world Islamic state.   
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2000 
Al-Qaeda 
(Jihad, the 
Base) 
1980s Current Bin  Laden 50,000350 Global  
 
Afghanista
n 
Algeria 
Azerbaijan 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Egypt 
Eritrea 
Iran 
Jordan 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Mauritania 
Pakistan 
Qatar 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
UAE 
Uzbekistan 
Yemen  
 
 
 
(Saudi 
Arabia)  
1995 
1998 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
1 
2 
1 
3 
2 
11 
6 
1 
4 
0 
2 
1 
3 
1 
8 
0 
1 
1 
Al –Nawaz 1999 2000 Unknown Unknown 
 
Pakistan  1999 2  
Al-Qaeda in 
the Arabian 
Peninsula 
2004 Current  Bin Laden Unknown Saudi 
Arabia 
2004 5 2 
Al-Qaeda 
Organization 
in the Islamic 
Maghreb351 
1996 Current Unknown 300 Algeria 2000 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
1 
1 
3 
7 
15 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Al-Qaeda 
Organization 
in the Land of 
the Two 
Rivers 
2004 Current Zarqawi  Unknown Iraq 2004 
2005 
2006 
10 
198 
6 
2 
92 
3 
Al-Qanoon352 2002 Current Hai, Qari Abdul 300 Pakistan 2002 1 1 
Al-Quds 
Brigades353 
1970 Current Unknown 1,000 Palestinian  
Israel 
Lebanon 
Syria 
 
 
(Iran) 
 
2002 1 1 
                                                
350 Because of group size and/or membership; group will be counted three times 
351 Formerly known as the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) is a violent Sunni extremist group 
352 This group demands an end to Pakistani enslavement to the United States and the resignation of President 
Musharraf  
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Al-Sadr 
Brigades354 
1978 Current Unknown Unknown Lebanon 
Syria 
1988 1 0 
Al-Sahaba 
Soldiers 
 
2006 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq  2006 
2007 
 
Violent 
Violent 
 
Al-Saiqa355 1966 Inactive 
after 
1985 
Al-Ma’ayta, 
Mahmud and 
Isam al-Qadi 
and Muhammed 
Khalifah 
500 Lebanon 
Syria 
Palestinian 
 
(Syria) 
 
1975 
1979 
1981 
1984 
1985 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Al-Taeff al-
Mansoura356 
2006 Current  Unknown Small Egypt 2006 1357  
Al Taqfeer 
Wal Hijra358 
 
 
1960s Current Unknown Unknown Lebanon  
Syria 
Egypt  
   
Al-Tawhid 
 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 
Kurdistan 
 
 
   
Al-Tawhid 
Jordan359 
 
1995 2000 Unknown Unknown Jordan    
Al-Ittihaad al-
Islami 
(AIAI)360 
 
Late 
1980s 
Current  Sheikh Hassan 
Dahir Aweys 
Large over 
2,000361 
Ethiopia 
Somalia 
   
AL-Umar 
Mujahideen362 
1989 Inactive 
after 
2002 
Ganai, Manzoor 
and Mast Gul 
and Jamshed 
Khan 
700 Pakistan 2002 1 0 
Al-Umma 
Movement 
(Mouvement 
1989 Current Unknown Less than 300 Algeria     
                                                                                                                                                  
353 This is the armed wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad  
354 The al-Sadr Brigades was formed after the mysterious disappearance of Lebanese Shiite spiritual leader Iman 
Musa al-Sadr  
355 Translated as the Storm or the Thunderbolt  
356 Also known as The Victorious Sect. This group espouses Salafi-Taufiri, a Jihadist ideology that identifies 
anyone with whom disagrees with them as infidels and are considered potential terrorist targets   
357 This was an attempted attack: 22 Islamic militants belonging to this group were arrested by the Egyptian 
government for planning attacks against tourists, a gas pipeline in Cairo, and Muslim and Christian religious 
leaders  
358 May also be referred to as al-Takfir Wal Hijra which is an Egyptian founded in the 1960s and later 
reemerged in  the 1990s in Syria and Lebanon  
359 In 1995 this movement was a major supplier of Jihadi volunteers to the Bosnian Mujahideen – there is no 
relationship with other groups with similar names   
360 Also known as Islamic Union and Islanic Unity.  This organization seeks to create an Islamic state in Somalia 
and Ethiopia. 
361 Because of group size and/or membership; group will be counted three times 
361 Also known as the Lebanese Resistance Detachments and the Movement 
362 Goal is to liberate the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir and merge them with Pakistan 
363 The Movement el-Oumma has declined to participate in elections and its members have engaged in very few 
public activities. 
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el-Oumma)363 
Al Wefaq364 
 
Mid 
1990s 
(1995) 
 
Current Unknown 1,500365 Bahrain    
Al-Zulfikar 1977 Current  Bhutto, Mir 
Murtaza and 
Iluas Siddiqi 
Inactive Pakistan 
Afghanista
n 
Libya 
Syria 
1981 1 0 
Albanian 
Mujahideen   
 
2003 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq    
Ali Bin Abu 
Talib Jihad 
Organization 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2005 1 0 
Ali ibn Abi 
Talib Brigade 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2005 
2006 
Violent 
Violent 
 
 
Amal366 
(HOPE) 
1975 Current Berri, Nabih and 
Musa Sadr 
Unknown Lebanon 
 
(Syria) 
(Iran 1979-
1982) 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987  
1988 
1989 
1990 
1992 
1998 
4 
6 
3 
4 
3 
3 
14 
5 
10 
8 
5 
2 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Alliance for a 
Free Kabylie 
1990s 
(1992) 
Current  
 
 
Unknown Unknown Algeria    
AMAL (The 
Islamic 
Action)367 
1982 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 
 
(Iran) 
Violent   
Ansar al-
din368 
2004 Current 
 
Unknown Unknown Iraq 2004 1 0 
Ansar-e 
Hezbollah 
 
 
1992 Current Unknown Unknown Iran    
Ansar al-
Islam369 
(Supporters of 
2001 Current Ghul, Hassan 
and Mullah 
Krekar 
500 Iraq 2002 
2003 
2005 
2 
2 
1 
0 
1 
0 
                                                
364 Bahrain’s Largest and most popular political party  
365 Because of group size and/or membership; group will be counted three times 
366 Also known as the Lebanese Resistance Detachments and the Movement of Hope.  Also known as Afwaj al 
Muqawama al Lubnaniya or the Lebanese Resistance Detachments; this is a Shia group.  Iran financially 
supported this group until 1982.  Islamic AMAL is a splinter group from AMAL and most of these defectors 
were later absorbed into Hezbollah 
367 AMAL is a separate group from the Lebanese AMAL group.  The version is based in Iraq and is a Shiite 
group who sought to over throw the Ba’thist Regime in Iraq  
368 Also known as the Supporters of Islam 
369 An Islamic fundamentalist group with headquarters in the Kurdish area of Northern Iraq  
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Islam) 
Ansar al-
Jihad 
(Supporters of 
Jihad) 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2004 1 0 
Ansar al –
Sunnah Army 
(Followers of 
the Tradition)  
2003 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2003 
2004 
2005 
 
1 
2 
90 
 
1 
2 
14 
Ansar al-
Sunnah Army 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2005 
2006 
Violent 
Violent 
Many 
Many 
Ansar Allah 1994 Current Tufaili, Sobhi Unknown Lebanon 1994 
2003 
2 
1 
2 
0 
Anti-
Communist 
Command  
2000 Inactive 
after 
2000 
Guterres, Eurico 
and Eggi 
Sudjana 
Unknown Indonesia  2000 1 0 
Anti-
Imperialist 
International 
Brigade370 
1986 Inactive 
after 
1988 
Shirosaki, 
Tstomu 
Inactive Lebanon 1986 
1987 
1988 
4 
6 
3 
 
APO’s 
Revenge 
Hawks 
1989 Inactive 
after 
1989 
Unknown Unknown Turkey 1999 3 0 
APO’s Youth 
Revenge 
Brigades 
1999 Inactive 
after 
1999 
Unknown Unknown Turkey  1999 1 0 
Arab 
Commando 
Cells 
1984 Inactive 
after 
1984 
Unknown Inactive 
(very small) 
Libya 
Lebanon 
 
(Libya) 
1984 1 0 
Arab 
Communist 
Organization
371 
1974 Inactive 
after 
1977 
Murad, Faris 
and Na;al 
Haytham 
Unknown Lebanon 
Syria 
1974 
1975 
1977 
5 
6 
1 
0 
0 
0 
Arab 
Communist 
Revolutionary 
Party372 
1980 Inactive 
after 
1991 
Unknown Inactive Jordan 1990 
1991 
1 
1 
0 
0 
Arab 
Fedayeen 
Cells 
1986 Inactive 
after 
1986 
Unknown Inactive Lebanon 1986 3 0 
Arab 
Liberation 
Front373 
1969 Inactive 
after 
1986 
Ahmad, Abd al-
Rahim and abd 
al-Wahhab al-
Kayyali 
500 Palestinian 
Iraq 
Israel 
 
(Iraq) 
1975 
1980 
1986 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
 
Arab 
Nationalist 
Youth for the 
Liberation of 
Palestine374  
1974 Inactive 
after 
1974 
Unknown Inactive Libya 
Palestinian 
1973 
1974 
3 
4 
 
0 
0 
                                                
370 This is an anti-imperialist group formed by the Japanese Red Army (JRA) 
371 This is a Communist/Socialist movement/group. Dropped from large N but included in terrorism data  
372 This is a Community/Socialist movement/group. Dropped from large N but included in terrorism data 
373 This is a secular, leftist, Palestinian nationalist terror group founded by Iraqi Ba’athist party members  
374 This group was founded my Muammar Gaddafi to support the Palestinian people. Also known as: Arab 
National Youth Organization, Arab Nationals Youth Organization for the Liberation of Palestine, and Seventh 
Suicide Squad 
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Arab Revenge 
Organization 
1984 Current Unknown Inactive Lebanon 1984 1 0 
Arab 
Revolutionary 
Brigades 
Early 
1980s 
 Unknown Unknown United 
Arab 
Emirates 
   
Arab 
Revolutionary 
Brigades 
Early 
1970s 
Current Unknown 400 Iraq 
Libya 
Syria 
 
   
Arab Struggle 
Movement for 
the Liberation 
of Ahvaz375 
2006 Current Unknown Unknown Iran 2006 2 0 
Arabian 
Peninsula 
Freemen 
1989 Inactive 
after 
1989 
Unknown Inactive Saudi 
Arabia  
1989 1 0 
Arbav 
Martyrs of 
Khuzestan 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iran 2005 4 0 
Armed Berber 
Group (ABG) 
 
1998 Current  Unknown Unknown Algeria    
Armed 
Islamic 
Group376 
1992 Current Abdallah, 
Ahmed and 
Mourad Sid 
Ahmed and 
Rachid Oukali 
100 Algeria 1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
2001 
8 
24 
19 
4 
2 
5 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Armed Youth 
of Cherikha-
Ye Fadayee 
 
2005 Inactive  Unknown Inactive Iran 2005 1 0 
Armed 
Islamic al-
Qaeda 
Movement of 
Fallujah 
 
2003 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq  Violent  
Armenian 
Red Army 
1982 Inactive 
after 
1982 
Evingulu, 
Penuemin 
Inactive Turkey 1982 1 0 
Armenian 
Resistance 
Group 
1995 Inactive 
after 
1995 
Unknown Inactive Turkey 1995 2 0 
Armenian 
Revolutionary  
Army377 
1970 Inactive 
after 
1985 
Unknown Inactive Turkey 1970 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1 
2 
3 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Armenian 
Secret Army 
for the 
1975 Inactive 
after 
1997 
Agopyan, Agop 
and Montye 
Melkonian 
Inactive 
 
Lebanon 
Turkey 
1975 
1976 
1978 
3 
1 
6 
 
                                                
375 This is an ethnic terrorist group campaigning for the independence of Iran’s Arab minority   
376 The Groupe Islamique Arme’ (GIA) the GIA sought to create an Islamic state in Algeria and took a leading 
role in the insurgency and civil war 
377 This group is In the United States; However, it protest Turkish actions against the Armenians  
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Liberation of 
Armenia378 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1991 
1997 
 
9 
14 
10 
8 
18 
5 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Army for the 
Liberation of 
Kurdistan 
1981 Inactive 
after 
1981 
Unknown Inactive Lebanon 1981 1 0 
Army of 
Ansar al-
Sunna 
 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq  Violent   
Army of 
Muhammad 
 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq  Violent  
Army of the 
Conqueror  
 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq     
Army of the 
Followers of 
Sunni 
Islam379 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2004 1 0 
Army of the 
Partisans of 
the Sunnah 
 
2005 Current  Unknown Unknown Iraq 2005 
2006 
2007 
Violent  
Violent 
Violent 
Many  
Many 
Many 
Army of 
Palestine 
 
 
2002 Current Unknown Unknown Lebanon 2001 1 0 
Asbat al-
Ansar (Band 
of Partisans) 
1990380 Current Al-Saadi, 
Ahmas Abd al-
Karim and 
Adullah Shreidi 
and Hisham 
Shreidi 
300 Lebanon 1995 
1999 
2000 
2002 
2003 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Association 
of Combatant 
Clerics381  
1988 Current Unknown Unknown Iran    
Association 
of Muslim 
women 
1980 Mid 
1990s 
Unknown Unknown Iraq 
 
(Iran) 
 
   
                                                                                                                                                  
378 The ASALA’s operated mainly out of bases in Beirut.  Their main objective was to increase awareness of the 
Armenian genocide and further the cause of Armenian Independence  
379 Also known as Jaish Ansar al-Sunnah 
380 The exact year of formation is unknown – it is someplace in the late 1980s or the early 1990s, to be safe I put 
its establishment in 1990 
381 The Association of Combatant Clerics also translates as the Assembly of Combatant Clerics and is a 
relatively moderate pro-reform Iranian political party and should not be confused with the Combatant Clergy 
Association which is a conservative political party   
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Association 
of Muslim 
Women 
1970 Current Unknown Large382 Iran 
 
 
   
Aum 
Shinrikyo 
Aleph 
1984 Current Asahara, Shoko More than 
3000383 
Indonesia     
Women’s 
Association 
1980 Mid 
1990s 
Unknown Unknown Iraq 
 
(Iran) 
 
   
Women’s 
Association 
1970 Current Unknown Large384 Iran    
August 23 
Movement 
1982 Inactive 
after 
1982 
Unknown Inactive Lebanon 1982 1 0 
Azerbaijan 
Islamic 
Party385 
 
1992 1996386 Unknown Small Azerbaijan     
Baath 
Battalions 
 
2003 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq  Violent   
Babak 
Khoramdin 
Organization 
1992 Current Unknown Unknown Iran    
Badr Forces 2001 Inactive 
after 
2001 
Abayat, Atef Unknown Israel  
West Bank 
2001 1 0 
Badr Brigade 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq  Violent   
Bahraini 
Mujahideen 
 
2003 Current Unknown Unknown Bahrain     
Baloch 
Liberation 
Army 
2002 Current Unknown Unknown Pakistan 2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
1 
8 
19 
17 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Baloch 
Student’s 
Organization 
 
1967 Last 
active 
1979 
Khair jan 
Baluch 
Unknown Pakistan    
Balochistan 
Liberation 
Front 
 
1964 Current Jumma Khan Unknown Pakistan    
Bani Halai 
Tribe 
1996 Inactive 
after 
1996 
Unknown Unknown  Egypt 1996 1 0 
Bangladesh 
Nationalist 
Party387 
 
1978 Current General Ziaur 
Rahman 
Large Bangladesh    
                                                
382 Counted as three  
383 Counted as three 
384 Counted as three 
385 Political party funded by Iran and supports an Islamic state in Azerbaijan 
386 The party was banned in 1996; all leaders were arrested and accused of espionage for Iran  
387 The party views Islam as an integral part of the sociocultural life of Bangladesh. 
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Bangladeshi 
Mujahideen 
 
2000 Current Unknown Unknown Bangladesh     
Banner of 
Islam 
 
2006 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2006 1 0 
Battalion of 
the Look-Out 
for Iraq  
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2005 1 0 
 
Battalions of 
the Faith  
 
1994 1998 Unknown Unknown  Saudi 
Arabia  
   
Battalion of 
the Martyr 
Abdullah 
Azzam (Al-
Qaeda in the 
Levant) 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Egypt 
Jordan 
Syria 
2004 
2005 
1 
3 
0 
0 
Battalions of 
the Ahwaz 
Resurgence388 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iran    
Belmokhtar 
Group 
(Groupe 
Islamigue 
Armee) 
 
1996 Current Abdelouadoud, 
Abou 
Belmokhtar, 
Mokhtar 
300 Algeria     
Biplobi 
Communist 
Party 
(Revolutionar
y Communist 
Party)389 
1971 Current Unknown Unknown Bangladesh     
Black Brigade 1985 Inactive 
after 
1985 
Unknown Unknown Lebanon 1985 1 0 
Black 
Brigades390  
 
Early  
(1980s) 
Inactive  Unknown Inactive  Kuwait  
Iraq 
 
(Iran) 
 
   
Black 
December 
1973 Inactive 
after 
1973 
1997391 
Unknown Inactive Pakistan 1973 2 0 
Black Friday 1988 Inactive 
after 
1988 
Unknown Inactive Turkey 
 
(Iran) 
 
1988 1 0 
Black Hand 1983 Inactive 
after 
Unknown Inactive Lebanon 1983 2 0 
                                                
388 Sunni Mujahideen movement  
389 This is a Communist political party/movement  
390 This is an obscure Kuwaiti Shiite revolutionary group active in Iraq and Kuwait with Iranian financial 
assistance. Also known as the Black Brigades of Lebanon (BBL), Christian anti-Muslim Organization, and the 
Lebanese Black Brigades     
391 Not heard from between the years of 1973 and 1997 
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1983 
Black June392 
 
1976 Inactive 
in mid 
1980s 
(1988) 
Unknown 500 Palestinian 
 
(Iraq) 
 
Violent    
Black 
Panthers393 
1988 Current Ikmail, Ahmed 
Awad 
100 Palestinian  2005 1 0 
Black 
September394 
1971 Current  Iyad, Abu and 
Mohammad 
Oudeh 
Inactive Jordan 
Palestinian 
Lebanon 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1981 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1988 
3 
64 
12 
1 
1 
10 
1 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Block of the 
Faithful 
(Gush 
Emunim)395 
1974 Current Unknown Unknown Israel    
Borok 
National 
Council of 
Tripura 
 
2000 Current Unknown Unknown Bangladesh     
Brethren 
(Battalions) 
of the Faithful 
 Current 
 
 
Unknown Unknown Saudi 
Arabia 
   
Brigade of 
Ansar al-
Tawhid wa-
Sunna396 
2006 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2006 1 0 
                                                
392 Black June was an Iraqi state-sponsored group with the revolutionary aim of destroying Israel and 
establishing a Palestinian state by force.   
393 The Black  Panthers (named for the animal and not the Black Nationalist group) this is a vigilante group 
loosely affiliated with al-Fatah 
394 Also known as the Black September Organization. The BSO was a clandestine group created by al Fatah for 
the limited purpose of avenging the suppression and expulsion of the PLO form Jordan.   
395 This political-religious movement was established to help occupy the territories that were seized by Israel in 
the Six Day War (1967).  The movement attached religious messianic significance to the consequence of that 
war; initiated Jewish settlement projects in the territories and protested official policies to curb Jewish 
settlement or any attempt to reach an agreement with the Palestinians and Arab states involving the return of the 
territories.   
396 Supporters of the Monotheism and the Prophet’s Tradition; also known as Ansar al-Tawid wa al-Sunna 
Brigade. Supporters of Monotheism and the Profits Supports of the Tawhid and Sunna Brigades   
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Brigade of al-
Husayn the 
Lord of the 
Martyrs 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq     
Brigades for 
the Defense 
of Holy 
Shrines397 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2004 1 0 
Brigade of the 
Horrors of the 
Secret Islamic 
Army 
 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq     
Brigades of 
Abu Ubaydah 
al-Jarrah 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq   Violent   
Brigades of 
Hayzun al-
Jihadiyah 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq  Violent  
Brigades of 
Islamic Rage 
 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq  Violent  
Brigades of 
Imam al-
Hassan al-
Basri 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2005 1 0 
Brigades of 
Martyr 
Ahmed 
Yassin 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2004 1 0 
Brigades of 
the 
Mujahidden 
in Iraq 
 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2004 
2005 
2 
1 
0 
0 
Brigades of 
Mohhammed 
bin Abdullah 
 
2004 Current  Unknown Unknown Iraq  Violent   
Brigades of 
the Victorious 
Lion of God 
 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2004 1 0 
Brigades of 
the 1920 
Revolution 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq  Violent   
Children of 
Iran Party 
 
1999 Current Unknown Unknown Iran    
                                                
397 Also known as: Squadrons Defending Holy Places   
  317 
Committee 
for the 
Security of 
the Highways 
 
1998 Inactive 
after 
2001 
Unknown Unknown Israel  1998 
2001 
2 
2 
0 
0 
The 
Combatant 
Clergy 
Association 
 
1977 Current Ali Khamenei 
Motahhari 
Unknown Iran    
Communist 
Workers 
Movement398 
 
2001 Inactive 
after 
2003 
Unknown Inactive Turkey 2002 
2003 
1 
1 
0 
0 
Committee 
for Solidarity 
with Arab and 
Mideast 
Political 
Prisoners 
(CSAMPP)399  
1984 Late 
1980s 
Unknown Inactive France  
 
(Iran and 
Lebanon)  
 Violent  
Committee 
for Relief in 
Kosovo 
 
(Saudi 
Arabia)   
 
1990s 2000 Unknown Unknown Saudi 
Arabia  
 Violent   
Committee to 
Support the 
Afghans 
 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
 
Early 
1980s 
Mid 
1990s 
Unknown Unknown Saudi 
Arabia  
   
Committee 
for the 
Defense of 
Legitimate 
Rights in 
Saudi Arabia 
 
2003 Current Unknown Unknown Saudi 
Arabia400 
 
 
   
Crescent Star 
Party401 
 
1998 Current Unknown Unknown Indonesia     
Dar al-Ifta al-
Sunni (Sunni 
Juridical 
Office) 
 
Early 
1970s 
Current Unknown Unknown Lebanon 
 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
 
   
De Fes 1994 Inactive Falah, Tarik and Inactive Morocco 1994 1 0 
                                                
398 The Communist Workers Party is a Communist/Socialist movement/party. This groups was dropped from 
large N but included in terrorist data 
399 This was the cover name for a pro-Iranian Lebanese cellular group which engaged in an anti-French bombing 
campaign for the limited end of pressuring the French government to release George Ibrahim Abdullah, the 
leader of the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions arrested in France in 1984 for his group-s attacks on U.S. 
and Israeli diplomats.   
400 Group is now in exile in London, England  
401 The Crescent Start Party is a moderate Islamist political party.   
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after 
1994 
Redouane 
Hammadi and 
Stephane Idir 
Death Squad 
of 
Mujahideen 
of Iraq  
 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2004 1 0 
Democratic 
Front for the 
Liberation of 
Palestine402 
1969 Current Hammad, Abd 
al-Karim and 
Nayef 
Hawatmeh and 
Qais Abdul 
Karim 
500 Palestinian  
 
 
 
(Syria and 
Libya) 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1984 
1985 
1988 
1992 
1994 
2002 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2 
2 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
7 
1 
1 
3 
4 
4 
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Democratic 
Party of 
Iranian 
Kurdistan 
1945 Current Unknown Unknown Iran    
Democratic 
Revolutionary 
Front for the 
Liberation of 
Arabistan403 
1980 Current Unknown Unknown Iran 
 
(Iraq) 
1980404 1 0 
Democratic 
Unionist 
Party405  
1990 Current Unknown Unknown Egypt 
Sudan 
   
Denouncers 
of Infidels406 
1970 Late-mid 
1970s  
 
Unknown Unknown Egypt     
Deobandi-
Wahabi 
 
Mid 
1980s 
(1985) 
Current Unknown Unknown Pakistan 
 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
Violent
407 
  
Dhi Qar 
Organization 
 
2006 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2006 1 0 
DHKP/C 
Revolutionary 
Left 
1994409 Current Karatas, Dursun 
and Bedri Yagan 
1000 Turkey 1991 
1992 
1993 
27 
8 
3 
0 
0 
0 
                                                
402 The PDFLP id a Marxist-Leninist Palestinian Secular Nationalist Movement  
403 This group was sponsored by Iraq to cause instability is Iran  
404 On May 30, 1980, five men calling themselves the Democratic Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of 
Arabistan walked into the Iranian Embassy in London and took the occupants captive.  
405 The DUP is closely related to the Sudanese party of the same name.  Its major purpose seems to be to 
organize Sudanese residents in Egypt  
406 In 1970 Sadat co-opted several leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood into the Egyptian political system.  As a 
result, members of the Muslim Brotherhood broke off and formed more radical short-lived groups.   
407 According to Karmon (2006) the Deobandi-Wahabi is a militant Sunni group who is highly anti-Shia and 
receives significant financial support from Saudi Arabia.  
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Revolutionary 
People’s 
Liberation 
Party408 
1995 
1996 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
8 
1 
2 
6 
3 
3 
6 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Divine Wrath 
Brigades 
 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2004 2  
Dukhtaran e-
millat 
(Daughters of 
the Faith) 
 
1987 Inactive 
after 
1995 
Unknown Unknown Kashmir  1995 1 0 
Eagles of 
National 
Unity 
 
1972 Current Unknown Inactive Yemen 1972 1 0 
East 
Turkistan 
Liberation 
Organization 
 
2002 Current Unknown Unknown Kyrgyzstan 2002 1 1 
Egypt’s 
Mujahideen 
   
2005 Current Unknown Small Egypt 2005 
2006 
1  
Egypt’s 
Revolution410 
1984 Inactive 
after 
1989 
Sulayman, 
Mahmound 
Unknown Egypt 1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1989 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad 
Late 
1970s 
Current Al-Rahman, 
Sheikh 
Al-Zawahiri, 
Ayman 
200 Egypt 
Afghanista
n  
1993 
1998 
1 
1 
0 
0 
Eritrean 
Islamic Jihad 
Movement 
1980 Current Amer, Shaikh 
Khalil and Abul 
Bara’ Hassan 
Salman 
Unknown Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Sudan 
2003 1 0 
Eritrean 
Liberation 
Front 
1960 Inactive 
after 
1991 
Adem, 
Mohammeed 
and Adem Akte 
and Idris 
Galaydos 
Inactive Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
 
(Syria and 
Iraq) 
1970 
1971 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1986 
1991 
5 
1 
5 
7 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Eritrean 
People’s 
1970 Inactive 
after 
Unknown Inactive Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
1987 1 0 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
408 The DHKP/C is a Marxist, anti-Western party/movement. This group was dropped from my large N but 
included in terrorist data 
409 There is a date discrepancy here because it is a splinter group of Devrimci Yol which was itself a splinter of 
the Turkish People’s Liberation Party.   
410 Egypt’s Revolution is also known as Nasserist Revolution which advocated militant nationalism in the 
tradition of the former President Gamal Nasser.  
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Liberation 
Front 
1987 
Ethiopian 
People’s 
Revolutionary 
Army411 
1972 Current Unknown Inactive Ethiopia412  
Sudan 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
Executives of 
Construction 
Party 
Mid 
1990s 
Current President Akbar 
Hashemi 
Rafsanjani 
Unknown Iran    
EYAL 
(Fighting 
Jewish 
Organization) 
1995 Inactive 
after 
1995 
Raviv, Avishai Inactive Israel 
West Bank 
1995 1 0 
Fadaeeyan-e-
Eslam 
(Devotees of 
Islam)413 
1930s Current  Unknown Unknown Iran 1998 
1999 
1 
1 
0 
0 
Fadayan – 
Majority 
Faction 
 
1980 Current Unknown Unknown Iran    
Fadayan – 
Minority 
Faction 
 
1980 Current Unknown Unknown Iran    
Fallujah 
Mujahdeen 
2004 Current 
 
Adbullah, Abu Over 2500 Iraq 2004 1 0 
Fatah Wing 
 
 
1998 Current Unknown Unknown Sudan    
Fatah-RC414 1974 
 
Inactive 
since the 
early 
1990s 
(1992) 
Unknown Unknown Palestinian  
Iraq 
Syria 
Libya415 
Violent
416 
  
Fatah 
 
Early 
1960s 
 
Current  Over 2,000 Palestinian     
Fedateen 
Khalq 
(People’s 
Commandos)
417 
1979 1987 Unknown Unknown Iran 1987 1 0 
                                                
411 Leftist organization, anti-monarchy group and it called itself the first political party in the country  
412 Because of group size and/or membership; group will be counted three times in Ethipoia  
412 Also known as the Lebanese Resistance Detachments and the Movement 
413 This group is also known as: Fedayeen-e-Islam Mohammadi Hanif, Devotees of Pure Mohammedan Islam, 
Islamic Commandos, Fedayeen Islam, and Volunteers of Martyrdom for Islam 
414 The Fatah-RC was considered one of the most dangerous and active Palestinian terror organizations in the 
1980s.  Thee Fatah-RC was also known as the Arab Revolutionary Council but chose to claim credit for its 
actions under the names of the Arab Revolutionary Brigades, the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist 
Muslims when claiming attacks on British targets, Black June when claiming credit for attacks on Jordanian 
targets, and the Black September Organization.      
415 Its headquarters were in Baghdad from 1974-1980, then they moved to Syria, then Libya and been located 
there ever since. 
416It is assumed that the Fatah-RC committees 44 major terrorist acts between 1980-1987, of which 11 were 
assassinations, seven bombings and one car bombing.    
417 Leftist Movement   
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Federation of 
Armenian 
Revolutionari
es  
1985 Inactive 
after 
1985 
Unknown Inactive Lebanon 1985 1 0 
Forqan 
(proof)418 
 
1978 Mid 
1980s 
(1985) 
 
Unknown Unknown Iran    
Fighting 
Ansar of 
Allah 
 
Unknow
n 
Active Uknown Unkown Saudi 
Arabia  
   
Fighting 
Islamic Group 
in Libya 
 
1995 Current Unknown Unknown Libya    
Fighting 
Vanguard419 
 
Late 
1960s 
Mid 
1980s 
Unknown Unknown Syria  1970s Violent  
 
 
First Army of 
Muhammad 
 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq  VERY  Many  
 
Force 17420 
 
Early 
1970s 
(1973) 
Early 
1990s 
(1995) 
Unknown Unknown Palestinian  Violent  
Forces of 
Unity 
 
 
2003 Current Unknown Unknown Sudan    
Free Aceh 
Movement 
(Aceh 
Security 
Disturbance 
Movement)421 
1970 Inactive 
after 
2005 
Abdullah, 
Bakhtiar and Ai 
Tiro, Hasan and 
Husaini Hasan 
Inactive 
(5,000)422 
Indonesia  2005 
2004 
2003 
2002 
2001 
2000 
2 
3 
3 
10 
17 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Free Papua 
Movement 
1963 Inactive 
after 
2001 
Kwalik, Kelly 
Mawen, 
Berardus 
Onde, Willem 
Unknown  Indonesia 1990 
1995 
1996 
1999 
2000 
2001 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Free People 
of Galillee 
2003 Inactive 
after 
2003 
Unknown Unknown Israel 2003 1 0 
Free Salafi 
Group 
1998 Current 
 
Unknown Unknown Algeria  2006 1 0 
Freedom 
Movement of 
Iran 
 
1961 Current Unknown Unknown Iran    
Front for the Late Inactive Husan, Hasri 3,000423 Indonesia  2000 1 0 
                                                
418 The Arabic word furqan literally means proof, and when it is used with the definite article, al-furqan, it refers 
to the Quran.   
419 This is the secret cell of the militant members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.   
420 Force 17 was originally intended as a personal security force for Yasser Arafat and other PLO leaders, Force 
17 eventually became one of the PLO’s elite units and functions in various areas of operational activities under 
the direct guidance of Arafat.   
421 Goal is to establish an independent Islamic kingdom in the province of Aceh  
422 Because of group’s size and/or membership, group will be counted three times  
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Defenders of 
Islam 
1990s after 
2001 
Shihab, Habib 
Usman, Alwi 
2001 
 
1 0 
Front of 
Justice and 
Revenge 
 
1986 Inactive 
after 
1986 
Unknown Small Lebanon    
Front for the 
Liberation of 
Lebanon from 
Foreigners 
1977 Inactive 
after 
1983 
Unknown 200 Lebanon 1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
 
1 
6 
4 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Front for the 
Liberation of 
the French 
Somali Coast 
1975 Inactive 
after 
1975 
Unknown Inactive Somalia 1975 1 0 
Front of 
Justice and 
Revenge424 
1986 Inactive 
after 
1986 
Unknown Inactive Lebanon 1986 1 0 
Generation of 
Arab Fury 
1989 Inactive 
after 
1989 
Unknown 100 Iran 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Kuwait425 
 
(Iran) 
1989 2 0 
Greater Israel 
Movement426 
1967 1980 Unknown Unknown Israel    
Great East 
Islamic 
Raiders Front 
(IBDA-C)427 
 
Mid 
1970s 
(1975) 
Current Unknown Small Turkey  Violent
428 
 
Green 
Brigade of the 
Prophet 
 
2004 Current Unknown Small Iraq  Violent  
Green Cells 1987 Inactive 
after 
1987 
Unknown Inactive Lebanon 1987 1 0 
Grey Wolf429 1969 Current Colonel 
Alparslan Turks 
26,000430 Turkey  Violent
431 
  
Groupe 
Islamique 
Combattant 
Late 
1990s 
(1998) 
Current Unknown Unknown Morocco  2003 
 
1 0 
                                                                                                                                                  
423 Because of group’s size and/or membership; the group will be counted three times 
424 Leftist Nationalist  
425 However, attacks are centered against Saudi Arabia  
426 This movement/party was founded in 1967, following the Six Day War, in order to promote the case for 
Greater Israel.  This movement initiated the renewal of Jewish settlements in Hebron. 
427 The IBDA-C is a Sunni Salafist group that advocates Islamic rule in Turkey and considers Turkey’s present 
secular leadership to be “illegal”.  This is a particularly radical organization and is ideologically opposed to 
virtually every other Islamic movement; however, it does cooperate with the other groups.    
428 The IBDA-C prefers to carry out activities that involve little personal risk, such as throwing Molotov 
cocktails.  Members of the group are encouraged to and launch their own attacks independently.   
429 Or Gray Wolves; this was originally a student group organized to oppose Marxist-Leninist students in the 
universities in Turkey     
430 Because of size – this group and/or movement will be counted as three 
431 In 1976 they turned into a right-wing death squad and by 1980 the group was reported to have committed 694 
political murders  
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Marocain 
Group of the 
Martyrs 
Mostafa 
Sadeki and 
Ali Zedeh 
1993 Current  Unknown Inactive Iran 1993 1 0 
Guardians of 
the Friends of 
the Prophet 
(Siph-e-
Sahaba 
Pakistan 
(SSP)432 
 
1985 Current Maulana 
Mujibur 
Rehman Inqilabi 
Small Pakistan Violence    
Guardians of 
the Islamic 
Revolution 
 
1980 Inactive 
after 
1989 
Unknown Small  
Inactive  
Rome 
London 
 
(Iran) 
1980 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1 
1 
2 
2 
 
Guardians of 
the Islamic 
Revolutions 
1979 Current Unknown Unknown Iran    
Guardmen of 
Islam 
1980 Inactive 
after 
1984 
Unknown Inactive Iran 1984 1 0 
Hamas 1987 Current Al-Zahhar, 
Mahmud 
Ghousheh, 
Ibrahim 
Hanud, Mahmud 
Greater than 
1000 
West Bank 
 
 
(Iran and 
Saudi 
Arabia) 
1988 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
1 
1 
3 
5 
13 
6 
5 
4 
3 
1 
20 
34 
59 
206 
183 
36 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
4 
4 
1 
0 
0 
9 
11 
8 
6 
3 
0 
Haq 
Movement for 
Liberty and 
Democracy 
2005 Current Ali Rabea 
Shaikh Lsa Al 
Jowder 
Unknown Bahrain    
Harakat al-
Islah wal-
Tihaddi (The 
Movement of 
Reform and 
Challenge)433 
1998 1999 Abd al-Nasir  Unknown Jordan 
 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
 Violent  
Harkat-i-
Islami-yi 
Afghanistan 
(Islamic 
Movement of 
Early 
1990s 
(1992) 
Current Ayatollah 
Muhammad 
Asif Muhdini 
Unknown Afghanista
n 
 
   
                                                
432 The SSP is a Sunni sectarian party/movement that has been involved in terrorist violence against the minority 
Shia population in Pakistan.  The SSP is an offshoot the Jamiat-e-Uleme-e-Ialam (JUI), a major Sunni political 
movement/party.  The SSP’s objective is to have Pakistan be decaled a Sunni state.   
433 This was a very small violent group that derived from Neo-Wahhabiyyaism sponsored from Saudi Arabia.  
See: http://haganah.us/harchives/003973.html  
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Afghanistan) 
Harakat al-
Shuhada al-
Islamiyah 
(Islamic 
Martyrs 
Movement) 
1996 Inactive 
after 
1998 
Ahmed, 
Abdallah 
Al-Hami, 
Mahummad 
Khaleefa 
Unknown Libya 1998 1 0 
Harakat ul-
Jihad-I-Islam 
(HUJI) 
1980 Current Unknown Unknown Pakistan     
Harakat ul-
Mudjahidin 
(HUM)434 
2002 Current AL-Ghabra, 
Mohammed 
Azhar, Maulana 
Khalil, Farooq 
300 Pakistan 2002 
2004 
2005 
2006 
1 
3 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
Harakah al-
Isamiyyah 
(The Islamic 
Movement) 
 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Unknown Unknown Lebanon Violent   
Harakat al-
Jihad al-
Islami fi-
Filastin 
(Movement of 
Islamic 
Struggle in 
Palestine) 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Unknown Very Small Violent Lebanon 
Palestine 
 
  
Harkat Ul-
Ansar 
1993 Inactive 
after 
1995 
Khalil, Fazlur 
Rehman, Matiur 
Inactive Pakistan 1994 
1995 
1 
1 
0 
0 
Harakat il-
Jihad-I-
Islami-
Bangladesh 
435 
2000 Current Unknown Over 3,000 
members436 
Bangladesh  2000 1 0 
Hawk 
Brigades 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2005 1 0 
Helpers Party 
 
1936 Mid 
1970s 
(1975) 
Jamil Da’bul Uknown Lebanon    
Heritage 
Revival 
Society437 
 
Mid 
1980s 
(1985) 
Mid 
1990s 
(1995) 
 
Unknown Unknown Kuwait    
Hezb-e 
Azadi-ye 
Afghanistan 
(Freedom 
Party of 
Afganistan) 
1997 Current Pahlawan, 
Abdul 
Unknown Afghanista
n 
2006 1 0 
Hezbe Mid Current Unknown Unknown Afghanista    
                                                
434 HUM was formerly known as the Harakat ul-Ansar.  HUM was originally established to fight in Afghanistan 
against the Soviet occupation, the HUM has become an international network of fighters for Islamic causes all 
over the world.   
435 Group is also known as: Movement of Islamic Holy War 
436 Group counts as three 
437 Heritage Revival Society was a Sunni Islamist organization that pursued a generally quietist political 
platform emphasizing social reforms. 
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Wahdat (The 
Islamic Party 
of 
Afghanistan)
438 
 
1980s 
(1985) 
n 
Hezb-i-Islami 
Afghanistan 
 
Mid 
1980s 
Current Unknown Unknown Afghanista
n 
   
Hezb al-
daawa al-
Islamiyya  
 
(Al-Daawa 
Party)439 
1970s 
(1974) 
Current Al-Daawa Thousands440  Iraq 
Iran 
Violent    
Hezbollah 1982 Current Al-Mughassil, 
Ahmad 
Al-Nasser, 
Abdelkarium 
Al-Yacoub, 
Ibrahim  
Over 1,000441 Lebanon 
 
(Iran and 
Syria) 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
8 
36 
29 
14 
22 
10 
12 
3 
9 
3 
6 
2 
8 
6 
1 
5 
0 
0 
1 
0 
2 
1 
1 
4 
1 
2 
0 
0 
1 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Hezbollah 
Bahrain 
1996 Current Unknown Unknown Bahrain 
 
(Iran) 
   
Hezbollah 
Gulf 
 
 
1996 Current Unknown Unknown Saudi 
Arabia  
   
Hikmatul 
Zihad 
 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Bangladesh   Violent  
 
 
Hizb al 
Dawah al-
Islamiyyah 
(Party of 
Islamic Call) 
 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Unknown Unknown Lebanon    
                                                                                                                                                  
438 The Hezbe Wahdat is also known as the Wahdat.  The HW is the largest Shia group in Afghanistan. 
439 The Al-Daawa Party is a Shiite party/movement 
440 Upwards of 200,000 Shiites ended up in political exile in Iran, over the course of the 1980s and 1990s many 
of these exiles joined the Iran-based al-Daawa, which accepted Khomeini’s clerical rule; Group counts as three 
in Iran and one in Iraq. 
441 Group counts as three 
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Hizb-I-Islami 
Islamic Party 
Mid 
1970s 
(1974) 
 
Current Hikmatyar, 
Gulbuddin 
Unknown Afghanista
n 
2004 
 
2 0 
Hizb-I Islami 
Gulbuddin 
(HIG)442 
1977 Current Unknown Unknoen Afghanista
n  
Pakistan 
 
 Violent   
Hizb el Nahda 
 
 
1980s 
(1983) 
Current Rashid AL-
Ghannushi 
Unknown Tunisia    
Hizbul 
Mujahideen443 
1989 Current Butt, Abdul 
Dar, Majeed 
Dar, Ahsan 
Dhar, Ahsan 
100 Pakistan 2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
1 
2 
4 
1 
2 
7 
9 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
Hizb ut-
Tahrir444 
 
1953 Current Unknown Unknown Bangladesh  
Lebanon 
 
   
Hizb ut-
Tahrir-Egypt 
1950s Current Unknown Unknown Egypt 
 
 
   
Hizb ut-
Tahrir (The 
Party of 
Liberation)445 
1953 Current Judge Sheikh 
Taqiuddin al-
Habhani 
Unknown Jordan 
West Bank 
Syria  
Iraq 
Turkey 
Lebanon 
Sudan 
 
   
Hizb ut-
Tahrir al-
Islami 
(Islamic Party 
of 
Liberation)446 
1952 Current  Unknown  Over 5,000447 Uzbekistan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Tajikistan 
 
 
Pakistan 
Syria 
Turkey 
Indonesia 
 
   
Hizb-1-
Wahdat 
 
1980s 
(1982) 
 
Current Khalili Unknown Afghanista
n 
   
Holders of 
Black 
Banners 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq  Violent   
                                                
442 Goal of group is to liberate Afghanistan from the influence of foreign forces  
443 Largest Kashmir militant group and supports the liberation of Kashmir and its accession to Pakistan  
444 Hizb ut-Tahrir is dedicated to what it sees as the political unity of Muslims through the re-establishment of 
the caliphate, destroyed in 1924 by disbelieving colonialists, the removal of what it sees as neo-colonialist 
western control of the Islamic world, and a return to government based on Islamic law.   
445 The group argues that all Muslims should abolish national boundaries within the Islamic world and return to 
a single Islamic state, known as the “Caliphate” 
446 Their platform and actions fit within an “Islamic globalization” which is an alternative mode of globalization 
based on radical Islam.  They have called for a jihad against the United States and its allies, and moderate 
Muslim states.  The purpose of this jihad is to find and kill the kufar (non-believers).   
447 Because of size and/or membership groups is counted as three 
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Holy Jihad 
Brigades 
 
2006 Current Unknown 100 Palestinian  2006 1 0 
Holy War 
Society 
Civil 
War 
Years 
 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Unknown Unknown Algeria     
Holy 
Warriors in 
Egypt 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Egypt 2005 2  
Ikhwan 
(Brotherhood)
448 
Early 
1990s 
(1992) 
Current  
 
Unknown Small Saudi 
Arabia 
   
Imam 
Hussein 
Brigades 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2005 
2006 
3 
1 
0 
0 
International 
Justice 
Group449 
1995 Inactive 
after 
1995 
Unknown Inactive Egypt 1995 1 0 
Iran 
Liberation 
Front 
 
 
1986 Current Manuchehr 
Ganji 
Unknown Iran    
Iran 
Baluchistan 
 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iran     
Iranian 
Democratic 
Party of 
Kurdistan 
(KDIP)450 
1945 Current Alyar, Awat 
Ghassemlou, 
Abdoul 
Hassanzadeh, 
Mustapha 
1,800 Iran    
Iran Women 
Society 
 
1989 Current Unknown Unknown Iran    
Iranian 
Mujahideen  
 
1980 Current Unknown Large451 Iran     
Iran 
Prosperity 
Party 
 
1999 Current Unknown Unknown Iran    
Iran 
Independence 
Party 
 
1999 Current  Unknown Unknown Iran     
Iraqi 
Democratic 
Front 
 
1982 Current Unknown Inactive Iraq 1982 2 0 
                                                
448 These Militant disciples of Wahhabi theologian, Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab, constituted the military 
formations used by Abd al-Wahhab, constituted the military formation used to create the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia during the 1920s.  Suppressed by the government of the new state in the mid-1930s, they provided the 
inspiration for contemporary proponents of strict social and cultural practices in the kingdom, who resurrected 
the movement under its old name in the early 1990s. 
449 Gama’s al-Adela al-Alamiya 
450 Also Known as: Kurdish Democratic Part of Iran; Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, Revolutionary 
Leadership, Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, Revolutionary Command 
451 Counted as three  
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The Iraqi 
Hezbollah  
 
2003 Current Unknown 300 Iraq Violence 
 
  
Iraqi 
Legitimate 
Resistance  
 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown  Iraq 2004` 1 0 
Iraqi 
Liberation 
Army 
1980 Inactive 
after 
1981 
Unknown Inactive Iraq 1981 1 1 
Iraqi National 
Resistance  
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2005 1 0 
Iraqi Revenge 
Brigades 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2005 
2006 
1 
1 
0 
0 
Islam 
Devotees 
Society 
 
1989 Current Unknown Unknown Iran    
Islami 
Chhatra 
Shibir452 
 
1941 
 
Current Unknown Golam Azam Bangladesh  2001 1 1 
Islami 
Inqilabi 
Mahaz 
1997 Inactive 
after 
1997 
Unknown Unknown Pakistan  1997 1 1 
Islami Okiya 
Jote (IOJ) 
Islamic 
United Front 
1990 Current Unknown Unknown Bangladesh    
Islamic 
Action in Iraq 
1984 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 
Iran 
 
1984 4 0 
Islamic 
Action Front 
in Jordan453 
 
1992 Current Unknown Unknown Jordan    
Islamic 
Action 
Organization 
1961 Current Unknown Unknown Iran 
Iraq 
Syria 
 
1984 1 0 
Islamic 
Action 
Society454 
Mid 
1990s 
(1995) 
Current Shaykh Shaykh 
Muhammad 
Unknown Bahrain 
 
 
   
Islamic al-
Waqqas 
Brigade 
2004 Current 
 
 
Unknown Unknown Iraq  2004 1 0 
Islamic Amal 
Movement 
(Harakat 
Amal al-
Islamiyyah) 
 
1982455 Current Husayn al-
Musawi 
Unknown Lebanon    
                                                
452 ISC is one of the more radical Islamic political parties in Bangladesh and has expressed solidarity with the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan.   
453 IAFJ is the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood Association in Jordan 
454 The Islamic Action Society is the party that calls for public demonstrations and political seminars focusing 
on the issues affecting the majority Shia, who have been ruled by the minority Sunnis.     
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Islamic army 
of Aden 
(IAA) (Aden-
Abyan 
Islamic 
Army) 
 
1998 Inactive 
after 
2001 
Unknown Unknown Yemen 1998 1 0 
Islamic Army 
in Iraq 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2004 
2005 
2006 
13 
11 
13 
0 
5 
1 
Islamic 
Association 
 
1980 Mid 
1990s  
Unknown Unknown Iraq 
 
 
(Iran) 
   
Islamic 
Association 
 
1979 Current Unknown Unknown Iran    
Islamic Call 
(to faith) 
Party456 
1968 Current Unknown Unknown 
(rather large) 
Iraq 
Iran 
1985 
Violent  
1 1 
Islamic 
Civilization 
Party 
 
1999 Current Unknown Unknown Iran    
Islamic 
Community457 
 
1964 1990 Unknown Unknown Lebanon Violent   
Islamic 
Coalition 
Society 
 
1990 Current Unknown Unknown Iran    
Islamic 
Congress 
1970 
 
 
Current Unknown Unknown Palestine     
Islamic 
Front458 
Early 
1970s 
Current Unknown Unknown Lebanon    
Islamic Front 
for Iraqi 
Resistance 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2005 1 0 
Islamic Front 
for the 
Liberation of 
Bahrain 
(IFLB)459 
Late 
1960s 
Current Ali al-Mafoudh, 
Aheikh 
AL-Jamry, 
Mansur 
500 Syria  
Bahrain 
Iran 
   
Islamic Front 
for the 
Liberation of 
Palestine460 
  
 
1986 Inactive 
after 
1990 
Unknown Unknown Lebanon 1990 1 0 
                                                                                                                                                  
455 Islamic AMAL is a splinter group of AMAL and most of the Islamic AMAL members left the group and 
joined Hezbollah in 1980s; however the group still exists but is very small  
456 Also known as the Hizb al Da’wa al Islamiyya  this is a Shiite party whose goal was to overthrow the 
Ba’thist Regime in Iraq and create an Iranian style Islamic Republic   
457 This is a Sunni Militant movement  
458 Coalition of Sunni and Shiite shaykhs  
459 This is a Shiite group seeking to create an Islamic revolution in Bahrain under Iranian state sponsorship. 
460 For the most part this is a secular group and/or movement 
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Islamic Front 
in Syria 
 
1980 Current  Unknown Unknown Syria     
Islamic Glory 
Brigades in 
the Land of 
the Nile 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Egypt 2005 1 1 
Islamic Great 
Eastern 
Raiders Front 
1970s 
(1972) 
Current  Mizabeyoglu, 
Salih 
100 Turkey 1994 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
 
2 
1 
8 
3 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
Islamic Holy 
War 
Organization 
(Munazzamal 
al-Juihad al-
Islami 
 
Early 
1970s 
Unknow
n after 
1995 
Unknown Very Small Lebanon    
Islamic 
International 
Peacekeeping 
Brigade 
 
1998 Current Unknown 400 Azerbaijan 
Turkey 
 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
 
 Violent  
Islamic Iran 
Solidarity 
Party 
 
1998 Current Unknown Unknown Iran    
Islamic Iran 
Participation 
Front461  
 
1998 Current Mohammad 
Reza Khatami 
Unknown Iran    
Islamic Jihad 
Brigades 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2005 1 0 
Islamic Jihad 
Group462 
 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Uzbekistan 2004 3 3 
Islamic Jihad 
in the Hijaz463  
 
 
Mid 
1980s 
(1985) 
Inactive  
(1992) 
Unknown Unknown Lebanon 
Saudi 
Arabia 
 
(Iran) 
Violent    
Islamic Jihad 
Jerusalem  
1998 Current Unknown Unknown Palestinian 1998 
2001 
2003 
2004 
2005 
1 
1 
2 
11 
9 
1 
1 
2 
0 
0 
Islamic Jihad 
Group 
2004 Current Unknown Small Uzbekistan Violent    
                                                
461 The Islamic Iran Participation Front is a reformist political party; however the party still backs Islam but 
insists on an Islamic democracy     
462 Islamic Jihad Union is also known as the Islamic Jihad Group 
463 Also known as Hezbollah in the Hijaz; this group is an Iranian state-sponsored movement based in Lebanon 
and they have the revolutionary goal of overthrowing the Saudi Arabian monarchy in favor of an Iranian-style 
Islamic republic.  
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Uzbekistan  
Islamic 
Guidance 
Party 
 
1990 1996 Unknown Unknown Iran    
Islamic Labor 
Party 
1999 Current 
 
Unknown Unknown Iran    
Islamic Labor 
Welfare Party 
 
1999 Current Unknown Unknown Iran    
Islamic 
Liberation 
Organization 
1974 Inactive 
after 
1985 
Unknown Inactive Egypt  
Lebanon 
Libya 
Jordan 
Palestine 
 
1974 
1985 
1 
1 
0 
0 
Islamic 
Liberation 
Party 
 
(Hizb al-
Tahrir al-
Islami) 
 
1990 Current Unknown Unknown Uzbekistan  
Tajikistan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Kazakhstan 
 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
   
Islamic 
Liberation 
Party464 
1953 Current   Palestinian 
Jordan 
Syria   
Lebanon 
 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
   
Islamic 
Martyrs 
Movement  
Abdallah 
Djeallah 
 
1996 Current Unknown Unknown  Libya    
Islamic Jihad  
 
Early 
1970s 
(1972) 
Current Unknown Unknown Libya 
 
 
   
Islamic 
Liberation 
Party 
 
1963 Current Unknown Unknown Jordan 
Syria 
   
Islamic 
Meetings465 
1975 1990 Unknown Unknown 
 
Iraq     
The Islamic 
Movement 
 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Unknown Very Small Algeria     
Islamic 
Movement for 
Change 
1995 Current Al-Shuwaykhat, 
Jafaar  
Unknown Saudi 
Arabia  
Syria 
 
(Iran) 
1996 2 0 
Islamic 2004 Inactive Unknown Unknown Iraq 2004 1 0 
                                                
464 The original Islamic Liberation Front was created in 1953 in East Jerusalem as a splinter group from the 
Muslim Brotherhood.  According to its platform, its mission is to reinstitute the Islamic Caliphate was destroyed 
in 1924 and to institute Muslim religious law and to liberate the Islamic Ummah from foreign influence.  It must 
be emphasized that the ILF is a moderate party that communicates its messages via non-violent methods.      
465 Sunni Group 
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Movement of 
Holy 
Warriors 
after 
2004 
Islamic 
Movement of 
Iraqi 
Mujahideen 
  
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2004 1 0 
Islamic 
Movement of 
Algeria 
(MIA)466 
1989 1989 Unknown Unknown Algeria 1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1988 
1987 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
Islamic 
Movement of 
Kurdistan 
 
1998 Current Unknown Unknown Kurdistan     
Islamic 
Movement of 
Uzbekistan467 
1998 Current Khojaev, 
Jumaboi 
Yuldeshev, 
Tohir 
700 Afghanista
n 
Iran 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Pakistan 
Tajikistan 
Uzbekistan 
 
1999 
2001 
2005 
4 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
Islamic 
National 
Front468 
1970 Current Dr. Hassan al-
Turabi 
 
Large469 Sudan Very 
Violent 
  
Islamic Party 
of Egypt 
Unknow
n 
Inactive 
after 
1994 
Unknown Unknown Egypt 1994 1 0 
Islamic Party 
of Liberation 
(Hizb ut-
Tahrir al-
Islami)470 
 
1953 Current Unknown Unknown Jordan 
Syria 
Egypt 
Libya 
Tunisia 
 
   
Islamic 
Peninsula 
Movement for 
Change – 
Jihad Wing 
 
New 
Group 
(2005?) 
Current Unknown Unknown Saudi 
Arabia 
   
                                                
466 The MIA led a campaign against the Algerian regime form 1992-1987. 
467 The group’s original goal was the overthrowing of the government of Uzbek President Islam Karimov and 
replacing it with an Islamic state in Uzbekistan.  The group changed its name in 2001 to the Islamic Party of 
Uzbekistan and its new objective was the creation of an Islamic state in all of Central Asia, which would include 
all of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and China’s Xinxiang province.     
468 Ruling Party  
469 Group will be counted three times 
470 This group believes it can achieve its utopian state in three steps. The first involves educating Muslims about 
its philosophies and goals.  In the second step, the Muslims would then spread these views among others in their 
countries, especially members of the government, the military and other power centers. In the third and final 
step, they believe its faithful will cause secular governments to crumble because loyalists will then lie solely 
with Islam – not nationalities, politics, or ethnic identifications. See: 
http://www.freemuslims.org/news/article.php?article=1276 
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Islamic Rage 
Brigade 
2004 Current 
 
 
Unknown Unknown Iraq 2004 1 0 
Islamic 
Renewal 
Movement  
1995 Inactive 
after 
1995 
Unknown Inactive Jordan 1995 1 0 
Islamic 
Republican 
Party471 
 
1989 Current Unknown Unknown Iran    
Islamic 
Renaissance 
Movement   
 
Mid 
1990s 
(1995) 
Current Lahbib Adam Small Algeria    
Islamic 
Renaissance 
Party (IRP)472 
1990 Current Unknown  Said Abdullo 
Nuri 
Uzbekistan 
Tajikistan  
 
   
Islamic 
Resistance 
Movement  
 
 
1970 Current Unknown Unknown Lebanon    
Islamic 
Resistance 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Unknown Unknown Lebanon 
 
(Iran) 
Violent    
Islamic 
Resistance 
Brigades 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2004 
2005 
1 
1 
0 
0 
Islamic 
Resistance 
Party 
 
2001 Current Unknown Unknown Tajikistan    
Islamic 
Revival 
Movement 
(Mouvement 
de la Nahda 
Islamique 
(MNI)473 
1990 Current Abdallah 
Djeallah 
Unknown Algeria    
Islamic 
Revolution 
Party 
1980s Mid 
1990s 
Unknown Unknown Iraq  
 
(Iran) 
 
   
Islamic 
Revolution 
Party 
1979 Current Unknown Unknown Iran 
 
   
Islamic 
Revolutionary 
Organization 
  
Before 
1994 
Current Unknown Unknown Saudi 
Arabia  
 
(Iran) 
   
                                                
471 The IRP was the political party of the pro-Khomeini clergy; however, the conservatives and radicals within 
the party could not work together and compromise and as a result the party fell apart.    
472 A year before the fall of the USSR, Muslims established the last Soviet political party in Astrakhan, the IRP.  
The IRP mandate explicitly states that the party is opposed to ethnic nationalism and aims at being the political 
expression of all Muslims of the USSR.  The ideology of the party is very similar to that of the Muslim 
Brotherhood: to establish an Islamic state by combining da’wat (predication) with political action.    
473 The MNI was exclusively identified with its founder and leader, Abdallah Djeallah.  His decision to 
transform his association into a political party came in the early fall of 1990, following the rejection by the FIS 
of Mahfound Nahnah’s call for Islamic Alliance, which Djeballah supported.   
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Islamic 
Revolutionary 
Guards Corps 
(IRGC)474 
1979 Current The State of Iran 4,000475 Iran 
Lebanon 
   
Islamic 
Salvation 
Front476 
1989 Current  Belhadj, Ali 
Cherif, Rashid 
Haddam, 
Anouar 
4,000477 Algeria 1992 3 0 
Islamic 
Shashantantra 
Andolon478 
 
2002 Inactive 
after 
2002 
Karim, Syed 
Fazlul 
5,000479 Bangladesh 2002 2 0 
Islamic 
Society480 
1986 Current 
 
Unknown Inactive Lebanon 1986 1 0 
Islamic 
Society 
Movement 
(Mouvement 
de la Societe 
Islamique)481 
1990 Current Mangound 
Nahnah 
Unknown Algeria     
Islamic 
Society of 
Philanthropic 
Projects 
  
1970s Current Unknown Unknown Lebanon 
Syria 
 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
   
Islamic 
Squadrons for 
the Liberation 
of Iraq 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq  Violent   
Islamic State 
of Iraq 
 
2006 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq  Violent   
Islamic State 
of Iraq 
2006 
 
 
Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2006 77 11 
Islamic 
Struggle 
Movement 
(Harakah al-
Islamiyyah al-
Mujahidah) 
 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Unknown Very Small Violent     
                                                
474 The IRGC was created by the 1979 Iranian Constitution with “defending the Islamic Revolution and 
safeguarding its achievements” 
475 Counted as three 
476 Also known as: Armee Islamiquede Salut (AIS), Army of Islamic Salvation, and the Islamic Salvation Army.  
The FIS was initially created as a network of small, independent mosque groups  
477 Counted as three  
478 This is an alliance of numerous small parties in Bangladesh.  The ISA is opposed tot eh current secular rule 
in Bangladesh and their objective is the enforcement of Sharia in the country  
479 Counted as three 
480 Also referred to as the Islamic Coalition and is based on an organization of extremist Sunni Muslim factions 
based in Southern Lebanon 
481 The acronym is HAMAS.  HAMAS is the political expression of the national nonpolitical association for 
Guidance and Reform. 
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Islamic 
Tendency 
Movement482 
 
1979 1987 Unknown Unknown Tunisia    
Islamic 
Tunisian 
Front 
 
1995 Current Unknown Unknown Tunisia    
Islamic 
Unification 
Movement 
 
1994 Current Unknown Unknown Lebanon    
Islamic Unity 
Front (Islami 
Oikko Jot) 
 
1985 Current Unknown Unknown Bangladesh     
Islamic Unity 
Front (IUF) 
 
2001 Current Unknown Unknown Kurdistan     
Islamic 
Youth483 
 
1969 Current Unknown Unknown Morocco    
Israeli Arab 
Movement 
Unknow
n 
Inactive 
after 
1999 
Unknown Unknown Israel 1999 1 1 
Ittihad-i-
Islami Bara-yi 
Azadi 
Afghanistan 
(Islamic 
Union for the 
Liberation of 
Afghanistan) 
 
 
Early 
1980s 
(1982) 
Current Abdul Rasul 
Sayyaf 
Unknown Afghanista
n 
 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
   
Jagrata 
Muslim 
Janata 
Bangladesh484 
 
1998 Current Islam, Siddiqul 
Rahman, 
Maulana 
Unknown Bangladesh 2005 2 0 
Jaish al-Taifa 
al-Mansoura 
Amry of the 
Victorious 
Community 
 
2003 Current Al, Al-Haj 
Osama, Abu 
Unknown Iraq 2005 3 0 
Jaish a-
Mohammad 
(Army of 
Mohammad) 
2000 Current Ahmed, 
Maulana 
Azhar, Maulana 
Jabbar, Maulana 
100 Pakistan 2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
19 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
                                                
482 The Nahdha (Resergence) seeks to replace existing secular governments in Tunisia with an Islamic regime 
under which religious and political affairs would be governed via Islamic law. 
483 This is one of the most active Islamic movements in Morocco.  It seeks to overthrow the monarchy and 
establish Islamist political system.    
484 Also known as the Awakened Muslim Masses of Bangladesh and Jama’Atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB).  
The goal of the group was/is to create an Islamic state based on the Sharia via an Islamic revolution.  
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Jaish ul-
Muslimin 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Afghanista
n 
2004 
2006 
1 
1 
0 
0 
Jama’ah  a-
Islamiyyah 
(Islamic 
Association) 
 
Early 
1970s 
Current Unknown Unknown Lebanon    
Jama’at al 
Fuqra (Group 
of the Poor)485 
Early 
1980s  
(1982) 
 
Current Unknown 200 Pakistan    
Jama’at-I 
Islami 
(Islamic 
Party) 
 
1941 Current Unknown Unknown Pakistan    
Jama’at al-
Tabiligh 
(Society of 
Transition) 
 
1970 1975 Unknown Unknown Egypt    
Jamaat-e-
Islami 
Bangladesh486 
 
1978 Current Unknown Unknown Bangladesh    
Jama’t al-
Muslimin487 
 
1978 Current Unknown Unknown Egypt  
 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
   
Jamaat ul-
Fuqra 
 
 
2002 Current Jaish 
Mohammad 
Unknown Pakistan 2003 1 1 
Jamiat Islami 
(Islamic 
Society)488 
 
1968 Current Unknown Unknown  Afghanista
n 
   
Jamatul 
Majahedin 
Bangladesh489 
2005 Current Al-Ghalib, 
Muhammad 
Islam, Siddiqul 
10,000490 Bangladesh 2005 12 4 
Jamiat-I 
Ulama491 
Early 
1980s 
(1982) 
Current Unknown Unknown Pakistan     
Jamiat-i- 2001 Current Unknown Unknown Afghanista    
                                                
485 This is a small Sunni Islamic group/movement the group is also known as the Jihad Council of North 
America and also the Muslims of the Americans.  Members live in approximately 97 small communal cells, 
isolated from surrounding society and attempting to live according to the precepts of an austere form of 
Fundamentalist Islam.   
486 Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh is the largest and most influential Islamic political party in Bangladesh because 
of this it will be counted three times 
487 The group’s popular name in: al-Takfir wal-Hijrah.  This group has adopted the Saudi Ikhwan ideas in all 
their extremism, including the idea of settling in the desert to found  a pure Islamic society (Hijrah).   
488 The Jamiat Islami is the oldest Islamic political party in Afghanistan.  It has a communitarian ideology based 
on Islamic law but is also considered moderately progressive 
489 Their goal is the removing the country’s secular government and impose a Taliban inspired Islamic theocracy 
in its place 
490 Because of group’s size and/or membership it will be counted as three 
491 Party was formed to help fight the Soviets in Afghanistan  
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Khudamul 
Quran492 
 
n  
Jamiat Ul-
Majahedin 
1990 Current Basit, Sheikh 
Salah, 
Mohammed 
Unknown Pakistan 2003 
2004 
2006 
3 
1 
7 
0 
0 
0 
Jammu and 
Kashmir 
Islamic Front 
1995 Current Baig, Nilal 
Jehangir, Arif 
Inactive Kashmir493 1995 
1996 
2006 
 
1 
2 
2 
0 
0 
Jeay Sindu 
and 
Muttahida 
Movement 
 
2001 Inactive 
after 
2001 
Hussain Altaf Inactive Pakistan 2001 1 0 
Jemaah 
Islamiya 
(Islamic 
community 
Islamic 
Group) 
1993 Current Anshori, 
Abdullah 
Bashir, Abu 
Bun Hur, Zulkifi 
300 Indonesia  2002 
2004 
2005 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Jenin 
Martyr’s 
Brigade 
 
2003 Current Unknown 100 Palestinian  2003 
2005 
1 
1 
1 
0 
Jewish 
Defense 
League494 
 
1984 1992 Meir Kahane Small Israel     
Jewish 
National 
Front (Hayil) 
 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Israel     
Jihad 
Brigades 
Before 
1987 
Inactive 
after 
2004 
Unknown Unknown Jordan 
Iraq 
Palestine  
1987 
1991 
2004 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
Jihad Pegah 
(Jihad Base) 
 
2005 Current Unknown Small Irag    
Jihad in 
Sweden 
2005 Current Fahlen, Andreas 
Ganjin, Nima 
Inactive Sweden 
AL-Qaeda  
2005 1 0 
Jihad Pegah 
(Jihad Base) 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2005 2 2 
Jordanian 
Free Officers 
Movement495 
 
1974 Inactive 
after 
1977 
Unknown Inactive Jordan 1974 
1977 
1 
1 
0 
0 
Jordanian 
Islamic 
Resistance 
 
1997 Current  Unknown 100 Jordan 1997 1 0 
Jordanian 
Muslim 
Early 
1950s 
Current Unknown Large Jordan    
                                                                                                                                                  
492 Also known as the Association of Servants of the Quran  
493 JKIF was formed by Pakistan’s intelligence agency  
494 This party/movement called for the expulsion of all Arabs from Israel, arguing Jews and Arabs cannot 
coexist.    
495 Nationalist/secular group/movement. Dropped from large N and kept in terrorist data 
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Brotherhood 
 
Jordanian 
National 
Liberation 
Movement496 
 
1972 Inactive 
after 
1972 
Unknown Inactive Egypt 
Jordan 
1972 1 0 
Liberation 
Party of the 
Peninsula497 
 
1978 1979 Unknown Unknown Saudi 
Arabia 
   
Jordanian 
Hamas  
 
1988 Current Unknown Unknown Jordan     
Jordanian 
Mujahideen 
 
1980s Current Unknown Unknown Jordan     
Jordanian 
Revolutionary 
and Military 
Committee 
 
1983 Inactive 
after 
1983 
Unknown Inactive Jordan 1983 2 0 
Jordanian 
Democratic 
People’s 
Party 
 
1989 Current Unknown Unknown Jordan    
Jund al-Sham 
(army of the 
Levant: 
Soldiers of 
Greater Syria) 
1999 Current Al-Sahmarani, 
Ghandi 
Sharqiyah, 
Muhammad 
30 Afghanista
n 
Lebanon 
Syria 
West Bank 
2005 2 1 
Jund Allah 
(Soldiers of 
Allah)498 
1970 Mid 
1970s 
Unknown Unknown Egypt     
Jund Allah 
Organization 
for the Sunni 
Mujahideen 
in Iran 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iran 2005 1 0 
Jundallah499 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Gaza/West 
Bank 
 
2005 1  
June 16 
Organization
500 
1987 Inactive 
after 
1989 
Unknown Inactive Turkey 1987 
1989 
1 
1 
0 
0 
Junud Allah 
(Soldiers of 
1970 1977 Unknown Very Small Egypt  Semi- 
Violent 
 
                                                
496 Nationalist/secular group/movement. Dropped from large N and kept in terrorist data 
497 This Shiite organization was active in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia in the months following the 
Iranian Revolution.  I Believe is also called the Liberation Party of Jazirah (Hizb Tahrir al-Jazirah (Liberation 
Party of Jazirah) – Dekmejian (1995) did not have Liberation Party of the Peninsula but did have Liberation 
Party of Jizirah and both were active and suppressed right after the Iranian Revolution  
498 In 1970 Sadat co-opted several leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood into the Egyptian political system.  As a 
result, members of the Muslim Brotherhood broke off and formed more radical short-lived groups.   
499 This is a new radical Islamic group and it is assumed they have close ties with al-Qaeda and the group 
consists of mostly former Hamas and Islamic Jihad members.  Others feel this new group is a split from Fatah.   
500 Leftist movement/party; dropped from large N but included in terrorist data  
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God) 
 
Jund al-Haq 
(Soldiers of 
Truth) 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Unknown Unknown Lebanon  Violent  
Justice and 
Charity (AL 
Adi Wal 
Ihsane) 
1981 Current Arslane, 
Fathallah 
Chibani, 
Abdallah 
Unknown501 Morocco    
Justice 
Commandos 
for the 
Armenian 
Genocide502 
1975 Inactive 
after 
1983 
Unknown Inactive Lebanon 1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1 
1 
4 
9 
2 
5 
1 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
KACH 1971 Current Federman, 
Noam 
Kahane, Rabbi 
Marzel, Baruch 
100 Israel 1988 
1991 
1992 
1994 
1998 
2002 
2005 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Kahane Chai 1990 Inactive 
after 
1995 
Ben-Gvir, Itamir 
Federman, 
Noam 
Kahane, 
Binyamin 
100 Israel 1993 
1995 
1 
1 
0 
0 
Kamtapur 
Liberation 
Organization 
 
1995 Current Unknown Unknown Bangladesh    
Karbala 
Brigades 
2004  Current 
 
Unknown Unknown Iraq 2004 1 0 
Kata’ib al-
Junayd al-
Jihadiyah 
(Junayd 
Judaist 
Brigades) 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2005 1 0 
Khaibar 
Brigades 
1985 Inactive 
after 
1985 
Unknown Inactive Lebanon 1985 3 0 
Kifaya 
(Enough)503  
 
2000 Current Unknown Unknown Egypt     
Knights of the 
Storm  
 
2005 Active Unknown Unknown West Bank 2005 1 0 
Komando 
Jihad (Holy 
Way 
Command) 
Mid 
1970s 
(1975) 
Inactive 
after 
1981 
Unknown Inactive Indonesia 1981 1 0 
                                                
501 Exact size in unknown; however, this is the largest Islamic group in Morocco, attracting primarily high 
school and university students as well as many civil servants  
502 JCAG was dedicated to establishing an independent Armenian state 
503 This is a grassroots coalition which draws its support from across Egypt and opposes President Mubarak’s 
presidency and the possibility that he may transfer power directly to his son 
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Kumpulan 
Mujahidin 
Malaysia 
1995 Current Unknown Unknown Indonesia    
Kurdish 
Democratic 
Party 
1946 Current Barzani, 
Massoud 
Barzani, 
Mustafa 
Unknown Iraq 1998 1 0 
Kurdish 
Islamic Unity 
Party 
1995 Inactive 
after 
1995 
Unknown Inactive Turkey 1995 1 0 
Kurdish 
Patriotic 
Union 
 
1994 Current Unknown Unknown Turkey 1994 3 0 
Kurdistan 
Freedom 
Hawks 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2004 
2005 
2006 
9 
7 
19 
0 
0 
0 
Kurdistan 
National 
Union 
Unknow
n 
Inactive 
since 
1987 
Unknown Unknown Iraq 1987 2 0 
Kurdistan 
Workers 
Party 
1974 Current Bayik, Cemil 
Kalkan, Duran 
Ocalan, 
Abdullah 
Ocalan, Osman 
Over 1,000 Turkey 1980 
1989 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
10 
1 
1 
5 
23 
5 
25 
2 
2 
2 
11 
4 
3 
13 
13 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Lashkar-e-
Jhangvi 
(Army of 
Jhangvi) 
1996 Current Ajmal, 
Muhammad 
Asif, Choto 
Basra, Riaz 
Less than 300 Pakistan 
 
1997 
1998 
2001 
2002 
2004 
2005 
1 
1 
1 
4 
3 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
Lashkar I 
Jhangvi 
 
1995 Current Unknown Unknown Libya  1996504 
 
1  
Lashkar-e-
Taiba (Army 
of the Pure) 
2000 Current Iqbal, Zafar 
Kashmiri, 
Maulana 
Saeed, 
Mohammed 
300 Pakistan 2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2005 
2006 
1 
3 
10 
2 
3 
9 
 
Lashkar-I-
Omar  
2001 Active 
last 2001 
 
Hai, Qai Abdul Unknown Pakistan 2001 1 0 
Laskar Jihad 
(Army of 
Jihad) 
 
2000 Active 
last 2002 
Thalib, Jafar 10,000505 Indonesia 2002 1 0 
                                                
504 It claimed responsibility for an assassination attempt against Gaddafi in 1996 which failed.   
505 Counted ass three 
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Lebanese 
Arab Youth 
 
1977 Active 
last 1977 
Unknown Inactive Lebanon 1977 4 0 
Lebanese 
Armed 
Revolutionary 
Faction 
1979 Active 
last 1986 
Unknown Inactive Lebanon 1981 
1982 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1 
5 
2 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Lebanese 
Islamic 
Resistance 
Front 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Unknown Very Small Lebanon    
Lebanese 
Force506  
 
1975 Current Unknown Unknown Lebanon 1975 Violent
507 
 
Lebanese 
Liberation 
Front 
1987 Current  Unknown Inactive Lebanon 
 
(Syria) 
 
1987 
1989 
3 
1 
 
0 
0 
Lebanese 
Mujahideen  
 
1980S Current Unknown Unknown Lebanon     
Lebanese 
National 
Resistance 
Front508 
1982 Active 
last 1990 
Unknown Inactive Lebanon 1983 
1984 
1985 
1990 
2 
1 
3 
1 
0 
0 
2 
0 
Lebanese 
Revolutionary 
Socialist 
Movement509 
1975 Active 
last 1974 
Unknown Inactive Lebanon 1974 1 0 
Lebanese 
Resistance 
Detachments 
 
 
1985 Current Unknown Unknown Lebanon    
Lebanese 
Socialist 
Revolutionary 
Organization
510 
 
1973 Active 
last 1974 
Unknown Inactive Lebanon 1973 
1974 
1 
2 
0 
0 
Legitimate 
Command  
 
1996 Current Unknown Unknown Sudan    
Liberation 
Battalion 
 
1987 Current Unknown Inactive Lebanon 
 
(Syria) 
1987 1 0 
Liberation 
Party 
1970s 
 
Active 
last 2003 
Unknown Unknown Israel 2003 1 0 
                                                
506 Lebanese Force is a former militia during the civil war (it is currently a political party) which fought on the 
side of the Christians    
507 Violent during the civil war years  
508 LNRF is a Communist/Socialist party/movement. Dropped from large N analysis but included in terrorism 
data 
509 LRSM is a Socialist party/movement. Dropped from large N analysis but included in terrorism data 
510 LSRO is a Socialist party/movement. Dropped from large N analysis but included in terrorism data 
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The 
Liberation 
Party511 
1974 1975 Salem Rahhal 
and Saleh Serrya 
Very small     
Libyan 
Islamic 
Fighting 
Group (Al 
jam’a Al-
Islamiyyah al-
MMuqatilah 
Bo-i-Libya)512 
1995 Current Unknown 300 Libya     
Libyan Jihad 
Movement 
 
1980 
 
Current Unknown Unknown Libya    
Libyan 
National 
Democratic 
Movement 
1979 Current Unknown Unknown Libya    
Libyan 
National 
Movement 
 
1980 Current Unknown Unknown Libya    
Libyan 
National 
Salvation 
Committee 
 
1981 Current Unknown Unknown  Libya    
Lions of the 
Truth 
Brigades 
 
2006 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2006 1 0 
Lord’s 
Resistance 
Army 
1992 Current Joseph Koney Unknown Sudan  Violent   
Martyr 
Abdallah 
Azzam 
Brigades 
 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq  Violent   
Martyr Al-
Hakim 
 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Yemen 
Saudi 
Arabia  
Iraq 
Afghanista
n  
 
 
   
Martyrs for 
Allah 
 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Syria 
Iraq 
Saudi 
Arabia  
   
                                                
511 Founded by two Palestinians in 1974 only to be crushed by the State the same year – the group was blamed 
for an attempts coup d’ate known as the “incident for the Technical Military Academy” 
512 Group also known as: Libyan Fighting Group, Libyan Islamic Group, Fighting Islamic Group, and Muslim 
Brothers  
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Mattyr Umar 
 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Yemen  
 
   
Mahdi Army 
 
2003 Current Unknown Small Iraq 
 
(Iran) 
   
Mehdi Army 
 
 
2003 Current Al-sadr, 
Moqtada 
Unknown Iraq 2004 4 0 
Marada 
Brigade513 
 
1975 Current Unknown 3500514 Lebanon  Violent  
 
  
Mahir Cayan 
Suicide 
Group 
 
1975 Active 
last 1975 
Unknown Unknown Turkey 1975 1 0 
Majlis al-
Islami al-Shi 
al-Ala (Shiite 
Council) 
 
 
Early 
1970s 
Current Unknown Unknown Lebanon 
 
(Iran) 
   
Majmuat 
Husain al-
Intihariyyah 
(Husayn 
Suicide 
Squads) 
 
Civil 
War 
Civil 
War 
Unknown Unknown Lebanon 
 
(Iran) 
Violent   
Martyr Abu-
Ali Mustafa 
Brigades515 
(Red Eagles) 
2001 Current Unknown Unknown Palestinian 2006 1 0 
May 15 
Organization 
for the 
Liberation of 
Palestine  
1979 Active 
last 1985 
Unknown Unknown Iraq 1981 
1982 
1984 
1985 
3 
2 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
Military Wing 
of the Greater 
Syrian Army 
 
2005 Current Unknown Inactive Qatar 2005 1 1 
Millat-E-
Islami 
1970 
 
 
Last 
active 
2003 
Unknown Unknown Pakistan    
Milli 
Gurtulush516 
 
1989 Current Mahammad 
Hatemi Tantekin 
Small Azerbaijan     
Militant 
Clerics 
1989 Current 
 
Unknown Unknown Iran    
                                                
513 This is a Maronite Christian faction in the Lebanese civil war which turned into a political party after 1990.    
514 3500 was the height of its membership (during the civil war years) from 1975-1990 the group will be counted 
as three  
515 The Abu-ali Mustafa Brigades operates under the direction of the PFLP.  The PFLP is a Marxist-Leninist 
Palestinian secular nationalist movement  
516 Translates to the National Development Party  
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League   
Mohajir Qami 
Movement 
(Real Mohajir 
Qami 
Movement) 
1992 Active 
last 1998 
Ahmed, Afaq 
Khan, Aamir 
Unknown Pakistan 1998 1 0 
Mohammed’s 
Army 
2000 Current 
 
 
Unknown Unknown Yemen 2000 1 0 
Muhammad’s 
Army 
Mid 
1980s 
(1983) 
Active 
last 
2002517 
Al-Dik, Khalili  
Hawshar, Abu 
Unknown Jordan 1991 6 0 
Moroccan 
Islamic 
Combatant 
Group518 
Early 
1990s 
Current Rachid 
Bendouda 
Taeb Bentizi 
Abdennabi 
Kounjaa 
Unknown Morocco 
Turkey 
Egypt 
Afghanista
n 
 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
 
 Violent  
Mosque 
Society 
Early 
1970s 
 
Current Unknown Unknown Saudi 
Arabia  
   
Movement for 
Democracy 
 
1991 Current Unknown Unknown Libya     
Movement for 
Democracy in 
Algeria519 
 
Mid 
1990s 
(1995) 
Current Ahmed Ben 
Bella  
Small  Algeria     
Movement of 
the 
Disinherited
520 
 
1974 1991 Unknown Unknown  Lebanon 1975 Violent  
Movement for 
Islamic 
Change 
 
1995 Current Unknown Unknown Saudi 
Arabia 
1995 
1996 
1 
1 
 
Movement for 
the Struggle 
of the 
Jordanian 
Islamic 
Resistance 
 
2000 Active 
last 2000 
Unknown Unknown Jordan 2000 1 0 
Movement of 
Islamic 
Action on 
Iraq 
 
1982 Current Unknown Inactive Iran 
Iraq 
1982 1 0 
Movement in 
Youthward 
Brothers in 
1971 Active 
last 1971 
Unknown Unknown Palestinian 1971 1 0 
                                                
517 In 2002 most members and leaders were imprisoned by the Jordanian government  
518 This group is dedicated to the creation of an Islamic state in Morocco.  The group actively supports al-
Qaeda’s terrorsit objectives 
519 Moderate Islamic Party  
520 This organization was successful in recruiting some of the Shiite masses by advocating armed struggle.  
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War of the 
Palestinian 
People 
Movement for 
the Liberation 
of Bahrain521 
 
1981 Inactive 
after 
1987 
Unknown Inactive  Bahrain 
 
(Iran) 
   
Movement for 
National 
Reform 
 
1994 Current Unknown Unknown Algeria     
Movement for 
the Social 
Peace 
 
1992 Current Unknown Unknown Algeria     
Muadh Ibn 
Jabal Brigade 
 
2005 Current Sahar, Abu Unknown Iraq 2005 2 0 
Mujahadi 
Bayi Al-
Maqdid 
Brigades 
(Fighters if 
Jerusalem 
Brigades) 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown West Bank 2005 1 0 
Mujahedin-e-
Khalq 
People’s 
Mujahideen 
of Iran 
1963 Current Rajavi, Maryam 
Rajavi, Massoud 
500 Iran 
Iraq 
 
1975 
1976 
1981 
1987 
1992 
1994 
1996 
1998 
2001 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
7 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Mujahideen 
Army 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2004 
2005 
3 
1 
0 
0 
Mujahidin 
(Fighters) 
1979 Mid 
1990s 
Unknown Unknown Iraq 
 
(Iran) 
   
Mujahideen 
Division 
Khandaq 
2000 Current 
 
 
Unknown Unknown Indonesia 2000 1 0 
Mujahideen 
in Iraq 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2004 
2005 
1 
1 
0 
0 
Mujahideen 
Kompak 
 
2001 Current Unknown Unknown Indonesia 2001 1 0 
Mujahideen 
Message 
 
2003 Current Unknown Unknown Afghanista
n 
2003 1 0 
Mujahideen 
Shura Council 
(Shura 
Council of the 
Mujahideen 
of Iraq) 
2005 Current Al-Baghdadi, 
Abdullah 
Al-Iraqi, Abu 
Maysarah 
Al-Muhajir, Abu 
Unknown Iraq 2005 2 
83 
0 
0 
Mujahideen 
of Ninveh 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2005 1 0 
                                                
521 The MLB was an Iranian sponsored Shiite group/movement whose main objective was creating an Iranian-
style Islamic Republic in Bahrain.  
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Munazzamat 
al-Adalah al-
Thawriyyah 
(Revolutionar
y Justice 
Organization) 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Unknown Unknown Lebanon 
 
(Iran) 
Violent   
Munazzamat 
al-Tahrir al-
Islami 
(Islamic 
Liberation 
Organization 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Unknown Small Lebanon 
Palestine 
 
Violent   
Munazzamat 
al-Mustadafin 
fil-Ard 
(Organization 
of the 
Oppressed on 
Earch) 
Civil 
War 
years 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Unknown Unknown Lebanon 
 
(Iran) 
Violent   
Muqawamat 
al-Mu’inah 
(Resistance of 
the Faithful) 
 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Unknown Unknown Lebanon 
 
(Iran and 
Syria) 
Violent   
Muslim 
Artists and 
Writers  
 
1989 Current Unknown Unknown Iran    
Muslim 
Brotherhood 
 
1928 Current Hassan al-Banna More than 
3000522 
Egypt    
Muslim 
Brotherhood 
 
1950 Current Unknown Unknown Libya    
Muslim 
People’s 
Republican 
Party 
1979 1981 Unknown Unknown Iran    
Muslim 
Society Takfir 
Wal Higrah523 
 
Early 
1970s 
Inactive 
after 
1981 
Unknown 5,000 Egypt    
Muslim 
United Army 
 
2003 Current Ramzi, Asif Inactive Pakistan 2003 1 0 
Muttahida 
Majlis-e-
Amal (United 
Council of 
Action)524 
2001 Active Unknown Unknown Pakistan    
                                                
522 Counted as three 
523 Also known as Jama’at al Muslimin and is a Sunni Muslim purist and revolutionary splinter group of the 
Muslim Brotherhood that advocated total rejection of the contemporary Egyptian social and political system in 
favor of a fundamental state 
524 The MMA is a coalition opposition, formed after Pakistan became part of the “Global War on Terror”. The 
coalition is united against the current government of President Musharraf because of his support for the United 
States. 
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Muttahida 
Qami 
Movement 
(United 
National 
Front) 
2001 Active 
last 2001 
Hussain, Altaf 3,000525 Pakistan 2001 4 0 
Nadeem 
Commando 
 
 
Early 
1990s 
(1992) 
Current Unknown Unknown Pakistan    
National 
Awakening 
Party526 
 
Mid /late 
1990s 
Current Alwi 
Abdurrahman 
Shihab 
 
Unknown Indonesia     
National 
Conciliation 
Party527 
Early 
2000 
Current Rafaat AL-
Agroudy 
185 Egypt 
 
 
   
National 
Council of 
Resistance of 
Iran 
 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iran    
National 
Democratic 
Alliance 
 
1989 Current Unknown Unknown Sudan    
National 
Front for the 
Liberation of 
Egypt 
1988 Active 
last 1988 
Unknown Unknown Egypt 1998 1 0 
National 
Front for the 
Salvation of 
Libya (NFSL) 
1981 Last 
active 
2000 
Abu Zeid, Ali 
AL-Kikhya, 
Mansour 
Unknown Libya    
National 
Democratic 
Front 
 
1976 1980 Unknown Unknown Yemen     
National 
Front for the 
Salvation of 
Libya 
1981 Current Unknown Unknown Libya 
Sudan 
   
National 
Islamic 
Movement 
(Jumbish-i-
Milli) 
Early 
1990s 
Current Unknown Unknown  Afghanista
n 
   
National 
Liberation 
Army of Iran 
1987 Current Unknown Unknown Iran    
                                                
525 Counted as three 
526 The National Awakening Party is the third-largest political party in Indonesia.  The party’s base of support is 
strongest in the rural areas of Java, and draws from the constituency that formerly supported the conservative 
Muslim organization Nahdlatul Ulama.  The PKB differs substantially from Nahdlatul Ulama, though, in that 
while it supports a role for Islam in government, it does not share the NU’s support for an explicitly Islamic 
Republic/ 
527 The National Conciliation Party presses for reaching a solution to the Palestinian issue and standing against 
all imperialistic schemes. 
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National 
Liberation 
Front of 
Tripura 
1989 Current Debbarma, 
Biswamohan 
Jamatiya, 
Nayanbasi 
Koloi, Mantu 
1,500528 Bangladesh 1998 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2005 
2006 
 
1 
3 
4 
14 
4 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
National 
Mandate 
Party529 
 
1970 Current Unknown Unknown Indonesia     
National 
Movement for 
the 
Restoration of 
Pakistani 
Sovereignty  
2002 Last 
active 
2002 
Unknown Inactive Pakistan 2002 1 0 
National 
Rally for 
Democracy530 
 
Late 
1990s 
(1998) 
Current Unknown Small531 Algeria     
National 
Revolutionary 
Command 
1986 Current Unknown Inactive Lebanon 1986 4 0 
National 
Religious 
Party 
 
1956 Current Unknown Unknown Israel     
National 
Salvation 
Party532 
 
1972 1981 Unknown Thousands533 Turkey    
Nationalist 
Group for the 
Liberation of 
Palestine 
 
1970 Last 
active 
1972 
Unknown Unknown Palestinian  1972 1 1 
Nationalist 
Kurdish 
Revenge 
Teams 
1999 Last 
active 
1999 
Unknown Unknown Turkey 1999 1 0 
Ninawa 
Mujahideen 
in the City of 
Mosul 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq  Violent  
Nusantara 
Islamic Jihad 
1999 Last 
active 
Unknown Unknown Indonesia 1999 1 0 
                                                
528 Counted as three 
529 The MNP is a moderate Islamist political party 
530 The RND is a member of a three party political alliance, called the Presidential Alliance created in 2005 and 
compromises the parties known as the Movement for the Society of Peace (formally Hamas) and National 
Liberian Front (FCN) 
531 Will be counted as 3 after 1995 
532 The NSP was virtually a reconstruction of the Party for National Order (PNO), which was outlawed in May 
1971.  During the 1970s this was the third largest political party in Turkey.  The ideology of the party aimed at 
eliminating secularism and establishing a theocracy in Turkey.    
533 Counted as three 
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Forces  1999 
Ogaden 
National 
Liberation 
Front 
 
1984 Current Unknown Unknown Ethiopia 
Somalia 
1999 1 0 
Omar Bin Al-
Khattab 
Brigades 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown West Bank 2005 1 0 
Oromo 
Liberation 
Front534 
2000 Current Unknown Unknown Ethiopia  
Somalia 
2000 
2002 
2004 
1 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
Pakistani 
Harakat ul-
Mujahidin 
(HUM) 
 
1990 Current Unknown Unknown Violent     
Pakistan 
Muslim 
League535 
 
1962 2002 Unknown Unknown Pakistan 
 
 
   
Pakistan 
Muslim  
League536 
 
2002 Current Unknown Unknown Pakistan    
Pakistani 
Mujahideen 
 
2002 Current  Unknown Unknown Pakistan    
Palestine 
Liberation 
Front 
1959 Last 
active 
1990 
Zaidan, 
Muhammad 
Unknown Palestinian 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Tunisia 
1981 
1984 
1985 
1988 
1990 
2 
1 
3 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Palestine 
Liberation 
Organization 
1964 Current Arafat, Yasser  Palestinian 1970 
1971 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1990 
1991 
 
2 
1 
3 
2 
1 
2 
1 
5 
15 
3 
1 
1 
2 
2 
17 
1 
1 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Palestine Late Current Al, arian, Sami 1,000537 Palestinian 1988 6 0 
                                                
534 OLF is a ethnic separatist guerrilla group 
535 The  PLM is a centrist conservative Islamic political party.   
536 The Original Pakistan Muslim League was eliminated by President Musharraf and has sense splintered into 
three different parties all with the same name   
537 Because of size – count as three 
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Islamic Jihad 1970s 
(1978) 
Awda, Sheikh 
Musa, Bashir 
Saadi, Luay 
Lebanon 
Syria 
Israel 
1989 
1990 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1998 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
1 
7 
2 
2 
2 
2 
18 
14 
9 
8 
54 
115 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
5 
8 
4 
1 
7 
3 
Palestinian 
Popular 
Struggle 
Front538 
1967 Last 
Active 
1989 
Dergarabedian, 
Elias 
Gharbiah, 
Bahjat 
Inactive Palestinian 
Lebanon 
Jordan 
Syria 
1970 
1989 
1 
1 
0 
0 
Palestinian 
Resistance 
1980 2006 Unknown Inactive Palestinian 1980 
1994 
2006 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
Palestinian 
Revolution 
Force General 
Command 
1985 Last 
active 
1987 
Unknown Unknown Palestinian 1975 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1 
2 
4 
8 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
Parbatya 
Chattagram 
Jana Sanghati 
Samity 
(United 
People’s 
Party) 
1972 Current Larma, 
Jyotirindra 
Unknown Bangladesh 2005 1 0 
Partisans of 
Holy War 
1987 Last 
active 
1987 
Unknown Inactive Lebanon 1987 1 0 
Partitions of 
the Iranian 
People of 
Hormuzgan   
 
1979 Last 
active 
1983 
Unknown Unknown Iran 1983 1 0 
Partisans of 
the Sunni 
 
2005 Current  Unknown Unknown Iraq 2005 1 1 
Party of 
Islamic Call 
1980s Mid 
1990s 
Unknown Unknown Iraq 
 
(Iran) 
   
Party of 
Islamic Call 
 
1980 Current Unknown Unknown Iran 
 
   
Patriotic 
Union of 
Kurdistan 
1975 Current Unknown Inactive Iraq 1980 
1985 
1987 
1 
1 
2 
0 
0 
0 
Pause and 
Identify539 
Early 
1970s 
1980 Unknown Unknown Egypt Violent   
Paykar 
 
 
1979 Current Unknown Unknown Iran    
                                                
538 The (PSF) was a very small Palestinian organization that was set up right before the Six Day War in 1967 in 
the West Bank.  The organization attempted to mediate between the PLO/Fatah and Syria and the Palestinian 
organizations under its patronage, without much success.    
539 Part of the group that killed Sadat (Dekmejian: 225) 
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People’s 
Democratic 
Army 
 
1992 Current Unknown Unknown Tajikistan    
People’s 
Democratic 
Party 
 
1970 Current Unknown Unknown Sudan    
People’s 
Democratizati
on front for 
Oman 
 
1992 Current Unknown Unknown Oman    
People’s 
Liberation 
Army 
 
1978 Current Unknown 3,000540 Bangladesh 2005 
2006 
1 
3 
0 
0 
People’s 
Liberation 
Army of 
Kurdistan541 
1984 Last 
active 
1999 
Kalkan, Duran 
Ocalan, 
Abdullah 
Ocalan, Osman 
1,000 Turkey 1998 
1999 
3 
6 
0 
0 
The People of 
the Call  
Civil 
War 
Years 
Civil 
War 
Unknown Small Algeria     
People’s 
Mojahedin 
Organization 
of Iran542 
1965 1979 Unknown Unknown Iran    
Peoples 
Mojahedin of 
Iran 
 
1980 Current Unknown Large  Iran     
People’s 
Revolutionary 
Party of 
Kangleipak  
1977 Current Unknown 500 Bangladesh 2006 1 0 
People of 
Hadith (Ahl 
al-Hadith) 
 
Early 
1970s 
Current Unknown Unknown Saudi 
Arabia  
   
People’s 
Mujahideen 
of Iran 
  
1980 Current Unknown Unknown Iran    
People of the 
Vanguard 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Unknown Unknown Algeria     
Peykar 
Organization 
for the Fight 
for the 
Freedom of 
1975 Last 
active 
1982 
Unknown Inactive Iran 1982 1 0 
                                                
540 Counted as three 
541 The ARGK was established as the military wing of the PKK, a leftist nationalist terror organization. Groups 
dropped from large N analysis but included in terrorist data  
542 The ideology of the PMOI was to interpret Shiism as a revolutionary belief system and to activate these 
beliefs through class struggle and mobilization of the impoverished masses against internal feudalism and 
foreign imperialism   
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the Working 
Class543 
 
PKK Kongra-
Gel (Kongra 
Gele 
Kurdistan)544 
 
2003 Current Unknown Unknown Turkey 2004 
2005 
21 
1 
0 
0 
Polisario 
Front545 
1973 Last 
active 
1988 
Unknown Inactive Algeria 
Mauritania 
1976 
1977 
1980 
1981 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1 
4 
4 
1 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Polisario 
Front546 
(Frente 
Popular Para 
la Liberation 
de Saguia el-
Hamra y Rio 
de Ora) 
Late 
1970s 
(1978) 
Current Unknown Unknown  Morocco    
Popular Front 
for Armed 
Resistance 
 
Late 
1960s 
(1968) 
1973 Unknown Unknown Pakistan    
Popular Front 
for the 
Liberation of 
Palestine 
1967 Current El-zibri, Mastafa 
Habash, George 
Mallash, Abdel 
800 Palestinian 
Lebanon 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1984 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
2001 
2002 
2003 
14 
1 
3 
2 
9 
1 
7 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
5 
6 
3 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
1 
                                                                                                                                                  
543 PEYKAR was an anti-Shah, leftist offshoot of Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK).   
544 The PKK id a nationalist/separatist and/or Socialist movement/party. Dropped from large N but included in 
terrorist data 
545 The Polisario is committed to the liberation of the Saharawi people  
546 The Polisario  Front is a Saharawi national liberation movement that seeks to build a stats in what is now 
southern Morocco. 
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2004 
2005 
2006 
9 
16 
14 
1 
0 
0 
Popular Front 
for the 
Liberation of 
Palestine – 
General 
Command  
1968 Last 
active 
1993 
Jabril, Ahmed 300 Lebanon  
Syria 
 
1970 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1978 
1985 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1993 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Popular Front 
for the 
Liberation of 
Oman547 
 
1974 Current  Unknown Unknown Oman    
Popular 
Resistance 
Committees 
2000 Current Arqan, 
Mahmoud 
Samhadana, 
Jamal 
Unknown Palestinian  2004 
2005 
2006 
5 
22 
25 
0 
0 
0 
Popular 
Revolutionary 
Resistance 
Organization 
1987 Last 
active 
1987 
Unknown Inactive Lebanon 1987 1 0 
Protectors of 
Islam Brigade 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2005 1 0 
Progressive 
Democratic 
Tribune548 
2002 Current Unknown Unknown Bahrain    
Prosperous 
Justice 
Party549 
 
1998 Current Nurmahmudi 
Ismail 
Unknown Indonesia     
Prosperous 
Peace Party550 
 
1970 Current Ruyandi 
Hutasoit 
Unknown Indonesia    
Punishment 
Brigade for 
the Al-Jaafari 
Government  
2006 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2006 1 0 
Purbo 
Banglar 
2003 Current  Chowdhury, 
Mofakkar 
Unknown Bangladesh 2003 
2005 
6 
8 
0 
0 
                                                
547 This militant offshoot of the Popular Front foe the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf. 
548 The Progressive Democratic Tribune is a political outfit launched by the underground National Liberation 
Front in 2002 
549 The Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or PKS) is known for is public opposition to political 
corruption.  The party is closely associated with Islamic teachings, but according to its leadership it does not 
promote the mandatory implementation of sharia.  Many of its campaigns are based on conservative religious 
teachings, such as opposition to selling pornography.   
550 The prosperous Peace Party is a Christian-democratic based political party   
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Communist 
Party551 
Malitha, Abdur 2006 
 
14 0 
Rahanwein 
Resistance 
Army 
1995 Current Hassan 
Mohamed Nur 
Shargudud 
4,000552 Somalia     
Reform Star 
Party553 
 
1970 Current Unknown Unknown Indonesia    
Renaissance 
Party 
 
Early 
1980s 
Last 
active 
1992 
Rashid al-
Ghannushi 
Unknown Tunisia     
Renaissance 
Movement 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Unknown Very Small Algeria      
Revenge of 
the Hebrew 
Babies 
2002 Last 
active 
2002 
Unknown Inactive Israel 2002 1 0 
Revival 
Party554 
1980 Current Unknown Unknown Israel 
 
   
Revolutionary 
Action 
Organization 
of the Arab 
Resistance 
Front 
 
 
1990 Last 
active 
1990 
Unknown Inactive Lebanon 1990 1 0 
Revolutionary 
Organization 
of Socialist 
Muslims555  
1974 Last 
active 
1985 
Unknown Unknown Syria 
Libya 
Iraq  
1984 
1985 
4 
4 
0 
0 
Revolutionary 
Outburst 
Movement 
1993 Last 
active 
1993 
Unknown Inactive Lebanon 1993 1 0 
Revolutionary  
People’s 
Front 
 
1979 Current Unknown 1,500556 Bangladesh 2003 
2005 
1 
1 
0 
0 
Revolutionary 
Reople’s 
Liberation 
Party 
(Devrimci Sol 
(Revolutional
ry Left)557 
1978 Current Unknown Small Turkey  Violence    
Righteous 
Arrows 
Battalions 
 
2005 Current  Unknown Unknown Iraq 2007 1 0 
                                                                                                                                                  
551 The PBCP is a Maoist organization dedicated to ridding Bangladesh of class exploitation and establishing a 
Communist government.   
552 Counted as three.  Dropped from Large N analysis but included in my terrorist data set   
553 The reform Star Party is a Islamist reformist political party 
554 The Revival Party was founded in 1980 to protest the Camp David Agreements  
555 This is a Communist/Socialist party and/or organization. Not included in large N analysis but included in 
terrorist data  
556 Counted as three 
557 The DHCP/F was originally a splinter faction of the Turkish People’s Liberation Party.  Since the late 1980s 
this group has committed terrorist acts against retired Turkish security and military officials  
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Saad Bin Abi 
Waqas 
Brigades 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2005 1 0 
Saif-ul-
Muslimeen  
(Sword of 
Muslims) 
2003 Current 
 
 
 
Unknown Unknown Afghanista
n 
2003 1 0 
Salafi Cult 1740 Current Unknown Unknown Morocco 
Saudi 
Arabia 
   
Saraya al-
Jihad al-
Islami  
(Islamic Holy 
War Brigades  
1970 Current  Unknown Unknown West Bank    
Salafia 
Jihadia 
Mid 
1990s 
 
Current Fizazi, 
Mohamed 
700 Morocco 2003 1 0 
Salafist 
Group for 
Preaching and 
Combat 
(GSPC) 
 
1993 Last 
active 
2002 
Unknown  700-4,000 Algeria Violent
558  
  
Salafist Party Mid 
1990s 
Current  Ghanim al 
Buaneen 
Unknown Bahrain    
Salah Al-din 
Battalions 
2000 Current Unknown Unknown Israel  
West Bank 
2000 
2005 
2006 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
Salafiyyun 
(The Pious) 
 
Early 
1970s 
Current Unknown Unknown Saudi 
Arabia  
   
Salafuyya 
Group 
 
1991 Current Abu Mus’ab ads 
al-Wadoud 
Small Lebanon Violent 
 
  
Sami Al-Ghul 
Brigades 
 
2006 Current Unknown Unknown Israel  
West Bank 
2006 1 0 
Saraya al-
Shuhuada al-
Jihadiyah fi 
al-Iraq 
(Jihadist 
Martyrs 
Brigades in 
Iraq) 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2004 2 0 
Sarata Usud 
al-Tawhid 
(Brigades of 
the Lions of 
Monotheism) 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2004 1 0 
Saudi 
Hezbollah559 
 
1987 Current Sheikh Hashi al-
Shukus 
Sheikh 
Abdulrahman 
al-Hubail 
Small Saudi 
Arabia 
 
(Iran) 
1987 1 0 
                                                
558 The GSPC hardly ever accepts responsibility for attacks.  
559 Saudi Hezbollah espouses Khomeini’s principle of vilayat-e-faqih, and most members practice the teachings 
of Iran’s Supreme Leader.  The followers distrust the Saudi ruling family and government.  The truck bombing 
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Screaming the 
Truth 
2006 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2006 1 
 
 
0 
Secret 
Organization 
of Al-Qaeda 
in Europe 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown England 2005 4 4 
Shahin 
(Falcon) 
1992 Last 
active 
1992 
Unknown Unknown Iran 1992 1 0 
Shalhevet 
Gilad 
 Last 
active 
2005 
Unknown Unknown Israel 
West Bank 
2005 1 0 
Shas – 
Sephardo 
Association 
of the 
Observers of 
the Torrah 
1984 Current Unknown Unknown Israel    
Shurafa al-
Urbum 
(Honorable of 
Jordan) 
 
2001 Last 
active 
2002 
Unknown Unknown Jordan 2002 1 0 
Sipah-E-
Sahaba 
Pakistan 
(SSP) 
1985 Current Unknown Unknown Pakistan     
Solders of 
Justice560 
  
Early 
1980s 
(1982) 
Inactive 
after late 
1980s 
(1988) 
Unknown Unknown Lebanon  
Saudi 
Arabia 
 
(Iran) 
1988 
1989 
 
1 
1 
 
Socialist 
Labor Party561 
 
 
1986 Current Unknown Unknown Egypt    
Societies of 
Propagation 
 
1995 Current Unknown Unknown Saudi 
Arabia  
   
Society of 
Denouncemen
t562 
 
1970 Mid 
1970s 
Unknown Unknown Egypt     
Soldiers of 
the Prophet’s 
Companions 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2005 
2006 
2 
2 
1 
0 
Sons of the 
South 
1984 Last 
active 
1984 
Unknown Inactive Lebanon 1984 1 0 
                                                                                                                                                  
in June of 1986 of the Khobar Towers apartment complex in Dhahran, were 19 members of the US Air Force 
personal were killed and hundreds of Americans were injures, has been the main terrorist attack by Shia radicals 
in Saudi Arabia.  The government cracked down on Saudi Hezbollah as a result.       
560 This is an Iranian state-sponsored Shiite group based in Lebanon whose goal was the overthrowing of the 
Saudi Arabian monarchy in favor of an Iranian-style Islamic Republic  
561 The Socialist Labor Party was originally a social party; since 1986 the party has undergone a major 
ideological change turning into an Islamic party.   
562 In 1970 Sadat co-opted several leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood into the Egyptian political system.  As a 
result, members of the Muslim Brotherhood broke off and formed more radical short-lived groups.   
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Stern Gang 1940s Current Unknown  
 
Unknown Israel    
Society of 
Transmission 
1970s Current Unknown Unknown Pakistan 
 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
 
   
Society of 
Transmission 
of the Call 
 
1970s Current Unknown Unknown Pakistan 
Morocco 
 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
 
   
Society of the 
Ulama 
1970 Early 
1990s 
Unknown Unknown Iraq 
 
(Iran) 
   
Sons of the 
South  
 
1984 1984 Unknown Small Lebanon    
South Maluku 
Republic 
(RMS)563 
1998 Current 
 
 
Unknown Unknown Indonesia  2002 1 0 
Southern 
Sudan 
Independence 
Movement 
 
1991 Current Machar, Riak Inactive Sudan 1995 1 0 
Squadron of 
Fatimah the 
Pure Martyr 
 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
 
2003 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq   Violent   
Squadron of 
Muhammad 
ibn 
Maskamah 
 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq  Violent  
Squadrons of 
Abu Bakr as-
Siddiq 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq   Violent  
Squadrons of 
Al-Qaqa 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 
 
 
 Violent  
Squadrons of 
Hayzun 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq   Violent  
Squadrons of 
Orphans and 
Martys 
 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq   Violent  
Squadrins of 
the Lions of 
the Arabian 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq   Violent   
                                                
563 RMS is a Indonesian Christian separatist group that seeks independence  
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Peninsula 
 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
 
Struggles for 
the Unity and 
Freedom of 
Greater Syria 
 
 
2005 Current Unknown Small Lebanon 
 
(Syria) 
   
Supporters of 
the Sunni 
People 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq 2006 1 0 
Supporters of 
the Call 
Early 
1970s 
Current Unknown Unknown Pakistan  
 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
 
   
Sudanese 
People’s 
Liberation 
Army 
(SPLA)564 
 
1954 Current Unknown Thousands565 Sudan   Violent  
Sudanese 
Mujahideen 
 
2000 Current Unknown Unknown Sudan     
Sudanese 
Muslim 
Brotherhood 
 
1970 Current  Unknown Unknown Sudan     
Supreme 
Islamic 
Revolutionary 
Council in 
Iraq 
 
1970s Mid 
1990s 
Unknown Unknown Iraq  
 
(Iran) 
   
Support al-
Aqsa Vivison 
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Iraq  Violent   
Supporters of 
Shariah 
 
1999 Current Unknown Unknown Yemen 
Egypt 
 
   
Survivors of 
Fire/Hell (al-
Najoun min 
al-Nar)566 
 
1980 Current Unknown Unknown West Bank 
Egypt  
 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
 Violent  
Swords of the 
Righteousness 
Brigades 
2005 Current 
 
 
Unknown Unknown Iraq 2005 1 0 
                                                
564 The SPLA is a guerrilla group comprising non-Muslim tribal peoples living in the southern parts of Sudan 
who oppose the policies of the central government  
565 Counted as three 
566 Their main enemy is the secular Arab regimes rather than Israel; because of this, they took no part in the 
Palestinian uprising and maintain no links with Hamas or Hezbollah.  See: 
hppt://haganah.us/harchives/003973.html 
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Syrian 
Muslim 
Brotherhood 
 
1920s Current Unknown Unknown Syria    
Syrian 
Mujahideen 
 
2003 Current Unknown Unknown Syria 
Iraq 
 
   
Syrian 
Islamic Front 
(al-Jabhah al-
Islamiyyah fi 
Suriyya) 
1980 Current Unknown Unknown567 Syria     
Syrian Social 
Nationalist 
Party568 
1930 Last 
active 
1985 
Sa’adeh, Antun Inactive Lebanon 
Syria 
1985 3 0 
Tabriz 
Militant 
Clergy 
Association 
1989 Current Unknown Unknown Iran    
Tadjik 
Party569 
 
1990  Current Unknown Unknown Tajikstan 
Pakistan 
 
   
Takfir wa 
Hija  
Early 
1970s 
Current 
 
 
Unknown Unknown Iraq 2005 1 0 
Takif Wa al-
Hjira570 
 
 
Early 
1970s571 
Current  Unknown  Unknown  Algeria 
Egypt 
Lebanon 
Morocco 
 
 Violent   
Taliban 1994 Current Dadullah, 
Mullah 
Hakimi, 
Latifullah 
Khan, Naqiblah 
Thousands572 Afghanista
n 
1995 
1996 
1998 
1999 
2001 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
22 
75 
102 
158 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
5 
12 
Tanzim 1993 Current Abayat, Atef 
Barghouti, 
Marwan 
Unknown Israel 
West Bank 
2003 
2004 
1 
2 
0 
2 
Tanzim al-
Jihad (Jihad 
Organization) 
 
1970 Inactive 
after 
1995 
Unknown Very Small Egypt 
Afghanista
n 
Sudan 
 
   
                                                
567 According to Hrair Dekmejian (1995: 110) the ISF included numerous smaller Islamic fundamentalist 
groups; however, he does not distinguish which Islamic groups he hass included.  Because of this I will count 
the ISF three times.   
568 The SSNP is a Socialist/nationalist party. Dropped from large N analysis but included in terrorist data 
569 Also known as the Party of Islamic Renaissance (PIR) 
570 It’s name translates into English as “rejection of sins and exodus” and is regarded as one of the most 
fundamentalist of al Islamist groups 
571 There is some controversy over this: some suggest that the group was founded in the early 1970s in Egypt 
others argue it split from the Egyptian Islamic Jihad in the 1980s.  I will assume here that it emerged in the early 
1970s as a result of the opining of the Egyptian political institutions.    
572 Counted as three 
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Tawihid and 
Jihad (Holy 
Struggle) 
Late 
1990s 
(1998) 
Current Al-Ja’af, 
Mohammed  
Al-Loheibi, 
Salah 
Unknown Iraq 2003 
2004 
2005 
7 
22 
1 
1 
4 
0 
Tawahid and 
Jihad Group 
in Egypt  
 
2005 Current Unknown Unknown Egypt 2005 2  
Tawid Islamic 
Bridges 
2004 Current 
 
 
Unknown Unknown Egypt 2004 1 0 
Tawid wal 
Jihad 
(Unification 
and Holy 
War)573 
 
2004 Current Unknown  Unknown Egypt 2005 
2006 
1 
3 
0 
0 
Tehrike-e 
Jaafria (TEJ) 
Pakistan574 
 
1980 Mid 
1990s 
(1995) 
Allama Arif 
Hussein 
Unknown Pakistan Violent    
The Call575  Late 
1970s 
(1978) 
Early 
1980s 
(1982) 
Unknown Unknown Kuwait 
Saudi 
Arabia 
 
   
The Army of 
Mohammed
576  
1994 Last 
active 
2000 
Unknown Unknown  Yemen  2000 1 1 
The Islamic 
Liberation 
Party577 
 
1953 Current   Lebanon 
Syria  
Iraq 
Palestinian  
 
Turkey 
Pakistan 
Uzbekistan 
 
1974 
1999 
2000 
1 
1 
1 
 
The Group for 
the Promotion 
of Virtue and 
the 
Prevention of 
Vise 
2005 2005 Unknown Unknown Iraq 2005 1 0 
The Holders 
of the Black 
2004 Current 
 
Unknown Unknown Iraq 2004 1 0 
                                                
573 On April 24, 2006 three bombs exploded nearly simultaneously in the Sinai resort of Dahab.  The Cairo daily 
Al-Ahram claimed that a preliminary investigation into the terrorist attacks pointed to Tawhid wl Jihad, a new 
terrorist organization with connections to al-Qaeda.   
574 The TEJ is a Sunni Religious movement whose violent acts are directed toward Shia.  
575 The Call was an underground Shiite political organization was active during the late 1970s and early 1980s.  
Its program called for the overthrow of the existing regimes in these two states and their replacement with 
Islamic republics modeled on the Islamic Republic of Iran.   
576 Also known as the Army of Aden-Abyan 
577 The Islamic Liberation Party was a Palestinian movement that opened branches on Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, the 
UK, and France.  In the 1980s it began operating in Turkey, India, Pakistan, and in the 1990s Uzbekistan.  
Although the party has not been involved in the uprising against Israeli rule in the West Bank and Gaza since 
1967, it has committed mild acts of terrorism elsewhere.  For the most part, the party argues that Muslims 
currently live in Dar al-Kufr (the Disbelievers), because they are governed with laws other than the revelation of 
Allah.  Their objective seems to be the spreading of Islamic law and teachings.      
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Banners  
The 
Victorious 
Sect (Al-
Taefa 
Al_mansoura)
578 
2001 Active Unknown Unknown Egypt 2006 1  
al-Takfir Wa 
al Hijra 
(Denunciation 
Repentance of 
Infidel and 
Migration)579  
1970 Mid 
1970s 
Unknown Unknown Egypt     
Thunderbolt  
(Sa’iqa al) 
 
1968 Inactive 
after 
1976 
Unknown Unknown Palestinian 
Israel  
 
(Syria) 
1976 1  
Tigers of the 
Gulf 
 
 
1995 Current Bin Laden  Large Saudi 
Arabia  
1995 1  
Tigray 
Peoples 
Liberation 
Front 
1976 Last 
active 
1988 
Kinfe, Ato 
Tella, Fresseha 
Zenawi, Meles 
Unknown Ethiopia 1976 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
TKEL/L 
(Turkish 
Communist 
Labor 
Party)580 
1990 Last 
active 
2000 
 
Unknown 1,000 Turkey 1999 
2000 
1 
1 
0 
0 
Tradition and 
Law 
Civil 
War 
Years 
Civil 
War 
Unknown Unknown Algeria     
Tunisian 
Combatant 
Group 
 
 
2000 Current Unknown Unknown Afghanista
n  
   
Turkish 
People’s 
Liberation 
Army581 
1971 Last 
active 
1980 
Unknown Inactive Turkey 1971 
1972 
1979 
1980 
3 
2 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Turkish 
Mujahideen 
 
2003 Current Unknown Unknown Turkey    
Turkish 1982 Current Unknown Unknown Turkey  Violent  
                                                
578 The Victorious Sect’s members are mostly from the shanty-towns of Torah and Al-Zawya Al-Hamra, 
northeast of Cairo.  The group espouses Salafi takfiri, a Jihadist ideology that identifies anyone with whom they 
disagree as infidels and therefore potential targets. 
579 In 1970 Sadat co-opted several leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood into the Egyptian political system.  As a 
result, members of the Muslim Brotherhood broke off and formed more radical short-lived groups (Sidibe 
2006). 
580 The TKEP/L is a Communist/leftist party/movement. Party dropped from large N analysis but included in 
terrorist data  
581 TPLA is an anti-Globalization /leftist party/movement. Party dropped from large N analysis but included in 
terrorist data 
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Hezbollah 
 
 
Turkish 
Liberation 
Jihad 
 
 
1991 Current Unknown Unknown Turkey     
Turkish 
People’s 
liberation 
Front (THKP-
C)582 
1971 Current  Unknown Unknown Turkey 
 
1971 
1977 
1979 
1991 
1992 
1999 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Tunisian 
Combatant 
Group 
(TCG)583 
2000 Current Maaroufi, Tarek 
Ben Hassine, 
Saifallah 
Unknown Tunisia    
Ubdad al-
Rahman 
(Worshippers 
of the 
Compassionat
e) 
Early/mi
d 1970s 
 
 
 
Mid 
1990s 
Unknown Unknown Lebanon    
Uganda 
Democratic 
Christian 
Army 
1990 Current  Unknown Inactive Sudan 1993 2 0 
Ummah 
Liberation 
Army 
1999 Current  Al-mahdi, Sadiq 
Nuradeen, Umar 
Unknown Sudan 1999 
2000 
1 
1 
0 
0 
Ummah 
Movement 
Civil 
War 
Years 
 
 
Civil 
War 
Unknown Unknown Algeria Violent    
Umma 
Party584 
1983 
 
Current Unknown 185 Egypt 
 
 
   
Umma Party 
(Sudan) 
1970 Current Unknown Large Sudan 
 
 
   
Unified Unit 
of Jihad 
(United 
Company of 
Jihad) 
 
1993 Last 
active 
1993 
Unknown Inactive Algeria 1993 1 o 
Union of 
Peaceful 
Citizens of 
Algeria 
1994 Last 
active 
1994 
Unknown Inactive Algeria 1994 1 0 
                                                
582 The THKP-C is a Communist/socialist party/movement. Party dropped from large N analysis but included in 
terrorist data 
583 The TCG is a radical Islamic fundamentalist group with affiliation with Al-Qaeda.  The TCG has not 
committed any terrorist acts; however in 2002 they were suspected of plotting to attack the US Embassy as well 
as other Algerian, and Tunisian diplomatic interests in Rome. 
584 This is a small Egyptian political party that presses for promoting the a socialist democracy and adapting the 
Islamic sharia as the main source of legislation 
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United Achik 
National 
Front 
 
2004 Current Unknown Unknown Bangladesh 2006 1 0 
United Arab 
Revolution 
1986 Last 
active 
1986 
Unknown Inactive Kuwait 1986 1 0 
United 
Nasserite 
Organization 
1986 Last 
active 
1987 
Unknown Inactive Lebanon 1987 1 0 
United 
Islamic Front 
for the 
Salvation of 
Afghanistan
585 
 
 
 
1996 Current Unknown Unknown Syria     
United 
National 
Liberation 
Front 
1964 Current Meghen, 
Rejkumar 
Singh, 
Arambam 
3,500 Bangladesh 2005 
2006 
2 
2 
0 
0 
United 
Organization 
of Halabjah 
Martyrs 
1989 Last 
active 
1989 
Unknown Unknown Iraq 1989 1 0 
United 
People’s 
Democratic 
Front 
1998 Current Unknown Unknown Bangladesh 2005 1 0 
United Tajik 
Opposition 
2001 Current Unknown Unknown Tajikistan 2001 1 0 
Unity, Justice 
and Equality 
front in 
Mauritania 
1977 Current Unknown Unknown Mauritania 2007 1 0 
Union of 
Islamic Call 
 
Civil 
Way 
Years 
Civil 
War 
Unknown Unknown Algeria  Violent    
Usbat al-
Ansar (Band 
of Supporters) 
 
1988 2005 Unknown Unknown Lebanon  
Palestine 
 
1995 Violent
586 
 
Usbah al-
Hashimiyya 
(The 
Hashemite 
League) 
Mid 
1970s 
1983 Unknown Unknown Egypt    
Usd Allah 2004 Current 
 
Unknown Unknown Iraq 2004 1 0 
Vanguards of 
the Islamic 
Conquest 
Early 
1990s 
(1992) 
Last 
active 
2002 
Al-Zawahiri,  
Islamboui, 
Khaled 
Unknown Egypt    
Vanguard 
Society of 
Islam 
1975 Current Unknown Unknown Morocco     
                                                
585 Also known as the Northern Alliance (Jabha-yi-Muttahid-I Islami-yi-Milli Bara-yi Nijat-I Afghanistan).    
586 This Palestinian Group was outlawed by the Lebanese judiciary in 1995 for the assassination of a rival cleric 
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Welfare Party 
 
1983 1998587 Ahmed Tekdal Unknown588 Turkey    
World Islamic 
Jihad Group 
1998 Current 
 
 
Unknown Unknown Yemen 1998 1 0 
Yemeni Islah 
Party589 
1990 
 
Current Sheikh Abd al-
Majid al-
Zindani 
 Yemen    
Yemeni 
Mujahideen 
 
1993 Current Unknown Unknown Yemen     
Yemen 
Islamic Jihad 
1990 Current Saley al-Atwi 
Taria al-Fadhli 
Around 200 Yemen 
Libya 
Afghanista
n 
 
(Saudi 
Arabia) 
 
 
  
Yisrael 
Beiteinu (Our 
Home)590 
 
1997 Active Unknown Unknown Israel     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
587 The Welfare Party was ban in 1988.  The ban was upheld by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights on February 13, 2003 (see case of Refah Partisi and Others V. Rurkey)  
588 Party and/or movement will be counted as 3 because of size and/or membership numbers  
589 3,000 Yemeni volunteers participated in the war in Afghanistan and after returning home they found refuge 
and support from the Yemeni Islah Party.    
590 Yisrael Beiteinu is a right-wing extremist political party that takes a hard line toward Israeli Arabs and 
Palestinians and they believe an absolute Jewish state based religious teachings  
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Appendix Four: List of Muslim Brotherhood Members 
Currently Detained by the Egyptian State 
 
1. Usama Muhammad Amin Hassan, Damietta governorate, detained April 10, 2006 
2. Hussam al-Sayyid al-Tamimi, Damietta governorate, detained April 10, 2006   
3. `Abd al-Nabi `Ali `Abd al-Nabi, Bahariyya governorate, detained July 7, 2006   
4. Ahmad Husain Awad Ghazlan, Bahariyya governorate, detained July 17, 2006   
5. Bilal al-Sayyid al-Sadiq Muhammad, al-Sharqiyya governorate, detained August 13, 
2006   
6. Abdullah Muhammad Muhammad `Attiyya, al-Sharqiyya governorate, detained 
August 13, 2006   
7. Al-Sayyid `Abd al-Hadi Muhammad Faraj, al-Sharqiyya governorate, detained 
August 13, 2006   
8. Muhammad al-Sayyid `Abd al-Salam al-Shinnawi, Cairo governorate, detained 
August 16, 2006   
9. Kamal Muhammad Hassan Suliman, Kafr al-Shaikh governorate, detained August 19, 
2006   
10. Hamada Muhammad Ism`ail Ahmad Sa`ad, Kafr al-Shaikh governorate, detained 
August 21, 2006   
11. `Abd al-Qadir Salama Hassan Suliman, Kafr al-Shaikh governorate, detained August 
21, 2006   
12. Ahmad `Abd al-Mun`im Yunis, Bahariyya governorate, detained August 25, 2006   
13. Khalil Muhammad Yusif, Bahariyya governorate, detained August 25, 2006   
14. `Abd al-Nassir al-Sayyid `Ali, Bahariyya governorate, detained August 25, 2006   
15. Yasir Fu'ad `Abd al-`Alim, al-Sharqiyya governorate, detained September 13, 2006   
16. Nassir Salah `Attiyya, al-Sharqiyya governorate, detained September 13, 2006   
17. Al-Sayyid Ahmad al-Damardash Muhammad, al-Sharqiyya governorate, detained 
September 13, 2006   
18. Naji `Abd al-Halim al-Sayyid `Attiyya, al-Gharbiyya governorate, detained 
September 17, 2006   
19. Mahmud Fu'ad al-Sayyid al-Shami, al-Gharbiyya governorate, detained September 
17, 2006   
20. Mahir Muhammad al-Malwiji al-Hawari, al-Gharbiyya governorate, detained 
September 17, 2006   
21. Muhammad Mus`ad al-Sayyid `Ali Abu al-`Izz, al-Gharbiyya governorate, detained 
September 17, 2006   
22. Khalid `Abd al-Hakim Alwan, Fayum governorate, detained October 7, 2006   
23. Muhammad Sayyid `Urabi, Fayum governorate, detained October 7, 2006   
24. Muhammad Rajab Muhammad, Fayum governorate, detained October 7, 2006   
25. Imam Muhammad Muhammad al-Ads, Giza governorate, detained October 9, 2006   
26. Muhamad `Abd al-Halim, Manufiyya governorate, detained October 12, 2006   
27. Usama `Ammar, Manufiyya governorate, detained October 12, 2006   
28. Abu-Bakr `Ali Salih al-Qutt, Manufiyya governorate, detained October 12, 2006   
29. Salih `Uthman al-Nahrawi, Manufiyya governorate, detained October 12, 2006   
30. Majdi `Abd al-`Aziz Shama, Manufiyya governorate, detained October 12, 2006   
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31. Ashraf Kamal Mustafa, Manufiyya governorate, detained October 12, 2006   
32. Majdi Dandan, Manufiyya governorate, detained October 12, 2006   
33. Ahmad al-Khayat, Manufiyya governorate, detained October 12, 2006   
 
According to the same lawyer, the following members of the Muslim Brotherhood were held 
on charges of “belonging to an illegal organization” as of October 18:    
1. `Issam al-Din Muhamad Husain al-`Irian, Case Number 533/2006, Giza governorate, 
detained May 18, 2006 (Head of Political Committee)   
2. Muhammad Muhammad Mursi al-`Ayyat, Case Number 533/2006, al-Sharqiyya 
governorate, detained May 18, 2006 (Head of Parliamentary Committee)   
3. Ahmad Ibrahim Ahmad al-Halawani, Case Number 688/2006, Cairo governorate, 
detained June 19, 2006   
4. Mustafa Muhammad Salim Mustafa, Case Number 688/2006, Cairo governorate, 
detained June 19, 2006   
5. `Abd al-Ra`uf `Abd al-Mawla Hassan, Case Number 688/2006, Cairo governorate, 
detained June 19, 2006   
6. `Abd al-Qadir `Abd al-Hamid Mahjub, Case Number 688/2006, Giza governorate, 
detained June 19, 2006   
7. Khalid al-Shimi Muhammad Abu al-Dahab, Case Number 688/2006, Giza 
governorate, detained June 19, 2006   
8. Kamil Faruq Kamil Mayhub, Case Number 688/2006, Qalyubiyya governorate, 
detained June 19, 2006   
9. Tariq `Abd al-Fattah al-Sayyid `Abd al-Majid, Case Number 688/2006, Qalyubiyya 
governorate, detained June 19, 2006   
10. Muhsin Ramadan `Abd al-`Ail, Case Number 688/2006, Bani Suaif governorate, 
detained June 19, 2006   
11. Mahmud Badri Ahmad, Case Number 688/2006, Miniyya governorate, detained June 
19, 2006   
12. Sayyid `Abd al-Majid Bakhit, Case Number 688/2006, Assiut governorate, detained 
June 19, 2006   
13. Muhammad Mahmud `Abd al-Rahman Sayyid, Case Number 688/2006, Suhaj 
governorate, detained June 19, 2006   
14. `Abd al-Salam As`ad Ibrahim, Case Number 688/2006, Suhaj governorate, detained 
June 19, 2006   
15. `Ali Hamid Muhammad al-Balshi, Case Number 688/2006, Manufiyya governorate, 
detained June 19, 2006   
16. Zidan Hassan Zain al-Din Shaltut, Case Number 688/2006, al-Gharbiyya governorate, 
detained June 19, 2006   
17. Ahmad Muhammad Swailan `Ali al-Alfi, Case Number 688/2006, al-Gharbiyya 
governorate, detained June 19, 2006   
18. Sa`id al-Shawadfi `Abd al-Latif, Case Number 688/2006, Suez governorate, detained 
June 19, 2006   
19. Muhammad Muhammad `Abd al-Mun`im al-Dasuqi, Case Number 688/2006, 
detained June 19, 2006   
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20. Na`im Awad Mustafa Nu`man, Case Number 688/2006, Damietta governorate, 
detained June 19, 2006   
21. `Adil Muhammad Rada Sharaf, Case Number 688/2006, Damietta governorate, 
detained June 19, 2006   
22. Fathallah Muhammad Sa`ad al-Najjar, Case Number 688/2006, North Sinai 
governorate, detained June 19, 2006   
23. Muhammad `Abd al-`Ail `Ali Ziyada, Case Number 688/2006, North Sinai 
governorate, detained June 19, 2006   
24. `Abd al-Nassir `Ali Abdullah Abu-`Alw, Case Number 688/2006, Alexandria 
governorate, detained June 19, 2006   
25. Ra'fat `Ali al-Sayyid `Abd al-`Aziz, Case Number 688/2006, Marsa Matruh 
governorate, detained June 19, 2006   
26. Mustafa Ahmad `Abd al-Mu`ti al-Muslimani, Case Number 688/2006, al-Bahariyya 
governorate, detained June 19, 2006   
27. Muhammad Sufi `Abd al-Wahid, Case Number 688/2006, al-Fayum governorate, 
detained June 19, 2006   
28. Mus`ad Mahmud Mus`ad, Case Number 688/2006, al-Fayum governorate, detained 
June 19, 2006  
29. Hassan Muhammad Hassan Sayyid Ahmad al-Haywan, Case Number 1164/2005, al-
Sharqiyya governorate, detained October 17, 2006.   
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 Appendix Five: Terrorist and Suicide Terrorist Data 
 
Year 
 
Indonesia  
Number 
of 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
Indonesia 
Number 
of Suicide 
Attacks 
Tajikistan 
Number 
of 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
Tajikistan 
Number 
of Suicide 
Attacks 
Uzbekistan 
Number of 
Terrorist 
Attacks  
Uzbekistan 
Number of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
1970 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1971 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1972 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1973 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1974 0 0 0 0  0 0 
1975 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1976 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1977 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1978 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1979 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1981 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1982 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1983 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1984 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1985 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1986 3 0 0 0 0 0 
1987 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1988 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1991 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1993 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1995 0 0 4 0 0 0 
1996 3 0 4 0 0 0 
1997 0 0 6 0 0 0 
1998 4 0 16 0 0 0 
1999 14 0 0 0 4 0 
2000 27 0 10 0 0 0 
2001 70 1 9 1 1 0 
2002 48 1 1 0 0 0 
2003 9 1 1 0 0 0 
2004 23 1 0 0 8 5 
2005 19 1 1 0 1 1 
2006 7 0 3 0 0 0 
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Turkmenistan 
Number of 
Terrorist  
Attacks  
Turkmenistan 
Number of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
Algeria 
Number of 
Terrorist 
Attacks  
Algeria 
Number of 
Suicide 
Arracks 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 2 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 2 0 
0 0 6 0 
0 0 9 0 
0 0 31 0 
0 0 12 0 
0 0 4 0 
0 0 2 0 
0 0 81 0 
0 0 14 0 
0 0 8 0 
0 0 4 0 
1 0 5 0 
0 0 7 0 
0 0 12 0 
0 0 15 0 
0 0 20 1 
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Kyrgyzstan 
Number of 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
Kyrgyzstan 
Number of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
Kazakhstan 
Number of 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
Kazakhstan 
Number of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
Libya 
Number of 
Terrorist 
Attacks  
Libya 
Number of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
1970 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1971 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1972 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1973 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1974 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1975 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1976 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1977 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1978 0 0 0 0 2 0 
1979 0 0 0 0 2 0 
1980 0 0 0 0 2 0 
1981 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1982 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1983 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1984 0 0 0 0 2 0 
1985 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1986 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1987 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1988 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1989 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1990 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1996 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1998 2 0 1 0 1 0 
1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2001 3 0 0 0 0 0 
2002 3 0 1 0 0 0 
2003 2 0 0 0 0 0 
2004 1 0 2 0 0 0 
2005 2 0 1 0 0 0 
2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Egypt 
Number of 
Terrorist  
Attacks  
Egypt  
Number of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
Sudan 
Number of 
Terrorist 
Attacks  
Sudan 
Number of 
Suicide 
Arracks 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
2 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 2 0 
21 0 0 0 
5 0 5 0 
6 0 4 0 
2 0 2 0 
6 0 4 0 
2 0 1 0 
4 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 
6 0 1 0 
15 0 0 0 
16 0 0 0 
5 0 2 0 
5 0 6 0 
2 0 0 0 
2 0 2 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 2 0 
1 0 2 0 
0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
7 2 1 0 
2 1 2 0 
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Year 
 
Somalia 
Number of 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
Somalia  
Number of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
Tanzania  
Number of 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
Tanzania  
Number of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
Tunisia  
Number of 
Terrorist 
Attacks  
Tunisia  
Number of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
1970 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1971 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1972 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1973 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1974 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1975 1 0 1 0 0 0 
1976 2 0 0 0 0 0 
1977 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1978 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1979 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1981 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1982 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1983 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1984 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1985 0 0 0 0 2 0 
1986 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1987 1 0 0 0 4 0 
1988 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1989 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1990 3 0 0 0 0 0 
1991 3 0 0 0 2 0 
1992 3 0 0 0 0 0 
1993 20 0 1 0 1 0 
1994 13 0 0 0 1 0 
1995 4 0 0 0 1 0 
1996 6 0 0 0 0 0 
1997 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1998 1 0 1 1 0 0 
1999 1 0 1 0 0 0 
2000 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2001 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2002 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2003 2 0 0 0 0 0 
2004 1 0 2 0 0 0 
2005 4 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 2 1 0 0 0 0 
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Morocco  
Number of 
Terrorist  
Attacks  
Morocco 
Number of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
Turkey 
Number of 
Terrorist 
Attacks  
Turkey 
Number of 
Suicide 
Arracks 
0 0 13 0 
0 0 22 0 
0 0 0 0 
2 0 4 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 9 0 
0 0 15 0 
0 0 18 0 
0 0 15 0 
0 0 29 0 
1 0 10 0 
0 0 3 0 
0 0 5 0 
0 0 3 0 
0 0 1 0 
5 0 4 0 
5 0 5 0 
1 0 6 0 
0 0 11 0 
1 0 12 0 
1 0 8 0 
0 0 30 0 
0 0 19 0 
0 0 19 0 
1 0 15 0 
1 1 8 0 
0 0 8 0 
0 0 2 0 
1 0 86 1 
0 0 304 11 
0 0 110 0 
0 0 64 3 
0 0 35 0 
6 5 78 2 
0 0 105 3 
0 0 80 1 
0 0 80 1 
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Year 
 
Lebanon 
Number of 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
Lebanon 
Number of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
West Bank 
Number of 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
West Bank 
Number of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
Israel  
Number of 
Terrorist 
Attacks  
Israel 
Number of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
1970 8 0 1 0 3 0 
1971 3 0 0 0 3 0 
1972 14 0 1 0 19 0 
1973 12 0 0 0 0 0 
1974 13 0 0 0 13 0 
1975 24 0 0 0 9 0 
1976 16 0 1 0 7 0 
1977 8 0 0 0 10 0 
1978 5 0 1 0 15 0 
1979 13 0 2 0 30 0 
1980 16 0 1 0 12 0 
1981 42 1 0 0 7 0 
1982 26 0 0 0 6 0 
1983 36 5 0 0 3 0 
1984 34 0 0 0 10 0 
1985 80 10 7 0 45 0 
1986 61 1 0 0 27 0 
1987 41 0 0 0 32 0 
1988 29 2 0 0 31 0 
1989 18 3 0 0 27 0 
1990 8 1 3 0 23 0 
1991 33 0 2 0 15 0 
1992 3 0 0 0 11 0 
1993 14 0 1 0 15 0 
1994 9 0 5 0 24 4 
1995 4 0 5 0 11 0 
1996 5 0 2 0 10 5 
1997 2 0 1 0 6 1 
1998 11 0 31 1 20 1 
1999 7 0 10 0 14 0 
2000 2 0 167 0 19 0 
2001 8 0 326 7 85 18 
2002 21 0 432 16 108 42 
2003 10 0 164 6 74 16 
2004 3 0 351 9 27 7 
2005 23 0 479 9 76 3 
2006 9 0 26 1 414 5 
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Ethiopia  
Number of 
Terrorist  
Attacks  
Ethiopia 
Number of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
Eritrea  
Number of 
Terrorist 
Attacks  
Eritrea 
Number of 
Suicide 
Arracks 
3 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
5 0 1 0 
8 0 0 0 
8 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
3 0 1 0 
2 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
4 0 1 0 
3 0 2 0 
0 0 0 0 
9 0 0 0 
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Year 
 
Iraq 
Number of 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
Iraq 
Number of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
Iran 
Number of 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
Iran 
Number of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
Bahrain  
Number of 
Terrorist 
Attacks  
Bahrain 
Number of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
1970 0 0 3 0 0 0 
1971 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1972 0 0 4 0 0 0 
1973 0 0 2 0 0 0 
1974 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1975 1 0 3 0 0 0 
1976 2 0 1 0 0 0 
1977 0 0 2 0 0 0 
1978 2 0 18 0 0 0 
1979 1 0 9 0 1 0 
1980 3 0 0 0 0 0 
1981 3 0 2 0 0 0 
1982 2 0 1 0 0 0 
1983 3 0 9 0 0 0 
1984 3 0 6 0 0 0 
1985 4 0 0 0 0 0 
1986 1 0 2 0 1 0 
1987 5 0 4 0 0 0 
1988 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1989 2 0 1 0 0 0 
1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1991 1 0 4 0 0 0 
1992 10 0 4 0 0 0 
1993 3 0 2 0 0 0 
1994 8 0 3 0 0 0 
1995 7 0 0 0 1 0 
1996 4 0 1 0 10 0 
1997 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1998 4 0 7 0 1 0 
1999 4 1 0 0 0 0 
2000 4 0 0 0 0 0 
2001 3 0 3 0 0 0 
2002 14 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 147 25 6 0 0 0 
2004 849 65 0 0 0 0 
2005 2356 286 25 0 0 0 
2006 3966 191 11 0 3 0 
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Jordan 
Number of 
Terrorist  
Attacks  
Jordan 
Number of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
Kuwait 
Number of 
Terrorist 
Attacks  
Kuwait 
Number of 
Suicide 
Arracks 
12 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 
6 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
2 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 
2 0 2 0 
0 0 2 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
4 0 5 1 
4 0 0 0 
2 0 6 1 
0 0 2 0 
1 0 5 0 
2 0 3 0 
0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 
9 0 1 0 
2 0 6 0 
1 0 1 0 
2 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
3 0 2 0 
1 0 3 0 
0 0 1 0 
6 3 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
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Year 
 
Qatar 
Number of 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
Qatar 
Number of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Number of 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
Saudi 
Arabia  
Number of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
Syria 
Number of 
Terrorist 
Attacks  
Syria  
Number of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
1970 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1971 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1972 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1973 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1974 0 0 0 0 3 0 
1975 0 0 0 0 2 0 
1976 0 0 0 0 3 0 
1977 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1978 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1979 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1980 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1981 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1982 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1983 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1984 0 0 0 0 2 0 
1985 0 0 3 0 0 0 
1986 0 0 0 0 2 0 
1987 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1988 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1989 0 0 3 0 1 0 
1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1991 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1994 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1995 0 0 3 0 0 0 
1996 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1997 0 0 2 0 0 0 
1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 0 0 4 0 0 0 
2001 0 0 5 1 0 0 
2002 0 0 6 0 0 0 
2003 0 0 12 5 0 0 
2004 1 0 15 3 1 0 
2005 1 1 21 0 1 0 
2006 0 0 3 1 1 0 
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Yemen 
Number of 
Terrorist  
Attacks  
Yemen 
Number of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
Oman 
Number of 
Terrorist 
Attacks  
Oman 
Number of 
Suicide 
Arracks 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 
9 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 
38 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
12 3 0 0 
5 1 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 
  380 
 
Year 
 
Bangladesh 
Number of 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
Bangladesh 
Number of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
Pakistan 
Number 
of 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
Pakistan 
Number 
of Suicide 
Attacks 
Afghanistan 
Number of 
Terrorist 
Attacks  
Afghanistan 
Number of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
1970 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1971 0 0 6 0 0 0 
1972 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1973 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1974 0 0 2 0 0 0 
1975 2 0 0 0 0 0 
1976 0 0 4 0 0 0 
1977 1 0 1 0 0 0 
1978 0 0 4 0 0 0 
1979 1 0 3 0 4 0 
1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1981 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1982 0 0 3 0 4 0 
1983 0 0 4 0 3 0 
1984 0 0 3 0 1 0 
1985 0 0 4 0 1 0 
1986 0 0 12 1 2 0 
1987 0 0 26 0 2 0 
1988 1 0 34 0 6 0 
1989 1 0 15 0 2 0 
1990 0 0 4 0 2 0 
1991 0 0 11 0 1 0 
1992 0 0 2 0 2 0 
1993 0 0 1 0 4 0 
1994 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1995 0 0 9 1 2 0 
1996 2 0 8 0 3 0 
1997 0 0 5 0 0 0 
1998 0 0 48 0 4 0 
1999 4 0 31 0 0 0 
2000 0 0 33 1 0 0 
2001 15 1 47 0 3 0 
2002 10 0 80 2 65 2 
2003 17 0 69 2 149 0 
2004 24 0 84 5 147 1 
2005 45 4 163 2 207 16 
2006 25 0 314 7 409 47 
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Year 
 
United 
Arab 
Emirates  
Number 
of 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
United 
Arab 
Emirates  
Number 
of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
Mauritania  
Number of 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
Mauritania  
Number of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
Azerbaijan 
Number of 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
Azerbaijan 
Number of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
Djibouti   
Number 
of 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
Djibouti 
Number 
of 
Suicide 
Attacks 
1970 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1972 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1973 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1974 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1975 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1976 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1977 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
1978 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1979 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1980 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
1981 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1982 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1983 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1984 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1985 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1986 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1987 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1988 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1989 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1991 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1994 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1996 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1998 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
1999 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2001 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2004 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
  382 
  
References 
Abanes, R. 1996. American Militias. Downers Grove. Inter-Varsity Press.  
 
Abed-Qotob, Sana. 1995. The Accommodations Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood  
 of Egypt. International Journal of Middle East Studies. Pages 321–339. 
 
Abdalla, Ahmad. 1985. The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt. London: Al-Saqi Books 
 
Al Abd al-Fattah El-Awaisi. 1989. The Muslim brotherhood’s Conception of the Palestine Question.   
 Cairo. Islamic House of Publishing and Distribution. 
 
Abrahamian, Ervand. 1989. The Iranian Mujahidin. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Abrahamian, Ervand. 1982. Iran between Two Revolutions. Princeton University Press 
 
Abrahamian, Ervand. 1993. Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic. Berkeley: University of  
 California Press 
 
Aberback, Moshe and David Aberback. 2000. The Roman-Jewish Wars and Hebrew Cultural  
 Nationalism. New York: St. Martin’s Press 
 
Abd-Allah, Umar. 1983. The Islamic Struggle in Syria. Berkeley: University of California Press 
 
Abdalla, Ahmad. 1985. The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt, 1923-1970. London:  
Al-Saqi Books   
 
Abdel-Fadil, Mahmound. 1982. Educational Expansion and Income Distribution in Egypt: 1952-1977, in:  
 The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Egypt.  Gouda Abdel-Khalek and Robert Tignor.  
 New York: Holmes & Meier. 
Abu-Amr, Ziad. 1994. Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Bloomington: Indiana                   
Abu Azza, Abdullah. 1992. The Islamic Movements in the Arab Countries. Kuwait: Al-Qalam Publishing  
 House 
 
Abu Toameh, Khaled. 2005, March 20. Hamas PLC Bid: Against Oslo Accords. Jerusalem Post 
 
Aburish, Said 2004. Nasser: The Last Arab. Thomas Dunne Books 
 
Abuza, Zachary. 2006. Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia. Routledge Press 
 
Adams, Charles. 1993. Islam and Modernism in Egypt. New York: Russell and Russell.  
 
Adler, Emmanuel. 1992. The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the  
 International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control. International Organization:  
Pages 101-145 
 
Adler, Emmanuel and Peter Haas. 1992. Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the  
 creation of a Reflective Research Program. International Organizations. Pages 367-390  
 
Adwan, al-Sheikh Ahmad Yasin. 1989. The Palestine question between two charters: The Palestinian 
 national charter and the Islamic resistance movement’s charter: Hamas. Kuwait: Maktab Dar  al-
Bayan 
  383 
 
Agha, Hussein, J. and Ahmad S. Khalidi. 1995. Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation. London: Pinter.  
 
Ahmad, Hisham. 1994. Hamas. Jerusalem: PASSIA 
 
Ahmad, Hisham. 1994. Hamas—From Religious Salvation to Political Transformation: The Rise of Hamas 
 in Palestinian Society. Jerusalem: PASSIA. 
 
Aho, James. 1990. The Politics of the Righteous. Seattle: University of Washington Press 
 
Aisen, Ari and Francisco Jose Veiga. 2006. Does Political Instability Lead to Higher Inflation? A 
 Panel Data Analysis.  Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking. Pages 1379-1389.  
 
Albritton, Robert. 1979. Social Amelioration Through Mass Insurgency?  A Reexamination of Piven and 
 Cloward Thesis. American Political Science Review. Pages 1002-1011 
 
Aldrich, John. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America.  
 Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Alexander, Anne. 2005. Nasser: Life and Times. Haus Pub 
 
Algar, Hamid.  1983. The Roots of the Islamic Revolution.  London: Open Press. 
Aljazeera. December 19, 2005.  Palestinian Authority protects Hamas's right to participate in elections: 
 http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/2C016D1D-4719-450E-B9AA-BDF6E4533C94.htm 
Aljazeera. December 23, 2005. Fatah unites its list and the PLO sticks to the appointed election date. 
http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/ C668705D-2F73.-4304-A96D-  
Aljazeera. December 18, 2005. Europe will halt aid to Palestinians if Hamas rises to power: 
 http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/ exeres/FAAFB196-1069-4FBE-9824-B1691F56AB78.htm 
 
Aljazeera. December 17, 2005. American Warning against Hamas Participation in Legislative Council 
 elections http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/ exeres/912E15CC-3E97-40B1-AEB3- 7A4A96411BB0.htm. 
Aljazeera. December 17, 2005. Europe will halt aid to Palestinians if Hamas rises to power. 
Aljazeera. December 17, 2005. Palestinian Authority denounces American involvement in Palestinian 
 elections:  http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/649DD618-1358-4BE6-8ACD-
 0ADE8FAD1D2B.htm 
Aljazeera. December 17, 2005. Hamas wins in the municipalities and rejects the American stance:   
http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/744BF036-4289-4084-9D73-FC7675066912.htm 
Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in  
 Five Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
_______________ , Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan. 2002. Strong Religion: The Rise of  
 Fundamentalisms Around the World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
  
Amenta, Edwin, Bruce Carruthers, and Yvonne Zylan. 1992. A Hero for the Aged? The Townsend  
 Movement, the Political Mediation Model , and U.S. Old-Age Policy, 1934-1950. American  
 Journal of Sociology. Pages 309-339. 
 
  384 
Aminzade, Ronald (1993): Ballots and Barricades:  Class Formation and Republican Politics in France, 
 1830-1871. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton university Press. 
Arnon, Reguler, 2005, December 18. "Ha-Hamas hevisa et ha-Fatah ba-bhirot ha-meqomiyot" ("Hamas 
  defeats Fatah by a landslide in the local elections"), Ha'aretz. Internet: 
 http://new.walla.co.il/?w=//826541. 
Amnesty International. Egypt: Run-up to Shura Council Elections Marred by Wave of Arrests.  
May 15, 2001 
 
Amuzegar, Jahangir. 1995. Islamic Fundamentalism in Action: The Case of Iran.  Middle East Policy 
 
Andrews, Kenneth. 1997. The Impact of Social Movements on the Political Process: The Civil Rights  
 Movement and Black Election Politics in Mississippi. American Journal of Sociology.  
Pages 800-819. 
 
Anderson, Eugene N., & Pauline R. Anderson. 1967. Political Institutions and Social Change  
Continental Europe in the Nineteenth Century. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Anderson, John. December 12, 2004. Palestinians say Israel targets militant candidates. Washington Post 
 
Anderson, John. January 6, 2005. Hamas Won Power in West Bank Vote: Local Election May Prove to be 
 Harbinger.  Washington Post  
 
Andoni, Lamis. 1996, Spring. The Palestinian Elections: Moving Toward Democracy Moving Toward 
 Democracy or One Party Rule Journal of Palestine Studies. Pages: 5–16. 
 
Ansari, Hamied. 1986. Egypt: The Stalled Society. Albany: State University of New York 
 
_____________. 1984, March. The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics. International Journal of Middle  
 East Studies.  Page 129  
 
Anwar Syed. 1991. The Pakistan People’s Party and the Punjab: National Assembly Elections 1900 and 
1990. Asian Survey 
 
Apiku, Simon. 1998, November 8. Islamists Barred from Student Elections.  Middle East Times 
 
Armstrong, W. W. 1989. Labor I: Rural Population Growth, Systems of Employment, and Incomes. In  
 Joan Thirsk, ed., The Agrarian History of England and Wales. Vol. 6. 1750-1850. Cambridge:  
 Cambridge University Press.  
 
Arrighi, Giovanni. 1994. Hegemony and Social Change: Mershon International Studies Review  
 
Asad Abu Khalil. July 1991. Hezbollah in Lebanon: Islamisation of Leninist organizational principles:  
 Middle Eastern Studies 
 
Ash, Roberta. 1972. Social Movements in America. Chicago: Markam. 
 
___________. 1977. Social Movements in America. Chicago: Rand-McNally. 
 
Asprey, Robert. 1994. War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History. New York: William Marrow. 
 
Atran, Scott. 2006. The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism. The Washington Quarterly.  
Pages 127-147.  
 
  385 
Atkinson, G. 1993. Germany: Nationalism, Nazism, and Violence. In Bjorgo, T. and Witte, R.  
Racist Violence in Europe. Basingstoke: Macmillan 
 
Ayubi, Nazih. 1980, Bureaucracy and Politics in Contemporary Egypt. London: Ithaca Press.  
Al-Ayyam. December 25, 2005. Does Hamas really want to rule? 
Azem, A. J. 1977. The Islamic Action Front. In J. Schwedler, ed., Islamic Movements in Jordan, pp. 95– 
 144. Amman: al-Urdun al-Jadid Research Center. 
Azzam, Abdallah. 1987.  The defense of Muslims’ lands, the most important of individuals’ duties. Jidda:  Dar 
al-Mujtama. 
Backer, S. 1995. New Perspectives on the Far Right in Germany. German Politics. Pages: 165-71. 
 
Baidatz, Yossi. 2001. Bashar's First Year: From Ophthalmology to a National Vision. Washington, D.C.:  
 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy  
 
Baird, Vanessa. 2004. “The Effect of Politically Salient Decisions on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Agenda.” 
 The Journal of Politics. 66(3): 755-772. 
 
Baker, Raymond William. 2006. Islam without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists. Harvard University  
 Press 
 
_____________________. 1990. Sadat and After: Struggles for Egypt’s Political Soul. Cambridge 
Harvard University Press 
 
______________________.  1991. Summer. Afraid for Islam: Egypt’s Centrists between Pharaohs and  
 Fundamentalists. Daedalu.s Page 47 
 
______________________. 1990. Sadat and After: Struggles for Egypt's Political Soul. Harvard University  
 Press  
 
Balbus, Isaac. 1973. The Dialectics of Legal Repression:  Black Rebels before the American Criminal  
 Courts. New York: Russell Sage Foundation 
 
Bar, Shmuel. 1998. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv  
University. 
  
Bar'el, Zvi. 2003, February 19. Nothing like spending the war in Beirut. Haaretz. 
 
Banaszak, Lee Ann. 1996. Why Movements Succeed or Fail. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Al-Banna, Hasan. 1966. Memoirs of the Preaching and the Preacher. Cairo: Dar al-Shahab  
 
Barakat, Halim. 1993. The Arab World: Society, Culture and State. Berkeley: The University of  
California Press 
 
Barel, Zvi. Hamas on a Role. Ha’aretz, June 8, 2004.   
 
Barghuthi, Iyad. 1990. The Islamization and politics of the Palestinian occupied lands. Jerusalem: Markaz  al-
Zahra' lil-Dirasat wal-Abhath 
 
Barnard, Anne. January 24, 2006.  Hamas Hardens Campaign Rhetoric: Leaders Praise Jihad and Renew  
 Calls to Fight Israel.  Boston Globe. 
  386 
 
Barghuthi, Iyad and al-Aslama wal-Siyasa. 1990. The Islamization and politics of the Palestinian occupied  
 lands. Jerusalem: Markaz al-Zahra' lil-Dirasat wal-Abhath 
 
Barkan, Steven. 1984. Legal Control of the Southern Civil Rights Movement. American Sociological  
 Review. Pages 552-565 
 
Barkun, M. 1994. Religion and the Racist Right: The Origins of the Christian Identity Movement. Chapel 
 Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
 
Barnard, Anne. 2006, January 24. Hamas Hardens Campaign Rhetoric: Leaders Praise Jihad and Renew 
 Calla to Fight Israel. Boston Globe 
 
Bashier, Zakaria. 1987. Islamic Movement in the Sudan: Issues and Challenges. Islamic Foundation Press 
 
Batatu, Hanna. 2004. The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq. Saqi Books 
 
Bauman, Zygmunt. 1996. From Pilgrim to Tourist – or a Short History of Identity. In Stuart Hall and Paul  
 du Gay. Questions of Cultural Identity. London: Sage Publications. 
 
Bayan Nuwayhid al-Hout. 1986. The Political Leadership and Institutions in Palestine, 1917-1948. Beirut:  
 Institute for Palestinian Studies.  
 
Bayo, Alberto. 1965. 150 Questions for a Guerrilla. Boulder, Colorado: Panther Publications 
 
Beattie, Kirk. 2000. Egypt During the Sadat Years. Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Beinin, Joel. 2003. The Israelization of American Middle East Policy Discourse.  Social Text: Duke  
 University Press 
 
_________. 2004. Political Islam and the New Global Economy: The Political Economy of the Egyptian Social 
Movement.  
 
Belge, Murat. 2001. Inside Fundamentalist Mind. www.opendemocracy.net 
 
Bell, Stewart. Bell 2003. Hamas May Have Chemical Weapons: CSIS Report Says Terror Group May Be  
 Experimenting. National Post 
 
Belchem, John (1990): Industrialization and the Working Class:  The English Experience, 1750-1900. 
 Aldershot: Scolar. 
Ben-David, Lenny. 2002, July 17. Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah-Threatening Israel's North. Jerusalem Issue 
  Brief: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs  
Benford, Robert D. 1993. “Frame Disputes within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement.” Social Forces. 
 Pages: 677- 701. 
 
Bennett, C. 1995. Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences. New York:  
New York University Press. 
 
Bennett, W. Lance (2003): “Communicating Global Activism.” Information, Communication & Society 
 6: 143-68. 
 
Berkowitze, William. 1974. Socioeconomic Indicators in Ghetto Riot Tactics. Urban Affairs.  
Pages 69-94. 
  387 
 
Berrebi, Claude. 2003. Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty, and Terrorism Among 
 Palestinians. Princeton University: Working Paper 
 
Betz, Michael. 1974. Riots and Welfare: are they Related? Social Problems. Pages 345-355.  
 
___________. 1993. The New Politics of the Right. Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established  
 Democracies. New York: St. Martin’s  
 
Betz, Hans-George. July, 1993. The New Politics of Resentment: Radical Right-Wing Parties in Western 
 Europe. Comparative Politics. Pages: 413-427. 
 
Betz, Hans-George. 1991. Postmodern Politics in Germany: The Politics of Resentment. London:  
Macmillan. 
 
Betz, Hans-George. 1994. Radical Right-Wing Populism in Westen Europe. Basingstoke: Macmillian.  
 
Bin-Jiddu, Ghassan. 2005, March 10. Lebanon, a New Stage" program, featuring an interview with Ibrahim  
 Amin al-Sayyid, head of Hezbollah’s Political Council. Al-Jazirah 
 
Binder, Leonard. 1988. Islamic Liberalism. Chicago: London Press 
 
Biri, Yaacov. 1997, December 6. World Witness. Al-Hayat 
 
Birmingham, David. 1993. A Concise History of Portugal. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Black, Donald. 2004.  The Geometry of Terrorism. Sociological Theory. Pages 14-25  
 
Black, George. 1982. Triumph of the People. London: Zed Press 
 
Black, Eugene C. 1969. British Politics in the Nineteenth Century.  New York: Walker and Company. 
 
Blackstock, Allan. 2000. The Invincible mass’: Loyal Crowds in Mid-Ulster, 1795-96.”In Peter Jupp  
Eoin Magennis, eds., Crowds in Ireland c. 1720-1920. London: Macmillan. 
 
Blanford, Nicholas. 2002, April 23. Fears of a Second Front: The Lebanese-Israeli Border. Middle East  
 Report Online: at www.merip.org/mero/mero042302.html 
 
Blasier, Cole. 1983. The Giants Rival: The USSR and Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
 Press 
 
Blomberg, Brock, Gregory Hess, and Alila Weerapana. 2004. Economic Conditions and Terrorism.  
 European Journal of Political Economy. Pages 453-478 
 
Blumer, Herbert. 1951. Social Movements.: Principles of Sociology, New York: Barnes and Nobel.  
 
Botman, Selma. 1991. Egypt from Independence to Revolution, 1919-1952. Syracuse: Syracuse University  
 Press. 
 
Boulares, Habib. 1990. Islam: The Fear and the Hope. London: Zed Books. 
 
Boulton, L. 1990. A Survival of the Past: Anti-Semitism is Back. Financial Times.  
 
Brady, David and Ryan Denniston. 2006. Economic Globalization, Industrialization and  
 Deindustrialization in Affluent Democracies.  Social Forces. Pages 297-329. 
 
  388 
Bresson, G. 1995. Le Pen Biography. Paris: Balland 
 
Broeker, Galen. 1970. Rural Disorder and Police Reform in Ireland, 1812-36.  London: Rutledge &  
 Kegan Paul. 
 
Bronner, Stephen Eric. 1990. Politics and Judgment: A Critique of Rational Choice Marxism. The Review  
 of Politics. Pages 242-264.  
 
Brown, David and John Merrill. 1993. Violent Persuasions: The Politics and Imaginary Terrorism.  
Seattle: Bay Press 
 
Brown, Richard Maxwell. 1975. Strain of Violence: Historical Studies of American Violence and  
 Vigilitanism. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Brym, Robert and Bader Araj, 2006. Suicide Bombing as Strategy and Interaction: The Case of the Second  
 Intifada. Social Forces. Pages 1969-1986. 
 
Brynen, Rex, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble. 1998. Comparative Experiences of Political Liberalization  
 and Democratization in the Arab World. Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
 
Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan. 2005. Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence. 
 International Organizations. Pages 145-176 
  
_______________________. July 2005. The Quality of Terror. American Journal of Political Science.  
Pages 515-530  
 
Burawoy, Michael. 1982. Introduction: The Resurgence of Marxism in American Sociology. The American  
 Journal of Sociology. Pages 1-30. 
 
Burgat, François, and William Dowell. 1993. The Islamic Movement in North Africa. Austin: University  
of Texas Press 
 
Burke, Edmund III. 1988. Global Crises and Social Movements: Artisans, Peasants, Populists, and the  
 World Economy. Boulder, Colo.: Westview. 
 
Bull, M.J. and Newell, J. 1995. Italy Changes Course: The 1994 Elections and the Victory of the Right.  
Parliamentary Affairs.  
 
Burrell, R.M. 1989. Introduction: Islamic Fundamentalism in the Middle East – A Survey of its Origins and  
 Diversity. In: Islamic Fundamentalism. Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland:  
 London.  Pages: 4-32. 
 
Burstein, Paul. 1979. Public Opinion, Demonstrations, and the Passage of Anti-Discrimination  
 Legislation. Public  Opinion. Pages 157-172.   
 
____________. 1979. Equal Employment Opportunity Legislation and the Incomes of Women and Non- 
 Whites. American Sociological Review. Pages 367-391 
 
____________. 1979. Senate Voting on the Vietnam War, 1964-1973. Journal of Political and Military  
 Sociology. Pages 271-282. 
 
____________. 1985. Discrimination, Jobs, and Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
____________ and Rachel Einwohner, and Jocelyn Hollander. 1995. The Success of Political 
 Movements: A Bargaining Perspective.  The Politics of Social Protest. Craig Jenkins and Bert  
Klandermans. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Pages 275-295. 
  389 
 
 ____________ and William Freudenburg. 1978, Changing Public Policy: the Impact of Public Opinion,  
 Anti-War Demonstrations and War Costs on Senate Voting on Vietnam War Motions. American  
 Journal of Sociology. Pages 99-122. 
 
Button, James. 1978. Black Violence. Princeton: Princeton University Press 
 
___________, 1989. Blacks and Social Change. Princeton: Princeton University Press  
 
Bwy, Douglas. 1968 Spring. Political Instability in Latin America: The Cross Culture Test of a Causal  
 Model. Latin American Research Recview. Pages 17-66 
 
CSIS Report: www.csis.org/burke/saudi21/050202_SaudiCounterterrorism.pdf 
 
C.S.S. Special Information Bulletin, Marketing Terrorism. 2004, December. Hamas Exploitation of the  
 Eastern European Internet Infrastructure to Operate its Sites  
 http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/1_05/m_t.htm 
 
C.S.S. Special Information Bulletin: Spotlight on a Hamas Dawah Institution in the West Bank: A File of  
 Palestinian Preventive Security Documents Identified the Bethlehem Orphan Care Society as  
 Hamas Affiliated.  January 2005: www. Intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/1_05/dawah.htm 
 
Cahnman, Werner J.  (1966). Book Review: Lorenzo Von Stein: The History of the Social Movement in  
 France, 1789-1850; Traslated by Kaethe Mengelberg. The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 
 71, No. 6. (May, 1966). Pages 746-747. 
 
Campbell, Andrea.  2003. How Policies Make Citizens: Senior Citizen Activism and the American  
 Welfare State. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Canadian Secret Intelligence Services (CSIS). 2002, June. Terrorist Group Profiler  
 
Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2001 “The President’s Legislative Influence from Public Appeal.” American  
 Journal of Political Science. 45(2): 313-329 
 
Carter, S.K. 1990. Russian Nationalism: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow. London: Pinter. 
 
Carter, Neal Allan. 2003. Political Identity, Territory, and Institutional Change. : The Case of Belgium. 
 Mobilization 8: 205-20. 
 
Carpenter, Joel. 1996. Revive Us Again: The Reawakening of American Fundamentalism. New York:  
 Oxford University Press.  
  
Cassanos, Lynda Cohen. 2005. Indonesia: The Growth and Influence of Islam: in the Nations of Asia and  
 Central Asia. Mason Crest Publishers 
 
Chandhoke, Neera. 2002. The Limits of Global Civil Society. In Marlies Glasius, Mary Kaldor, & Helmut 
 Anheier, eds., Global Civil Society.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Choueiri, Youssef. 2002. Islamic Fundamentalism. Continuum: New York.  
 
Cingranelli, David and David Richards. 1999. Respect for Human Rights After the End of the  
 Cold War. Journal of Peace Research. Pages 511-534.  
 
Clark, B. 1996. Nationalist Ideas Move from the Margins. The World Today. 
 
Clarck, Samuel D., j. Paul Grayson, & Linda M. Grayson. 1975. Prophecy and Protest: Social Movements  
  390 
 in Twentieth-Century Canada. Toronto: Gage. 
 
______________. 1959. Movements of Social Protest in Canada, 1640-1840.  Toronto: University of  
 Toronto Press. 
 
Cobban, 1986. The Growth of Muslim Protest in Lebanon and its Implications for the Future.  New  
 Haven; Yale University Press and  
 
Cohen, Amnon. 1980. Political Parties in the West Bank Under Jordanian Rule 1948–1967. Ithaca, N.Y. 
 Cornell University Press. 
 
Cohen, Jean. 1985. Strategy of Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social 
 Movements. Social Research. Page 52 
 
Cohen, L.J. 1995. Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia. Boulder, CO: Westview 
 
Colby, David. 1975. The Effects of Riots on Public Policy: Exploratory Note. International Journal  
 Group. Pages 156-162  
 
___________. 1982. A Test of the Relative Efficacy of Political Tactics. American Journal of Political  
 Science. Pages 741-753. 
 
Constain and Majstorovic. 1994. Congress, Social Movements, and Public Opinion: Multiple Origins of  
 Women’s Rights Legislation. Political Research Quarterly. Pages 111-135.  
  
Chhibber Pradeep. February 1996. State Policy, Rent Seeking, and the Electoral Success of a Religious 
 Party Algeria. The Journal of Politics. Pages 136-145 
 
Childs, D. 1991. The Far Right in Germany since 1945. London: Longman. 
 
Chinlund, Christine. 2003, September 8. The Ombudsman; who should Wear The Terrorist Label?  
Boston Globe.    
 
Cook, Philip. 1971. Robert Michels’s Political Parties in Perspective. The Journal of Politics.  
Pages 773-796.  
 
Cordesman, Anthony and Nawaf Obaid. May 26, 2005. Saudi Counter terrorism Efforts: The Changing  
 Paramilitary and Domestic Security Apparatus 
 
Cox, Michael. 1992. After Stalinism: The Extreme Rigt in Russia, East Germany and Eastern Europe. In 
 Hainsworth, The Extreme Right in Europe and the USA. London: Pinter. 
 
___________. 1994. The Necessary Partnership. International Appairs. Pages: 635-58 
 
___________. 1999. Aftern the fall: Nationalist extremmisn in post-communist Russia. In Haisworth The  
 politics of the extreme right and the USA. London: Pinter. 
 
Cox, Robert. 1994. Hegemony and Social Change: Mershon International Studies Review.  
Pages 361-376.  
 
Cox & Shearman. 1999. The Politica of the Extreme Right. New York: Pinter 
 
Cox, Gary W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House.  
 California: University of California Press.  
 
Crenshaw, Martha. July 1981. The Causes of Terrorism. Comparative Politics. Pages 379-399  
  391 
 
Crecelius, Daniel. 1980. The Course of Secularization in Egypt. In John Esposito: Islam and Development:  
 Religion and Sociopolitical Change. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press  
 
Cronin, James E., & Jonathan Schneer (1982): eds., Social Conflict and the Political Order in Modern  
 Britain. London: Croom helm. 
 
Crow, Ralph. 1966. Confessionalism, Public Administration, and Efficiency in Lebanon. In: Politics in  
 Lebanon by Leonard Binder. New York: John Wiley and Sons.    
 
Daalder, Ivo H and James M. Lindsay. 2001. Nasty, Brutish, and Long: America’s War on Terrorism.  
 Current History. Pages 403-408. 
 
Dahl, Robert. 1961. Who Governs? Democracy and Power in the American City. New Haven: Yale  
 University Press 
 
__________. 1967. Pluralist Democracy in the United States. Chicago: Rand McNally. 
 
Dalton, R.J. 1993. The New Germany Votes. Oxford: Berg 
 
Davinport, Christian and David Armstrong. 2004. Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A  
 Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996. American Journal of Political Science. Pages 538-554.  
 
Davis, Richard. 1991. “The Media and the Mass public.” From The Press and American Politics: The 
 New Mediator 2nd edition. Edited Richard Davis. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
 
Deeb, M.J.  1992. Militant Islam and the Politics of Redemption.  Annals of the American Academy of  
 Political and  Social Protest. New Haven: Yale University Press 
 
Dekmejian, R. Hrair.1985. Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World. Syracuse: Syracuse 
 University Press 
 
_________________. 1990. The Anatomy of Islamic Revival: Legitimacy Crisis, Ethnic Conflict, and the 
 Search for Islamic Alternatives. In: Michael Curtis, Religion and Politics in the Middle East.  
Colorado: West-view Press. Pages 31-42 
 
_________________. 1971. Egypt Under Nasser: A Study in Political Dynamics. SUNY Press: Albany. 
 
_________________. 1978. Consociation Democracy in Crisis: The Case of Lebanon. Comparative  
 Politics. Pages 251-265.  
 
Denny, F.M. 1994. An Introduction to Islam. New York: Macmillan  
 
Della Porta, Donatella. 1995. Social Movements, Political Violence and the State. New York: Cambridge  
 University Press 
 
_________________. 1996. Social Movements and the State: Thought on the Policing of Protest. In:  
 Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer  
 Zald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
 
________________. 2003. Social Movements and democracy in the Turn of the Millennium. In: Social  
 Movements and Democracy. Pedro Ibarra. New Tork: Palgrave Macmillan. Pages 105-136 
 
________________ and Mario Diani. 1999. Social Movements: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
________________ and Hanspeter Kriesi. 1999. Social Movements in a Globalizing World: An  
  392 
 Introduction. In: Social Movements in a Globalizing World. Donatella della Porta, Hanspeter  
 Kriesi, and Dieter Rucht. New York: Macmillan. Pages 3-23.  
 
Dessouki , Ali Hillal. 1982. The Resurgence of Islamic Organizations in Egypt: An Interpretation. In:  
Alexander S. Cudsi and A.H. Dessouki, Islam and Power. London: Croom Helm. Pages 107-18 
 
AL-Destour. March 1, 1993. Al-Alami Interview 
 
Dillman, Bradford. 1992. Transition to Democracy in Algeria. Boulder: Westview Press 
 
Diken, Bulent and Carsten Lausten. 2006. We Two Will Never Twin: Fundamentalism and the Politics of  
 Security. Global Security. Pages 199-221. 
 
Dodd, C.H. 2001. The Development of Turkish Democracy. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies: 
 Pages 16-30 
 
Donovan, M. 1995. The Politics of Electoral Reform in Italy. International Political Science Review. 
 
Doran, Muchael, 2002. Pan-Arabism before Nasser: Egyptian Power Politics and the Palestine Question:  
 Studies in Middle Eastern History. Oxford University Press 
 
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.   
 
Druckman, James N. 2001. “On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame?” Political Behavior. 
 23(3): 225-256. 
 
Druckman, James N. and Kjersten R. Nelson. 2003. “Framing and Deliberation: How Citizens’  
 Conversations Limit Elite Influence.” American Journal of Political Science. 47(4): 729-745. 
 
Dubet, François and Henri Lustiger Thaler .2004. “The Sociology of Collective Action Revisited.”  
 Current Sociology. 52(4): 557-573. 
 
Dudkevitch, Margot. 2003. Israeli Killed by Terrorist in Bethlehem. Jerusalem Post.   
 
Dumper, Michael. 1994. Islam and Israel: Muslim Religious Endowments and the Jewish State.  
 Washington, DC: Institute for Palestinian Studies. 
  
Earl, Jennifer, Sarah A. Soule, & john D. MacCarthy. 2003. Protest under Fire? Explaining the Policing  
 of Protest.” American Sociological Review 68: 581-606. 
 
Ebeid, Mona Makram. 1989. The Role of the Official Opposition, in Egypt Under Mubarak. In: Charles  
 Tripp and Roger Owen: Egypt Under Mubarak. NY: Rutledge 
 
Effendy, Bahtiar. 2004. Islam and the State in Indonesia. Ohio University Press 
 
Egypt: Human Development Report 1995. 1995. Cairo: Institute of National Planning 
 
Eickelman, Dale F., and James Piscatori. 1996. Muslim Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 
 
_______________.  1990. Social Theory in the Study of Muslim Societies. In Dale F. Eickelman and  
 James Piscatori, eds., Muslim Travelers: Pilgrimage, Migration, and the Religious Imagination,  
 pp. 1–25. London: Routledge. 
 
Einwohner, Rachel L., Jocelyn A. Hollander, and Toska Olson. 2000. “Engendering Social Movements:  
 Cultural Images and Movement Dynamics.” Gender and Society. 14(5): 679-699. 
 
  393 
Eisinger, Peter K. 1974. “Racial Differences in Protest Participation.” The American Political Science  
 Review. 68(2): 592-606. 
 
Eisenberg, Ethan. 1996, March-April. Democracy in Gaza: An Election Diary. Congress Monthly.  
Pages: 9–13. 
 
Elder, Klaus. 1985. The New Social Movements: Moral Crusades. Political Pressure Groups, or Social  
 Movements? Social Research.  
 
Eliraz, Giora. 2004. Islam In Indonesia: Modernism, Radicalism, And The Middle East Dimension. Sussex 
 Academic Press 
 
Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, The. 2004. Islamic Movements: Impact on Political  
 Stability in the Arab World; I. B. Tauris 
 
Emsley, Clive (1983): Policing and its Context, 1750-1870. London: Macmillan. 
 
Emsley, Clive and Barbara Weinberger (1991): eds., Policing in Western Europe: Politics,  
Professionalism, and Public Order, 1850-1940. New York: Greenwood. 
 
Engel, M. 1999. A History of Hate. The Guardian 
 
Entelis, John and Lisa Arone. 1992. Algeria in Rurmoil: Islam, Democracy, and the State. Middle East  
 Policy.  Page 27  
 
Erich, Haggai. 1989. Students and University in 20th Century Egyptian Politics. London: Frank Cass 
 
Esposito, John. July 18 2002. Understanding Islam. Al-Jazeerah 
 
____________. 1984. Islam and Politics. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.  
 
Eugh, Andrea. 1985. Family in Contemporary Egypt. Cairo: American University Press.   
 
Falter, J. & S. Schumann. 1988. Affinity Towards right-wing extremisn in Western Europe. West  
 European Politics. Pages 96-110 
 
Faksh, Mahmound. 1980, May. The Consequences of eth Introduction and Spread of Modern Education: 
 Education and National Integration in Egypt. Middle Eastern Studies. Page 48    
 
Farrell, Sean.  2000.  Rituals and Riots: Sectarian Violence and Political Culture in Ulster 1784-1886. 
 Lexington: university Press of Kentucky. 
 
Fearon, James. 1995. Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization. Pages 379-414 
Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, July 2003. Terrorist and organized crime groups in the tri-
 border area (TBA) of South America 
Fein, Helen. 1995. More Middle in The Middle: Life-Integrity Violations and Democracy in the World.  
 Human Rights Quarterly. Pages 170-191. 
 
Feldman, Andreas and Maiju Parala. 2004. Reassessing the Causes of Nongovernmental Terrorism in Latin  
 America. Latin American Politics and Society. Pages 101-132. 
 
Fennema, M and C. Pollmann. 1998. Ideology and Anti- Immigrant Parties in the European Parliament.  
Acta Politica. Pages 111-38 
 
Fergany, Nader. 1991.  A Characterization of the Employment Problems in Egypt. In Employment and  
  394 
 Structural Adjustment: Egypt in the 1990s. Heba Handoussa and Gillian Porter. Cairo: American 
 University Pres 
 
Finn, Helena.  The case for cultural diplomacy: engaging foreign Audiences. Foreign Affairs.  
 November/December 2003, pages 15-20;  
 
Finnermore, Martha. 1996. National Interests in National Security. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 
 
Finkel, Steven E. 1987. “The Effects of Participation on Political Efficacy and Political Support:  
 Evidence from a West German Panel.” The Journal of Politics. 49(2): 441-464. 
 
Finkel, Steven E. and Edward N. Muller. 1998. “Rational Choice and the Dynamics of Collective 
 Political Action: Evaluating Alternative Models with Panel Data.” The American Political  
Science Review. 92(1): 37-49. 
 
Foran, John, 1994. A Century of Revolution: Social Movements in Iran: Social Movements, Protest, and 
Contention. University of Minnesota Press 
 
Ford, G. 1992. Fascist Europe: The Rise of Racism and Xenophobia. London: Pluto. 
 
Fording, Richard C. 1979. “The Conditional Effect of Violence as a Political Tactic: Mass Insurgency,  
Welfare Generosity, and Electoral Context in the American States.” American Journal of  
Political Science. 41(1): 1-29. 
 
Freeman, I. 1979. Resource Mobilization and Strategy. In: The Dynamics of Social Movements. Zald and 
 McCarthy. Cambridge: Winthrop. Pages 167-189 
 
Fredrickson, George M. 1997.  The Comparative Imagination: On the History of Racism, Nationalism, 
 and Social Movements.  Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Frey, Scott, Thomas Dietz, and Linda Kalof. 1992. Characteristics of Successful American Protest 
 Groups: Another Look at Gamson’s Strategy of Social Protest. American Journal of Sociology.  
Pages 368-387. 
 
Fricsh, Hillel. 1994. The Evolution of Palestinian Nationalist Islamic Doctrine: Territorializing a Universal  
 Religion. Canadian Review in Nationalism. Pages 45–55. 
Frisch, Hillel. 1989/90. Armed Struggle over State Borders to Political Mobilization and Intifada Within It: 
  The Transformation of the PLO Strategy in the Territories.  Plural Societies. Pages 92–115 
Fromm, Erich. 1963. Escape from Freedom. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston 
 
Futrell, Robert. 2003. “Framing Processes, Cognitive Liberation, and NIMBY Protests in the U.S.  
 Chemical-Weapons Disposal Conflict.” Sociological Inquiry. 73(3): 359-386. 
 
Gambill, Gary. 2002, September. Hezbollah's Israeli Operatives. Middle East Intelligence Bulletin: 
 www.meib.org/articles/0209_l2.htm  
___________. 2002, July 17. Hezbollah's Strategic Rocket Arsenal. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs    
___________. 2002.  Hezbollah's Strategic Rocket Arsenal. Middle East Intelligence Bulletin. At:  
 www.meib.org/articles/0211_l2.htm. 
  395 
Gambill, Gary and Ziad Abdelnour. 2002. February. Hezbollah: Between Tehran and Damascus. Middle  East 
Intelligence Bulletin: www.meib.org/articles/0202_l1.htm 
Gamson. William. 1990. The Strategy of Social Protest. Belmont: Wadsworth.   
 
______________. 1968. Power and Discontent. Homewood: Dorsey.  
 
______________. 1975. The Strategy of Social Protest. Homewood: Dorsey. 
 
______________. 1980. Understanding the Careers of Challenging Groups. American Journal of 
 Sociology. Pages 1043-1060. 
 
Gamson, William and Gadi Wolfsfeild. 1993. Movements and Media as Interacting Systems. Annals of  
 the American Academy of Political Science.  
 
Gamson, William and Fireman, B. 1979. Utilitarian Logic in the Resource Mobilization Perspective. In: 
 The Dynamics of Social Movements. Zald, McCarthy. Cambridge: Winthrop. Pages 8-45. 
  
Gartner, Scott and Patrick Regan. 1996. Threat and Repression: The Non-Linear Relationship Between 
 Government and Opposition Violence. Journal of Peace Research. Pages 273-287. 
 
Gehad Auda. 1993. Islamic movement and Resource Mobilization in Egypt: a Political Culture  
 Perspective. In: Larry Diamond, Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries.  
 Colorado: Lynne Reiner Publishers.  
 
Gil, Seden. 1994, November 10. Taming the Monster. The Jewish Journal  
 
Gelb, Joyce. 1989. Feminism and Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press.   
 
Gelb, Joyce and Marian Palley.  1987. Women and Public Process. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
Gelner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
 
Gelpe, Christopher. 1997. Crime and Punishment: The Role of Norms in Crises Bargaining. American  
 Political Science Review .   
 
Gershoni, Israel and James Jankowski. 1995. Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930-1945.  
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Getler, Michael Getler. 2003. The Language of Terrorism. Washington Post 
 
Ghanem, As`ad. 1996. Founding Elections in Transitional Period: The First Palestinian General Elections.  
 Middle East Journal. Pages 513–528. 
 
al-Ghazali, Zainab. 1994. Return of the Pharaoh: Memoir in Nasser’s Prison. Islamic Foundations: London 
 
Gibowsky, W.G. 1995. Election Trends In Germany: An Analysis of the Second General Election  
is Reunited Germany. German Politics. PP 26-53. 
  
Gills, Barry. 1994. Hegemony and Social Change. International Studies Review.  
 
Gilpin, Robert. 1988. The Theory of Hegemonic War. Journal of Interdisciplinary History. 591-613. 
 
____________. 1989. War and Change in World Politics New York: Cambridge University Press:  
 
____________. 1977. Interdependence and National Security. Kansas: Regents Press.  
  396 
 
____________, 1981. War and change in World Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press 
 
Giugni, Marco. 1995. Outcomes of New Social Movements. In: Kriesi, Hanspeter et al. New Social  
 Movements in Western Europe. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.   
 
____________, Doug McAdam, Charles Tilly. 1998a. How Movements Matter. Minneapolis: University 
 of Minnesota Press.   
 
____________, Doug McAdam, Charles Tilly. 1998b. From Contention to Democracy. Boulder:  
 Rowman and Littlefield.  
 
Gleason, Gregory. 1997. Uzbekistan: The Politics of National Independence. In: Ian Bremmer and Ray  
 Taras. New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations. Cambridge: Cambridge  
 University Press.   
 
Glen, John k. 2001. Framing Democracy: Civil Society and Civic Movements in Eastern Europe.  
 Stanford:Stanford University Press. 
 
Glenny, M. 1999. Slobodan’s Basic Instinct. Obsever: London 
 
Goldberg, Jeffrey. 2002, October 14. In The Party of God. The New Yorker 
 
Goldfield, Michael. 1986. “Labor in American Politics—It’s Current Weakness.” The Journal of Politics.  
 Pages:2-29. 
 
Goldfield, Michael. 1989. “Worker Insurgency, Radical Organization, and New Deal Labor Legislation.”  
 The American Political Science Review. 83(4): 1257-1282. 
 
Goldstein, Leslie. 2001. “Aristotle’s Theory of Revolution: Looking at the Lockean Side.” Political  
 Research Quarterly. 54(2): 311-331. 
 
Goldstein & Keohane. 1993. Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change. Cornell  
 University Press 
 
Goldstein, Judith. Winter 1989. The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy: The Origins of U.S. Agricultural  
 and Manufacturing Policies.  International Organizations.   
 
Goldstein, Judith. Winter 1989. The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy: The Origins of U.S. Agricultural 
 and Manufacturing Policies.  International Organizations.  Pages 31-71 
 
Goldstein, Robert J. 1983. Political Repression in Nineteenth-Century Europe. London: Croom Helm.  
 
________________. 2000. The War for the Public Mind: Political Censorship in Nineteenth-Century  
 Europe. Westport: Connecticut  
 
Goldstone, Jack. 1980. The Weakness of Organization: a New Look at Gamson’s The Strategy of Social  
 Protest. American Journal of Sociology.  Pages 1017-1042. 
 
_____________. 2003. Introduction: Bridging Institutionalized and Non-institutionalized Politics.  In  
 Jack Goldstone. States, Parties, and Social Movements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Goma, Salwa Sharawi. 1987.  An Explanation of Voting Behavior: A Comparative Study of the District of  
 East Cairo and the Governorate of Suez. The People’s Assembly Elections. Page 49.  
 
Gomberg, Paul. 1990. Patriotism is like Racism.  Ethics 101. Pages 144-50 
  397 
 
Goodwin, Jeff. 2006. A Theory of Categorical Terrorism. Social Forces. Pages 2027-2046. 
 
Gordon, Joel. 2006. Nasser: Hero of the Arab Nation: Makers of the Muslim World. Oneworld Publications  
  
Gordon, Joel. 2006. Nasser's Blessed Movement: Egypt's Free Officers and the July Revolution. American 
University in Cairo Press 
 
 
Gouldner, Alvin. 1974. Marxism and Social Theory. Theory and Society. Pages 17-35. 
 
Graham, Carol. 2002. Can Foreign Aid Help Stop Terrorism? Not With magic Bullets.  Brookings  
 Review. Pages 28-32  
 
Green, Donald, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler. 2002. Partisan Hearts and Minds. New Haven:  
 Yale University Press. 
 
Griffin, R. 1995. Post-War Fascism. Oxford: Oxford University Press  
 
Gross, Jan. 2001. Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwaben, Poland. Penguin  
 Books.  
 
Gordon, Neve and George Lopez. 1999. Terrorism in the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Occasional Paper Series  
 Number 18 (May). Joan Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. University of Notre Dame.  
 
Gurr, Robert. 1980. On the Outcome of Violent Conflict. In Handbook of Political Conflict, Theory and  
 Research. Robert Gurr. New York: Free Press. Pages 238-294 
 
__________. 1980. Handbook of Political Conflict, Theory and Research. New York: Free Press.  
 
__________. 1981.Group Protest and Policy Response: New Cross-national Perspectives. American  
 Behavior.  
 
Gusfield, Joseph. 1981. The Culture of Public Problems. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
_____________. 1968. The Study of Social Movements. In Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. New 
 York: Macmillian. Pages 445-452 
 
____________. 1982. Social Movements and Social Change. Social Movements, Conflict and Change.  
 Pages 283-316. 
 
____________. 1962. Mass Society and Extremist Politics. American Sociological Review. 19-30 
 
Gurr, Ted. 2000. Peoples Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century. Washington, D.C.:  
 United Stets Institute of Peace Press. 
 
________. 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
Haas, Peter. 1992. Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination.  
 International Organization. Pages 1-35 
 
Haas, Peter. Winter 1992. Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect  
 Stratospheric Ozone.  International Organization: pages 187-224 
 
Haas, Peter. 1989. Do Regimes Matter: Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control.  
 International Organizations. Pages 377-403 
  398 
 
Habermas, Jurgen. 1981. New Social Movements. Telos 
 
Hahn, Harlan. 1970. Civic Responses to Riots: a Reprisal of Kerner Commission Data. Public Opinion.  
 Pages 101-107.  
 
Hainsworth, Paul. 1999. The Right: Divisions and Cleavages in France. West European Politics.  
Pages: 38-56. 
 
Hainsworth, Paul. 1992. The Extreme Right in Europe and the USA. London: Pinter 
 
Hajjar, Sami. 2002.  Hezbollah, Terrorism, National Liberation, Or Menace? Strategic Studies Institute  
 Monographs, U.S. Army War College. Pages 29-35 
 
Halawi, Jailan and Salonaz Sami. April 3, 2006. Shattered Dreams. Al-Ahram Weekly Online 
 
Hall, Richard and Frank Wayman. 1990. “Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias  
 in Congressional Committees.” American Political Science Review. 84: 797-820. 
 
Hall, Robert L., Mark Rodeghier, and Bert Useem. 1986. “Effects of Education on Attitude to Protest.” 
 American Sociological Review. 51(4): 564-573. 
 
Halliday, Fred. 1994. The Politics of Islamic Fundamentalism. In Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Dnnan. 
 Islam, Globalization and Post Modernity. London: Rutledge.  
 
Halpern, Nanfred. 1963. The Politics of Social Change in The Middle East and North Africa. Princeton:  
 Princeton University Press 
 
Hamas Introductory Memorandum, Dated  
 
The Hamas Charter.  
 
Hamas Memorandum to the PNC, dated April 6, 1990 
 
Hamas memo shown dated April 16, 1995 
 
Hamas leaflet dated September 22, 1993. Untitled 
 
Hamas Leaflet no. 14 of April 1988 Untitled 
 
Hamas Leaflet no. 22 of June 1988 Untitled 
 
Hamas Leaflet no 36 of February 25, 1989 Untitled  
 
Hamas Leaflet no. 86 or May 7, 1992 Untitled 
 
Hamas leaflet. 1993, October 12. The Hamas Movement Condemns the Assassination of al-Saftawi as a  
 Criminal Act” 
 
Hamas leaflet. September 22, 1993. “No To Political Assassination 
 
Hamas leaflet “A Statement to Set the Record Straight Concerning Fabricated Reports” Dated May 7, 1993 
 
Hamas Periodic statement no 108 of October 5, 1993 
 
Hamas Periodic statement no. 45 of July 21, 1989 
  399 
 
Hamas Periodic statement no 107, February 4, 1994 
 
Hamas Periodic statement no 27, August 3, 1988 
 
Hamas Periodic statement no 115, September 3, 1994 
 
Hamas Periodic statement no 32, November 25, 1988 
 
Hamas Periodic statement no 71, March 2, 1991 
 
Hamas Periodic statement no 75, June 1, 1991 
 
Hamas Periodic statement no 76, July 1, 1991 
 
Hamas Periodic statement no 77, August 3, 1991 
 
Hamas Periodic statement no 62, August 17, 1990 
 
Hamas Periodic statement no 63, August 29, 1990 
 
Hamas Internal Document. 1994, April 6. Al-Risala (The Epistle) 
 
Hamas Pamphlet. 1997, April 16. Statement on the Iranian-German Crisis 
 
Hamas pamphlet: The Intifada in Two Year: Characteristics and Trends: Islamic Palestine Committee. 
  Date Unknown 
 
Hamas Public Statement. Statement issued by Hamas Political Bureau on April 26, 1994  
 
Hamas Letter (Yassin letter) dated October 3, 1993.  
 
Hamas Letter (Sheikh Ahmad Yassin) Al-Wasat, November 11, 1993 
 
Hamas leadership interview, Filastin al-Muslima, April 1990 
 
Hamid, N, 1981. Process of Agricultural Development- A Case Study of The Punjab, 
University Microfilms International 
 
Hamzeh, Ahmad. 1997. Lebanon’s Hezbollah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation.  
Third World Quarterly  
 
_____________. 2004. In The Path of Hezbollah. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 
 
_____________. 2000. Lebanon’s Islamists and Local Politics: A New Reality. Third World Quarterly.  
 Pages 739-759 
 
______________. 1997b. The Role of Hezbollah in Conflict Management Within Lebanon’s Shiite  
 Community.  Chapter 6 of Conflict Resolution in the Arab World. Paul Salem. Beirut: American  
 University of Beirut Press.  
 
______________. 1996. A Sufi response to Political Islamism: Al-Ahbash of Lebanon. International  
 Journal of Middle East Studies. May 1996,  
 
Hamzeh, Ahmad and Hrair Dekmejian. 1993, Spring. The Islamic Spectrum of Lebanese Politics. Journal  
 of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. Pages 25-42 
  400 
 
Hammami, Rema. 1977. From Immodesty to Collaboration: Hamas, the Women’s Movement, and National 
 Identity in the Intifada. In: Joel Benin and Joe Stork, Essays from Middle East Report. New York:  
I.B. Tauris. Pages 194-210 
 
Hammond, Andrew. 1996, December 7. Brotherhood Crisis Takes on New Proportions. Middle East Times 
 
Hanafi, Hasan. 1982. The Relevance of the Islamic Alternative in Egypt. Arab Studies Quarterly. Page 60 
 
Handoussa, Heba. 1991. Crisis and Challenge: Prospects for the 1990s. In: Employment and Structural  
 Adjustment in Egypt in the 1990s. Heba Handoussa and Gillian Potter. Cairo: American  
 University Press 
 
Handoussa, Heba and Gillian Potter. 1994. Employment and Structural Adjustment: Egypt in the 1990s.  
 Cairo: American University in Cairo Press 
 
Harik. Judith. 1996. Between Islam and the System: Sources and Implications of Popular Support for  
 Lebanon’s Hizballah 
 
__________. 2004. Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism. New York: Tauris 
 
Harik, Judith and Denis Sullivan. 1992. Privatization and Liberalization in the Middle East. Bloomington:  
 Indiana University Press 
 
Harik, Iliya. 1972 Fall. The Ethnic Revolution and political Integration in the Middle East. International  
 Journal of Middle Eastern Studies; pages 313-324 
 
_________. 1974. The Political Mobilization of Peasants: A Study of an Egyptian Community.  
Bloomington.  
 
Hargreaves, A. 1994. Immigration, Race and Ethnicity in Contemporary France. London: Rutledge. 
Harel, Amos. 2005, January 11. Hezbollah's Terror Factory in the PA. Ha'aretz,  
Harrell, David E. 1993. American Revivalism from Graham to Robertson: In: Edith Blumhofer and Randall  
 Balmer. Modern Christian Revivals. University of Illinois Press: Champaign-Urbana  
 
Hatina, Meir. 2001. Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic Jihad Movement. Moshe Dayan Center  
 for Middle Eastern and African Studies 
 
Hatoum, Majdoline. 2005, June 18. Hezbollah: Politics, resistance don't conflict. Daily Star 
 
Al-Hayat.. July 3, 1993. Christians in the Occupied Territories: The Reality of Social coexistence Despite  
 The Occupation 
 
Heaney, Michael. 2005. “Party in the Street: Social Movements, Protest, and the 2004 Republican  
 National Convention.” Paper Presented for the American Political Science Association in  
 September, 2005. 
 
Heaney, Michael. 2005. “The Place of Framing: The Politics of Protesting the Iraq War near Fort Bragg.”  
 Institute for Social and Police Studies: Yale University. 
 
Heberle, Rudolf. 1951. Social Movements. New York: Appleton Century Cofts. 
 
Hechter, Michael. 1979, November. Notes on Marxism and Sociology in the USA.  Theory and Society. 
  401 
 Pages 377-386. 
 
Heitmeyer, W. 1993. Hostility and Vioence towards Foreigners in Germany.  In Bjorho, T and Witte, R.  
 Racist Violance in Europe. Basingstoke: Macmillian. 
 
Helena Cobban. 1990, Spring. The PLO and the Intifada.  Middle East Journal. Pages 207–233;  
 
Heller, Corinne. December 18, 2005"Hamas Poll Win Threatens Aid for Palestinians. Reuters 
 
Hermassi, Elbaki. 1984.  La Societe’ Tunisienne au miroir islamiste.  Majhreb-Machrek  
 
Herzog, Michael. 2005, March 29. The Hezbollah Conundrum.  The Washington Institute for Near East  
 Policy, Policy Watch, No. 981. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05. php?CID=2286 
 
Hezbollah: Identity and Goals: www.Hizbollah.org 
 
Hinnebusch, Raymond. 1988. Egyptian Politics Under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an  
 Authoritarian-Modernizing State.  Boulder: Lynne Rienner  
 
Hitti, Philip. 1967. Lebanon in History: From The Earliest Times to the Present. London: Macmillan 
 
Hobsadawn, E.J. 1975. The Age of Capital, 1848-1875. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson. 
 
_____________. 1988. The Age of Imperialism. New York: Pantheon 
 
_____________. 1994. The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991. New York: Pantheon 
 
Hoerder, Peter. 2002. Crowd Action on Revolutionary Massachusetts, 1765-1780. New York:  
Academic Press 
 
Hockstader, Lee. 2001. Palestinians Find Heroes in Hamas; Popularity Surges for Once-Marginal Sponsor 
 of Suicide Bombings.  Washington Post. 
 
Hoffman, Bruce. 1999. Terrorism Trends and Prospects. In Ian Lesser. Countering the New Terrorism.  
 Santa Monica: RAND. Pages 15-28 
 
____________. 1998. Inside Terrorism.  Columbia University Press.  
 
Hopwood, Derek. 1991. Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990. Routledge Press 
 
Horsman, Mathew and Andrew Marshall. 1994. After the Nation-State: Citizens, Tribalism, and the New  
 World Disorder. London: Harper-Collins  
 
Hourani, Albert. 1947. Minorities in the Arab World. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Howe, Marvine. 2000. Turkey Today: A Nation Divided Over Islam's Revival. Westview Press 
 
Huband, Mark. 2005. Radical Muslims Turn to Words of War: Tensions Between Older and Younger  
 Followers of Islam have Complicated Attempts to Reduce the Rise in Extreme Attitudes since the  
 attacks of September 11, 2001. Financial Times 
 
Huberts, Leo. 1989. The influence of Social Movements on Government Policy. International Social  
 Movement Research. Pages 395-426. 
 
Human Rights Watch. 1994. Middle East Watch, Human Rights Conditions in the Middle East in 1993  
 NY: Human Rights Watch.  
  402 
 
Huntington, Samuel. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press 
 
Hussein, Ashraf. 1987. Political Participation and Parliamentary Elections, In Parliamentary Elections in  
 Egypt: a Study of the 1987 Elections. Ahmed Abdalla Cairo: AL-Ahram Center for Arab Studies,  
 Sina Publishers. 1990 
 
Hussein Agha. 2004, September 23. A note on Hezbollah: In Hezbollah and the Lebanon-Israel border,  
bitter-lemons-international 2004, at: 
http://www.bitterlemonsinternational.org/previous.php?opt=1&id=57 
 
Hussain, Asaf. 1983. Islamic Movements in Egypt, Pakistan and Iran: An Annotated Bibliography.  
Mansell Press 
 
Huwaidi, Fahmi. 1980. In Iran From the Inside. Cairo: ak-Ahram Center for Translation and Publishing. 
 
Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. 1980. Anatomy of Egypt’s Militant Groups. International Journal of Middle East  
 Studies. Pages: 423-53. 
 
________________. 1982.  Islamic Militancy as a Social Movement: The Case of Two Groups in Egypt.  
 In: Ali E. Millal Dessouki.  Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World: New York: Praeger. 
 Pages 117-37.   
 
______________. April 1988. Egypt’s Islamic Activism in the 1980s.  Third World Quarterly. 
 Pages 632-657   
 
______________. 1995. December. Civil Society and Electoral Politics in Egypt. Civil Society page 4 
 
______________. 1996. The Changing Face of Egypt's Islamic Activism," in Roberto Aliboni, George 
 Joffé, and Tim Niblock, eds., Security Challenges in the Mediterranean Region. London: 
 Frank Cass 
 
_______________. 1986, 2002.  An Islamic Alternative in Egypt: The Muslim Brotherhood and Sadat. In  
Ibrahim: Egypt, Islam, and Democracy: http://books.google.com/books?id=7D4qNInLBq 
8C&pg=PP1&ots=ihEaHURWvs&dq=Egypt,+Islam,+and+Democracy&sig=rWQztFNj-
ndxS5bpt976mTt3BsY#PPP1,M1 
 
_________________. 1982. The New Arab Social Order. Boulder: Westview Press 
 
Ignazi, P. 1997. The Crisis of Parties and the Rise of New Political Parties.  Party Politics. 
 
Ihonvbere, Julius. 1995. From movement to Government: The Movement for Multi-Party democracy and 
 the Crisis of Democratic Consolidation in Zambia.  Canadian Journal of African Studies. 
 
Ikram, Khalid. 1981, September. Meeting the Social Contract in Egypt. Finance and Development.  
 Pages 30-33 
 
Ikenberry, John. 1989.  Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony. Political Science Quarterly.  
 Pages 375-400. 
 
Immerfall, Stefan and Betz, Hans. 1998. The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and 
 Movements in Established Democracies. New York: St. Martin’s Press 
 
Inbari, Pinhas. 1996. The Palestinians Between Terrorism and Statehood. Brighton, UK: Sussex  
Academic Papers 
 
  403 
Independent Media Review Analysis (IMRA). ISA and Israel Police Arrest Senior Hamas Terrorist.  
 September 27, 2005: www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=27007 
 
Inglehart, Ronald. 1971. The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial  
 Societies. American Political Science Review. Pages 991-1017 
 
______________. 1977. The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western  
 Publics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
International Crisis Group, Middle East Report. 2005, January 11. Syria After Lebanon, Lebanon After 
 Syria?: at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east_north_africa/    
  arab_israeliconflict/lebanon/39_syria_after_lebanon_lebanon_after_syria.pdf. 
International Crisis Group. April 2003. Report from International Crisis Group: Islamic Social Welfare  
 Activism in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: A Legitimate Target? Middle East Report, 
 http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=933.   
 
Ion, Bria. 1995. Romania: Orthodox Identity at a Crossroads of Europe. World Concil of Churches.  
 Budapest 
 
Irvine, Jill. 1998. Women in the Politics of Post Communist East Europe. New York: Mrmonk  
 
Isaac, Larry, and William Kelly. 1981. Racial Insurgency, the State, and Welfare Expansion: Local and  
 National Level Evidence from the Postwar United States. American Journal of Sociology.  
Pages 1348-1386. 
 
Ismil Fahmy. 1983.  Negotiating Peace in the Middle East. Cairo: American University Cairo Press 
 
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Financial Sources of the Hamas Terror Organization” July 30,  
 2003: http://israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAHOnmu0    
 
Israeli, Raphael. 1993. Muslim Fundamentalism in Israel. Brassey: London 
 
_____________. 1990. The Charter of Allah: The Platform of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas).  
 In Y. Alexander and A.H. Foxman and E. Mastragelo: The 1988–1989 Annual on Terrorism (The  
 Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.  Pages 109–132. 
 
Issawi, Charles. 1954. Egypt at Mid-Century: an Economic Survey. London: Oxford University Press 
 
Jabar, Faleh. 2004.  Shi'ite Movement in Iraq. Saqi Books; Sanchez, James. 2007. Who's Who in Al-Qaeda  
 & Jihadi Movements in Iraq and the Middle East: 30,631 Key Individuals, Organizations,  
 Incidents, and Linkages. Lulu.com 
 
Jaber, Hala. 1997. Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance. New York: Columbia University Press.  
 
James, Laura. 2006. Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy. Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Al Jarbawi, Ali. 1994, January-April. The Position of Palestinian Islamists on the Palestine-Israel Accord. 
 The Muslim World . Pages 127–154. 
 
____________. 1994. Hamas’s Bid to Lead the Palestinian People. Annandale VA: United Association for  
 Studies and Research. Page 10 
 
Jarman, Neil. 1997. Material Conflicts: Parades and Visual Displays in Northern Ireland. Oxford: Nerg 
 
  404 
Jenkins, Craig. 1981. Sociopolitical Movements. In: The Handbook of Political Behavior. New York: 
 Plenum. Pages 81-53. 
 
___________ and Barbara Brents. 1989. Social Protest, Hegemonic Competition, and Social Reform: a  
 Political Struggle Interpretation of the Origins of the American Welfare State. American  
 Sociological Review. Pages 891-909. 
 
___________ and Charles Perrow. 1977. Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker Movements (1946- 
 1972). American Sociological Review. Pages 249-268. 
 
Jennings, Edward. 1979. Civil Turmoil and the Growth of Welfare Rolls: a Comparative State Policy 
 Analysis. Policy Studies. Pages 739-745. 
 
_____________. 1980. Urban and Welfare Policy Change: a Test of the Piven-Cloward Theory. In Why  
 Politics Succeed of Fail, Helen Ingram. Beverly Hills: Sage. Pages 59-82. 
 
_____________. 1983. Racial Insurgency, the State, and Welfare Expansion: A Critical Comment and  
 Reanalysis. American Journal of Sociology. Pages 1220-1236. 
 
Jennings, Kent. 1987. Residues of a Movement: the Aging of the American Protest Generation. American 
 Political Science Review. Pages 367-382. 
 
____________. And Richard Niemi. 1981. Generations and Politics. Princeton: Princeton  
University Press. 
The Jerusalem Post. July 26, 2004. According to the IDF Intelligence Chief Views Hezbollah-Syria Ties,  PA 
Chaos, Saudi Stability 
Jerusalem Daily. Al-Quds, November 16, 1988 
 
Jones, Gareth Stedman. 1975.  Class Struggleand the Industrial Revolution. New Left Review. Pages 35-70 
 
Johnson, James Turner. 1997. The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions. University Park: 
 Pennsylvania State University Press.  
 
Jonson, Lena. 2006. Tajikistan in the New Central Asia: Geopolitics, Great Power Rivalry and Radical  
 Islam. International Library of Central Asia Studies. Publisher: I. B. Tauris 
Jonson, David. 2006. Islamic Economics and The Final Jihad. Xulon Press: Longwood, Florida  
 
Johnson, Douglas Hamilton. 2003. The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars. Indiana University Press 
 
Joppke, Christian. 1993. Mobilizing Against Nuclear Energy. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
  
Jordan, Grant. 1998. “Politics Without Parties: A Growing Trend?” Parliamentary Affairs.  
Pages: 314-329. 
 
Joyce, Patrick. 1980. Work, Society, and Politics. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.  
 
Juergensmeyer, Mark. 1993. The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State  
 Berkeley: University of California Press 
 
Jun, Ho Jin. 2002. Religious Pluralism & Fundamentalism in Asia. International Academic Publishers:  
 Colorado Springs 
     
  405 
Kaplan, Temma. 1992. Red City, Blue Period: Social Movements in Picasso’s Barcelona. Berkeley:  
 University of California Press. 
 
Karmon, Ely. Redicalization of the Sunni-Shi’a Divide. The international Institute for Counter Terrorism.   
 http://www.ict.org.il/apage/1727.php 
___________. 1999, June. A Solution to Syrian Terrorism. Middle East Quarterly. Pages 23-34  
Kassim, Anis F. 1980. The Palestine Liberation Organization’s Claim to Status: A Juridical Analysis Under  
 International Law.  Denver Journal of International Law and Policy. Pages 19–30. 
 
Katzenstein, Peter. 1996. The Culture of National Security. NY: Columbia University Press 
 
Kawtharany, Wajih. 1989, February. Three eras in the Arab and Islamic renaissance project, al-Mustaqbal  al-
`Arabi, no. 120. Pages 4–25 
 
_______________. 1994. The Political and Social Trends of Mount Amil. Beirut: Bahsun Press 
 
Kavlan, Muammer. 2005. The Kemalists: Islamic Revival And The Fate Of Secular Turkey.   
Prometheus Books 
 
Keddie, Nikki. 1988.  Ideology, Society and the State in Post-Colonial Muslim Societies. London: 
 Macmillan 
 
___________. 2003. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. New Haven: Yale University Press.  
  
__________. 1998, The New Religious Politics: Where, When, and Why Do Fundamentalisms Appear?  
 Comparative Studies in Society and History. Pages 696-723. 
 
Kegley, Charles. 1990. International Terrorism: Characteristics Causes, Controls. New York: St. Martin’s  
 Press 
 
Keith, Linda Camp. 1999. The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political  
 Rights: Does it Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior.  Journal of Peace  
 Research, Pages 95-118.  
 
Keith, Lind Camp. 2002. Constitutional Provisions for Individual Human Rights (1977-1996):  
 Are They More The Mere Window Dressing? Political Science Quarterly.  
Pages 111-143. 
 
Kelly, William and David Snyder. 1980. Racial Violence and Socioeconomic Changes Among Blacks in  
 the United States. Social Forces. Pages 739-760. 
 
Keohane, Robert. 1980. The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic  
 Regimes. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
_____________. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.  
 Princeton: Princeton University Press 
 
Kepel, Gilles. 1985.  The Prophet and Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in Egypt.  London: Al-Saqi Books 
 
__________. 1985.  Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh. Berkeley: University of  
 California Press. 
 
__________. 1993. Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh. Berkeley: University of 
  406 
 California Press. 
 
Kernberg, Otto. 1990. Hatred as Pleasure. In Robert A. Glick and Stanley Bone. Pleasure Beyond the  
 Pleasure Principle. New Haven; Yale University Press 
 
Kerr, Malcolm. 1965. Education and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press 
 
Khalaf, Roula. 2001, March 9. Egypt’s Survey. Financial Times 
 
Khalidi, Rashid. 1997. Palestinian Identity: The Construction and Modern National Consciousness. New 
 York: Columbia University Press 
 
Khashan, Halal. 2000. Arabs at the Crossroads: Political Identity and Nationalism. Gainesville:  
 University Press of Florida 
 
____________. 1992. Inside the Lebanese Confessional Mind. Lanham. University Press of America.  
 Page 16-19.   
 
Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah. 1978. Questions Clarified. Tehran. 
 
Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah. 1989.   The Complete Text of Iman Khomeini’s Divine Will and Political  
 Testament.  Tehran. 
 
Kimhi, Shaul and Shmuel Even. 2003. Who Are the Palestinian Suicide Terrorists.  Strategic Assessment  
 (Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies), Tel Aviv University 
 
King, John. 1988. Repression, Domestic Threat, and Interactions in Argentina and Chile. Journal of  
 Political and Military Sociology. Pages 1-27. 
 
Kitschelt Herbert. 1986. Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements  
 if Four Democracies. British Journal of Political Science. Pages 57-85. 
 
______________. 1995.  The Radical Right in Western Europe: a Comparative Analysis.  Ann Arbor: 
 University of Michigan Press 
 
______________. 1981. New Social Movements in West Germany and the United States. Political Power  
 and Social Theory. 
 
 Kjorlien, M. L. 1993. Hamas in Theory and Practice. Arab Studies Journal. Pages 4–7. 
 
Klein, Menachem. 1997. Competing Brothers: The Web of Hamas-PLO Relations. In: Bruce Maddy- 
 Weitzman and Efraim Inbar, Religious Radicalism in the Greater Middle East. London:  
Frank Cass 
 
Klosko, George, Edward N. Muller, and Karl Dieter Opp. 1987. “Rebellious Collective Action Revisited.” 
  The American Political Science Review. 81(2): 557-564. 
 
Koufa, Kalliopi. 2002. Special Report on Human Rights and Terrorism, United Nations Economic and  
 Social Council (UNESCO). Sub commission on Human Rights. Protection of Human Rights:  
 Terrorism and Human Rights. Progress Repot. E/CM.4/Sub.2/31. New York: UNESCO. 
 
Kramer, G. 1994. The Integration of the Integrist: A Comparative Study of Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia. In 
 Ghassan Salame, ed., Democracy Without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the  
World. Pages 200–226. London: Tauris. 
 
Kramer, Martin. 1996, June. Fundamentalist Islam at Large: The Drive for Power. Middle East Quarterly.  
  407 
 Pages 37–49. 
 
Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1996. The Organizational Structure of New Social Movements in a Political Context.  
 In: Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing 
 Structures, an Cultural Framings. Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press.   
 
_____________. 1995. The Political Opportunity Structure of New Social Movements: Its Impact on their 
Mobilization. In Politics of Social Protest. Jenkins. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
Pages 167-198.  
 
_____________, 1995. Ruud Koopmans, Jan Duyvendak, and Marco Giugni. New Social Movements in  
Western Europe.  Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
_____________. 1988. Local Mobilization for the People’s Petition of the Dutch Peace Movement. In:  
 From Structure to Action: Social Movement Participation Across Cultures. By Bert Klandermans,  
 Sidney Tarrow. Greenwich: JAI  
 
_____________ and Philip van Pragg. 1987. Old and New politics: The Dutch Peace Movement and the  
 Traditional Political Organizations. European Journal for Political Science. Pages 316-346 
 
Kritzman, Tally. 2000, August 29. Arrest of Hezbollah Supporters in the U.S.A: Successful anti-terrorist  
 action or a drop in the bucket? International Institute for Counter Terrorism:   
 http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=129. S 
 
Krueger, Alan and Jitka Maleckova. June 2002. The Economics and the Education of Suicide Bombers.  
 The New Republic. Paged 27-33  
 
Krugman, Herbert C. 1952.  “The Appeal of Communism to American Middle Class Intellectuals and  
 Trade Unionists.” The Public Opinion Quarterly. 16(3): 331-355. 
 
Krueger, Alan and Jitka Maleckova. 2002. The Economics and the Education of Suicide Bombers: Does  
 Poverty Cause Terrorism? New Republic. Pages 27-33 
 
Kydd, Andrew and Barbara Wlter. 2006. The Strategies of Terrorism. Insecurity Security. Pages 49-79 
 
Lahman, Shay. 1982. Zionism and Arabism in Palestine and Israel. London: Frank Cass. 
 
Lake, David. 2002. Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century. Dialog-IQ.  
 Pages 15-28 
 
Langohr, Vickie. 2002, July. An Exit From Arab Autocracy. Middle East Studies After 9/11 
 
Lapidus, Ira M. 1988. Islam Political Movements: Patterns of Historical Change. In Edmund Burke and Ira 
 M. Lapidus, eds., Islam, Politics, and Social Movements. Pages 3–35. Berkeley and Los Angeles:  
University of California Press 
 
Lapidus, Ira M. 2005. A History of Islamic Societies. Pluto Press 
 
Laqueur, Walter. 1976. Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study. Boston: Little Brown. 
 
_____________. 1993. Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia. NY: Harper Collins. 
 
_____________. 1977. Terrorism. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
 
_____________.  1987. The Age of Terrorism. Boston: Little Brown 
  408 
 
_____________ and Alexander Yonah. 1987. The Terrorism Reader. New York: Meridian  
Litani, Y. 1989, December. Militant Islam in the West Bank and Gaza. New Outlook. Pages 40–42  
Litani, Y. 1992, December 18. This is how we built Hamas. Kol Ha`ir (Jerusalem)  
Lau, Richard and David Redlawsk. 1997. “Voting Correctly.” American Political Science Review. 91(3):  
585-598. 
 
Lawson, Steven. 1976. Black Ballots. New York: Columbia University Press.  
 
Lawson, Fred. 1982, November-December) Social Basis off the Hamas Revolt. MERIP Report 
 
Lawrence, Bruce. 1989. Defenders of God: The Fundamentalists Revolt Against the Modern Age. San 
 Francisco: Harper and Row. 
 
Lazarus-Yafeh, Hava. 1988. Contemporary Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Jerusalem  
 Quarterly, Pages 27-39 
 
Legrain, J. F. 1997.  Hamas: Legitimate Heir of Palestinian Nationalism? In John L. Esposito. Political 
 Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform. Pages 159–178. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner 
 
Levitt, Mathew. 2006. Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad. New Haven: Yale 
 University Press 
 
Lewis, Bernard. 1990. The Roots of Muslim Rage. The Atlantic 
 
____________. 1967. The Assassins: a Radical Sect in Islam. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Lia, Brynjar. 1998. The Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement,  
 1928-42. Reading: Ithaca Press 
 
Lianf, His-Huey. 1992. The Rise of Modern Police and the European State System form Metternich to the  
 Second World War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Lichbach, Mark. 1989. An Evolution of ‘Does Economic Inequality Breed Political Conflict?’ Studies.  
 World Politics. Pages 431-470.  
 
Lindberg, Staffan. 2006. The Surprising Significance of African Elections. Journal of  
 Democracy, Pages 139-151.  
 
Ling, Lisa. 2004. Female Suicide Bombers: Dying to Kill. National Geographic Explorer. 
 
Lipsky, Michael. 1968. Protest as a Political Resource. American Political Science Review.  
Pages: 1114-1158.   
 
Lipsky, Michael and David Olson. 1977. Commission Politics. New Brunswick: Transaction Books 
 
Litani, Y. 1989. The Militant Islam in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. New Outlook. Pages 40–42. 
 
Litvak, Meir. 1966. The Islamization of Palestinian Identity: The Case of Hamas.  Tel Aviv: The Moshe  
 Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. 
 
Lopez, George. 1988. Terrorism in Latin America. In Stohl 1988. pages 497-524 
  409 
 
Lowery, David and Virginia Gray. 1995. “The Population Ecology of Gucci Gulch, or the National  
 Regulation of Interest Group Numbers in the American States.” American Journal of Political 
 Science. 39:1-29. 
 
Lomax, Louis. 1962. The Negro Revolt. New York: New American Library 
 
Ludtke, Alf. 1989. Police and State in Prussia, 1815-1850. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Luft, Gal. 2002, April 16. Israel's Response to Lebanese Border Skirmishes. Peace Watch: The Washington 
 Institute for Near East Policy 
 
Lurfi Marsot, Afaf. 1977. Egypt’s Liberal Experiment: 1922-1936. Los Angeles: University of California  
 Press 
 
MFA. 2002, June. Hamas Use of Charitable Societies to Fund and Support Terror: Interview with Israeli  
 intelligence analyst, Jerusalem, Israel  
 
Mabro, Robert. 1974. The Egyptian Political Economy. Oxford: Clarendon Press 
 
MacKuen, Michael B., Robert S. Erikson, and James A. Stimson. 1992. “Peasants or Bankers? The  
 American Electorate and the U.S. Economy.” American Political Science Review. 86: 598-611. 
 
al-Madhoon, Rabi. 1988, October 18. The Islamic Movement in Palestine, 1928-1987. Shu’un Filastiniyya 
Pages 10 -50.   
 
Mah, Harold. Review: Marxism’s Truth: Recent Interpretations of Marxist Theory. The Journal of Modern  
 History. Pages 110-127. 
 
Mahish, Neveen and Sherine Abdel-Razek. April 3 2006. The Guessing Game. Al-Ahram Weekly Online 
al-Majid, Wahid Abd. 1988, May. The Palestinian uprising: The historical context, the acting forces, the 
  course and future. al-Mustaqbal al-`Arabi. Pages 8–10  
Maltzman, Forrest, James F. Spriggs II, and Paul J. Wahlbeck. 1998. “Strategy and Judicial Choice: New  
Institutionalist Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making.” Pp. from Cornell Clayton and 
Howard Gillman (eds), Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Makovsky, David. 2005. Peace Watch, are all politics local?  A look at the Palestinian municipal election  
results Washington Institute for Near East Policy 
 
Maktabi, Rania. May 1999. The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited: Who are the Lebanese? British  
 Journal of Middle Eastern Studies.  Pages 219-241 
 
Al-Manar, October 30, 2004. Nasrallah Speech: http://www.intelligence.org.il/sp/1_05/hezbollah.htm 
 
Marin-Guzman, Roberto. 2003. Fanaticism: A Major Obstacle in the Muslim/Christian Dialogue.  The Case  
 of Twentieth Century Islamic Fundamentalism.  Arab Studies Quarterly. Pages 63-96  
 
Marty, Martin E. and Scott Appleby.  1993. Education and the Media. In Fundamentalism and Society:  
 Reclaiming the Science, the Family, and Education, Chicago: Chicago University Press.  
 
_____________________________. 1993. Fundamentalism and the State: Remaking Politics, Economics,  
 and Militancy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
  410 
  
Markovits, Daniel. 2005. “Democratic Disobedience.” The Yale Law Journal. 114: 1897-1952. 
Marr, Phebe. 1994. The United States, Europe, and The Middle East: an Uneasy Triangle.  Middle East      
 Journal. Pages 21-225 
Mars, David. 1969. “The Federal Government and Protest.” Annals of the American Academy of Political  
 and Social Science. 382: 120-130. 
 
Marsden, George M.  1990. Defining American Fundamentalism. In: Norman J. Cohen. The 
 Fundamentalist Phenomenon: a Response from Without. Grand Rapids: Michigan University 
 Press    
 
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. The Communist Manifesto. 1848/2006. New York: Penguin Classics. 
 
_________________________. The German Ideology. In The Marx-Engels Reader. W.W. Norton:  
New York.  
 
Marx, Karl. 1978. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. In The Marx-Engels Reader. W.W.  
 Norton: New York. 
 
_________. 1978. The Class Struggle in France. In The Marx-Engels Reader. W.W. Norton: New York. 
 
_________. 1967. Capital. New York: International Publishers.  
 
Masha’al, Khaled. 1994. Conditions and Possibilities of Conducting Fair Elections. Center of Middle East 
 Studies. 
 
Mayer, Tomas. 1990. Pro-Iranian Fundamentalism in Gaza.” In E. Sivan and M. Friedman. Religious  
 Radicalism and Politics in the Middle East. Pages 142–155. Albany: State University of New 
 York Press. 
 
____________. 1988. The awakening of the Muslims in Israel. Giv`at Haviva: ha-Makhon le-Limudim  
  
Mayfield, James. 1971. Rural Politics in Nasser’s Egypt: A Quest for Legitimacy. University of Texas  
 Press: Austin. 
  
Mayhew, David R. 1986. “The Electoral Incentive.” From Congress: The Electoral Connection. New  
 Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
McAdam, Doug. 1982. Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970. Chicago:  
 University of Chicago Press. 
 
_____________. 1983. Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency. American Sociological Review.  
 Pages 735-754.  
 
_____________. 1988. Freedom Summer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
_____________. 1996. Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Direction. In: Comparative 
 Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural 
 Framings. Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pages 23-40 
 
  ____________.  2003. Beyond Structural Analysis: Toward a More Dynamic Understanding of Social  
 Movements. In: Social Movements and Networks: Rational Approaches to Collective Action.  
  411 
 Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pages 281-298.  
 
McAdam, Doug, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald. 1996. Comparative Perspectives on Social  
 Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings. Cambridge:  
 Cambridge University Press.  
 
MaAdam, Doug and Dieter Rucht. 1993. The Cross-national Diffusion of Movement Ideas. Annals of the  
 American Academy of Political and Social Science. Pages 56-74. 
 
McAdam, Doug and Yang Su. 2002. “The War At Home: Anti-War Protests and Congressional Voting,  
 1965-1973.” American Sociological Review. 65(5): 696-721. 
 
McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, 2001. Dynamics of Contention. New York: 
 Cambridge University Press.  
 
McCann, Dennis. 1978, April. Reinhold Niebuhr and Jacques Maritain on Marxism: A Comparison of Two  
 Traditional Models of Practical Theology.  The Journal of Religion. Pages 140-168. 
 
McCarthy, John and Mayer Zald. 1997. Globalization of Social Movement Theory. In Transnational  
 Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State. In: Jackie Smith, Charles  
 Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 
 
McCarthy, John, Clark McPail, and Jacki Smith. 1996. Images or Protest: Dimensions of Selection Bias 
in Media Coverage of Washington Demonstrations, 1982 and 1991. American Sociological Review. 
Pages 478-499 
 
McCarthy, John and Mark Wolfson. 1992. Consensus Movements, Conflict Movements, and the  
 Cooptation of Civiv and State Infrastructures.  In Frontiers in Social Theory. A Morris and C. 
 McClug Mueller. Hew Haven: Yale University Press. Pages 273-298. 
 
McCarthy, John and Mayer Zald. 1977. Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory. 
 American Journal of Sociology. Pages 1212-1241. 
 
McClug, Mueller. 1978. Riot Violence and Protest Outcomes. Journal of Military Sociology. Pages 49-63  
 
McDonald, Kevin. 2004. “Oneself to Another: From Social Movement to Experience Movement.”  
 Current Sociology. 52(4): 575-593. 
 
McGuire, Kevin T. and Gregory A. Caldeira. 1993. “Lawyers, Organized Interests, and the Law of  
 Obscenity: Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court.” American Political Science Review. 87(3):  
 717-726. 
 
McKee, E. S. 2000, July 17. Fading Fundamentalists. Jerusalem Report 
 
McVeigh, Rory, Daniel J. Myers, and David Sykkink. 2004. “Corn, Klansmen, and Coolidge: Structure  
 and Framing in Social Movements.” Social Forces. 83(2): 653-690. 
 
Mayer, N. 1998. The Front National Vote in Plural. Patterns of Prejudice. PP 3-24.  
 
Meijer, R. 1997. Mainstream Islamic Movements in Egypt, Jordan and Palestine in the 1990s. Amsterdam: 
 Research Center for International Political Economy. 
 
Meijerink, F. C. Mudde, J. Van Holsteyn. 1998. Right Wing Extremism. Acta Politica. 165-78 
 
Melucci, Alberto. 1996. Challenging Codes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
  412 
_____________. The New Social Movements: A Theoreticcal Approach. Social Science Information. 
 
Melucci, Alberto and Leonardo Avritzer. 2000. “Complexity, Cultural Pluralism and Democracy:  
 Collective Action in the Public Space.” Social Science Information. 39(4): 507-527. 
 
Mendelberg, Tali. 2001. The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of  
 Equality. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Meo, Leila. 1956. Lebanon, Improbable Nation: A Study in Political Development. Bloomington: Indiana 
 University Press 
 
Metz, Steven. 1986. The Anti-Apartheid Movement and Populist Instinct in American Politics. Political  
 Science Quarterly, Pages 379-395.  
 
Michels, Robert. 1962. Political Parties. New York: The Free Press 
 
Micholus, Edward, Todd Sandler, and Jean Murdock. 1989. International Terrorism in the 1980s: 
 Chronicle of Events 1980-1983. Ames: Iowa State University Press 
 
__________________________________________. 1989. International Terrorism in the 1980s:  
 Chronicle of Events 1984-1987. Ames: Iowa State University Press 
 
Milbrath, Lester. 1970. The Impact of Lobbying on Governmental decisions.  In Policy Analysis in 
 Political Science. Sharkansky. Chicago: Markham. Pages 360-381 
 
Miller, Aaron David. 1983. The PLO and the Politics of Survival. Washington, D.C: Georgetown  
 University Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
Milton-Edwards, Beverly. 1996. Islamic Politics in Palestine. London: Tauris Academic Studies 
_____________________. 2005, Winter. Prepared for Power: Hamas, Governance and Conflict. Civil 
 Wars. Pages 311-329 
Mirala, Petre. 2000. A Large Mob, Calling Themselves Freemasons. In Peter Jupp and Eoin Magennis. 
 Crowds in Ireland: 1720-1920. London: Macmillan 
Mirowsky, John and Catherine Ross. 1981. Protest Group Success: The Impact of Group Characteristics.  
 Social Control, and Context. Social Focus. Pages 177-192.  
 
Mishal, Shaul, and Reuven Aharoni. 1994. Speaking Stones, Communiqués from the Intifada Underground.  
 Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 
Mitchell, Richard P. 1969. The Society of the Muslim Brothers. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mitra, S. 1988. The National Front in France. West European Politics: 47-64 
 
Moench, Richard. 1988. Oil Ideology and State Autonomy in Egypt. Arab Studies Quarterly. Pages 186 
 
Morris, Aldon. 1984. The Origins of Civil Rights Movements: Clack Communities Organizing for 
 Change. New York: Free Press 
 
Montazeri, Javad. 2005, March 14. In Interviews With Experts Extended Discusses Iran and the  
 Developments in Lebanon. E'temad (reformist daily published in Tehran) 
 
Montgomery, David. 1993. Citizen Worker: The Experience of Workers in the United States with  
  413 
 Democracy and Free Market During the 19th Century.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Mousseau , Michael. 2002/03 Market civilization and its clash with terror. International security .  
Pages 5-29.   
 
Moussalli, Ahmed. 1999. Historical Dictionary of Islamic Fundamentalist Movements in the Arab World, 
 Iran, and Turkey: Historical Dictionaries of Religions, Philosophies and Movements. The  
Scarecrow Press 
 
Mudde, Cas. 2000. The Extreme Right Party Family: Fact or Fiction. Manchester: Manchester   
University Press.  
 
_________. The Paradox of the Anti-party Party: Insights form the Extreme Right. Party Politics. 
 
_________. 1995. Right-Wing Extremism Analyzed. A comparative analysis of the ideologies of three 
 alleged right-wing extremist parties. European Journal of Political Research: 225-248  
 
_________ and Van Holsteyn, J. 1999. Over the Top: Dutch Right-Wing Extremist Parties. Politics. 
 Pages 127-34 
Al-Mughrabi, Nidal. December 24, 2005. Thousands Join Hamas March against US, EU in Gaza.  Reuters: 
 http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2005/12/24/worldupdates/2005-12 
24T000652Z_01_NOOTR_RTRJONC_0_-229273-1&sec=worldupdates;  
Mukkaled, Diana.  May 1, 2006. Al Zarqawi, Between Myth and Reality. Asharq Alawsat 
 
Muller, Edward and Mitchell Seligson. 1987. Inequality and Insurgency. American Political Science  
 Review. Pages 425-452 
 
Muller, Edward and Erich Weede. 1990 December. Cross-National Variation in Political Violence: A  
 Rational Action Approach. Journal of Conflict Resolution. Pages 624-651 
 
Munck Gerardo L. 1995. “Actor Formation, Social Co-Ordination and Political Strategy: Some  
 Conceptual Problems in the Study of Social Movements.” Sociology. 29(4): 667-685. 
 
Munger, Frank. 1979. Measuring of Popular Protest by English Justice of the Peace in the Industrial  
 Revolution. Historical Methods. Pages 76-83 
 
____________. 1981. Suppression of Popular Gatherings in England, 1800-1830, American Journal of  
 Legal History. Pages 111-140 
 
The Muslim Brotherhood pamphlet, Qawl Fasl. December 1950 
Nadvi, S.H. Haq. 1981. The Dawn of Spiritualism Mirrored in the Dawn of the XV Hijra Century. Durban  
 
Nafi, Bashir. 1988. Arabism, Islamism and the Palestinian Question, 1908-1941. Reading, UK: Ithaca Pres 
 
Al-Nahar. 2005, March 25. Fadlallah Tells Al-Nahar: The Shiites Are Not Sectarian and Not Inside a Shell,  
 But They Have Priorities; Weapon of the Resistance Is Necessary and Will Be Removed Once  
 Danger of Israeli Aggression Is Over 
Al-Nahar. 2002, March 12. Ra'd: Resistance Has Right to Support the Palestinians  
Al-Nahar. 2003, October 7. Lebanon: Hezbollah Says Israeli Attack on Syria Breaches All Red Lines  
 
  414 
Nassi AJ. Abramowitz SI. 1979. Transition or Transformation? Personal and Political Development of 
 Former Berkeley Free Speech Movement Activists. Journal of Youth adolescence. Pages 21-35    
 
Negus, Steve. 1997, April 3. Down but Not Out: The Muslim Brotherhood Keep a Low Profile, but Their  
 Main Activity, Charity Work – Still Does On.  Cairo Times  
 
Netanyahu, Benjamin. 1986. Terrorism: How the West Can Win. New York: Avon 
 
Niedermayer, Rosi. 1990. Backgrounder: German Democratic Republic. Vancouver: Province of British  
 Columbia Press  
 
Nizar Hamzeh. 1993. Lebanon’s Hezbollah: from Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation.  
 Third World Quarterly 
 
North, Douglass. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: 
 Cambridge University Press 
 
Norton, Augustus Richard. Summer 1991. Lebanon after Taifi is the Civil War Over.  The Middle East  
 Journal.  Pages 471-472 
 
_____________________. 1987. Amal and the Shia: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon. Austin: University  
 of Texas Press 
 
_____________________. 2001, May 23. Addendum. In Martha Neff Kessler, George Emile Irani, Peter  
 Gubser, Augustus Richard Norton, Lebanon and Syria: Internal and Regional Dimensions.  
 Capitol Hill conferences convened by the Middle East Policy Council 
 
______________________. 2000, autumn. Hezbollah and the Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon. 
 Journal of Palestine Studies. Pages 33-44 
 
O'Sullivan, Arieh. 2002, February 19. Hezbollah Recruiting Israeli Arabs. Jerusalem Post 
 
Oberschall, Anthony. 1973. Social Conflict and Social Movement. Englewood-Cliffs: Prentice Hill 
 
________________. 1978. Theories of Social Conflict. Social Revolution. Pages 291-315 
 
________________. 1978. The Decline of the 1960s Social Movements. Social Movements, Conflict, and  
 Change. Pages 257-289. 
 
Oberschall, Anthony. 1996. Opportunities and Framing in the Eastern European Revolts of 1989. In:  
 McAdam, Doug, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald. 1996. Comparative Perspectives on Social  
 Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings. Cambridge: 
 Cambridge University Press 
 
O’Dea, Colleen. 2006. Tajikistan: The Growth and Influence of Islam in the Nations of Asia and Central  
 Asia. Mason Crest Publishers 
 
Oegema, Dirk and Bert Klandermans. 1994. “Why Social Movement Sympathizers Don’t Participate: 
 Erosion and Non conversion of Support.”  American Sociological Review. 59(5): 703-722. 
 
Offe, Claus. 1985. New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics. Social  
 Research. Pages 817-868.  
 
Olimpio, Guido. February 27, 1997. Palestinian Sources – Saudis Increasing Funding to Hamas. Milan 
 Corriere della Sera 
 
  415 
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Opp, Karl-Dieter. 1989. The Rationality of Political Protest. Boulder: Westview. 
 
Ovendale, Ritchie. 1992. The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Wars. London: Longman.  
 
Overbeek, Henk. 1994. Hegemony and Social Change. International Studies Review. Pages 361-376.  
 
Palazzi, Abdual Hadi. 2002. The Islamists Have it Wrong. Middle East Quarterly. 
 
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Survey. January-March 2005. 
The Palestinian Information Center. December 25, 2005. Meeting with Mr. Khalid Mash'al on the satellite 
 television network al-Manar for the program What After? : http://www.palestine-
 info.net/arabic/hamas/hewar/2005/khaled1.htm.   
Palestinian Central Elections Commission. The CEC announced the final results of the second PLC  
 Elections. January 29, 2006.   
 
Paniel, Pipes. 1993. Sandstorm: Middle East Conflicts and America. Philadelphia: University Press of  
 America 
 
Palmer, El Safty, and E. Sullivan. 1996. The Relationship Between Economic and Religious Attitudes in  
 Egypt.   
  
Palmer, Stanley. 1988. Police and Protest in England and Ireland 1780-1850. Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press 
 
Paige, Jeffery. 1997. Coffee and Power: Revolution and the Rise of Democracy in Central America.   
 Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
 
Pape, Robert. 2003. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. American Political Science Review.  
Pages 343-361 
 
__________. Winter 1997-98. Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Ithaca: Cornell  
 University Press 
 
___________. 1975. Agrarian Revolution. New York: Free Press.  
 
Pappe, Ilan. 2006. A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples. Cambridge University Press 
 
Payne, Stanley G. 1995. A History of Fascism, 1914-45 London: University College London Press 
Paz, Reuven. 2005, October.  Al-Qaeda's Search for new Fronts: Instructions for Jihadi Activity in Egypt  and 
Sinai. PRISM Occasional Papers 
Paz, Reuven. March 2005. Arab volunteers killed in Iraq: an Analysis.  PRISM Series of Global Jihad 
Pedahzur, Ami, William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg. 2002. The War on Terrorism and the Decline of  
 Terrorist Groups Formation: A Research Note. Terrorism and Political Violence. Pages 141-147 
 
Pelletiere, Stephen C. 1994. Hamas and Hezbollah: The Radical Challenge to Israel in the Occupied  
 Territories. Carlistle, PA: U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute. 
 
Perlmutter, Amos. 1974. Egypt: The Praetorian State. New York. 
  416 
 
Peterson, Peter. Diplomacy and war on terrorism.  Foreign Affairs, September/October 2000 pages 74-96  
 
Petterson, Donald. 2003. Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict, and Catastrophe. Westview Press 
 
Picard, Elizabeth. 1993. The Lebanese Shia and Political Violence. United Nations Research Institute for  
 Social Development.  
 
Pickvance, C.G. (1997). Housing Privatization and Housing Protest In the Transition from State  
 Socialism: A comparative Study of Budapest  and Moscow. International Journal of Urban and  
 Regional Research. Pages 433-450.  
 
Pillar, Paul Pillar. Terrorism and US Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C., Brookings, 2001.  
Pages 145-148). 
 
Pipe, Daniel. 1983. In The Path of God: Islam and Political Power. New York: Basic Books. 
   
Piven, Frances Fox. 1981.  “Deviant Behavior and the Remaking of the World.” Social Problems.  
 Pages: 489-508. 
 
_______________ and Richard Cloward. 1979. Poor People’s Movements. New York: Vintage 
 
_______________ and Richard Cloward. 1993. Regulating the Poor. New York: Vintage  
 
Poe, Steven and Neal Tate. 1994. Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s:  
 A Global Analysis. The American Political Science Review. Pages 853-872.  
 
Poe, Steven and Scott Walker. 2002. Does Cultural Diversity Affect Countries’ Respect for  
 Human Rights?  Human Rights Quarterly. Pages 237-263.   
 
Popkin, Samuel L. 1994. The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential  
 Campaigns. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Porath, Yehoshua. 1974. From Riots to Revolt: The Arab-Palestinian National Movement 1929–1939. 
 London: Frank Cass. 
 
Post, Jerrold M, Ehud Sprinzak, and Laurita M. Denny. 2003. The Terrorists in Their Own Words:  
 Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists. Journal of Terrorism and Political  
 Violence. Pages 174-184 
 
Poulson, Stephen. 2006. Social Movements in Twentieth-Century Iran: Culture, Ideology, and Mobilizing  
 Frameworks. Lexington Books 
 
Powell, Bingham G. 1986. ”Extremist Parties and Political Turmoil: Two Puzzles.” American Journal of  
 Political Science. 30(2): 357-578. 
 
Praeger. (2001): Political Repression in Modern America from 1870 to 1976. Urbana: University 
 of Illinois Press. 
 
Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York:  
 Simon and Schuster. 
 
Qasem, Abdel Sattar. 1995. The Political Thought of Hamas. Al-Siyasa al-Filastiniyya. Pages 112-28 
Al-Qud. December 19, 2005. Hamas interested in joining the government following elections to Palestinian 
 Legislative Council 
  417 
Al-Quds. December 25, 2005. Hamas aims to form wide national mainstream with the victors of the 
  upcoming elections to Palestinian Legislative Council 
Qutb, Sayyid. 1983. Hadha al-Din. Dar al-Shuruq; Beirut. 
 
__________. 1960. The Characteristics of the Islamic Conception and its Foundation. Dar al-Shuruq;  
 Beirut 
 
__________. 1960. Islam and the Problems of Civilization. Dar al-Shuruq; Beirut 
 
__________. 1964. Signposts Along the Road. Dar al-Shuruq; Beirut 
 
__________. 1966. Under the Auspices of the Quran. Dar al-Shuruq; Beirut 
 
Rabinovich, Itamar. 1985. The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985. Cornell University Press 
 
Ramage, Douglas. 1997. Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, and the Ideology of Tolerance.  
 Routledge Press 
 
Randall, James and Brian Humes. 1988. Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game Theoretic  
 Analysis. The American Political Science Review; page 445-466 
 
Rashid, Ahmed. 2007. Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia. Penguin Book Press 
 
Ratliff, William. 1988. Revolutionary Warfare. New Brunswick: Transaction 
Ramadan, Nizar. 2005, December. Hamas between the arrests and the elections. Falastin al-Muslima 
Ramet, Sabrina. 1996. The Disintergration of Yugoslavia. Boulder, CO: Westview. 
 
Rapoport, David. September 1984. Fear and Trembling in Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions. 
  American Political Science Review.  
 
_____________. 2001. The Fourth Wave: September 11 and the History of Terrorism. Current History.  
 Pages 419-424 
 
Reagan, Patrich and Errol Henderson. 2002. Democracy, Threats and Political Repression in Developing   
 Countries: Are Democracies Internally Less Violent. Third World Quarterly. Pages 119-136. 
 
Reich, Wilhelm. 1983. The Mass Psychology of Fascism.  Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
Rekhess, Elie. 1995, May. The Terrorist Connection-Iran, the Islamic Jihad and Hamas Justice. Tel Aviv  
Reuters News Agency report April 11, 1994 
 
Richards, Alan. 1991, December. The Political Economy of Dilatory Reform.  World Development.  
Page 1724 
 
Richards, Alan and John Waterbury. 1990. A Political Economy of the Middle East: State, Class, and  
 Economic Development. Boulder Westview Press 
 
Rida, Ahmad. 1963. The Opening of South Lebanon, 1788-1840. Cambridge; Harvard University Press   
 
Rimmermna, Craig. 1996. Gay Rihts, Military Wrongs: Political Perspectives on Lesbian and  
Gays in the Military. Garland Publishers.  
  418 
 
Roberts, G.K. 1992.  Right-Wing Radicalism in the New Germany. Parliamentary Affais: 35-44. 
 
Robinson, Glenn E. 1997. Building a Palestinian State, the Unfinished Revolution. Bloomington: Indiana 
 University Press. 
 
_______________. 1997, Summer. Can Islamists Be Democrats? The Case of Jordan. Middle East  
 Journal. Pages 373–388. 
 
Rodinelli, Dennis. 1993. Development Projects as Policy Experiments.  London: Routledge. 
 
Rosendorff, Peter and Todd Sandler. 2004. Too Much of a God Thing? The Proactive Response  
 Dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution. Pages 657-671 
 
Rosenstone, Steven J. Roy L. Behr, and Edward H. Lazarus. 1996. Third Parties in America. New Jersey:  
 Princeton. 
 
Rosenstone, Steven J. and John Mark Hansen. 1993. Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in  
 America. New York: Macmillan Publishing 
 
Rotella, Sebastian. 2001, December 5. A pool of Militants: Europe Holds Fertile Soil for Jihads. Los Angeles 
Times 
Rougier, Bernard and Rascale Chazeleh. 2007. Everyday Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam among  
 Palestinians in Lebanon. Harvard University Press 
 
Roy, Denny. 1994. Hegemon on the Horizon? China’s Threat to East Asian Security. International  
 Security. Pages 149-168. 
 
Roy, Olivier. 1994. The Failure of Political Islam. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Rubinstein, Danny. December 23, 2005.  The fear of Hamas caused Abu Mazen to waive. Ha'aretz. 
Rucht, Dieter. 1989. Environmental Movement Organizations in West Germany and France: Structure  
 and Interorganizational Relations. International Social Movements Research. Pages 61-94  
 
__________. 1999. The Transnationalization of Social Movements. In Social Movements in a  
 Globalizing World. Donatella  della Porta, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Dieter Rucht. London:  
 Macmillan. Pages 206-222.  
 
Russell, Charels and Bowman Miller. 1977. Profile of a Terrorist. Terrorism: AN International Journal. 
 Pages: 17-34 
 
Ruzza, C. 1995. Towards a Modern Right. The New Italian Republic. London: Routledge. 
 
 
Saad Eddin Ibrahom. 1982. An Islamic Alternative in Egypt: The Muslim Brotherhood and Sadat. Arab  
 Studies Quarterly. Pages 75-93 
 
________________, 1988. Egypt’s Islamic Activism in the 1980s. The World Quarterly. Pages 642-43  
 
Al-Sabeel. November 2, 1993 
 
Sabri Jiryis, 1987, May/June. A dialogue of another sort over “the dialogue” and national unity. Shu'un  
 Filastiniyya. Pages 21–29 
 
  419 
Sachs, Susan. 2000. War on Fundamentalism Silences Dissent in Egypt. International Herald Tribune 
 
Sadiq, Liwaa Hasan. 1977. The Roots of Strife Between Islamic Sects. Cairo: The American  
University Press 
 
Saeed, Javaid. 1994. Islam and Modernization: A Comparative Analysis of Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey.  
 Praeger Publishers 
 
Sagiv, David.  1995. Fundamentalism and Intellectuals in Egypt, 1973-1993. London: Frank Cass 
 
Sahliyeh, Emile. 1988. In Search of Leadership: West Bank Politics since 1967. Washington, D.C.: 
 Brookings 
 
El-Said, Sabah. 1995. Between Pragmatism and Ideology: The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, 1989- 
 1994. Policy Papers, Number 29 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy) 
 
Saleh, Mohsen M. 1988. The Islamic Trend in Palestine and its effects on the struggle Movement 1917- 
 1948. Kuwait City: AL-Falah Library. 
 
Salibi, Kama. 1988. A House of Many Mansions. London: I. B. Tauris 
 
Samia DSad Imam. 1987. Who Owns Egypt? An Analytical Study of the Social Origins of the Infitah Elite, 
 1974-1980. Cairo: Dar al-mustaqbal al-arabi 
 
Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. Parties and Party Systems. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Sarrah, Fayez. 1989, June. The Islamic Movement in Palestine: Unity of Ideology ad Political Divisions; al- 
 Mustaqbal al-Arabi. Pages 48-64 
 
Satloff, Robert.  1989, Summer. Islam in the Palestinian Uprising.” Orbis. Pages 389–401. 
____________. 1988, October, 7. Islam in the Palestinian Uprising. Policy Focus, The Washington Institute 
 for Near East Policy 
al-Sayed, Mustafa Kamal. 1993. Spring. A Civil Society in Egypt? Middle East Journal. Page 232 
 
____________________. 1990. The Islamic Movement in Egypt: Social and Political Implications: in The  
 Political Economy of Contemporary Egypt. Ibrahim Oweiss. Washington, D.C. Center for  
 Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University 
 
Sayigh, Yezid. 1997. The Armed Struggle and Palestinian Nationalism. In: Avraham Sela and Moshe 
 Ma`oz; The PLO and Israel: From Armed Conflict to Political Solution, 1964–1994. New York:  
St. Martin’s Press 
 
Sayyid Abula’la. 2001. Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic Jihad Movement. Dayan Center  
 Papers. Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and Affairs: Islamic Foundation 
 
Schain, M. 1999. The National Front and the French Party System. French Politics and Society.  
 
Schiff, Zeev and Ehud Yaari. 1984. Israel’s Lebanon War. New York: Simon and Schuster  
 
_______________________. 1989. Intifada, the Palestinian Uprising, Israel’s Third Front. New York:  
Simon & Schuster.  
 
Schwartz, M. 1976. Radical Protest and Social Structure. New York: Academic 
  420 
 
Schweingruber, David and Clark McPhail. 1999. “A Method for Systematically Observing and Recording  
 Collective Action.” Sociological Methods and Research. 27(4):451-498. 
 
Schumaker, Paul. 1975. Policy Responsiveness to Protest-Group Demands. Journal of Politics. 
 Pages 488-521. 
 
Schweitzer, Y. 2002. Suicide Terrorism: Development and Main Characteristics. In Countering Suicide  
 Terrorism. Countering Suicide Terrorism. Anti-Defamation League. Pages 77-88 
 
_____________. 1978. The Scope of Political Conflict and the Effectiveness of Constraints in  
 Contemporary Urban Protest. Sociological Quarterly. Pages 168-184.   
Seale, Patrick. 1988. Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East. Berkeley: University of California Press 
 
Sears, D and McConahay J. 1973. The Politics of Violence. Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
 
Sebenius, James K. 1992.  Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation:  
 Negotiation Analysis and the case of Epistemic Communities. International Organizations.  
Pages: 323-365 
 
Segal, Jeffrey A. 1997. “Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts.”  
 American Political Science Review. 91(1): 28-44. 
 
_____________. 1987. Invisible Armies: Terrorism into the Nineties. San Diego: Harcourt Brace  
 Jovanovich 
 
Sela, Avraham, and Moshe Ma'oz. 1997.  The PLO and Israel: From Armed Conflict to Political Solution,  
 1964–1994. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 
Schock, Kurt. 2004. Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements In Nondemocracies. University of  
 Minnesota Press;, Inc 
 
Schiff, Ze’ev and Ehud Ya’ari. 1989. The Palestinian Uprising – Israel’s Third Front. New York: Simon  
 and Schuster  
 
Shabi, A and R. Shaked. 1994.  Hamas: From belief in Allah to the road of terror. Jerusalem: Keter 
 
Al Shafey, Mohammed. Dahab Bombers Inspired by Al-Qaeda. Asharq Alawsat, April 29, 2006 
 
Shahuri, Ra'uf. 2005, May 27. Plan B in the Battle of Disarming Hezbollah. Beirut Al-Anwar 
Shanahan, Rodger. 2005. The Shia of Lebanon: Clans Parties and Clerics. Tauris Academic Studies: 
 New York  
Shapira, Shimon. Hezbollah between Iran & Lebanon. United Kibbutz: Red Line publisher 
Sharkanski, Ira. 1997. The Potential of Ambiguity: The Case of Jerusalem.” In Efraim Karsh: From Rabin 
 to Netanyahu, pages 187–200. London: Frank Cass. 
 
Shawqi Zaki, Muhammad. 1954. The Muslim Brothers and Egyptian Society. Cairo: The American  
 University Press. 
Shay, S. 2001. Terror in the Service of the Imam – 20 Years of Shiite Terrorism. The International Policy 
  Institute for Counter-Terrorism: The Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya. 
  421 
Shay, S. & Schweitzer, Y. 2001. Faultiness Writings on Conflict Resolution. Bulwork Books and The 
  Institute for Conflict Management. 
Shelev, Aryeh. 1991.  The Intifada: Causes and Effects. Tel Aviv and London: Westview Press.   
 
Shikaki, Khalil. 1996, Spring. The Palestinian Elections: An Assessment. Journal of Palestine Studies. 
 Pages 17–22. 
 
Al-Shishani, Murad. 2006, April 25. Egypt Breaks-up al-Ta'efa al-Mansoura Jihadist Group," Terrorism 
 Focus, Jamestown Foundation 
 
Sidel, John. 2007. The Islamist Threat in Southeast Asia: A Reassessment. East-West Center Washington;  
 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) 
 
Sidel, John. 2006. Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia. Cornell University Press 
 
Sills, R.H. 1947. The Volunteers. New York: Free Press 
 
Silver, Ira. 1998. “Buying an Activist Identity: Reproducing Class through Social Movement 
 Philanthropy.” Sociological Perspectives. 41(2): 303-321. 
 
Singerman, Diane. 1985. Avenues of Participation: Family, Politics and Networks in Urban Quarters of  
 Cairo. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
Sivan, Emmanuel. 1985. Radical Islam. New Haven: Yale University Press 
 
______________. 1995. Eavesdropping on Radical Islam. Middle East Quarterly. Pages 13–24. 
 
Skocpol, Theda, Kenneth Finegold; Michael Goldfield. 1990. “Explaining New Deal Labor Policy.” The  
 American Political Science Review. 84(4): 1297-1315. 
 
Skowronek, Stephen. 1993. The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to George Bush.  
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press. 
 
Slackman, Michael. 2006, April 27. Peacekeepers Targets of New Sinai Attacks: NYT 
Snidal, Duncan. 1985. Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory. International Organization  
Snow, David A. 1992. Master Frames and Cycles of Protest. In: Frontiers in Social Movement Theory.  
 Aldom Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller. New Haven: Yale University Press. Pages 135-155 
 
____________. 1999. Alternative Types of Cross-National Diffusion in the Social Movement Arena. In  
 Social Movements in Globalizing World. Donatella Della Porta, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Dieter  
 Rucht. New York: Macmillan. Pages 23-39.  
 
____________. 1988. Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization. In: From Structure to  
 Action: Social Movement Participation Across Cultures. Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi,  
 and Sidney Tarrow. Greenwich: JAI Press. Pages 197-217.  
 
Snow, David A., Burke E. Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. 1986. “Frame  
 Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation.” American Sociological  
 Review. Pages: 464-481. 
 
Snow, David and Susan Marshall. 1984. Cultural Imperialism, Social Movements, and Islamic Revival. 
 Research in Social Movements, Conflict, and Change. Pages 131-151. 
  422 
 
Snyder, David and William Kelly. 1979. Strategies for Investigating Violence and Social Change:  
 Illustrations from Analyses of Racial Disorders and Implications for Mobilization Research. In: 
 The Dynamics of Social Movements. Zald, McCarthy. Cambridge: Winthrop. 
  
Sobelman, Daniel. 2002, August. Hezbollah Two Years after the Withdrawal - A Compromise between  
 Ideology, Interests, and Exigencies. Strategic Assessment, Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, Tel- 
 Aviv University: http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v5n2p4Sob.html.  
 
Springborg, Robert. 1988. Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order. Boulder: Westview Press 
 
_______________. 1979, October. Professional Syndicates in Egyptian Politics, 1952-1970. International 
Journals of Middle East Studies. Pages 275-295 
  
_______________. 1989. Mubarak’s Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order. Boulder:  
Westview Press;  
 
Sprinzak, Ehud. 2000. Rational Fanatics. Foreign Policy. Pages 66-74 
 
Staggenborg, Suzanne. 1986. Coalition Work in the Pro-Choice Movement: Organizational and 
 Environmental Opportunities and Constraints. Social Problems. Pages 623-641. 
 
Steedly, Homer and John Foley. 1979. The Success of Protest Groups: Multivariate Analyses.  
 SociologicalResearch. Pages 1-15  
 
Stein, Arthur. 1984. The Hegemon’s Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International  
 Economic Order. International Organizations. Pages 355-386. 
 
Stern, Jessica. 1999. The Ultimate Terrorists. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Steinberg, Matti. 1989. The PLO and Palestinian Islamic Fundamentalism. Jerusalem Quarterly.  
Pages 37–54. 
 
Steinmetz, George. 1994. Regulation Theory, Post-Marxism, and he New Social Movements. Comparative  
 Studies in Society and History. Pages 176-212. 
 
Stephens, Glenn. 1995. “Remodeling Collective Violence: James Tong’s Rational Choice Model and the  
 Great Strikes of 1877.” Political Research Quarterly. 48(2):345-369. 
 
Stewart Bell, Stewart. 2003, December 10. Hamas May Have Chemical Weapons: CSIS Report Says  
 Terror Group May Be Experimenting. National Post (Canada) 
 
Stohl, Michael. 1988. The Politics of Terrorism. New York: Marcel Dekker 
 
Storch, Robert. 1976. The Policeman as Domestic Missionary: Urban Discipline and Popular Culture in  
Northern England, 1850-1888. Journal of Social History. Pages 481-509. 
 
Stoss, R. 1988. The Problem of Right Extremism in West Germany. West European Politics. PP 34-46. 
 
Streusand, Douglas. 1997, September 20. “What Does Jihad Mean?” http://www.ict.org.il/apage/1727.php 
 
Sullivan, Denis. August 1990. The Political Economy of Reform in Egypt.  International Journal of  
 Middle East Studies 
 
_____________. 1994. Private Voluntary Organizations in Egypt: Islamic Development, Private Initiative,  
 and State Control. Gainesville: University of Florida Press 
  423 
 
Swyngedouw, M. 1998. The extreme right in Belgium: of non-existent Front National. In H.G.  
 
el-Tahawy, Mona. 1999, October 23. Egypt Cracks Down on Islamist Activists. The Guardian 
 
Talattof, Kamran. 2005. Comrade Akbar: Islam, Marxism, and Modernity. Comparative Studies of South  
 Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Pages 634-649. 
 
Tarrow, Sidney. 1993. “Cycles of Collective Action: Between Moments of Madness and the Repertoire of  
 Contention.” Social Science History. 17(2) 281-307. 
 
____________. 1989. Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy 1965-1975. Oxford:  
 Clarendon Press. 
 
____________. 1994. Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics. New  
 York: Cambridge University Press.  
 
____________. 1998. Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics. New  
 York: Cambridge University Press.  
 
____________. 1996a. States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements. In:  
 Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer  
 Zald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
____________. 1996b. Social Movements in Contentious Politics: a Review Article. American Political  
 Science Review. Pages 874-883 
 
____________. 2001. Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International Politics. Annual  
 Review of Political Science. Pages 1-20. 
 
Tessler, Mark & Jodi Nachtwey.  October 1998. Islam and Attitudes Toward International Conflict:  
Evidence from Survey Research in the Arab World.  The Journal of Conflict Resolution. 
 
Tessler, Mark and Jodi Nachtwey. 1999. Palestinian Political Attitudes: An Analysis of Survey Data from 
 the West Bank and Gaza. 1999. Islamic Studies 
 
Tessler, Mark. 1997. The Origins of Popular Support for Islamist Movements: a Political Economy  
 Analysis. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
 
Thompeon, E.P. 1963. The Making of The English Working Class. London: Gollancz.  
  
Tibi, Bassam. 1988. The Crisis of Modern Islam: A Preindustrial Cultural: the Scientific and Technical  
 Age. Salt Lake City: Utah University Press 
 
__________. 2002. The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and The New World Disorder. University 
of California Press: Berkeley.  
  
Tilly, Charles, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly. 1975. The Rebellious Century, 1830-1930. Cambridge:  
 Harvard University Press. 
 
Tilly, Charles. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading: Addison Wesley 
 
__________. 1982. Britain Creates the Social Movement. In: Social Contract and the Political Order in   
 Modern Britain. J.E. Cronin and J. Schneer.  London: England Croom Helm. 
 
__________. 1984. Social Movements and National Politics. In: State-making and Social Movements:  
  424 
 Essay in History and Theory. C. Bright and S. Harding. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 
 
__________. 1996. Invisible Elbow. Social Forum. Pages 589-601 
 
__________. 1995. State-Incited Violence. Greenwich: JAI Press 
 
__________. 1998. From Interactions to Outcomes in Social Movements. In: Marco Giugni, Doug  
 McAdam, Charles Tilly. 1998a. How Movements Matter. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota  
 Press  
 
__________. 2001. Mechanisms in Political Processes.  Annual Review of Political Science. Pages 21-41 
 
__________. 2003. The Politics of Collective Violence. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
__________. 2004. Social Movements, 1768-2004. Boulder; Paradigm.  
 
__________. 2004. Terror, Terrorism, and Terrorists. Sociological Theory. Pages 5-13 
 
Titus, Murray. 2005. Islam in India and Pakistan: A Religious History of Islam in India and Pakistan.  
 Musnhiram Manoharlal Press 
 
Toplin, Robert Brent. 2006. Radical Conservatism: the Right’s Political Religion. University of Kansas  
 Press: Lawrence. 
   
Toth, James. 1999. Rural Labor Movements in Egypt and Their Impact on the State, 1961-1992. University 
 Press of Florida Press 
 
Touraine, Alain. 1971. The Post Industrial Society. New York: Random House  
 
Tripp, Charles and Roger Owen. 1989. Egypt Under Mubarak. London: Rutledge 
 
Tsebelis, George. 1999. Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical  
 Analysis. American Political Science Review. Pages 591-608)  
Tuwayni, Jubran, 2002, March 21. Lebanon's Role. Beirut al-Nahar 
U.S. House Committee on Financial Services, Testimony of E. Anthony Wayne, Assistant Secretary for  
 Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State. “The Hamas Asset Freeze and Other  
 Government Efforts to Stop Terrorist Financing,” September 24, 2003.  
 
U.S. Treasury Department: U.S. House Financial Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and  
 Investigations, Testimony of David Aufhauser, General Counsel, United States Department of the 
 Treasury, September 24, 2003.      
 
U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Testimony of Matthew Levitt:  
 Untangling the terror Web: the need for a strategic understanding of the crossover between  
 international terrorist groups to successfully persecute the war on terror. October 22, 2003.   
 
U.S. House Committee on Financial Services, Testimony of E. Anthony Wayne, Assistant Secretary for  
 Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State, “The Hamas Asset Freeze and other  
 Government Efforts to Stop Terrorist Financing,” September 24, 2003,  
 http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/092403eaw.pdf 
 
The U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Public Affairs, Written Testimony of David D. Aufhauser, 
 General Counsel, Before the House Financial Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight  
  425 
and Investigations, September 24, 2003 
 
U.S. House Committee on Financial Services. The Hamas Asset Freeze and Other Government Efforts to  
 Stop Terrorist Funding. September 24, 2003 
 
U.S. Department of State. U.S. State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism. U.S. Department of State  
 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism.  Thirty-six volumes were used here: 1970-2006.    
 http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/Patterns-of-Global-Terrorism.asp and  
 http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/ 
 
Ulph, Stephen. 2006, March 21. Possible Terrorist Attack Foiled in Egypt," Terrorism Focus, Jamestown  
 Foundation 
 
United Press International. 2000, September 19. Egypt’s Islamists Blast Government for Election Ban 
 
Useem, Bert. 1980. Solidarity Model, Breakdown Model, and the Boston anti-Bussing Movement.  
 American sociological Review. 
 
Useem, Bert and Michael Useem. 1979. “Government Legitimacy and Political Stability.” Social Forces.  
 Pages: 840-852. 
Usher, Graham. December 1, 1995  Arafat’s Opening. New Statement and Society  
Valverde, Gilbert. 1999. Democracy, Human Rights, and Development Assistance for Education:  
 The USAID and World Bank in Latin America and the Caribbean. Economic  
 Development and Cultural Change.  Pages 401-419.  
 
Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1996. Voice and Equality: Civic  
 Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Vickers, Adrian. 2005. A History of Modern Indonesia. Cambridge University Press 
 
Vicziany, Marika. 2005. Terrorism and Islam in Indonesia: Myths and Realities. International Specialized  
 Book Services 
 
Voll, John. 2006. Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World. In: Martin E. Marty and R. Schott Appleby.  
 Fundamentalisms Observed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
   
Von Stein, Lorenz. 1964. History of the French Movement from 1789 to the Present 1850. Boston: 
 Common Wealth Books.  
 
Wald, K. 1993. Religion and Politics in the United States, Washington DC: Congressional  Quarterly  
 Press 
 
Walz, S. 1986. Islamist Appeal in Tunisia. Middle East Journal: page 652 
 
Walzer, Michael. 2002 Winter. Five Questions About Terrorism. Dissent. Pages 5-11 
 
Al-Wasat.  May 13, 2000. Nasrallah, Interview 
 
Al-Wasat. September 2. 2000. Hezbollah: Identity and Goals.  
 
Waterbury, John.  January 1992. Export-led Growth and the Center-Right Coalition in Turkey.  
 Comparative Politics. Pages 128-133    
 
  426 
______________. 1983.  The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes.  Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press.  
 
Waterbury, John and Alan Richards. 1996. Political Economy of the Middle East. Boulder: Westview Press 
 
______________. 1985, October.  The Soft State and the Open Door: Egypt’s Experience with Economic 
Liberalization, 1974-1984. Comparative Politics. Pages 65-81.  
 
Weaver, Mary Anne. 1999. A Portrait of Egypt: A Journey Through the World of Militant Islam. New 
 York. Ferrar, Straus & Giroux 
 
Weber, Max. 1989. The National State and Economic Policy. In: Keith Tribe. Reading Weber. London 
: Rutledge. Pages: 188-209.  
 
__________. 1981. Some Categories of Interpretive Sociology. Sociological Quarterly. Pages 51-80. 
 
__________. 1978. Economy and Society: An Interpretive Outline of Economics. Berkeley: University of  
 California Press.   
 
__________. 1958. The Religion of India. New York: The Free Press.  
 
Weiss, John. 1967. The fascist tradition: radical right-wing extremism in modern Europe. NY: Harper and  
 Row  
 
Weizmann, Ezer. 1997, October 10. President of Israel. Al-Hayat 
 
Welch, Susan. 1975. The Impact of Urban Riots on Urban Expenditures. American Journal of Political  
 Science. Pages 741-760. 
 
Whalen, John and Richard Flacks. 1980. The Notes of the Fate of Student Activists. Social Focus. Pages  
 215-236. 
 
Wickham, Carrie. 1997. Islamic Mobilization and Political Change: The Islamist Trend in Egypt’s  
Professional Associations. In Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, eds.  Political Islam: Essays from Middle East 
Report. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Wickham, Carrie. 2002. Mobilizing Islam. New York: Columbia University Press 
 
Wilson, Alex. 1970. Chartism. In: J.T. Wared, Popular Movements: 1830-1850. London: Macmillan 
 
Wilson, Frederich, 1969. Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances 1787-1983. New York: Arno Press 
 
Wilder, Andrew. 1994. Changing Patterns of Punjab Politics in Pakistan: National Assembly Election  
 Results, 1988 and 1993 
 
Wilkinson, David. 1994. Hegemony and Social Change: International Studies Review. Pages 361-376.  
 
Wilkinson, Paul. 1981. Fascism. London: Grant Mclntye  
 
Wiktorowicz, Quintan. 2004. Islamic Activism. Indiana Unievrsity Press: Indianapolis.  
 
White, Jenny. 2002. Islamist Mobilization in Turkey. Seattle; University of Washington Press 
 
Write, Robin. Quite Revolution: Islamic Movement’s New Phase. Christian Science Monitors  
November 6, 1987.   
 
  427 
Wright, Robin. 1988. Lebanon. In: The Politics of Islamic Revivalism. Shireen T. Hunter.  Bloomington  
 and Indianapolis: Indiana University press 
 
Yaari, Ehud. 1970. Strike Terror: The Story of Fatah. New York: Sabra Books 
 
Yassin, Sheikh Ahmed. Quds Press. May 7, 1997 
Yavuz, M. Hakan. 2000. Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Religion and Global Politics. Oxford University 
Press; Maududi 
Ynet. December 14, 2005. At the head of Hamas list for elections: Isma'il Haniyya: 
 http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3184451,00.html.  
Ynet. December 14, 2005.The attractive Hamas. http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3183171,00.html 
 
Youngman, Nicole. 2003. “When Frame Extension Fails: Operation Rescue and the “Triple Gates of  
 Hell” in Orlando.” Journal of Contemporary Ethnography. 32(5): 521-554. 
 
Zaki, Moheb. 1995.  Civil Society and Democratization in Egypt: 1881-1994. Cairo: Center for 
 Development Studies 
 
Zald, Mayer N. 1970. Political Economy: A Framework for Comparative Analysis. In: Mayer Zald. Power  
 in Organizations. Nashville: Vanderbilt University. Pages 221-261. 
 
____________. 1988. The Trajectory of Social Movements in America. Research in Social Movements,  
 Conflict and Change. Pages 19-41. 
 
Zald, Mayer N, and Roberta Ash. 1966. Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay, and Change.  
 Social Forces. Pages 327-341.  
  
Zald, Mayer N. and Michael A. Berger. 1978. “Social Movements in Organizations: Coup d’Etat,  
 Insurgency, and Mass Movements.” The American Journal of Sociology. 83(4): 823-861. 
 
Zaller, John R. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ziad Abu Amt. 1987. Origins of the Political Movements in the Gaza Strip, 1948-1967. Acre: Al-Aswar  
 House Press 
 
Ziad Abu-Amr, 1994. Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and  
 Islamic Jihad. Indiana University Press 
 
Zimmermann, Ekkart & Thomas Saalfeld.  1993.  The Three Waves of West German Right-Wing  
 Extremism.  In Peter Merkl and Leonard Weinberg . Encounters with the Contemporary Radical  
 Right. Boulder: Westview Press 
 
Zisser, Eyal. 2002, Fall. The Return of Hezbollah. Middle East Quarterly: www.meforum.org/article/499 
 
Zoubir, Yahia. 1992.  The Painful Transition from Authoritarianism in Algeria. Arab Studies Quarterly. 
 
Zubaida, Sami. 1992, November/December. Islam, the State and Democracy: Contrasting Conceptions of  
 Society in Egypt. Middle East Report. Page 22 
Zuhur, Sherifa. 2005, May 19.  A New Phase for Jihad in Egypt? Terrorism Monitor 
Zunes, Stephen. 1999. Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective. Wiley-Blackwell 
  428 
Vita 
 
D. Dustin Berna was born in NY, NY and received two bachelor’s degrees from Niagara 
University in political science and English literature.  His first master’s degree is from 
Canisius College in history-education.  In 2001 he moved to New Orleans to attend the 
University of New Orleans and he received his second master’s degree in political science in 
2004.  His three areas of concentration in the doctoral program were in International 
Relations, Comparative Politics, and American Institutions.       
 
